Actions, reasons, and automaticity by Lieke Asma
Synthese, 2023
In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attit... more In this paper, I argue that instead of primarily paying attention to the nature of implicit attitudes that are taken to cause implicit discrimination, we should investigate how discrimination can be implicit in itself. I propose to characterize implicit discrimination as unintentional discrimination: the person responds to facts unintentionally and often unconsciously which are, given their end, irrelevant and imply unfair treatment. The result is a unified account of implicit bias that allows for the different ways in which it can display itself and can be explained. Furthermore, the view can account for the central characteristics of implicit bias: (1) that it is, for a variety of reasons, difficult to control, (2) that we are not necessarily unconscious of implicit bias but not properly conscious either, and (3) that we can unintentionally discriminate regardless of whether we claim to care about fairness.
Philosophical Explorations
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, expe... more Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua Shepherd (2015; 2021) aims to fill this gap. His proposal is grounded in the standard causalist account of action, according to which, simply put, bodily movements are controlled by the agent if and only if they are caused, in the right way, by the relevant psychological states. In this paper, I argue that the proposal does not succeed in distinguishing between mere causation and actual control; it does not solve the problem of deviant causation. On the basis of my criticism, Anscombean action theory promises to offer a valuable perspective. It suggests that an important function of consciousness is to integrate an action into a rational whole. If this is on the right track, it supports Shepherd’s overall claim that the importance of consciousness for action control is often underestimated, because this contribution of consciousness may often go unnoticed in experimental settings.
David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them ... more David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them has had a substantial influence on contemporary psychology of motivation. He did not, however, reflect on the nature of implicit motives in much detail. In this article, I fill this gap. I argue that implicit motives should not be understood as mental states the agent has no introspective access to. Instead, I propose that the implicit motives that McClelland and others in the field distinguish—the power, achievement, and affiliation motive—are generic descriptions of specific ends an agent may act for. These motives are implicit, because they are not explicitly expressed but merely implied in what the agent does, thinks, and feels. Establishing whether an agent acts for or has a certain implicit motive, then, is a matter of interpreting the agent’s expressions. This proposal is in line with and explains the empirical findings.
How can agents act virtuously out of habit? Virtuous actions are done for the right reasons, and ... more How can agents act virtuously out of habit? Virtuous actions are done for the right reasons, and acting for (right) reasons seems to involve deliberation. Yet, deliberation is absent if an agent’s action is habitual. That implies that the relationship between reasons and actions should be characterized in such a way that deliberation is unnecessary. In this paper, I examine three possible solutions: radical externalism, unconscious psychologism, and unconscious factualism. I argue that these proposals all fail to cast reasons in their proper role. In light of that, I propose an alternative view of how to account for habitual virtuous actions, based on the work of G. E. M. Anscombe. I maintain that if we focus on the inherently rational structure of actions, the tension between acting habitually and acting for the right reason dissolves.
Theories based on Frankfurt’s (Am Philos Q 15(2):157–162, 1978) view of action have recently been... more Theories based on Frankfurt’s (Am Philos Q 15(2):157–162, 1978) view of action have recently been developed to account for passive, automatic, and habitual actions. What these theories share is that they aim to distinguish between actions and mere bodily movements without appealing to psychological states as causes. Instead, agents have guidance control over their actions. In this paper I argue that the versions of the theory that have been proposed are problematic. I propose to pay attention to Frankfurt’s other claim instead: that actions and mere bodily movements are inherently different. I argue that Anscombe’s approach to action does take this inherent distinction seriously, and is able to account for passive, automatic, and habitual actions.
Free will and science by Lieke Asma
Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Lib... more Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best characterized in terms of conscious states and/or processes being part of the causal chain leading up to the action, and (2) that the third-person perspective is a suitable means to capturing the relationship between free will and consciousness. I provide an alternative proposal of how free will and consciousness may be related, in which an agent’s self-understanding of what she is doing and why, while acting, takes center stage. In order to capture the relationship between the two, I argue, the first-person perspective should be investigated instead of explained away.
In this paper, I analyze how neuroscientists come to the conclusion that the brain “decides” what... more In this paper, I analyze how neuroscientists come to the conclusion that the brain “decides” what we will do. I do so by focusing on a recent study on free won’t, from which it is concluded that the decision to veto is not free. First, I argue that assumptions about voluntariness and freedom that underlie this and other Libet-style experiments are more stringent than assumed by other critics (Mele, 2009; Schlosser, 2014). Second, I claim that these assumptions lead to an experimental setting in which the conclusion that the brain “decides” is almost unavoidable. This is because the only decisions subjects are allowed to make in these experiments are spontaneous decisions that are not based on reasons. Even if the subjects acted for reasons or deliberated about what to do it would not be interpreted as such. Because of this, alternative definitions of voluntariness and freedom are necessary for neuroscientific experiments to provide a valuable contribution to the debate on free will.
Primary teacher's attitudes towards science by Lieke Asma
Attention to the attitudes of preservice and inservice primary teachers toward science is of fund... more Attention to the attitudes of preservice and inservice primary teachers toward science is of fundamental importance to research on primary science education. However, progress in this field of research has been slow due to the poor definition and conceptualization of the construct of primary teachers' attitude toward science. This poor theoretical background has led to the use of a multitude of different concepts and measurement instruments. The main goal of this article is to present a new and comprehensive theoretical framework for primary teachers' attitudes toward science. The framework is based on an extensive review of previously used concept definitions of the construct. It is argued that this framework should serve as a necessary conceptual basis for future research and interventions in this domain, as well as for the construction of valid measurement instruments. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed96:158–182, 2012
The study on primary teachers’ attitudes towards science and technology has received considerable... more The study on primary teachers’ attitudes towards science and technology has received considerable research attention over the last decades. However, if one looks at the extant literature in this domain, a major problem that becomes apparent is the lack of consistency in the conceptualization of what is meant by teacher attitudes. Attitude is a complex and multidimensional construct and a clear definition and thorough theoretical understanding are essential for research in this area. The present chapter is intended to shed more light on this construct and to present the results of a focus group study amongst pre- and in-service primary teachers that investigated both their personal attitudes towards science and technology and their attitudes towards teaching science and technology at primary school level.
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Actions, reasons, and automaticity by Lieke Asma
Free will and science by Lieke Asma
Primary teacher's attitudes towards science by Lieke Asma