He also served as Assistant Secretary (acting) and DoD Chief Information Officer. In 26 years of ... more He also served as Assistant Secretary (acting) and DoD Chief Information Officer. In 26 years of naval service he commanded a destroyer squadron and a guided missile destroyer.
Abstract : In 2010, a National Defense University (NDU) research project called TIDES (Transforma... more Abstract : In 2010, a National Defense University (NDU) research project called TIDES (Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support) was invited to partner with a company to produce a tradeshow about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and related capabilities. Despite senior-level Department of Defense (DoD) guidance to pursue public-private partnerships, DoD attorneys told TIDES managers to reject the agreement. Differing legal interpretations of the word partner generated concern that the proposed partnership could create an impermissible perception of government endorsement of a private company. Even though it would have advanced the government's mission and promoted efficiency, a variety of obstacles scuttled the proposed cooperation. Such limitations on public-private engagement are often reported at combatant commands and raise questions about what policies and activities are appropriate. The examples cited in this paper collectively represent a broad landscape of situations in which well-intentioned people pursued cooperation between a DoD organization and private entities yet encountered serious obstacles. These examples generated provocative and interesting questions about how best to conduct public-private cooperation (PPC), and led to a diverse array of insights into the nature of PPC and to recommendations. The paper is intended to promote PPC in DoD. The opening section articulates the imperative for PPC. It then proposes an analytical framework that features four broad categories along a continuum of formality: contractual arrangements, well-defined standards and protocols, broad frameworks for interaction, and emergent or undefined situations. The next section presents examples from each of the four categories, including how the collaborators overcame the challenges they faced and practical implications for future PPC efforts. The paper ends with key observations and recommended next steps for further research and reform.
In The Starfish and the Spider, Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom explore two competing methods of or... more In The Starfish and the Spider, Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom explore two competing methods of organization. The spider represents a traditional, hierarchical organization with one leader having centralized responsibilities not replicated in the rest of the organization. Destroy the head and the spider dies. A starfish organization is distributed; members' roles and responsibilities (including leadership selection and refinement) can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. 3 Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) is a networked effort that combines centralized and decentralized types of organizations. Its greatest strength is an extended network of interested individuals, businesses, government offices (civil and military), universities, and other entities from Australia to Singapore to northern Europe. 4 Within this extended network, a steering team of 7 to 10 people is being formed to set broad priorities for outreach, research, event coordination, and technology integration. The team is supported by a small core to execute guidance and oversee engagement with particular TIDES projects. Most importantly, the steering and core teams act together as a catalyst to engage the exceptional energies and talents that reside in the extended network. Some people are dedicated fulltime by their organizations to support the project, some are part-time, and most are volunteers. The broad scope of available expertise has helped STAR-TIDES investigate such diverse areas as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HADR) in tropical regions, building partner capacity (BPC), and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in the United States. The network has supported responses to real world eventsincluding wildfires in southern California, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailer replacement, shelter solutions for The Department of Defense increasingly is involved in postwar stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, capacity-building of partner nations at home and abroad, and other such complex operations. To provide sustainable support to stressed populations in these environments, an international, networked, knowledge-sharing research project called Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) 1 encourages innovative approaches to public-private collaboration, whole-of-government solutions, and transnational engagement. It leverages a distributed network of people and organizations to conduct research, support real world contingencies, and bridge gaps among disparate communities. The three main goals of STAR-TIDES are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, extend the military's ability to work with civilians in such situations, and economize by identifying cost-effective logistic solutions and rationalizing supply chains. STAR-TIDES fosters unity of effort among diverse organizations when there is no unity of command. The project is building a repository of information about potential solutions to provide "knowledge on demand" to support decisionmakers and those working in the field, rather than act as an operating agency. Information collected is made available in the public domain via a Web site, 2 and feedback, opinions, and recommendations from users are encouraged.
Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea- power. A letter of introduction f... more Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea- power. A letter of introduction from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., DSN, to the Chief of the Maritime Staff, Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, JMSDF, established many of the contacts which made the project possible, i am deeply grateful to both leaders for their interest and support. It is impossible to personally acknowledge each of those who gave their time and assistance for this study. However, particular thanks must go to five individuals without whose help much less could have been accomplished. Miss Hakai Yoko of the United States Information Service, Tokyo, provided introductions, translations, source materials and encouragement. Her friendship and enthusiasm were among the highlights of this research. Mr. Taoka Shunji, defense correspondent for Asahi Shimbun , has been an invaluable source of information on a remarkable range of subjects extending far beyond Japanese strategic studies. The hospitality which he and his wife Noriko have shown me both in Japan and the United States is unforgettable. Dr. Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library began my education in Japanese security problems during my first research visit. His perception and experience have been invaluable. Vice Admiral Kitamura Kenichi, JMSDF (Ret.), offered basic insights and corrected misconceptions from the beginning of the project. He also took time from an extremely busy schedule to review parts of the manuscript. Captain Yamazumi Akira, JT.ISDF, Head of the Foreign Liaison section of the Maritime Staff Office, was instrumental in arranging many interviews and made available a variety of useful services. His cheerfulness and attention to detail overcame several periods of discouragement. Dr. Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University guided the overall study, as well as most of my post-graduate education. His criticisms have been useful both in style and substance. Dr. George Liska posed many of the questions from which the seapower section was developed and was second reader for the thesis. Dr. Ann L. Hollick of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- national Studies initiated my interest in ocean policy and law of the sea issues. While in Tokyo, I was attached to the Defense Attache Office in the American Embassy. Captain Wilton L. Atkinson, USN, and his successor as Naval Attache, Captain Marvin L. Duke, USN, offered VI the support and assistance of their staffs. I am particularly grateful to Commander John S. Viccelio, USN, for his comments and advice.
Abstract : Todays information sharing tools let adversaries interfere more directly than ever wit... more Abstract : Todays information sharing tools let adversaries interfere more directly than ever with a targeted nations political processes and the minds of its citizens.1 Operating effectively in such cognitive-emotional conflict requires that information-based capabilities be employed and countered in agile, integrated ways across the military, government, and society.2 Coherent narratives tied to strategy and backed by actions are important.3 Technical cyberspace activities need to be well-coordinated with content-based approaches like military information operations, government-wide messaging, and intelligence gathering (including all forms of security).4 Even more important is to build a societys resilience against persistent, disruptive, or disinformation campaigns that aim to undermine citizen confidence andcore beliefs.
Abstract : In 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to develop and implement... more Abstract : In 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to develop and implement the Comprehensive Approach (CA) concept to address international security challenges involving civil and military actors. The commitment to CA was reaffirmed at Lisbon in the Alliance s 2010 Strategic Concept. Motivations included both the need for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources. However, implementation of the CA and its structures has to be grounded in the political realities surrounding any major operation, whether in response to a manmade crisis or a natural disaster. Not only will political imperatives drive the structure, scope and timing of any CA, but they also have a tendency to change rapidly as part of either the domestic issues of the day or the response from the international community. Partly as a result, the Alliance has not yet agreed on a precise definition of the CA. But this should not be a cause for inactivity. All agree that CA refers to the integration, in some manner, of military and civilian activities, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Dutch Foreign Ministry recommendation that the approach be as civilian as possible, and as military as necessary seems correct. As the papers point out, under any CA definition, NATO will need an effective change management process to prepare for operations in complex, civil-military environments. Developing such increased agility, in itself, can be valuable asset for facing a future that is likely to be filled with chaos, complexity and surprise. Moreover, many of the capabilities that can be applied in different civil-military contingencies can be developed at relatively low cost by leveraging private sector developments.
CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR ACROIX AND LINT ... JAPANESE CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR . he backbon... more CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR ACROIX AND LINT ... JAPANESE CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR . he backbone of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in World War II. cruisers were active in all parts of the Pacific and involved in nearly every naval action. Based on both official ...
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, Jan 29, 2011
This paper describes a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan known as Village Stabi... more This paper describes a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan known as Village Stability Operations, as well as some of the contributions information sharing strategies are making to its success. In a "population-centric" strategy, it is essential to understand the people and what is important to them in their world, not ours. In this environment, information about the population, also known as "white" data, can be mission critical, although it wasn't treated as such at the beginning of the Afghan campaign. "White" information is not a panacea; it needs to be blended with enemy ("red") information and government ("green") information to form an integrated approach. The paper examines several projects that have been undertaken in Afghanistan, their successes and challenges, and how they have helped the Afghan population while supporting coalition objectives.
