Papers by Victoria Tin-bor Hui
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations, 2020
This chapter seeks to reconcile the seemingly pacifist nature of Eastern religions and civilizati... more This chapter seeks to reconcile the seemingly pacifist nature of Eastern religions and civilizations and the reality of terrorism, communal violence, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Asia. All religions promote peaceful change but justify violent change. All civilizations have Gandhi-like advocates for peaceful change but also leaders who agitate for violent change. Civilizational plurality and canonical ambiguity have paradoxically provided a fertile ground for the reduction of complex identities, which are more amenable to peaceful change, into singular ones, which are more prone to civilizational clashes. The weakness of inclusive institutions has further incentivized the politicization of religion. While singular ethnonational identities are constructed and can theoretically be deconstructed, they have tended to become hardened. The chapter anchors the analysis with Islam in Afghanistan and Indonesia; Hinduism in India; Buddhism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Tibet; and Conf...
The Edinburgh Companion to the History of Democracy, 2012
Both Western and Chinese analyst s often presume that democracy is unique to Western civilisation... more Both Western and Chinese analyst s often presume that democracy is unique to Western civilisation and alien to the Chinese. The roots of Western dynamism are, in turn, assumed to derive from the political complexity of Europe, whereas those of Chine se stagnation from political unity. However, as this chapter illustrates , China in fact experienced fluctualions between unification and division in history. Intense international competition in the classical era (770-221 BCE) gave rise to citizenship rights defined as stat e-society bargains over the means uf war. Although the development of Chinese citizenship was aborted by Q!n's successful unification of the Warring States system in 221 BCE, the classical legacy continued to live on in the rest of Chinese history, albeit in diminished forms. In subsequent eras of division, contending regimes would he compelled to make concessions to society. Even in eras of unification, formall y unchecked emperors were subject to Confucian doctrines developed in the classical period.
Contact: 217 O’Shaughnessy Hall University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. Tel. 574-631... more Contact: 217 O’Shaughnessy Hall University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. Tel. 574-631-5681 http://www.nd.edu/~apsacp Peter Gourevitch University of California San Diego [email protected] That may produce some paradoxes: the more laws we find that drive regularities in political action, the more constraints on individual discretion we find, and the less we can say choice is at work, thus diminishing the role of politics. Politics involves making choices; if there is no choice, there is no politics. We debate why political choices are made as they are (though we often confuse the why and what with how, taking the process as the substance of the choice). An important element of choice involves agency1 or a sense of the locus of initiative or voluntarism. Agency may, in our arguments about choice, be high or low.
The Evolution of Social Institutions, 2020
This chapter examines and deconstructs a well-known institution in China: Confucianism. China is ... more This chapter examines and deconstructs a well-known institution in China: Confucianism. China is often presumed to be different from Europe: While the Western world was simultaneously cursed by a Hobbesian state of war and blessed by a deeply ingrained tradition of constitutionalism, the East was supposed to be endowed with peace but burdened with autocracy. Confucianism, a political philosophy that emphasizes benevolence, is often taken to prescribe pacifism in China’s external relations and paternalism in China’s state-society relations. Yet, Confucianism is not unlike other world philosophical thoughts in that it contains both elements that support peace and those that justify war and components that champion freedom and those that defend autocracy. This chapter traces Confucianism’s evolution from its birth in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (770–221 BCE) to its construction in the Imperial era (221 BCE to 1911 CE). It shows that China’s history had roughly equal parts of pacifism and aggression, and limited government and imperial despotism. Confucianism has continued to be reconstructed to this day to support the official line of “peaceful rise” in international relations and a one-party dictatorship in state-society relations. Nevertheless, this deep historical analysis suggests that both the past and the present have suppressed alternatives truer to the Confucian legacy.
