My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I a... more My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel’s classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn from Torbjörn Tännsjö’s well-known article ‘Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?’ Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it (i.e. though talent per se). If we may call this puzzle ‘the talent problem,’ the questions driving the present work are as follows: (1) what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and (2) can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and therefore sports) are more praiseworthy than simpler ones because the former require an athlete to nurture a more complex matrix of talents, skills, and capacities and are therefore less vulnerable to the natural lottery.
The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not wa... more The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not warrant proscription. They are wrong because they propagate false or misleading beliefs about others and contribute to disrespectful misrelationships. This moral wrong lacks the weight to warrant proscription because of the countervailing weight of free-expression and the fact that Native mascots are mere offensive nuisances rather than profound offenses. Because Native mascots are morally wrong they ought to be challenged and resisted, but without recourse to legislature.
Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen ... more Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen Pearson’s Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics and Mark J. Hamilton’s There’s No Lying in Baseball (Wink, Wink). On a Kantian foundation, I argue that attempts to deceive officials, such as framing pitches in baseball, are morally unacceptable because they necessarily regard others (e.g., the umpire) as incompetent and as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. More dramatically I argue, contrary to Pearson and Hamilton, that some forms of competitor-to-competitor deception (which Pearson labels ‘strategic deception’) are similarly unacceptable. Specifically, I offer a ‘principle of caustic deceit’ according to which any strategic deception that divorces a game from its constitutive skills is morally untoward and ought to be met with negative social pressure at least, and/or legislated out of existence. The problem with these forms of strategic deception is that they treat one’s opponents, again in the Kantian sense, as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends.
My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I a... more My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel's classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn from Torbjörn Tännsjö's well-known article 'Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?' Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it (i.e. though talent per se). If we may call this puzzle 'the talent problem,' the questions driving the present work are as follows: (1) what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and (2) can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and therefore sports) are more praiseworthy than simpler ones because the former require an athlete to nurture a more complex matrix of talents, skills, and capacities and are therefore less vulnerable to the natural lottery.
Applying Bernard Suits’ conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual de... more Applying Bernard Suits’ conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual definition of sport, I ask and answer the following question: can hunting be a sport? An affirmative answer is substantiated via the following logic. Premise one, all sports are games. Premise two, a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Premise three, fair-chase hunters voluntarily accept unnecessary obstacles. Conclusion one: fair-chase hunting is a game. Premise four, a sport can be defined as a game that requires the exercise of physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability. Premise five, some fair-chase hunts require physical skill, have a wide following, and have institutional stability. Conclusion two, fair-chase hunting that requires physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability is a sport. After substantiating each premise and conclusion I consider and refute several important objections. Primarily, 1) that hunting lacks constitutive rules and 2) that hunting lacks volitional engagement and thus cannot be a game or sport
The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not wa... more The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not warrant proscription. They are wrong because they propagate false or misleading beliefs about others and contribute to disrespectful misrelationships. This moral wrong lacks the weight to warrant proscription because of the countervailing weight of free-expression and the fact that Native mascots are mere offensive nuisances rather than profound offenses. Because Native mascots are morally wrong they ought to be challenged and resisted, but without recourse to legislature.
Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, co... more Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, conservation, heurism, and atavism. More importantly, some hunting is valued intrinsically. A particular form of hunting (i.e., fair-chase hunting) is a game and game playing, categorically, is often valued intrinsically. This view can be further supported with an application of a concept of caring and an accompanying argument that hunting generally, and fair-chase hunting in particular, is cared about deeply by millions of its practitioners. There are normative grounds for a shift in the way that hunting is valued. While hunting as game playing is valued and cared about deeply by millions of fair-chase practitioners, which is (morally) far more important than any of its various instrumentalities, the position that such hunting is morally villainous can be sustained.
