Papers by Marcus Teo
The Global Undergraduate Awards, 2019
This work examines the prima facie contradiction between Rational Choice Theory and Moral Sentime... more This work examines the prima facie contradiction between Rational Choice Theory and Moral Sentimentalism. Specifically, it considers the apparent incompatibility between rationality and sentimentality (a.k.a., emotion; affect) as the bases of moral (or immoral) behaviour, such that the former asserts that moral behaviour is rational by nature, and the latter asserts that moral behaviour is emotive by nature. This incompatibility is emphasised by the fact that Rational Choice Theory is strongly supported by empirical psychological research, while Moral Sentimentalism is strongly supported by empirical neurobiological research. If this contradiction is true, then it appears that moral psychology (and, in extension, criminology) is at an epistemic impasse. This work begins its attempt first by citing some of the literature that supports each theory before fleshing out the problem at hand. Following this, I posit that the contradiction is illusory; a mere product of semantic confusion. I propose a compatibilist approach in which Rational Choice Theory may conceptually subsume Moral Sentimentalism into one of its core premises, "bounded" rationality. After giving reasons to believe that my proposal has explanatory power over the prima facie contradiction while being conceptually realistic, sample implications on rehabilitation and crime prevention are considered. This is done in particular respect to cognitive-behavioural therapy and situational crime prevention.
This work introduces the topic of cerebral organoid technology before considering relevant ethica... more This work introduces the topic of cerebral organoid technology before considering relevant ethical questions that have been raised, or may be raised, pertaining to the treatment of cerebral organoids. I argue that given the present state of cerebral organoid technology, we do not have moral reasons to resist scientific progress on the matter, as issues that may arise may easily be avoided with pre-emptive measures like ensuring the acquisition of informed consent.
Singapore Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, 2018
The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has taken the 21st century by storm, mechanising many ... more The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has taken the 21st century by storm, mechanising many different processes that were once considered accessible only to human capabilities. Recent progress in AI see advents such as self-driving cars, representing AI’s involvement in the realm of moral decision-making. For instance, self-driving cars must deliberate between the lives of the passengers and pedestrians should such a dilemma arise, often applying principles of utilitarianism in these value judgements (see Bonnefon et al.; Brant). Given the exponential rate at which AI is growing (e.g., see Jayakumar), it seems reasonable to consider future instances of automating moral decision-making. For such developments to be satisfactory, however, it seems like there is a criterion that the moral decision-making machine must meet: it must possess the capability to engage in moral decision-making at a level of robustness that meets ours. In the present work, I intend to argue that moral intuition, as highlighted by Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Approach (SIA 1 ), suggests an immediateness in moral decision-making that seems exclusive to humanity. Because of the role of moral intuition in our moral cognition, I postulate that it is implausible, at least for the foreseeable future, to automate moral decision-making.
Conference Presentations by Marcus Teo
The present work aims to provide a defence of Christopher Hom’s Combinatorial Externalism as a th... more The present work aims to provide a defence of Christopher Hom’s Combinatorial Externalism as a theory of slurs. This will be done by first fleshing out what I refer to as Non-Derogatory Non-Appropriation (NDNA) cases of slurring, which I take to be necessary for a theory of slurs to account for. Following this, I argue that Hom’s theory is the best fit (as compared to two other theories) in meeting this necessary condition. To this effect, this work examines three slurs: (1) “N*gger”, a slur used against people of African-American descent, (2) “K*ke”, a slur used against Jewish people, and (3) “B*tch”, a slur used against women. These three slurs are useful to consider because they each target different demographics (i.e., race, religion, and gender respectively) that are presumably central to the identities of most people even though my argument applies in the same manner to all slurs.
To flesh out my defence, I compare Hom’s theory against two other dominant theories of slurs: Pragmatic Minimalism and Prohibitionism. Drawing comparisons between the three dominant theories of slurs, I argue that Hom’s Combinatorial Externalism captures our intuitions about (and common uses of) slurs the best, given its ability to account for NDNA cases with the least resistance as compared to the other theories.
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Papers by Marcus Teo
Conference Presentations by Marcus Teo
To flesh out my defence, I compare Hom’s theory against two other dominant theories of slurs: Pragmatic Minimalism and Prohibitionism. Drawing comparisons between the three dominant theories of slurs, I argue that Hom’s Combinatorial Externalism captures our intuitions about (and common uses of) slurs the best, given its ability to account for NDNA cases with the least resistance as compared to the other theories.
To flesh out my defence, I compare Hom’s theory against two other dominant theories of slurs: Pragmatic Minimalism and Prohibitionism. Drawing comparisons between the three dominant theories of slurs, I argue that Hom’s Combinatorial Externalism captures our intuitions about (and common uses of) slurs the best, given its ability to account for NDNA cases with the least resistance as compared to the other theories.