Books by Phil Hutchinson
"'Phil Hutchinson offers an incisive, insightful and deeply humane New Wittgensteinian critique o... more "'Phil Hutchinson offers an incisive, insightful and deeply humane New Wittgensteinian critique of a number of influential accounts of the emotions, including shame. That too many philosophers have marginalized the 'person' in their accounts – that they have forgotten the place of the emotions in human lives and in the life-world – is the shame of philosophy.'
- Katherine Morris, Oxford University
'A fine work: not only does it provide convincing answers to important questions, it also reveals the limitations - and cures some of the blindspots - of much contemporary research on emotions. The discussion of cognitivism is particularly subtle, while the perspicuous presentation of the lived experience of shame might help to resolve some crucial theoretical aporias about the nature and the significance of being a person.'
- Anthony Hatzimoysis, The University of Manchester
'Hutchinson's book is a thoughtful, thorough and interesting work. He offers many striking reflections on emotion, language and, specifically, shame. In showing how different conceptions of emotions are based on problematic conceptions of language, he also goes much deeper than philosophers usually when they write about this subject.'
- Ylva Gustafsson, Philosophical Investigations
'Shame and Philosophy is an engaging philosophical effort to explore reflection about emotion with its relevant connection to personhood. Phil Hutchinson offers a careful reflection that establishes a dialogue among current research both from the analytical and the continental traditions. This novel approach to philosophy of emotions provides, just like Hutchinson wants, a conceptual network for a better understanding of how emotions make up our world.'
- Dina Mendonça, Metapsychology online
Abstract
In an important contribution to the burgeoning area of philosophy of emotions, Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. Shame and Philosophy advances a framework for understanding emotion: world-taking cognitivism. He argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of our world and ourselves. The book contains detailed engagements with theorists of emotions such as Peter Goldie, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz and Jenefer Robinson as well as a chapter on the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which also contains a detailed critical engagement with Jacques Derrida's work. The Chapter on Griffiths' work also contains a detailed critique of the program of natural kind semantics. As the book progresses it becomes more and more concerned to meditate on shame as discussed by Primo Levi and other survivors of extreme trauma. The book moves towards conclusion by suggesting further directions for study."
The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book argui... more The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book arguing his work suffered misrepresentation in both recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Re-establishing a Winchian voice, the authors examine how such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues which occupied him in his Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy and later papers remain central to social studies.
The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined.
Papers by Phil Hutchinson
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2024
In this paper we introduce Critical Praxeological Analysis (CPA). CPA respecifies critical studie... more In this paper we introduce Critical Praxeological Analysis (CPA). CPA respecifies critical studies and research by operationalising insights from gestalt psychology and, in particular, the praxeological and linguistic gestalts identified by Harold Garfinkel and Ludwig Wittgenstein. CPA offers a framework for analysing the in-situ production, maintenance, challenging, repair and overcoming of norms and structures. Using naturally occuring data, as well as fictional and imagined examples, CPA examines the meanings that situations have for the participants who constitute them. The paper provides brief praxeological analyses, which draw upon themes from Frantz Fanon’s work to illustrate CPA in practice. We conclude by inviting others to apply CPA to themes drawn from the critical studies literature, in the hope that such analyses will deepen our understanding of how norms and structures are produced, maintained, challenged, repaired and overcome in interaction.
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2023
Bioethics seems preoccupied with establishing, debating, promoting and sometimes debunking princi... more Bioethics seems preoccupied with establishing, debating, promoting and sometimes debunking principles. While these tasks trade on the status of the word 'principle' in our ordinary language, scant attention is paid to the way principles operate in language. In this paper, we explore how principles relate to rules and practices so as to better understand their logic. We argue that principles gain their sense and power from the practices which give them sense. While general principles can be, and are, establishable in abstraction from specific practices, as they are in principlist bioethics, such principles are impotent as moral guides to action. We show that the purchase any principle has as a moral guide to action emerges from its indexical properties as a principle which has sense in a specific practice. The meaning of any principle is internal to the practice and context in which it is invoked and, therefore, principles are not kinds of master rule which dictate moral judgement in new contexts but rather chameleon-like rules which change with the contexture in which they are invoked.