The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations (1) is important, yet actors rare... more The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations (1) is important, yet actors rarely do it well. U.S. and allied military forces must be able to communicate, collaborate, and exchange information effectively with the local populations they seek to influence, or they cannot achieve the goals for which they have been committed. Nonetheless, experience from stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief missions, and efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners suggest that effective information-sharing is much harder than might be expected. This paper sheds light on the difficulties of setting up and sustaining projects to share information in such situations and suggests ways to do better in the future. The reasons are straightforward. Government practitioners are unfamiliar with many of the technical solutions to ineffective information-sharing. Moreover, information-sharing runs counter to long-held information-controlling habits. Incentives rarely reward sharing and instead punish leaks. Projects that try to mitigate information-sharing problems typically take a long time to develop, need broad coalitions to implement, and have results that are hard to measure and attribute. Many of the stakeholders do not have institutional ties and some actively seek to minimize relationships with each other. As has often been seen in projects in Afghanistan, changes in personnel and government priorities can make projects hard to sustain. Collectively, the impacts have been detrimental to information-sharing. This paper draws on examples from Afghanistan to highlight some lessons that members of diverse organizations have observed over a number of years. (2) The first case study focuses on an informal information-sharing project near Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province that builds on personal relationships and technical infrastructures developed since 2006. It is colloquially referred to as the Nangarhar pilot and continues to unfold. The second project, termed UnityNet, went through various phases. A combination of organizations in Washington and Kabul began UnityNet in mid-2010 to build on experiences from Nangarhar and elsewhere to develop a globally deployable, sustainable program to share population-centric, or "white," information. However, personnel turned over and disagreements developed over the purpose and scope of the project. Efforts to move UnityNet away from its original white information focus and repurpose it for "green" (government-military) intelligence collection raised concerns that associating with it could jeopardize people in the field who had intended to support only population-centric information-sharing. In early 2011, components of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan proposed an implementation effort under UnityNet, called UnityNet Afghanistan, to support Village Stability Operations (VSO). However, the continued emphasis on green intelligence reraised the same concerns about the safety of associated partners and UnityNet was terminated. The third case relates to a new follow-on project, focused on both green and white information, that was named Jade-A in June 2011. An assessment team evaluated its status in early 2012. The origins of the various efforts along with examples of their activities and descriptions of how different kinds of open information were accessed and shared are outlined below. Some of the organizational challenges that each approach encountered and the lessons available to be learned if behaviors can be changed--at several levels--are also included. This is important since the lessons are similar to those derived from other contingencies and may be applicable in other regions in the future. It is also vital to distinguish some of the categories of information this paper addresses. Classified information involves a variety of dissemination restrictions. Confidential, secret, and top secret are the most well known, and each has its own handling rules. …
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
From 8--12 November, RELIEF convened its sixth session of field experiments for humanitarian info... more From 8--12 November, RELIEF convened its sixth session of field experiments for humanitarian information management and crisis mapping at Camp Roberts in Paso Robles, CA.
No stacks of forms and files to manage No delay for assessments and calculations Reports are upda... more No stacks of forms and files to manage No delay for assessments and calculations Reports are updated live as data is entered
In addition to NGOs, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) (such as Rotary), and International O... more In addition to NGOs, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) (such as Rotary), and International Organizations (IOs) (such as the UN), often participate in civil-military activities. For the purposes of this report, NGO will be treated as shorthand for NGO/PVO/IO and related organizations.
T he Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of lo... more T he Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of local populations. It emphasizes the interdependency among telecommunications, reliable power, and information-sharing support, and encourages projects to be developed in integrated packages rather than in stovepiped lines of effort. 1 ValSServ focuses on bottomup projects in complex civil-military operations 2 that can be funded, planned, and executed at local levels, while being consistent with top-down national and theater strategies. It takes a system-of-systems approach, 3 recognizing that successful projects can generate positive ripple effects in local environments and throughout extended networks. This paper focuses on ValSServ within the wide range of U.S. Department of Defense operating environments, such as capacitybuilding to help shape peacetime conditions in partner nations, post-disaster recovery, and helping to move from the "hold" to the "build" phases in counterinsurgency operations. 4 The ValSServ approach is based on six planning and operating principles. First, local development and governance efforts need to be aligned with overall strategic objectives. 5 Second, the focus must be population-centric. Personnel must respect and work through local conditions, cultures, relationships, and requirements to develop personal links that can be used to initiate projects and support them over the long term. Third, projects must concentrate on building capacity that can be sustained by the local population. Fourth, projects must draw on a wide range of inputs and analytical approaches to identify potential risks and threats present in the project area and adapt to changing circumstances.
He also served as Assistant Secretary (acting) and DoD Chief Information Officer. In 26 years of ... more He also served as Assistant Secretary (acting) and DoD Chief Information Officer. In 26 years of naval service he commanded a destroyer squadron and a guided missile destroyer.
