Caleb Cohoe
Supervisors: Hendrik Lorenz and John Cooper
Address: Department of Philosophy
CN307F, Metropolitan State University of Denver
Denver, CO, 08204
Address: Department of Philosophy
CN307F, Metropolitan State University of Denver
Denver, CO, 08204
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In order to determine whether Aristotle thinks the soul meets this condition, I lay out his metaphysical views concerning human beings. I argue that for Aristotle the human being, not the body or the soul, is the underlying subject of all human activities, including understanding. I then argue that Aristotle’s conception of the soul is compatible with the soul having powers and activities that do not involve the body. If the intellectual power and its activities can exist separately from the body, the human being can as well.
I present Aristotle’s account of the intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual, and use this account to reconstruct and defend Aristotle’s argument in III 4 that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. Understanding is universal, but any cognitive activity that operates through bodily organs will be particular.
I then argue that in DA III 5 Aristotle introduces a human intellectual power, the productive intellect, which draws out the intelligible characteristics of things from the images we possess in order to produce understanding. I maintain that my Human Intellect view, according to which Aristotle is claiming that the human intellect is undying and divine, is superior to the Divine Intellect view, on which Aristotle’s claim is about a divine extra-human intellect. On my view, understanding is not an activity that is done with the body, it only employs the soul. Aristotle can reasonably maintain that understanding no longer requires images after the destruction of the body, since there is no longer a need to coordinate with other cognitive powers. Human beings persist after death because we continue to understand, although we can no longer remember or experience emotions.
An advanced undergraduate course exploring the implications that different views of ultimate reality have for conceptions of, speech about, and attitudes towards the divine. Thinkers considered include Xenophanes, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Bonaventure, and Julian of Norwich.
Course Description:
What are the implications different views of ultimate reality have for conceptions of, speech about, and attitudes towards the divine? In this course we will examine the connection between metaphysics and mysticism by closely looking at the role that the divine plays in the metaphysics of a number of key figures in the Western tradition. We will see the diverse ways in which mysticism is understood and practiced, from philosophical and theological theorizing to visions and sensory experience to systematic ways of organizing one’s life. We will also examine disputes about the nature and import of mystical experiences. While mystical theology is sometimes opposed to rational philosophy, we will see that three of the most important ancient Greek philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, all advocated the superiority of the divine over the human and put forward conceptions of the divine that were influential not just in philosophy but also in the theology of the three Abrahamic religions. We will examine several important mystics and metaphysicians in the Islamic tradition, the Jewish tradition, and both Eastern and Western Christianity.
Course Description: Much of what we know about the world comes from others. But how do we get knowledge through testimony? Philosophers sharply disagree. Some suggest that testimony is like perception, a basic cognitive faculty. Others insist that properly receiving testimony is just a matter of making the right inferences. Still others root the role of testimony in practices of trust or in social norms. We will consider the merits of these accounts and the puzzles they raise. We will also examine what difference they make to our individual belief formation. How should we respond to various kinds of testimony? What are the benefits and risks of trying to decide what to believe on our own? What role should broader communities play? Our class sessions will explore the alternatives on offer while the paper assignments will involve applying these accounts to your own thinking about issues you find important. We will begin by laying out some general issues about trust and testimony and examining some relevant psychological findings about personal knowledge and deference (week 1). We will then examine several influential historical accounts of trust and reasons for accepting testimony, including those of Augustine, Hume, and Thomas Reid (weeks 2-4). Next we consider issues about testimony and trust raised by contemporary scientific practice and science communication (weeks 5-6). We will then carefully examine several leadings contemporary accounts of the nature of testimony and trust (weeks 6-10). We will close by considering accounts of epistemic authority and epistemic communities and their role in ecosystems of knowledge (weeks 11-15)