I am certain of one thing: Colin Gray would be exasperated with claims that “Grand strategy is de... more I am certain of one thing: Colin Gray would be exasperated with claims that “Grand strategy is dead.” What he would have called a “banality” is commonplace these days. Some question the need for grand strategy; others contend the United States has lost the art of developing one. Not that Colin would disagree with the difficulty of strategy, or American shortfalls: “In war after war,” he noted, “America demonstrates an acute strategy deficit.” There is certainly plenty of evidence over the past two decades to suggest that a deficiency in conceptualizing and conducting national strategy afflicts the United States. I strongly suspect that Colin’s retort to the demise of grand strategy would draw upon a theme from his book Another Bloody Century — namely, that we will see the end of history well before the value of sound strategy is eclipsed. It is an enduring human function, eternally tied to human nature. Strategy will retain its utility as long as security communities have interests, and as long as policymakers and military commanders need to counter challenges and align resources to obtain desired objectives. Dr. Gray typically ensured any debate began with a clear definition of basic terms. His concise formulation of grand strategy has much to commend it. “Grand strategy,” he stated, “is the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.” Like most scholars, Gray believed that true grand strategy requires the conceptualization of all of the elements of national power, not just its military power. As an unreformed Clausewitizian, our dear friend knew that strategy is defined by policy and decided by the intercession of politics. While embracing the eloquence of this unique definition, one modification to this definition should be offered. The use of “development” rather than “direction” captures one of the potential uses of a strategy: the shaping of instruments to better achieve defined policy outcomes. The final purpose of strategy, too often overlooked, is the development of either missing capacity or the inadequate capability of an instrument of national power. Grand strategies can be anticipatory and long term, seeking to shape the development of instruments of state power, adding new agencies and entirely new competencies or forms of power to a nation’s arsenal. They do more than just guide the integrated application of existing tools of state toward defined goals. Some in the academy focus on narrower pieces of the strategy process by analyzing specific documents. Few think of it holistically or consider the dimensions that constitute what Colin termed the “whole house.” Colin was rare in this regard. While some might find his penchant for creating enumerated lists distracting, including his noted “17 dimensions of strategy,” the 23 “dicta,” and 40 maxims, many found it instructive. Colin believed that applying the art of strategy requires the “whole house” or all the dimensions of strategy. These considerations represent critical components that Colin Gray sought to teach aspiring strategists as they struggled to understand what strategy is about as they sought to achieve their nation’s policy and security interests. This short list provides the gist of the holistic understanding of strategy as a practical art and comprises the main theme of Colin’s intellectual contribution to security studies. Such an understanding was something our honored colleague always endeavored to help us appreciate.
Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Ken... more Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Kennedy [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In his new book, Engineers of Victory, Paul Kennedy has crafted a unique and lively history of the Second World War. His frequently incisive tale takes a different tack from the more traditional historical focus on the decisions of senior statesmen or military leaders. Instead of "Masters and Commanders," the author narrows his scope to the often unknown middle-rank officers and government officials who resolved critical operational gaps with the key organizational or technological breakthroughs that made victory possible. In 1942, the sweeping strategic strokes laid down by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill represented more aspiration than executable plans. While the ends were clear, the means were not immediately at hand, and numerous shortfalls in capability were not yet even evident. Over a span of just a few ye...
This volume aims to provide an account of how Western militaries have adapted themselves in Afgha... more This volume aims to provide an account of how Western militaries have adapted themselves in Afghanistan since 2001. There is little doubt that it represents an important contribution to the military innovation in the security studies literature but, in fact, before all else, the collection represents the best academic compendium on the military campaign in Afghanistan currently in print. The editors, Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James Russell, have successfully gathered together a prominent group of scholars each of whom has provided an illuminating account of the activities of major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troop-contributing nations over the last decade. Certainly, there have been many works on specific aspects of the military campaign, especially by journalists such as
A s former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy)... more A s former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrinally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed. 1 Because of war's inherently interactive nature, victory often depends on which side most quickly can recognize problems or gaps in performance and implement changes. Despite this well-grounded observation, interest has arisen only recently in how military organizations adapt during war. 2 Moreover, what literature does exist focuses heavily on operational and tactical forms of change, overlooking strategic adaptation. This article explores that gap, beginning with an overview of the literature on assessment and adaptation. Next it establishes an analytical framework for both strategic assessment and adaptation that will serve as the basis for a subsequent analysis of a particular strategic reassessment: the Obama administration's surge decision in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 3 The article concludes by offering insights relevant to senior policy makers and the joint community.