Abstract : In 2010, a National Defense University (NDU) research project called TIDES (Transforma... more Abstract : In 2010, a National Defense University (NDU) research project called TIDES (Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support) was invited to partner with a company to produce a tradeshow about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and related capabilities. Despite senior-level Department of Defense (DoD) guidance to pursue public-private partnerships, DoD attorneys told TIDES managers to reject the agreement. Differing legal interpretations of the word partner generated concern that the proposed partnership could create an impermissible perception of government endorsement of a private company. Even though it would have advanced the government's mission and promoted efficiency, a variety of obstacles scuttled the proposed cooperation. Such limitations on public-private engagement are often reported at combatant commands and raise questions about what policies and activities are appropriate. The examples cited in this paper collectively represent a broad landscape of situations in which well-intentioned people pursued cooperation between a DoD organization and private entities yet encountered serious obstacles. These examples generated provocative and interesting questions about how best to conduct public-private cooperation (PPC), and led to a diverse array of insights into the nature of PPC and to recommendations. The paper is intended to promote PPC in DoD. The opening section articulates the imperative for PPC. It then proposes an analytical framework that features four broad categories along a continuum of formality: contractual arrangements, well-defined standards and protocols, broad frameworks for interaction, and emergent or undefined situations. The next section presents examples from each of the four categories, including how the collaborators overcame the challenges they faced and practical implications for future PPC efforts. The paper ends with key observations and recommended next steps for further research and reform.
In The Starfish and the Spider, Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom explore two competing methods of or... more In The Starfish and the Spider, Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom explore two competing methods of organization. The spider represents a traditional, hierarchical organization with one leader having centralized responsibilities not replicated in the rest of the organization. Destroy the head and the spider dies. A starfish organization is distributed; members' roles and responsibilities (including leadership selection and refinement) can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. 3 Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) is a networked effort that combines centralized and decentralized types of organizations. Its greatest strength is an extended network of interested individuals, businesses, government offices (civil and military), universities, and other entities from Australia to Singapore to northern Europe. 4 Within this extended network, a steering team of 7 to 10 people is being formed to set broad priorities for outreach, research, event coordination, and technology integration. The team is supported by a small core to execute guidance and oversee engagement with particular TIDES projects. Most importantly, the steering and core teams act together as a catalyst to engage the exceptional energies and talents that reside in the extended network. Some people are dedicated fulltime by their organizations to support the project, some are part-time, and most are volunteers. The broad scope of available expertise has helped STAR-TIDES investigate such diverse areas as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HADR) in tropical regions, building partner capacity (BPC), and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in the United States. The network has supported responses to real world eventsincluding wildfires in southern California, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailer replacement, shelter solutions for The Department of Defense increasingly is involved in postwar stabilization and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, capacity-building of partner nations at home and abroad, and other such complex operations. To provide sustainable support to stressed populations in these environments, an international, networked, knowledge-sharing research project called Sustainable Technologies, Accelerated Research-Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support (STAR-TIDES) 1 encourages innovative approaches to public-private collaboration, whole-of-government solutions, and transnational engagement. It leverages a distributed network of people and organizations to conduct research, support real world contingencies, and bridge gaps among disparate communities. The three main goals of STAR-TIDES are to enhance the ability of civilian coalitions (business, government, and civil society) to operate in stressed environments, extend the military's ability to work with civilians in such situations, and economize by identifying cost-effective logistic solutions and rationalizing supply chains. STAR-TIDES fosters unity of effort among diverse organizations when there is no unity of command. The project is building a repository of information about potential solutions to provide "knowledge on demand" to support decisionmakers and those working in the field, rather than act as an operating agency. Information collected is made available in the public domain via a Web site, 2 and feedback, opinions, and recommendations from users are encouraged.
Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea- power. A letter of introduction f... more Japan's image abroad and into coastal state perceptions of sea- power. A letter of introduction from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., DSN, to the Chief of the Maritime Staff, Admiral Samejima Hiroichi, JMSDF, established many of the contacts which made the project possible, i am deeply grateful to both leaders for their interest and support. It is impossible to personally acknowledge each of those who gave their time and assistance for this study. However, particular thanks must go to five individuals without whose help much less could have been accomplished. Miss Hakai Yoko of the United States Information Service, Tokyo, provided introductions, translations, source materials and encouragement. Her friendship and enthusiasm were among the highlights of this research. Mr. Taoka Shunji, defense correspondent for Asahi Shimbun , has been an invaluable source of information on a remarkable range of subjects extending far beyond Japanese strategic studies. The hospitality which he and his wife Noriko have shown me both in Japan and the United States is unforgettable. Dr. Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library began my education in Japanese security problems during my first research visit. His perception and experience have been invaluable. Vice Admiral Kitamura Kenichi, JMSDF (Ret.), offered basic insights and corrected misconceptions from the beginning of the project. He also took time from an extremely busy schedule to review parts of the manuscript. Captain Yamazumi Akira, JT.ISDF, Head of the Foreign Liaison section of the Maritime Staff Office, was instrumental in arranging many interviews and made available a variety of useful services. His cheerfulness and attention to detail overcame several periods of discouragement. Dr. Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University guided the overall study, as well as most of my post-graduate education. His criticisms have been useful both in style and substance. Dr. George Liska posed many of the questions from which the seapower section was developed and was second reader for the thesis. Dr. Ann L. Hollick of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter- national Studies initiated my interest in ocean policy and law of the sea issues. While in Tokyo, I was attached to the Defense Attache Office in the American Embassy. Captain Wilton L. Atkinson, USN, and his successor as Naval Attache, Captain Marvin L. Duke, USN, offered VI the support and assistance of their staffs. I am particularly grateful to Commander John S. Viccelio, USN, for his comments and advice.
Abstract : Todays information sharing tools let adversaries interfere more directly than ever wit... more Abstract : Todays information sharing tools let adversaries interfere more directly than ever with a targeted nations political processes and the minds of its citizens.1 Operating effectively in such cognitive-emotional conflict requires that information-based capabilities be employed and countered in agile, integrated ways across the military, government, and society.2 Coherent narratives tied to strategy and backed by actions are important.3 Technical cyberspace activities need to be well-coordinated with content-based approaches like military information operations, government-wide messaging, and intelligence gathering (including all forms of security).4 Even more important is to build a societys resilience against persistent, disruptive, or disinformation campaigns that aim to undermine citizen confidence andcore beliefs.
Abstract : In 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to develop and implement... more Abstract : In 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to develop and implement the Comprehensive Approach (CA) concept to address international security challenges involving civil and military actors. The commitment to CA was reaffirmed at Lisbon in the Alliance s 2010 Strategic Concept. Motivations included both the need for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources. However, implementation of the CA and its structures has to be grounded in the political realities surrounding any major operation, whether in response to a manmade crisis or a natural disaster. Not only will political imperatives drive the structure, scope and timing of any CA, but they also have a tendency to change rapidly as part of either the domestic issues of the day or the response from the international community. Partly as a result, the Alliance has not yet agreed on a precise definition of the CA. But this should not be a cause for inactivity. All agree that CA refers to the integration, in some manner, of military and civilian activities, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Dutch Foreign Ministry recommendation that the approach be as civilian as possible, and as military as necessary seems correct. As the papers point out, under any CA definition, NATO will need an effective change management process to prepare for operations in complex, civil-military environments. Developing such increased agility, in itself, can be valuable asset for facing a future that is likely to be filled with chaos, complexity and surprise. Moreover, many of the capabilities that can be applied in different civil-military contingencies can be developed at relatively low cost by leveraging private sector developments.
CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR ACROIX AND LINT ... JAPANESE CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR . he backbon... more CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR ACROIX AND LINT ... JAPANESE CRUISERS OF THE PACIFIC WAR . he backbone of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in World War II. cruisers were active in all parts of the Pacific and involved in nearly every naval action. Based on both official ...
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, Jan 29, 2011
This paper describes a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan known as Village Stabi... more This paper describes a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan known as Village Stability Operations, as well as some of the contributions information sharing strategies are making to its success. In a "population-centric" strategy, it is essential to understand the people and what is important to them in their world, not ours. In this environment, information about the population, also known as "white" data, can be mission critical, although it wasn't treated as such at the beginning of the Afghan campaign. "White" information is not a panacea; it needs to be blended with enemy ("red") information and government ("green") information to form an integrated approach. The paper examines several projects that have been undertaken in Afghanistan, their successes and challenges, and how they have helped the Afghan population while supporting coalition objectives.
