Papers by Davide Bordini
European Journal of Philosophy, 2021
In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophe... more In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherently present-oriented; others instead maintain that it is inherently future-oriented or that it has no inherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear's temporal orientation as one-dimensional-that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a view that introduces a two-dimensional account of fear's temporal orientation. On such a view, we can say that fear is inherently future-oriented, independently of its being about something in the present or in the future.
Ergo
A widespread (and often tacit) assumption is that fear is an anticipatory emotion and, as such, i... more A widespread (and often tacit) assumption is that fear is an anticipatory emotion and, as such, inherently future-oriented. Prima facie, such an assumption is threatened by cases where we seem to be afraid of things in the past: if it is possible to fear the past, then fear entertains no special relation with the future—or so some have argued. This seems to force us to choose between an account of fear as an anticipatory emotion (supported by pre-theoretical intuitions as well as empirical research in psychology) and admitting cases of past-oriented fear. In this paper, we argue for a proposal that dissolves this dilemma. Our claim is: with the right account in place, the future-orientation of fear can be made compatible with, and is actually explanatory of, cases where we are genuinely afraid of something in the past. So, there is no need to choose: fear is still future-oriented, even when we are genuinely afraid of things in the past. The key is a correct understanding of what fear’s temporal orientation amounts to, and the framework we offer here provides us with such an understanding.
In this paper, I investigate the relation between recipes and taste. In particular, I do three th... more In this paper, I investigate the relation between recipes and taste. In particular, I do three things. First, I sketch and articulate different versions of essentialism, a view that I take to reflect our pre-theoretical intuitions on the matter. Roughly, on this view, taste is essentially related to recipes—either by contributing to their identity or by being otherwise strongly related to it. Second, I argue that no version of essentialism is really convincing; hence, I conclude, recipes and taste are not essentially related. Third, after drawing some general lessons from the discussion, I lay the ground for an alternative approach to account for that relation. My final suggestion will be that the main source of the relation between recipes and taste is not to be found in recipes themselves and their essences, but in dishes—i.e., the concrete instances of a recipe.
European Journal of Philosophy
In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophe... more In this paper, we discuss the inherent temporal orientation of fear, a matter on which philosophers seem to have contrasting opinions. According to some, fear is inherently present-oriented; others instead maintain that it is inherently future-oriented or that it has no inherent temporal orientation at all. Despite the differences, however, all these views seem to understand fear's temporal orientation as one-dimensional-that is, as uniquely determined by the represented temporal location of the intentional object of fear. By contrast, we present a view that introduces a two-dimensional account of fear's temporal orientation. On such a view, we can say that fear is inherently future-oriented, independently of its being about something in the present or in the future.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2017
According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the in... more According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite unsatisfying. More recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, b) has suggested something that looks more interesting and promising: instead of re-describing moods’ phenomenology, she accepts its undirectedness at face value and tries to explain it in intentionalist terms. In this paper, I focus on and criticize Mendelovici’s proposal. As I will show, despite its prima facie virtues, the view is poorly motivated. For, contrary to what Mendelovici argues, introspection does not support her proposal—arguably, it provides some evidence against it. So, the problem that intentionalism has with moods is not solved, but is still there.
Philosophical Studies, 2017
The so-called transparency of experience (henceforth TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting ... more The so-called transparency of experience (henceforth TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e. the view that phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the Phenomenal Intentionality View (PIV), according to which intentionality is in some strong way dependent on phenomenal character. If this line of argument succeeds, then not only TE does not speak in favor of Representationalism, but it actually speaks against it, contrary to the philosophical common-sense of the last two decades. Moreover, the representationalist project of naturalizing phenomenal character turns out to be seriously undermined on the same intuitive grounds that were supposed to make it plausible. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV and argue that our introspective intuitions (TE) do not push us in the direction of PIV. On the contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak to force us to conclude that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required for PIV to be true.
This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction be... more This article sketches out the key features of the debate on the analytic-synthetic distinction between phenomenology and logical empiricism, which took place in the early part of the twentieth century. On the one side, the author reconstructs the debate itself from an historical angle; on the other, he gives a theoretical account of the different positions and arguments. In particular, he has three main aims: a) to clarify how, according to Husserl, the analyticsynthetic opposition is to be understood as the form-matter opposition; b) to show how this position has been misunderstood by neo-empiricist philosophers, in particular by Schlick in his paper against the theory of the factual a priori; c) to point out that Husserlian theory anticipates some relevant features in the matter of analyticity (i.e. the distinction between logical analytic and extra-logical analytic truths) which will be made fully explicit only by Carnap and Quine, philosophers of the following generation.