Philosophical Investigations, 2022
In this paper, we explicate the method of Investigative Ordinary Language Philosophy (IOLP). The ... more In this paper, we explicate the method of Investigative Ordinary Language Philosophy (IOLP). The term was coined by John Cook to describe the unique philosophical approach of Frank Ebersole. We argue that (i) IOLP is an overlooked yet valuable philosophical method grounded in our everyday experiences and concerns; and (ii) as such, Frank Ebersole is an important but neglected figure in the history of ordinary language philosophy. 1 Cook (1999). 2 Levi (2004). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2023
In Where the Ethical Action Is, we argued that medical and ethical modes of thought are not diffe... more In Where the Ethical Action Is, we argued that medical and ethical modes of thought are not different in kind but different aspects of a situation. One of the consequences of this argument is that the requirement for or benefits of normative moral theorising in bioethics is undercut. In response, Wagner has argued that normative moral theories should be reconceived as models. Wagner's argument seems to be that once reconceived as models, the rationale for moral theorising, undercut by our arguments in Where the Ethical Action Is, will be re-established because we will see those moral-theories-now-rebrandedas-models as serving a role akin to the role models serve in some of the natural sciences. In this response to Wagner, we provide two arguments against Wagner's proposal. We call these arguments the Turner-Cicourel Challenge and the Question Begging Challenge.
Philosophia Scientiae, 2022
Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology (EM) at its core involves a praxeological, or interactional, respeci... more Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology (EM) at its core involves a praxeological, or interactional, respecification of Gestalt phenomena. In early EM, this is pursued through the development of a category of praxeological Gestalten in which social facts (or social units) are respecified as Gestalt phenomena, where members are the constituents and the social unit is the whole or Gestalt, produced praxeologically by the methodic work of its members. In later work, Garfinkel would praxeologically transpose traditional perceptual Gestalt phenomena, such as music, to explore the interactional work done in the production and perception of those phenomena. In developing EM by praxeologically reconfiguring Gestaltism, Garfinkel drew on the constitutive phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch, wherein Gurwitsch sought to integrate Gestalt Psychology and phenomenology. In drawing on Gurwitsch, while also being informed by the work of Schütz and, later, Merleau-Ponty, EM is often depicted as either heavily indebted to phenomenology or as a distinct type of phenomenology: praxeological phenomenology, perhaps. At the same time, parallels have been drawn between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work and EM, since Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology was published in 1967. The parallels drawn have often centred on the treatment of rules and rule-following and on the similarities in the treatment of meaning in EM and in Wittgenstein’s later work. However, given the centrality of Gestalt psychology to the development of EM, it is worth noting that in his later manuscripts Wittgenstein discussed Gestalt phenomena and Gestalt Psychology extensively and in ways that often anticipate what Garfinkel would do with Gestaltist ideas. It is, therefore, worth exploring the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein’s, Gurwitsch’s and Garfinkel’s engagement with Gestaltism. This is what I seek to do in this article. In conclusion, I propose that EM should be seen, like Wittgenstein, as post-phenomenological.
Philosophia Scientae, 2022
The idea for the current issue of Philosophia Scientiae emerged from discussions which took place... more The idea for the current issue of Philosophia Scientiae emerged from discussions which took place in the Manchester Ethnomethodology Reading Group. This reading group has its origins in Wes Sharrock's weekly discussion groups, which have taken place in Manchester (UK) since the early 1970s. As the global Covid-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, the reading group moved online, facilitated by Phil Hutchinson and Alex Holder. Being an online reading group opened up participation to people beyond Northwest UK and within weeks the group became global, with the membership including participants logging on from Canada,
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2022
In this paper, I discuss stigma, understood as a category which includes acknowledged, enacted de... more In this paper, I discuss stigma, understood as a category which includes acknowledged, enacted degradation, discreditation and discrimination. My discussion begins with an analysis of HIV stigma, as discussed in a social media post on Twitter. I then analyse a fictionalized clinical stigma scenario. These two analyses are undertaken to highlight aspects of the conceptual anatomy and interactional dynamics of stigma and by extension shame. Brief social media declarations and short, fictionalized clinical interactions are rich with information which helps us understand how stigma-degradation, discreditation and discrimination-is operationalized in interaction.
Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 2021
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2022
In our article, Where the ethical action is, we argue that medical and ethical modes of thought a... more In our article, Where the ethical action is, we argue that medical and ethical modes of thought are not different in kind but merely different aspects of a clinical situation. In response, Emmerich argues that in so doing, we neglect several important features of healthcare and medical education. Although we applaud the spirit of Emmerich's response, we argue that his critique is an attempt at a general defence of the value of bioethical expertise in clinical practice, rather than a specific critique of our account.
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2021
It is common to think of medical and ethical modes of thought as different in kind. In such terms... more It is common to think of medical and ethical modes of thought as different in kind. In such terms, some clinical situations are made more complicated by an additional ethical component. Against this picture, we propose that medical and ethical modes of thought are not different in kind, but merely different aspects of what it means to be human. We further propose that clinicians are uniquely positioned to synthesise these two aspects without prior knowledge of philosophical ethics.
Theory & Psychology, 2020
Philosophical debates about how best to explain emotion or placebo are debates about how best to ... more Philosophical debates about how best to explain emotion or placebo are debates about how best to characterise and explain the distinctive form of human responsiveness to the world that is the object of interest for each of those domains of inquiry. In emotion research, the cognitive theory of emotion faces several intractable problems. I discuss two of these: the problem of epistemic deficit and the problem of recalcitrant emotions. Cognitive explanations in Placebo Studies, such as response-expectancy and belief-based explanations, also face the problem of epistemic deficit in addition to the problem of logically self-destructive true belief. While such considerations might motivate a retreat to affect, this brings its own problems. I argue that it is a particular version of cognitivism, representational cognitivism (Rep-Cog), that generates the paradoxes we encounter in emotion and placebo research. I propose that turning to nonrepresentational accounts of cognition will dissolve these paradoxes. As I move toward conclusion, I propose drawing on the ethnomethodological tradition to respecify human responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld by undertaking ethnographies of members' own situated methods for making intelligible and accountable their attitudinal and nonattitudinal responsiveness to loci of significance in their environment. Philosophical debates about how best to explain emotion or placebo are debates about how best to characterise and explain the distinctive form of human responsiveness to the world that is the object of interest for each of those domains of inquiry. In both cases, what is to be explained, the boundaries of the explananda, are identified in the first instance with the grammar of the vernacular terms: "emotion" and "placebo."
BMJ Medical Humanities, 2020
Empathy is a broad concept that involves the various ways in which we come to know and make conne... more Empathy is a broad concept that involves the various ways in which we come to know and make connections with one another. As medical practice becomes progressively orientated towards a model of engaged partnership, empathy is increasingly important in healthcare. This is often conceived more specifically through the concept of therapeutic empathy, which has two aspects: interpersonal understanding and caring action. The question of how we make connections with one another was also central to the work of the novelist E.M. Forster. In this article we analyse Forster's interpretation of connection-particularly in the novel Howards End-in order to explore and advance current debates on therapeutic empathy. We argue that Forster conceived of connection as a socially embedded act, reminding us that we need to consider how social structures, cultural norms and institutional constraints serve to affect interpersonal connections. From this, we develop a dispositional account of therapeutic empathy in which connection is conceived as neither an instinctive occurrence nor a process of representational inference, but a dynamic process of embodied, embedded and actively engaged enquiry. Our account also suggests that therapeutic empathy is not merely an untrainable reflex but something that can be cultivated. We thus promote two key ideas. First, that empathy should be considered as much a social as an individual phenomenon, and second that empathy training can and should be given to clinicians.
The Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind, 2019
Ethnographic Studies, 2019
Throughout his career, Wes Sharrock has, following in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter... more Throughout his career, Wes Sharrock has, following in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Winch and Harold Garfinkel, sought to argue against accounts of the identity of an action which are the products of a social theory, a specific methodology or what Garfinkel termed formal analysis. In contrast, much of contemporary social science and social theory is grounded in a belief that ordinary or competent members of societies are unreliable authorities on the identity of their own and others' actions because they are subject to systems of sociological refraction. The idea being that ordinary members of society are systematically misled as to the identity of their actions and those of their peers because they-or their perceptions of actions-are subject to the refractive properties of (for example) ideology, or folk theories of action, and so on. In this paper, I subject to analysis this core commitment of much social science and social theory.
