Papers by Philip A . Pucillo
Is federal diversity jurisdiction case-specific or claim-specific? Consider a state-law case in f... more Is federal diversity jurisdiction case-specific or claim-specific? Consider a state-law case in federal court between a Texas plaintiff and two defendants — one from California and the other from Texas. The complete-diversity rule taught to every first-year law student makes clear that, when the diversity defect is noted, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action as a whole. The court cannot, therefore, proceed with either claim as long as the nondiverse claim remains. But does the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction nevertheless extend to the diverse claim, such that the case can continue if the spoiler is dismissed? This question is both pervasive and unsettled. We identify and explore two possible answers, each based on a different theory of subject-matter jurisdiction. The first we denote “joint jurisdiction ”— an all-or-nothing theory — under which the presence of a nondiverse claim contaminates the whole case and deprives the court of diversity jurisdiction o...
In the recent cases of Kontrick v. Ryan, Eberhart v. United States, and Bowles v. Russell, the Su... more In the recent cases of Kontrick v. Ryan, Eberhart v. United States, and Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court addressed the critical distinction between two kinds of mandatory timing prescriptions: one that directly governs a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and one that merely governs a court's administration of a proceeding over which its subject-matter jurisdiction is not in doubt. While noncompliance with the former will deprive the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the proceeding, noncompliance with the latter, which the Court has colloquially described as an inflexible claim-processing rule, will result in a litigant's forfeiture of the opportunity to raise a timeliness challenge once the court has adjudicated the proceeding on the merits. This Article seeks to address the implications of the three cases in question for at least two types of timing prescriptions routinely confronted by federal appellate litigants. The first concerns the initiation of an appeal as of right. Although the traditional understanding was that the relevant timing restrictions were jurisdictional regardless of the nature of the underlying proceeding or the status of the appellant, the Court has since confirmed that this understanding no longer pertains to appeals initiated by criminal defendants because the governing timing restrictions are not prescribed by statute. Accordingly, the government's failure to object to a defendant's appeal on timeliness grounds prior to its adjudication on the merits will result in a forfeiture of that objection. The second timing prescription concerns the filing in civil proceedings of certain post-judgment motions that routinely precede an appeal from the judgment. The requirements for the timely filing of such a motion, like the requirements for the timely filing of appeal as of right, had long been regarded as jurisdictional prerequisites. But because those restrictions are not prescribed by statute, they are now properly understood as mere processing rules that are subject to forfeiture by a litigant who fails to object on timeliness grounds before the district court's adjudication of the motion on the merits.
A federal court of appeals ordinarily has no authority to entertain an appeal that is filed out o... more A federal court of appeals ordinarily has no authority to entertain an appeal that is filed out of time. On occasion, however, the untimeliness of an appeal will result not from the appellant's carelessness or lack of familiarity with governing timing prescriptions, but instead from reasonable reliance upon a district court's representation that the appeal period would be lengthier than it turned out to be. To provide the courts of appeals with an equitable basis upon which to reach the merits of such an appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized what has come to be known as the unique circumstances doctrine. Employing this approach, the courts of appeals were able to preserve numerous appeals that were technically untimely. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the unique circumstances doctrine, however, have narrowed it almost completely out of existence. Specifically, the Court recently declared that, given the jurisdictional nature of the timing prescriptions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, the doctrine can no longer be applied in the context in which it was most often implicated: an appeal as of right from a decision by a federal district court in a civil proceeding. Even before that decision, the Court had generated significant confusion by imposing conditions for the doctrine's application that were both unduly demanding and inconsistent with its original understanding. Ironically, as a consequence of either of these rulings, the doctrine no longer encompasses the circumstances giving rise to Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., the very case in which the Court initially recognized and invoked the doctrine. The courts of appeals have thus been deprived of discretion to reach the merits of many appeals that would have fallen within the purview of the doctrine as originally conceived. This Article urges that Congress reclaim legislatively the essence of the unique circumstances doctrine that the Supreme Court had implemented judicially in Harris. Such a measure would involve an amendment to § 2107 codifying a formulation of the doctrine that comports with its original understanding. To derive that formulation, this Article examines Harris and the Court's other key decisions addressing the doctrine. The formulation ultimately reached is that in determining whether an appeal is timely, a court of appeals is bound to accept as true any representation of a district court upon which a litigant reasonably relies in foregoing an opportunity to initiate an indisputably timely appeal. This quasi-estoppel approach to the doctrine appropriately emphasizes the notion that the timeliness of an appeal should not be governed by ordinarily applicable timing prescriptions when the appellant would have complied with those prescriptions but for the district court's representation that more time to appeal would be available. Instead, the court of appeals must assume the truth of the district court's representation, even if legally erroneous, and assess the timeliness of the appeal accordingly.
for their counsel and encouragement throughout the preparation of this Article and to Anthony Sta... more for their counsel and encouragement throughout the preparation of this Article and to Anthony Starkus, Karlye Horton, and Cimarron Gilson for their contributions to its content. 1. Dillon v. United States, 184 F.3d 556, 559 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Ryan, J., dissenting). 2. Following a restyling of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1998, Rule 3(c) was converted from a single paragraph of text into five numbered paragraphs, with the first of these paragraphs containing the respective content requirements of a notice of appeal in the lettered subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C).
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Papers by Philip A . Pucillo