Andrew Melnyk
I am the author, most recently, of Phenomenal Properties and the Intuition of Distinctness: The View from the Inside (OUP, 2025), in which I try to explain why we might find it impossible to believe that phenomenal conscious is purely physical, even if in fact it is. An earlier book, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (CUP, 2003), sought to formulate a comprehensive thesis of physicalism (or materialism) in terms of a carefully-defined relation of realization, to explore the implications of physicalism for various reductionist theses, to defend its consistency with causal claims made in the special sciences and everyday life, and to display empirical evidence that it is true.
But I'm interested in all aspects of the philosophy of mind and in many aspects of general philosophy of science and of metaphysics. I've also written about naturalism, philosophical methodology, and (a little bit) the philosophy of language.
I'm a professor of philosophy in (and a former chair of) the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri. I was born in London, England, and educated at St.Paul’s School, London, and Oxford University, where I studied philosophy as an undergraduate under C.C.W. Taylor and Jennifer Hornsby, and as a graduate student under Jennifer Hornsby again, Jonathan Barnes, Michael Dummett, Michael Woods, and Bill Newton-Smith.
Here you will find my CV, which lists all my philosophical publications, and a version of (or link to) nearly all of my published work since 2001. There are also a few unpublished pieces, including my doctoral dissertation. Some are works in progress, while others, if of value at all, are of pedagogical value only.
Supervisors: Michael Dummett and William Newton-Smith
Phone: (573) 884 0906
Address: Department of Philosophy
123 Middlebush Hall
University of Missouri
Columbia, MO 65211
But I'm interested in all aspects of the philosophy of mind and in many aspects of general philosophy of science and of metaphysics. I've also written about naturalism, philosophical methodology, and (a little bit) the philosophy of language.
I'm a professor of philosophy in (and a former chair of) the Philosophy Department at the University of Missouri. I was born in London, England, and educated at St.Paul’s School, London, and Oxford University, where I studied philosophy as an undergraduate under C.C.W. Taylor and Jennifer Hornsby, and as a graduate student under Jennifer Hornsby again, Jonathan Barnes, Michael Dummett, Michael Woods, and Bill Newton-Smith.
Here you will find my CV, which lists all my philosophical publications, and a version of (or link to) nearly all of my published work since 2001. There are also a few unpublished pieces, including my doctoral dissertation. Some are works in progress, while others, if of value at all, are of pedagogical value only.
Supervisors: Michael Dummett and William Newton-Smith
Phone: (573) 884 0906
Address: Department of Philosophy
123 Middlebush Hall
University of Missouri
Columbia, MO 65211
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Academic Papers (Since 2001) by Andrew Melnyk
Eliminative type physicalism is apt to face three objections, and so my thesis, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. In the first, I argue against the idea that there are tenable positions, both physicalist and non-physicalist, alternative to eliminative type physicalism. I argue that each of these positions token physicalism (Fodor, middle Putnam), supervenience physicalism (Lewis, Horgan) and and a non-physicalist view I call pluralism (Goodman, late Putnam)
is defective. In the second part, responding to the objection that there is just no reason to be a physicalist, I develop a positive argument for eliminative type physicalism, an argument resting upon a strong version of the explanatory test for reality according to which only explanatorily indispensable properties can justifiably be said to exist. In the third and final part, I argue, against the charge that eliminative type physicalism cannot accommodate what I call phenomenal properties (qualia, raw feels etc.), that there is no good reason to deny, and one good reason to affirm, that phenomenal properties just are physical properties.
I should, however, caution the potential reader that my interpretation of how Ladyman and Ross mean to argue from physics to their striking metaphysical conclusion turned out to be incorrect.
Some recent naturalistic philosophers of science (e.g., Larry Shapiro) have inquired how far mental phenomena are in actual fact multiply—as opposed to uniformly—realized. I applaud this line of inquiry. I hope to contribute to it in a small way by proposing an account of what multiple realization—actual multiple realization—amounts to; this account has an advantage over the only other developed account of actual multiple realization known to me, that given in (Shapiro 2004).