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2018
Over 200 years ago, doctors' most effective tools were typically not found in their medical bags.... more Over 200 years ago, doctors' most effective tools were typically not found in their medical bags. Indeed, most treatments in the history of medicine have, until relatively recently, caused more harm than good. Prior to the bio-medical revolution in the late 19th century, doctors' most reliable and effective instruments of healing were their skills of communication with patients and an aptitude for a positive and supportive bedside manner. Bearing out this portrait of medicine, Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1807, noted that " one of the most successful physicians I have ever known has assured me that he used more bread pills, drops of colored water, and powers of hickory ashes, than of all other medicines put together " (qtd. in De Craen et al. 1999, 511). Jefferson referred to these skills of beneficent persuasion as a " pious fraud. " Exactly one hundred years later, in 1907, Mark Twain drew similar observations: " Physicians cure many patients with a bread pill; they know that where the disease is only a fancy, the patient's confidence in the doctor will make the bread pill effective. " Two major developments would downgrade the value of the interpersonal, doctor-patient relationship in professional medicine. The first development was the biomedical revolution. A wave of scientific medical success stories during the latter half of the 19th century would lead to a substantially more effective and reliable treatments and techniques than doctors had ever before employed. Encompassing a range of significant developments for public health and medical
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2018
In 2002, Dan Moerman outlined three candidate explanations for the " placebo response " : the " c... more In 2002, Dan Moerman outlined three candidate explanations for the " placebo response " : the " conditioned stimulus-response, " Irving Kirsch's " response expectancy " explanation, and the " meaning response. " The meaning response, Moerman argued, was the only one of the three candidate explanations that could cover all the data, gained from decades of RCTs and centuries of historical record. Moerman went so far as to propose replacing the term " placebo effect/response " with the term " meaning response, " because people are not responding to placebos, since there is nothing to respond to; people are responding to meanings. There is evidence of medically significant meaning responses where there is no evidence for conditioning. Similarly, there is evidence for such responses where those subject to them lack the knowledge—epistemic capital—required to form the beliefs which might constitute an expectation. Something else, neither conditioning nor propositional attitudes, explained placebo responses, and Moerman proposed the meaning response. While the authors consider the meaning response to avoid the pitfalls of conditioning and response-expectancy, it has been subject to criticism. The criticisms have focused on what is seen as the explanation falling foul of the naturalistic demand and not fitting
There are five ways in which shame might negatively impact upon our attempts to combat and treat ... more There are five ways in which shame might negatively impact upon our attempts to combat and treat HIV.
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician.
Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care.
Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to new sexual partners.
Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be.
Drawing on recent philosophical work on shame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotion, we (a.) propose a framework for understanding how shame operates upon those who experience the emotion, (b.) propose a strategy for combatting the negative role shame plays in the fight against HIV, and (c) suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed.
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Books by Phil Hutchinson
- Katherine Morris, Oxford University
'A fine work: not only does it provide convincing answers to important questions, it also reveals the limitations - and cures some of the blindspots - of much contemporary research on emotions. The discussion of cognitivism is particularly subtle, while the perspicuous presentation of the lived experience of shame might help to resolve some crucial theoretical aporias about the nature and the significance of being a person.'
- Anthony Hatzimoysis, The University of Manchester
'Hutchinson's book is a thoughtful, thorough and interesting work. He offers many striking reflections on emotion, language and, specifically, shame. In showing how different conceptions of emotions are based on problematic conceptions of language, he also goes much deeper than philosophers usually when they write about this subject.'
- Ylva Gustafsson, Philosophical Investigations
'Shame and Philosophy is an engaging philosophical effort to explore reflection about emotion with its relevant connection to personhood. Phil Hutchinson offers a careful reflection that establishes a dialogue among current research both from the analytical and the continental traditions. This novel approach to philosophy of emotions provides, just like Hutchinson wants, a conceptual network for a better understanding of how emotions make up our world.'