Dr. F. G. Hoffman, a former Marine infantry officer, retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 200... more Dr. F. G. Hoffman, a former Marine infantry officer, retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 2001 as a lieutenant colonel. He served 40 years as a national security analyst, with tours at Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, and the Office of the Secratary of Defense. He is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University. ABSTRACT: This article examines the potential implications of the combinations of robotics, artificial intelligence, and deep learning systems on the character and nature of war. The author employs Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity concept to discuss how autonomous weapons will impact the essential elements of war. The essay argues war’s essence, as politically directed violence fraught with friction, will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more intelligent machines are involved at every level.
Abstract Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Gar... more Abstract Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy.
T he next Administration will want to examine the last 15 years of strategic performance to impro... more T he next Administration will want to examine the last 15 years of strategic performance to improve sound strategy options and to promote timely re-assessment and adaptation of approved policies and strategies. Building off of two recent studies of U.S. decisionmaking and policy implementation at the strategic level, this article examines proposals to enhance the quality of policy making and implementation oversight mechanisms at the National Security Council. Major recommendations are offered to improve interagency planning and the creation of an inter-agency community of national security professionals.
Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelle... more Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelled at this portion of the conflict spectrum in the past half century. Its current conventional military superiority will ensure that it gets much more experience in today's Small Wars Century, an era that began in the 1950s with the rise of revolutionary warfare. For several decades, thanks in large part due to lingering myths from the Vietnam war, this area has been a conceptual and intellectual orphan in US professional military institutions. Without understanding the past, and how new conditions impact the relevance of this experience as a guide, US military planners and policy makers will be unable to translate America's intentions into effective campaigns. Without a sound grasp of history and the characteristics of nontraditional war as part of the overall social phenomena of war, the US will continue to find its overwhelming military dominance irrelevant to its most pressing security interests.
I am certain of one thing: Colin Gray would be exasperated with claims that “Grand strategy is de... more I am certain of one thing: Colin Gray would be exasperated with claims that “Grand strategy is dead.” What he would have called a “banality” is commonplace these days. Some question the need for grand strategy; others contend the United States has lost the art of developing one. Not that Colin would disagree with the difficulty of strategy, or American shortfalls: “In war after war,” he noted, “America demonstrates an acute strategy deficit.” There is certainly plenty of evidence over the past two decades to suggest that a deficiency in conceptualizing and conducting national strategy afflicts the United States. I strongly suspect that Colin’s retort to the demise of grand strategy would draw upon a theme from his book Another Bloody Century — namely, that we will see the end of history well before the value of sound strategy is eclipsed. It is an enduring human function, eternally tied to human nature. Strategy will retain its utility as long as security communities have interests, and as long as policymakers and military commanders need to counter challenges and align resources to obtain desired objectives. Dr. Gray typically ensured any debate began with a clear definition of basic terms. His concise formulation of grand strategy has much to commend it. “Grand strategy,” he stated, “is the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.” Like most scholars, Gray believed that true grand strategy requires the conceptualization of all of the elements of national power, not just its military power. As an unreformed Clausewitizian, our dear friend knew that strategy is defined by policy and decided by the intercession of politics. While embracing the eloquence of this unique definition, one modification to this definition should be offered. The use of “development” rather than “direction” captures one of the potential uses of a strategy: the shaping of instruments to better achieve defined policy outcomes. The final purpose of strategy, too often overlooked, is the development of either missing capacity or the inadequate capability of an instrument of national power. Grand strategies can be anticipatory and long term, seeking to shape the development of instruments of state power, adding new agencies and entirely new competencies or forms of power to a nation’s arsenal. They do more than just guide the integrated application of existing tools of state toward defined goals. Some in the academy focus on narrower pieces of the strategy process by analyzing specific documents. Few think of it holistically or consider the dimensions that constitute what Colin termed the “whole house.” Colin was rare in this regard. While some might find his penchant for creating enumerated lists distracting, including his noted “17 dimensions of strategy,” the 23 “dicta,” and 40 maxims, many found it instructive. Colin believed that applying the art of strategy requires the “whole house” or all the dimensions of strategy. These considerations represent critical components that Colin Gray sought to teach aspiring strategists as they struggled to understand what strategy is about as they sought to achieve their nation’s policy and security interests. This short list provides the gist of the holistic understanding of strategy as a practical art and comprises the main theme of Colin’s intellectual contribution to security studies. Such an understanding was something our honored colleague always endeavored to help us appreciate.
Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Ken... more Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War By Paul Kennedy [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In his new book, Engineers of Victory, Paul Kennedy has crafted a unique and lively history of the Second World War. His frequently incisive tale takes a different tack from the more traditional historical focus on the decisions of senior statesmen or military leaders. Instead of "Masters and Commanders," the author narrows his scope to the often unknown middle-rank officers and government officials who resolved critical operational gaps with the key organizational or technological breakthroughs that made victory possible. In 1942, the sweeping strategic strokes laid down by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill represented more aspiration than executable plans. While the ends were clear, the means were not immediately at hand, and numerous shortfalls in capability were not yet even evident. Over a span of just a few ye...
This volume aims to provide an account of how Western militaries have adapted themselves in Afgha... more This volume aims to provide an account of how Western militaries have adapted themselves in Afghanistan since 2001. There is little doubt that it represents an important contribution to the military innovation in the security studies literature but, in fact, before all else, the collection represents the best academic compendium on the military campaign in Afghanistan currently in print. The editors, Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James Russell, have successfully gathered together a prominent group of scholars each of whom has provided an illuminating account of the activities of major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troop-contributing nations over the last decade. Certainly, there have been many works on specific aspects of the military campaign, especially by journalists such as
A s former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy)... more A s former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrinally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed. 1 Because of war's inherently interactive nature, victory often depends on which side most quickly can recognize problems or gaps in performance and implement changes. Despite this well-grounded observation, interest has arisen only recently in how military organizations adapt during war. 2 Moreover, what literature does exist focuses heavily on operational and tactical forms of change, overlooking strategic adaptation. This article explores that gap, beginning with an overview of the literature on assessment and adaptation. Next it establishes an analytical framework for both strategic assessment and adaptation that will serve as the basis for a subsequent analysis of a particular strategic reassessment: the Obama administration's surge decision in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 3 The article concludes by offering insights relevant to senior policy makers and the joint community.
Dr. F. G. Hoffman, a former Marine infantry officer, retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 200... more Dr. F. G. Hoffman, a former Marine infantry officer, retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in 2001 as a lieutenant colonel. He served 40 years as a national security analyst, with tours at Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, and the Office of the Secratary of Defense. He is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University. ABSTRACT: This article examines the potential implications of the combinations of robotics, artificial intelligence, and deep learning systems on the character and nature of war. The author employs Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity concept to discuss how autonomous weapons will impact the essential elements of war. The essay argues war’s essence, as politically directed violence fraught with friction, will remain its most enduring aspect, even if more intelligent machines are involved at every level.
Abstract Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Gar... more Abstract Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy.
T he next Administration will want to examine the last 15 years of strategic performance to impro... more T he next Administration will want to examine the last 15 years of strategic performance to improve sound strategy options and to promote timely re-assessment and adaptation of approved policies and strategies. Building off of two recent studies of U.S. decisionmaking and policy implementation at the strategic level, this article examines proposals to enhance the quality of policy making and implementation oversight mechanisms at the National Security Council. Major recommendations are offered to improve interagency planning and the creation of an inter-agency community of national security professionals.
Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelle... more Despite its own extensive experience in nontraditional wars, the United States has rarely excelled at this portion of the conflict spectrum in the past half century. Its current conventional military superiority will ensure that it gets much more experience in today's Small Wars Century, an era that began in the 1950s with the rise of revolutionary warfare. For several decades, thanks in large part due to lingering myths from the Vietnam war, this area has been a conceptual and intellectual orphan in US professional military institutions. Without understanding the past, and how new conditions impact the relevance of this experience as a guide, US military planners and policy makers will be unable to translate America's intentions into effective campaigns. Without a sound grasp of history and the characteristics of nontraditional war as part of the overall social phenomena of war, the US will continue to find its overwhelming military dominance irrelevant to its most pressing security interests.
Uploads
Papers by Frank Hoffman