Communication and Media Studies

This paper explores the concept of grace in etiquette as a social aesthetic. Etiquette is often understood as distinct from ethics because it is perceived as a mere conventional rule following, and a matter of style. Alternatively, it may be understood as a form of civility that has a social and moral basis that is unrelated to aesthetics. This paper argues that the contemporary term 'gracious' is both a moral and aesthetic evaluation. To do so, I explore the relationship between etiquette, virtue, and ethics through the theoretical frames of Erving Goffman's concepts of deference and demeanour, and Confucian ethics. Using the example of a disrupted lunch party in Agatha Christie's The Hollow (1946), I show how etiquette expresses social relationships and moral obligations through the sensual qualities of food. Gracious behaviour does not simply involve the observance the codes of socially acceptable behaviour but also requires a mastery of, and improvisation on, them to express attitudes and relationships.

This essay explores questions of cross-cultural aesthetic appreciation when galleries display indigenous artefacts or artists appropriate religious symbols. In such cases, the work is not necessarily treated with disrespect, and yet can deeply concern or distress to people in the cultures that produce the representation. I suggest that what underlies this response is a different understanding of the metaphysics of art, and the relationship between the symbol and what it represents. Rather than being a 'mere' symbol and conventional sign, such symbols are thought of as participating in what they represent, and the work as externalising spiritual reality. From the perspective of this metaphysical framework, how we 'should' respond to these religious objects is with recognition of the nature of that reality, and that response should express our relationship to that reality, or the order of the world. Finally I argue that such a belief is recognisable to people who do not accept that the symbols have this metaphysical structure, a,s even in contemporary Western societies, people will treat with respect images of that which they hold dear.

Kant's account of aesthetic appreciation was the experience of attending to something as purposive yet without attending to a purpose. In Noel Carroll's account of what this means, he says, 'We savor the colours in the painting of a tree for their richness and variety rather than using them to tell ourselves what kind of tree it is. We imaginatively explore the multiple, metaphorical, shifting meanings that a heraldic emblem might have, rather than simply, practically regarding it as the insignia of a certain family or clan.' 1 Carroll suggests that this account of aesthetic experience involves two distinct conceptions of freedom: the freedom of disinterestedness, that is, not being concerned with any practical, moral, financial or political interest, and freedom in the sense in which the imagination and understanding are free from the governance of concepts. 2 As David Whewell has observed, 'Few ideas in the history of aesthetics have been more pervasive than that of the disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude.' 3 This paper explores whether this concept of aesthetic appreciation can be applied cross culturallythat is, is it a fundamental human experience, as many of us presuppose? If it is not, then what would a cross-cultural concept of aesthetics look like, and how would it affect our philosophical understanding of aesthetic appreciation?

This paper explores the ethics of ethnomusicology through a case study into Ida Halpern's recordings of First Nations music. The paper develops a performative model of First Nations music as a mnemonic device in law, and explores moral rights to the use of the music based on an argument first developed by Kant in relation to publishing. The paper was later extensively rewritten with Rosemary J. Combe, and published as “A Broken Record: Subjecting ‘Music’ to Cultural rights” by Elizabeth Burns Coleman and  Rosemary J. Coombe with Fiona MacArailt,  in Conrad Bunk and James O. Young (eds.), The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation, Blackwell, 2009.

The object of scientific study of medicine is the physical body. As Ivan Varga points out, modernity has meant 'materialising' as well as 'scientificising' the body, which is studied as subject to the laws of nature: 'advances in biochemistry, genetics…dietetics, etc., together with their often watered down popularisation, spread the image of the scientifically determinable natural body. The healthy bodyin itself not a bad thing-is more and more associated with scientific advances'. 1 Varga underestimates the 'good' of a healthy body here, yet in medicine, such treatment of the body may limit our perspective and communication about who or what is being treated. We need to ask ourselves whether this treatment concerns only the disease, or the human being. To treat the human being is to recognise they way in which they make meaning of the illness, their values, and their world view. Often, however, a religious position is seen as contrary to 'obvious' scientific truth about health and well being.

In debates concerning the treatment of sacred objects, symbols and figures in multicultural societies, questions often arise as to what it means to treat beliefs with respect. Responses from a Millian liberal tradition have generally argued that the idea of treating beliefs with respect is inconsistent with freedom of expression, and that it is illogical to expect people to respect beliefs and practices with which they fundamentally disagree. This chapter explores this response in relation to an episode in the Australian media, in which an Aboriginal Australian claimed that a book should be pulped for advocating that girls learn to play the didgeridoo. Drawing on sociological and philosophical accounts of the relationship between identity and face, and the nature of civility, the chapter examines the role of deference in multicultural societies, and provides an alternative understanding of what it means to treat beliefs with respect. It argues that “respect for beliefs” is best understood as respect for the social identity of persons, and consists in ordinary codes of politeness. These codes are not inconsistent with freedom of expression, and do not involve the agent actually respecting beliefs and practices with which they do not agree.

It seems fair to say that there is a widespread belief that academic accounts of art and aesthetics of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were fundamentally flawed. Yet there is a more pervasive belief that the theories were not only flawed, but that objects of fine art and have no universal or objective value. Let us call this art scepticism. Like religious scepticism, art scepticism expresses doubt about the ‘established facts’ that aesthetic appreciation is some kind of special experience, that it is universal, or that fine art was ‘expressive of humanity’. In The Artful Species, Stephen Davies explores the various ways in which art and aesthetics may be considered connected to human evolution, in the process providing reasons to believe that aesthetic appreciation, and artistic expression, are genuinely important.

