Papers by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
The Gospel of Matthew and Judaic Traditions, 2015
The Gospel of Matthew and Judaic Traditions, 2015
ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the ways in which Iranian political leaders responded to the even... more ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the ways in which Iranian political leaders responded to the events of 9/11 and rhetorically appropriated the U.S. “war on terror” in support of Iranian foreign policy objectives. From the Iranian point of view, US President George W. Bush’s uncompromising assertion that “you are either for us or against us” posed both dangers and opportunities. Ultimately, Iran would choose to reject both options. In the three and a half months between Sept. 11, 2001 and Bush’s State of the Union address on Jan 29, 2002, Iran was remarkably successful in taking advantage of the US “war on terror” in attaining several of its long-term foreign policy objectives. Bush’s denunciation of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” helped to undermine the domestic political positions of some Iranian political leaders who had been the strongest advocates of rapprochement with Europe and the US, but it strengthened the position of Iranian hardliners and ideologues and set the stage for the defeat of pragmatists and reformists during Iran’s 2005 election.
Presented at the Middle East and Central Asia (MECA) Conference
Univ. of Utah, Sept. 7-9, 2006
tritaparsi.com
... Uri Lubrani, appointed to head the Israeli “trade mission” in Tehran in 1973, was unsuccessfu... more ... Uri Lubrani, appointed to head the Israeli “trade mission” in Tehran in 1973, was unsuccessfully attempting to present his diplomatic credentials to the Shah, a move that would both have elevated him to ambassador-type status and signified Iran's de jure recognition of Israel ...
This paper (presented to the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis Conference in Orlando, FL ... more This paper (presented to the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis Conference in Orlando, FL in April, 2004) examines the ways in which Israeli and Iranian political leaders rhetorically appropriated the U.S. “war on terror” in support of their own foreign policy goals after the September 11th attacks. It observes some interesting and rather unique features of Israeli and Iranian public diplomacy that have not, to the author's knowledge, been closely analyzed from a comparative perspective.
Israel’s rhetorical campaign against Iran since September 11, 2001, has had four objectives. All had been foreign policy priorities for at least a decade. What was new was the opportunity to legitimize and achieve them as a concomitant of the U.S. “war against terror” declared by President George W. Bush. They include 1) upgrading and formalizing Israel’s strategic and security links with the U.S.; 2) preventing the normalization, or even moderate improvement, in relations between the U.S. and Iran; 2) blaming Iranian interference and support for terrorism for Israel’s failure to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians and 4) preserving Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East by convincing the U.S. to either destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and potential or to acquiesce to Israel’s doing so in a preemptive strike similar to the attack on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in June 1981.
From the Iranian perspective, the “war on terror” and Bush’s uncompromising assertion that “you are either for us or against us” posed both dangers and opportunities. The greatest danger was that Iran might become the direct target of a U.S. strike against “Islamic fundamentalism.” But the “the war on terror” also seemed to present, at its outset, the possibility that the U.S. might modify its position sufficiently so as to allow for Iran’s inclusion in a coalition of “anti-terrorist” Muslim states. Within a week of the 9/11 attacks, Iran had articulated four demands which would influence its participation in such a coalition: 1) the insistence that military action in the “war against terrorism” be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations rather than of the United States; 2) a definition of “terrorism” that would encompass Israeli actions against Palestinians and Lebanon; 3) a crackdown by the U.S. and Europe on the activities of the Mojahedin-e Khalq; and 4) the assurance that the regime replacing the Taliban in Afghanistan would not be hostile to Iran.
(This paper is being made available to academia.edu more than a decade after its presentation at the CIRA Conference because the arguments presented have retained their salience and are very much part of the debate on all sides about a nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. Its detailed documentation from Israeli and Iranian media sources provide a useful timeline leading up to the current debate.)