- Dina Mendonça, Metapsychology online
Abstract
In an important contribution to the burgeoning area of philosophy of emotions, Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. Shame and Philosophy advances a framework for understanding emotion: world-taking cognitivism. He argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of our world and ourselves. The book contains detailed engagements with theorists of emotions such as Peter Goldie, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz and Jenefer Robinson as well as a chapter on the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which also contains a detailed critical engagement with Jacques Derrida's work. The Chapter on Griffiths' work also contains a detailed critique of the program of natural kind semantics. As the book progresses it becomes more and more concerned to meditate on shame as discussed by Primo Levi and other survivors of extreme trauma. The book moves towards conclusion by suggesting further directions for study."
The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined.
Papers by Phil Hutchinson
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician.
Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care.
Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to new sexual partners.
Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be.
Drawing on recent philosophical work on shame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotion, we (a.) propose a framework for understanding how shame operates upon those who experience the emotion, (b.) propose a strategy for combatting the negative role shame plays in the fight against HIV, and (c) suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed.
- Katherine Morris, Oxford University
'A fine work: not only does it provide convincing answers to important questions, it also reveals the limitations - and cures some of the blindspots - of much contemporary research on emotions. The discussion of cognitivism is particularly subtle, while the perspicuous presentation of the lived experience of shame might help to resolve some crucial theoretical aporias about the nature and the significance of being a person.'
- Anthony Hatzimoysis, The University of Manchester
'Hutchinson's book is a thoughtful, thorough and interesting work. He offers many striking reflections on emotion, language and, specifically, shame. In showing how different conceptions of emotions are based on problematic conceptions of language, he also goes much deeper than philosophers usually when they write about this subject.'
- Ylva Gustafsson, Philosophical Investigations
'Shame and Philosophy is an engaging philosophical effort to explore reflection about emotion with its relevant connection to personhood. Phil Hutchinson offers a careful reflection that establishes a dialogue among current research both from the analytical and the continental traditions. This novel approach to philosophy of emotions provides, just like Hutchinson wants, a conceptual network for a better understanding of how emotions make up our world.'
- Dina Mendonça, Metapsychology online
Abstract
In an important contribution to the burgeoning area of philosophy of emotions, Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. Shame and Philosophy advances a framework for understanding emotion: world-taking cognitivism. He argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of our world and ourselves. The book contains detailed engagements with theorists of emotions such as Peter Goldie, Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz and Jenefer Robinson as well as a chapter on the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which also contains a detailed critical engagement with Jacques Derrida's work. The Chapter on Griffiths' work also contains a detailed critique of the program of natural kind semantics. As the book progresses it becomes more and more concerned to meditate on shame as discussed by Primo Levi and other survivors of extreme trauma. The book moves towards conclusion by suggesting further directions for study."
The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined.
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician.
Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care.
Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.
Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to new sexual partners.
Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be.
Drawing on recent philosophical work on shame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotion, we (a.) propose a framework for understanding how shame operates upon those who experience the emotion, (b.) propose a strategy for combatting the negative role shame plays in the fight against HIV, and (c) suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed.
Trans. Azambuja, Martini & Sattler
this version published in Revista de Filosofia Aurora v.28 n.44 2016 pp.689-716
1. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing all the relevant facts about their sexual history to the clinician.
2. Shame can be a motivational factor in people living with HIV not engaging with or being retained in care.
3. Shame can prevent individuals from presenting at clinics for STI and HIV testing.
4. Shame can prevent an individual from disclosing their HIV (or STI) status to new sexual partners.
5. Shame can serve to psychologically imprison people, it makes the task of living with HIV a far more negative experience than it should, or needs to, be.
Drawing on recent philosophical work on shame, and more broadly on work in the philosophy and psychology of emotion, we (a.) propose a framework for understanding how shame operates upon those who experience the emotion, (b.) propose a strategy for combatting the negative role shame plays in the fight against HIV, and (c) suggest further study so as to identify the tactics that might be employed in pursuing the strategy here proposed.