Panel proposals and individual papers are invited for the ethics stream of the Australian and New Zealand Communication Association annual conference.

The conference will be held from 8-10 July in Queenstown, Aotearoa New Zealand.
http://www.arts.canterbury.ac.nz/conferences/anzca//

The theme of the conference is Communication, Space and Identity. Papers and panel proposals are invited on the following issues:

The recent attack on the office of Charlie Hebdo asks us to inquire, if we are not Charlie, why not? Why might giving offense be morally wrong? Under what circumstances is it morally acceptable to give offense? Do the conditions of mediatization and globalisation change the moral
nature of attacks on identity?

Other recent events such as the 'Gamergate' controversy and attacks on journalists and academics including defamation, threats and stalking raise new questions regarding computer-mediated communication and the ethics of communication. When do online attacks exceed the right of freedom of
expression, and become denials of the rights of others? Moreover, as the International Communications Association has observed, there is a need for research into the cultures of interaction that are created in online communities. What are the ethical implications of different cultures? Do 'communities' necessarily have a positive value, or can they be morally
condemned?

Anonymity may be considered the expressive equivalent of the ring of Gyges. Plato's famous tale questioned what motive a person who is invisible has to be good (http://sites.wofford.edu/kaycd/plato/). Similarly, anonymity is
held responsible for multitudes of unethical acts, from bullying to defamation (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323468604578245841828280344). What is the value of anonymity? Is it, as some people have suggested, a right?

Other issues may include interrogations of the nature of privacy and its value, the ethical difference between whistle-blowing and leaking, reputation and defamation, and journalism ethics.

All papers, panel proposals and abstracts should be submitted online through the conference website by Friday 27 February. Full papers that are submitted by this date will be double-blind reviewed, and are eligible for publication in the conference proceedings. Panel proposals will be reviewed by the conference organising panel. All people who submit a paper, panel proposal or abstract will be notified whether their contribution has been accepted by late March. Reviews will be sent people who submit papers by by 28 April, for revision by 5 June.

The social costs of increasing antagonism, fear and social dislocation on the basis of religious persuasion suggest that Australia, as well as other multicultural societies, needs to re-examine the place of religion in society, the causes of social discontent, as well as the various means by which religious differences may be negotiated peaceably. Such an examination requires information from a wide variety of perspectives, and discussion at all levels of society. The purpose of this volume is to make a contribution to this discussion by providing a rich, multifaceted exploration of the issue. It brings together religious and secular perspectives and the insights of scholarship from a wide variety of disciplines. It explores histories of religious conflicts, our assumptions about secularisation, and examples of ways in which people of religious persuasions have, and can, negotiate religious difference. These issues have enormous practical significance in a multicultural society with diverse religious beliefs and cultural practices.

Margaret Preston, an Australian painter, has been credited as the first nonanthropologist to begin to explore Australian Aboriginal art as an art. Preston saw in Aboriginal painting the well-spring for an ‘indigenous art of Australia’. The seeking of a national identity, and specifically a connection with place, is common to many if not most societies, reflecting a Herderian idea of art, language and culture shaped by land, and a connection between people and place. But if this is common to most societies, it is perhaps most keenly felt in colonial settler states. For Preston, if there were to be a truly national art, it would be through inspiration from Aboriginal art and its relation to land; all it needed was the ‘all seeing eye of the Western Artist to adapt it to the 20th century’.1

This paper explores the concept of grace in etiquette as a social aesthetic. Etiquette is often understood as distinct from ethics because it is perceived as a mere conventional rule following, and a matter of style. Alternatively, it may be understood as a form of civility that has a social and moral basis that is unrelated to aesthetics. This paper argues that the contemporary term 'gracious' is both a moral and aesthetic evaluation. To do so, I explore the relationship between etiquette, virtue, and ethics through the theoretical frames of Erving Goffman's concepts of deference and demeanour, and Confucian ethics. Using the example of a disrupted lunch party in Agatha Christie's The Hollow (1946), I show how etiquette expresses social relationships and moral obligations through the sensual qualities of food. Gracious behaviour does not simply involve the observance the codes of socially acceptable behaviour but also requires a mastery of, and improvisation on, them to express attitudes and relationships.

Kant's account of aesthetic appreciation was the experience of attending to something as purposive yet without attending to a purpose. In Noel Carroll's account of what this means, he says, 'We savor the colours in the painting of a tree for their richness and variety rather than using them to tell ourselves what kind of tree it is. We imaginatively explore the multiple, metaphorical, shifting meanings that a heraldic emblem might have, rather than simply, practically regarding it as the insignia of a certain family or clan.' 1 Carroll suggests that this account of aesthetic experience involves two distinct conceptions of freedom: the freedom of disinterestedness, that is, not being concerned with any practical, moral, financial or political interest, and freedom in the sense in which the imagination and understanding are free from the governance of concepts. 2 As David Whewell has observed, 'Few ideas in the history of aesthetics have been more pervasive than that of the disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude.' 3 This paper explores whether this concept of aesthetic appreciation can be applied cross culturallythat is, is it a fundamental human experience, as many of us presuppose? If it is not, then what would a cross-cultural concept of aesthetics look like, and how would it affect our philosophical understanding of aesthetic appreciation? Surrounding this issue is a debate, if one may call it that, about whether indigenous arts, or artefacts or primitive arts, whatever you would like to call them, are arts. Often it has some political heat, as each side accuses the other as imposing an ideology that reinforces the structures of colonial domination. Here I offer a kind of composite version of the positions as I understand them. One side of this debate suggests that people who deny that indigenous arts are art are imposing an ideology which establishes a hierarchy of what is valuable that allows other groups of people to be seen as less