Journal of Democracy, 2020
Hong Kong, a place where liberty once bloomed, has now been crushed by the People’s Republic of C... more Hong Kong, a place where liberty once bloomed, has now been crushed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). On 30 June 2020, the PRC imposed a draconian national-security law on the city, seeking to “prevent, stop, and punish” a string of vaguely defined crimes of “secession,” “subversion,” “terrorism,” and “collusion with foreign forces.” The crackdown is the latest response by the Chinese Communist party-state to the campaign in defense of freedom and democracy that Hong Kong’s citizens have been waging for decades. The “one country, two systems” constitutional structure that Hong Kong was given at the time of the 1997 handover from Britain was troubled from birth. The radicalization of the 2019 protests against the PRC’s extradition law gave Beijing the perfect excuse to impose its own preferred answer—which might be called “Tiananmen-lite”—to the long-running problem that Hong Kong posed as a thorn of liberty embedded in the side of the PRC’s one-party dictatorship.
Orbis, 2020
Hong Kong's new Police Commissioner Chris Tang announced in Beijing on December 7, 2019, that he ... more Hong Kong's new Police Commissioner Chris Tang announced in Beijing on December 7, 2019, that he would use "both hard and soft approaches" to end the anti-government protests. This article argues that such "approaches" amount to physical and non-physical repression-hard power, but employed by Hong Kong, rather than mainland, forces, combined with sharp power exercised by both Beijing and the local authorities. These measures are responses to the limits on what Beijing can do under the "one country, two systems" model. As Beijing cannot send the People's Liberation Army (PLA), it has subverted Hong Kong's once-respected civilian police force to act like the mainland's public security. And as Hong Kong's judiciary is relatively autonomous and many of the arrested would not be convicted or sentenced, the police have resorted to a decapacitation campaign to inflict direct violence on protesters. Moreover, as the city's freedom has allowed the public to support protesters in various ways, Beijing has launched a program of dismissal of pro-democracy individuals in both public and private sectors. To zoom in on Beijing's hard and soft repression, this article examines in closer detail the other "frontliners" at protest sites who provide professional services vital to the sustainability of protests: medics, firefighters, lawyers, journalists, and educators. ong Kong's Police Commissioner Chris Tang, who assumed office on November 19, 2019, announced in Beijing on December 7, 2019, that he would use "both hard and soft approaches" to end the anti-government protests which have taken place since May 2019. 1 The protests started in response to a proposed law to permit the extradition of people from the city to face prosecution by mainland authorities. The declared "hard and soft approaches" offer a prime example of how Beijing has deployed measures that lie between conventional "hard 1 Christy Leung and Amanda Lee, "New Hong Kong Police Chief Chris Tang tells top Beijing officials that 'hard and soft' tactics will be used to thwart protest crisis," South China Morning Post, Dec. 7, 2019, crime/article/3041102/new-hong-kong-police-chief-chris-tang-tells-top. H HUI power" and "soft power" in Hong Kong. Tang himself explained that he would take tougher actions against violent acts, such as the use of petrol bombs and arson. At the same time, he promised to deal with peaceful protests and minor issues among young protesters in a "more humane and flexible way." Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam, arguably, has offered a softer approach by launching another set of livelihood policies worth about HK$10 billion in mid-January 2020. These policies include expansion of mandatory holidays, retirement fund contributions, allowances for the elderly, and cash handouts for the unemployed and low-income households. 2 The latest package adds to three other rounds announced since August 2019 and brings the total of new annual expenditure to HK$24 billion. 3 Yet, while the Hong Kong government claims to alleviate poverty for the grassroots, it is also taking away livelihoods for pro-democracy actors as a form of sharp power. Beijing and the Hong Kong governments have certainly not made it easier to voice dissent. The Hong Kong police have wielded hard power by greeting Christmas, the New Year, and Lunar New Year with more tear gas, arrests, and beatings. 4 Statements and actions by Hong Kong's police head, and even its Chief Executive, reflect Beijing's dictates rather than the local government's own initiatives. Hong Kong has been promised "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" with "a high degree of autonomy" under the "one country, two systems" model. This model was laid out in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since the handover in 1997, however, Beijing has been ruling from behind the scenes. Beijing's former chief representative in Hong Kong, Liaison Office Director Wang Zhimin, commented, "It is good that Central (the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government) and Western Districts (the Liaison Office) work together." 