Talks by Davide Bordini
According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing o... more According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing over and above the intentional content of experience (what experience represents). This view is strongly supported by evidence coming from visual experiences. Yet, it has hard times when it comes to moods (states like, e.g., anxiety, depression or elation). Indeed, moods do not appear to be intentional at all, but just seem raw feelings. Two replies to the challenge raised by moods have been offered by the intentionalists. According to the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM), moods would represent very general objects (e.g., everything or the world as a whole) or many different objects across the time (e.g., Crane 1998, 2007; Seager 1999; Tye 2008). Recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b) has proposed a different view. On her account, which is an extension of Chalmers’ Edenic view (2006), undirected moods would represent unbound affective properties. Call this the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods (EIAM). In this talk, I focus on EIAM and argue for a twofold claim: on the one hand, EIAM is better than SIAM; on the other, it is still not fully convincing––in particular, if one adopts a theory-neutral standpoint.
According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing o... more According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing over and above the intentional content of experience (what experience represents). This view is strongly supported by evidence coming from visual experiences. Yet, it has hard times when it comes to moods (states like, e.g., anxiety, depression or elation). Indeed, moods do not appear to be intentional at all, but just seem raw feelings. Two replies to the challenge raised by moods have been offered by the intentionalists. According to the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM), moods would represent very general objects (e.g., everything or the world as a whole) or many different objects across the time (e.g., Crane 1998, 2007; Seager 1999; Tye 2008). Recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b) has proposed a different view. On her account, which is an extension of Chalmers’ Edenic view (2006), undirected moods would represent unbound affective properties. Call this the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods (EIAM). In this talk, I focus on EIAM and argue for a twofold claim: on the one hand, EIAM is better than SIAM; on the other, it is still not fully convincing––in particular, if one adopts a theory-neutral standpoint.
According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing o... more According to Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience (what it’s like) is nothing over and above the intentional content of experience (what experience represents). This view is strongly supported by evidence coming from visual experiences. Yet, it has hard times when it comes to moods (states like, e.g., anxiety, depression or elation). Indeed, moods do not appear to be intentional at all, but just seem raw feelings. Two replies to the challenge raised by moods have been offered by the intentionalists. According to the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM), moods would represent very general objects (e.g., everything or the world as a whole) or many different objects across the time (e.g., Crane 1998, 2007; Seager 1999; Tye 2008). Recently, Angela Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b) has proposed a different view. On her account, which is an extension of Chalmers’ Edenic view (2006), undirected moods would represent unbound affective properties. Call this the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods (EIAM). In this talk, I focus on EIAM and argue for a twofold claim: on the one hand, EIAM is better than SIAM; on the other, it is still not fully convincing––in particular, if one adopts a theory-neutral standpoint.
Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), accord... more Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), according to which the phenomenal character of experience is entirely reducible/identical to what experience represents (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 1995, 2000). This view is strongly motivated by the phenomenological evidence that our perceptual experiences appear to be directed upon specific mind-independent objects and their properties. For example, we see red cars parked over the street, we hear sounds coming from the street, etc. However, when it comes to other kinds of experiences, such as moods (states like anxiety or depression or elation), Intentionalism has hard times. Indeed, moods do not seem to be directed at any object. On the contrary, they appear as “raw feelings:” purely qualitative experiences rather than representations. In this talk I introduce the problem of moods, discuss some recent intentionalist replies and argue that they are not convincing.
Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), accord... more Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), according to which the phenomenal character of experience is entirely reducible/identical to what experience represents (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 1995, 2000). This view is strongly motivated by the phenomenological evidence that our perceptual experiences appear to be directed upon specific mind-independent objects and their properties. For example, we see red cars parked over the street, we hear sounds coming from the street, etc. However, when it comes to other kinds of experiences, such as moods (states like anxiety or depression or elation), Intentionalism has hard times. Indeed, moods do not seem to be directed at any object. On the contrary, they appear as “raw feelings:” purely qualitative experiences rather than representations. In this talk I introduce the problem of moods, discuss some recent intentionalist replies and argue that they are not convincing.