The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations (1) is important, yet actors rare... more The sharing of information in complex civil-military operations (1) is important, yet actors rarely do it well. U.S. and allied military forces must be able to communicate, collaborate, and exchange information effectively with the local populations they seek to influence, or they cannot achieve the goals for which they have been committed. Nonetheless, experience from stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief missions, and efforts to build the capacity of foreign partners suggest that effective information-sharing is much harder than might be expected. This paper sheds light on the difficulties of setting up and sustaining projects to share information in such situations and suggests ways to do better in the future. The reasons are straightforward. Government practitioners are unfamiliar with many of the technical solutions to ineffective information-sharing. Moreover, information-sharing runs counter to long-held information-controlling habits. Incentives rarely reward sharing and instead punish leaks. Projects that try to mitigate information-sharing problems typically take a long time to develop, need broad coalitions to implement, and have results that are hard to measure and attribute. Many of the stakeholders do not have institutional ties and some actively seek to minimize relationships with each other. As has often been seen in projects in Afghanistan, changes in personnel and government priorities can make projects hard to sustain. Collectively, the impacts have been detrimental to information-sharing. This paper draws on examples from Afghanistan to highlight some lessons that members of diverse organizations have observed over a number of years. (2) The first case study focuses on an informal information-sharing project near Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province that builds on personal relationships and technical infrastructures developed since 2006. It is colloquially referred to as the Nangarhar pilot and continues to unfold. The second project, termed UnityNet, went through various phases. A combination of organizations in Washington and Kabul began UnityNet in mid-2010 to build on experiences from Nangarhar and elsewhere to develop a globally deployable, sustainable program to share population-centric, or "white," information. However, personnel turned over and disagreements developed over the purpose and scope of the project. Efforts to move UnityNet away from its original white information focus and repurpose it for "green" (government-military) intelligence collection raised concerns that associating with it could jeopardize people in the field who had intended to support only population-centric information-sharing. In early 2011, components of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan proposed an implementation effort under UnityNet, called UnityNet Afghanistan, to support Village Stability Operations (VSO). However, the continued emphasis on green intelligence reraised the same concerns about the safety of associated partners and UnityNet was terminated. The third case relates to a new follow-on project, focused on both green and white information, that was named Jade-A in June 2011. An assessment team evaluated its status in early 2012. The origins of the various efforts along with examples of their activities and descriptions of how different kinds of open information were accessed and shared are outlined below. Some of the organizational challenges that each approach encountered and the lessons available to be learned if behaviors can be changed--at several levels--are also included. This is important since the lessons are similar to those derived from other contingencies and may be applicable in other regions in the future. It is also vital to distinguish some of the categories of information this paper addresses. Classified information involves a variety of dissemination restrictions. Confidential, secret, and top secret are the most well known, and each has its own handling rules. …
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
From 8--12 November, RELIEF convened its sixth session of field experiments for humanitarian info... more From 8--12 November, RELIEF convened its sixth session of field experiments for humanitarian information management and crisis mapping at Camp Roberts in Paso Robles, CA.
No stacks of forms and files to manage No delay for assessments and calculations Reports are upda... more No stacks of forms and files to manage No delay for assessments and calculations Reports are updated live as data is entered
In addition to NGOs, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) (such as Rotary), and International O... more In addition to NGOs, Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) (such as Rotary), and International Organizations (IOs) (such as the UN), often participate in civil-military activities. For the purposes of this report, NGO will be treated as shorthand for NGO/PVO/IO and related organizations.
T he Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of lo... more T he Valued Sustainable Services (ValSServ) concept is an approach to building the capacity of local populations. It emphasizes the interdependency among telecommunications, reliable power, and information-sharing support, and encourages projects to be developed in integrated packages rather than in stovepiped lines of effort. 1 ValSServ focuses on bottomup projects in complex civil-military operations 2 that can be funded, planned, and executed at local levels, while being consistent with top-down national and theater strategies. It takes a system-of-systems approach, 3 recognizing that successful projects can generate positive ripple effects in local environments and throughout extended networks. This paper focuses on ValSServ within the wide range of U.S. Department of Defense operating environments, such as capacitybuilding to help shape peacetime conditions in partner nations, post-disaster recovery, and helping to move from the "hold" to the "build" phases in counterinsurgency operations. 4 The ValSServ approach is based on six planning and operating principles. First, local development and governance efforts need to be aligned with overall strategic objectives. 5 Second, the focus must be population-centric. Personnel must respect and work through local conditions, cultures, relationships, and requirements to develop personal links that can be used to initiate projects and support them over the long term. Third, projects must concentrate on building capacity that can be sustained by the local population. Fourth, projects must draw on a wide range of inputs and analytical approaches to identify potential risks and threats present in the project area and adapt to changing circumstances.
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Papers by Linton Wells