My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I a... more My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel’s classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn from Torbjörn Tännsjö’s well-known article ‘Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?’ Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it (i.e. though talent per se). If we may call this puzzle ‘the talent problem,’ the questions driving the present work are as follows: (1) what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and (2) can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and therefore sports) are more praiseworthy than simpler ones because the former require an athlete to nurture a more complex matrix of talents, skills, and capacities and are therefore less vulnerable to the natural lottery.
The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not wa... more The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not warrant proscription. They are wrong because they propagate false or misleading beliefs about others and contribute to disrespectful misrelationships. This moral wrong lacks the weight to warrant proscription because of the countervailing weight of free-expression and the fact that Native mascots are mere offensive nuisances rather than profound offenses. Because Native mascots are morally wrong they ought to be challenged and resisted, but without recourse to legislature.
Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen ... more Herein I address and extend the sparse literature on deception in sports, specifically, Kathleen Pearson’s Deception, Sportsmanship, and Ethics and Mark J. Hamilton’s There’s No Lying in Baseball (Wink, Wink). On a Kantian foundation, I argue that attempts to deceive officials, such as framing pitches in baseball, are morally unacceptable because they necessarily regard others (e.g., the umpire) as incompetent and as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends. More dramatically I argue, contrary to Pearson and Hamilton, that some forms of competitor-to-competitor deception (which Pearson labels ‘strategic deception’) are similarly unacceptable. Specifically, I offer a ‘principle of caustic deceit’ according to which any strategic deception that divorces a game from its constitutive skills is morally untoward and ought to be met with negative social pressure at least, and/or legislated out of existence. The problem with these forms of strategic deception is that they treat one’s opponents, again in the Kantian sense, as a mere means to one’s own self-interested ends.
My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I a... more My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel's classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn from Torbjörn Tännsjö's well-known article 'Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?' Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it (i.e. though talent per se). If we may call this puzzle 'the talent problem,' the questions driving the present work are as follows: (1) what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and (2) can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and therefore sports) are more praiseworthy than simpler ones because the former require an athlete to nurture a more complex matrix of talents, skills, and capacities and are therefore less vulnerable to the natural lottery.
Applying Bernard Suits’ conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual de... more Applying Bernard Suits’ conceptual definition of game-playing, and his outline of a conceptual definition of sport, I ask and answer the following question: can hunting be a sport? An affirmative answer is substantiated via the following logic. Premise one, all sports are games. Premise two, a game is a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Premise three, fair-chase hunters voluntarily accept unnecessary obstacles. Conclusion one: fair-chase hunting is a game. Premise four, a sport can be defined as a game that requires the exercise of physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability. Premise five, some fair-chase hunts require physical skill, have a wide following, and have institutional stability. Conclusion two, fair-chase hunting that requires physical skill, has a wide following, and institutional stability is a sport. After substantiating each premise and conclusion I consider and refute several important objections. Primarily, 1) that hunting lacks constitutive rules and 2) that hunting lacks volitional engagement and thus cannot be a game or sport
The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not wa... more The two-part thesis of this work is that Native mascots are morally wrong but that they do not warrant proscription. They are wrong because they propagate false or misleading beliefs about others and contribute to disrespectful misrelationships. This moral wrong lacks the weight to warrant proscription because of the countervailing weight of free-expression and the fact that Native mascots are mere offensive nuisances rather than profound offenses. Because Native mascots are morally wrong they ought to be challenged and resisted, but without recourse to legislature.
Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, co... more Hunting is typically valued for its instrumentality for food procurement, wildlife management, conservation, heurism, and atavism. More importantly, some hunting is valued intrinsically. A particular form of hunting (i.e., fair-chase hunting) is a game and game playing, categorically, is often valued intrinsically. This view can be further supported with an application of a concept of caring and an accompanying argument that hunting generally, and fair-chase hunting in particular, is cared about deeply by millions of its practitioners. There are normative grounds for a shift in the way that hunting is valued. While hunting as game playing is valued and cared about deeply by millions of fair-chase practitioners, which is (morally) far more important than any of its various instrumentalities, the position that such hunting is morally villainous can be sustained.
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