In this talk I explore some connections between the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT) and in... more In this talk I explore some connections between the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT) and introspection. I sketch out some reasons why it might be appealing for the phenomenal intentionalist to argue from introspection to PIT. My conclusion, however, is that arguing from introspection is not a good strategy to argue for PIT -- at least, if one moves from the (alleged) introspective datum assumed by some phenomenal intentionalists.
In this talk I explore some connections between the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT) and in... more In this talk I explore some connections between the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT) and introspection. I sketch out some reasons why it might be appealing for the phenomenal intentionalist to argue from introspection to PIT. My conclusion, however, is that arguing from introspection is not a good strategy to argue for PIT -- at least, if one moves from the (alleged) introspective datum assumed by some phenomenal intentionalists.
In this talk I argue that the Transparency of Experience is silent. In other words, it is a too w... more In this talk I argue that the Transparency of Experience is silent. In other words, it is a too weak introspective datum that does not allow one to choose between the two concurrent types of Intentionalism that appeal to it.
Thesis Chapters by Davide Bordini
This is a 644 words abstract of my PhD dissertation. If you are interested in reading the whole d... more This is a 644 words abstract of my PhD dissertation. If you are interested in reading the whole dissertation, please email me at [email protected]
Here I introduce the main issues I deal with in my dissertation. In the final section, I sketch a... more Here I introduce the main issues I deal with in my dissertation. In the final section, I sketch and summarize the main structure of the whole whole work. I thereby offer a preliminary map of the structure of the work and of my arguments.
If you are interested in reading the whole dissertation, please email me at [email protected]
Conference Organization by Davide Bordini
Fourth IAPT Meeting. June 12-14, 2017. University of Milan, Palazzo Feltrinelli, Gargnano del... more Fourth IAPT Meeting. June 12-14, 2017. University of Milan, Palazzo Feltrinelli, Gargnano del Garda, italy
Invited Speakers: Patrick Blackburn (Roskilde), Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck), Jenann Ismael (Arizona), Tim Maudlin (NYU), Sven Rosenkrantz (Barcelona).
Round Table on Temporal Illusions: Valterri Arstila (Turku), Adrian Bardon (Wake Forest), Sean Power (Dublin)
Organization: The Centre for Philosophy of Time: A. Bardon (Wake Forest), D. Bordini (Milan), V. Buonomo (MIlan), C. Calosi (Neuchâtel), F. Correia (Neuchâtel), S. Iaquinto (Milan), D. Ingram (Milan), U. Meyer (Colgate), K. Miller (Sydney), B. Neeser (Neuchâtel), G. Torrengo (Milan), C. Wüthrich (Geneva), and N. Young (Milan).
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Papers by Davide Bordini
Talks by Davide Bordini
Thesis Chapters by Davide Bordini
If you are interested in reading the whole dissertation, please email me at [email protected]
Conference Organization by Davide Bordini
Invited Speakers: Patrick Blackburn (Roskilde), Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck), Jenann Ismael (Arizona), Tim Maudlin (NYU), Sven Rosenkrantz (Barcelona).
Round Table on Temporal Illusions: Valterri Arstila (Turku), Adrian Bardon (Wake Forest), Sean Power (Dublin)
Organization: The Centre for Philosophy of Time: A. Bardon (Wake Forest), D. Bordini (Milan), V. Buonomo (MIlan), C. Calosi (Neuchâtel), F. Correia (Neuchâtel), S. Iaquinto (Milan), D. Ingram (Milan), U. Meyer (Colgate), K. Miller (Sydney), B. Neeser (Neuchâtel), G. Torrengo (Milan), C. Wüthrich (Geneva), and N. Young (Milan).
If you are interested in reading the whole dissertation, please email me at [email protected]
Invited Speakers: Patrick Blackburn (Roskilde), Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck), Jenann Ismael (Arizona), Tim Maudlin (NYU), Sven Rosenkrantz (Barcelona).
Round Table on Temporal Illusions: Valterri Arstila (Turku), Adrian Bardon (Wake Forest), Sean Power (Dublin)
Organization: The Centre for Philosophy of Time: A. Bardon (Wake Forest), D. Bordini (Milan), V. Buonomo (MIlan), C. Calosi (Neuchâtel), F. Correia (Neuchâtel), S. Iaquinto (Milan), D. Ingram (Milan), U. Meyer (Colgate), K. Miller (Sydney), B. Neeser (Neuchâtel), G. Torrengo (Milan), C. Wüthrich (Geneva), and N. Young (Milan).