5 In 2014, Beijing issued a White Paper on Hong Kong, which ruled out genuine universal suffrage and, thus, triggered the Umbrella Movement, and also proclaimed the central government's "comprehensive jurisdiction" 2 He Shusi and Li Bingcun, "HK govt to spend extra HK$10 billion to address livelihood issues," China Daily, Jan. 15, 2020, WS5e1e7c1aa31012821727120d.html. 3 He and Li, "HK govt to spend extra HK$10 billion to address livelihood issues." Hong Kong further announced a HK$30 billion relief fund to help businesses weather the coronavirus. Kimmy Chung and Kanis Leung, "Coronavirus: lawmakers expected to rush HK$30 billion relief package through Hong Kong legislature, but some call for cash handouts to benefit workers,"
s from concrete historical contexts and then chooses part of the works of the pre-Qin masters and... more s from concrete historical contexts and then chooses part of the works of the pre-Qin masters and expounds these texts .... Is the reading of pre-Qin history and the exposition of the thought of the pre-Qin masters a matter of amassing evidence or engaging in hermeneutics? If it is a matter of evidence, then it must be grounded in accurate and strict historical testimony. (Yang, 2011: 155)
This chapter seeks to reconcile the seemingly pacifist nature of Eastern religions and civilizati... more This chapter seeks to reconcile the seemingly pacifist nature of Eastern religions and civilizations and the reality of terrorism, communal violence, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Asia. All religions promote peaceful change but justify violent change. All civilizations have Gandhi-like advocates for peaceful change but also leaders who agitate for violent change. Civilizational plurality and canonical ambiguity have paradoxically provided a fertile ground for the reduction of complex identities, which are more amenable to peaceful change, into singular ones, which are more prone to civilizational clashes. The weakness of inclusive institutions has further incentivized the politicization of religion. While singular ethnonational identities are constructed and can theoretically be deconstructed, they have tended to become hardened. The chapter anchors the analysis with Islam in Afghanistan and Indonesia; Hinduism in India; Buddhism in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Tibet; and Conf...
Journal of Chinese Political Science
China perspectives, 2010
Review(s) of: Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context, b... more Review(s) of: Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context, by Charles Horner, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009, 224 pp.
Does War Make States?
As a rule, states without orderly families and trustworthy gentleman, and without the threat of f... more As a rule, states without orderly families and trustworthy gentleman, and without the threat of foreign invasion, will perish. Only then do we learn that we survive in adversity and perish in ease and comfort. 1 Charles Tilly's state formation paradigm is often criticized as Eurocentric and inapplicable to non-European contexts. Recent generations of social scientists, whether in political science or sociology, have been trained to challenge the Eurocentrism prevalent in putatively universal theories. Thus, critics often argue that there is no "automatic. .. relationship between war and increased state strength" and that one should not graft "mainstream social science onto comparative historical studies." 2 Critics overlook that Tilly's approach eschews universal laws and advocates causal mechanisms; it would be a mistake to liken Tilly's paradigm with, for instance, Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory. Moreover, Tilly's paradigm examines the interaction of "coercion" and "capital" and so there are multiple state formation pathways even in Europe. This chapter suggests that a more fruitful way to understand various criticisms is to see them as specifying scope conditions. In this perspective, the * I thank Lars Bo Kaspersen and Jeppe Strandsbjerg for inspiring this manuscript, Anna
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society …, 2005
... Toward a Confucian Multicultural Approach to a Liberal World Order: Insights from Historical ... more ... Toward a Confucian Multicultural Approach to a Liberal World Order: Insights from Historical East Asia by Victoria Tin-bor Hui* ... The treaties even granted the victorious powers, France and Sweden, the right to intervene in the empire. ...
Culture and Order in World Politics
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Papers by Victoria Tin-bor Hui