Drafts by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
most up to date list of errata to our book Brill 2015
Conference Presentations by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
"Headlines and Red Lines" proposes two vectors for analyzing Israeli discourse concerning the urg... more "Headlines and Red Lines" proposes two vectors for analyzing Israeli discourse concerning the urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat. The Headlines vector juxtaposes points of U.S. pressure on Israel to make territorial concessions with corresponding upsurges in media emphasis on the threat posed to Israel by Iran. The "Red Lines" vector relates the time frame of Israeli predictions of how close or far Iran is from acquiring a nuclear weapon to the availability and pending acquisition advanced weaponry from the U.S. Much of the debate in Israeli military circles over whether and when Israel should attack Iran has explicitly or implicitly hinged on the pending availability of the F-35 Joint Strike Force, which has been plagued by cost overruns and design flaws. Those advocating restraint have been arguing that Israel should wait until it has the enhanced military capabilities of the F-35 before striking. (Presented at the 2011 Middle East Studies Association Conference in Washington DC.)
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Papers by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
Presented at the Middle East and Central Asia (MECA) Conference
Univ. of Utah, Sept. 7-9, 2006
Israel’s rhetorical campaign against Iran since September 11, 2001, has had four objectives. All had been foreign policy priorities for at least a decade. What was new was the opportunity to legitimize and achieve them as a concomitant of the U.S. “war against terror” declared by President George W. Bush. They include 1) upgrading and formalizing Israel’s strategic and security links with the U.S.; 2) preventing the normalization, or even moderate improvement, in relations between the U.S. and Iran; 2) blaming Iranian interference and support for terrorism for Israel’s failure to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians and 4) preserving Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East by convincing the U.S. to either destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and potential or to acquiesce to Israel’s doing so in a preemptive strike similar to the attack on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in June 1981.
From the Iranian perspective, the “war on terror” and Bush’s uncompromising assertion that “you are either for us or against us” posed both dangers and opportunities. The greatest danger was that Iran might become the direct target of a U.S. strike against “Islamic fundamentalism.” But the “the war on terror” also seemed to present, at its outset, the possibility that the U.S. might modify its position sufficiently so as to allow for Iran’s inclusion in a coalition of “anti-terrorist” Muslim states. Within a week of the 9/11 attacks, Iran had articulated four demands which would influence its participation in such a coalition: 1) the insistence that military action in the “war against terrorism” be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations rather than of the United States; 2) a definition of “terrorism” that would encompass Israeli actions against Palestinians and Lebanon; 3) a crackdown by the U.S. and Europe on the activities of the Mojahedin-e Khalq; and 4) the assurance that the regime replacing the Taliban in Afghanistan would not be hostile to Iran.
(This paper is being made available to academia.edu more than a decade after its presentation at the CIRA Conference because the arguments presented have retained their salience and are very much part of the debate on all sides about a nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. Its detailed documentation from Israeli and Iranian media sources provide a useful timeline leading up to the current debate.)
Drafts by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
Conference Presentations by Marsha B Cohen, PhD
Presented at the Middle East and Central Asia (MECA) Conference
Univ. of Utah, Sept. 7-9, 2006
Israel’s rhetorical campaign against Iran since September 11, 2001, has had four objectives. All had been foreign policy priorities for at least a decade. What was new was the opportunity to legitimize and achieve them as a concomitant of the U.S. “war against terror” declared by President George W. Bush. They include 1) upgrading and formalizing Israel’s strategic and security links with the U.S.; 2) preventing the normalization, or even moderate improvement, in relations between the U.S. and Iran; 2) blaming Iranian interference and support for terrorism for Israel’s failure to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians and 4) preserving Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East by convincing the U.S. to either destroy Iran’s nuclear capability and potential or to acquiesce to Israel’s doing so in a preemptive strike similar to the attack on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in June 1981.
From the Iranian perspective, the “war on terror” and Bush’s uncompromising assertion that “you are either for us or against us” posed both dangers and opportunities. The greatest danger was that Iran might become the direct target of a U.S. strike against “Islamic fundamentalism.” But the “the war on terror” also seemed to present, at its outset, the possibility that the U.S. might modify its position sufficiently so as to allow for Iran’s inclusion in a coalition of “anti-terrorist” Muslim states. Within a week of the 9/11 attacks, Iran had articulated four demands which would influence its participation in such a coalition: 1) the insistence that military action in the “war against terrorism” be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations rather than of the United States; 2) a definition of “terrorism” that would encompass Israeli actions against Palestinians and Lebanon; 3) a crackdown by the U.S. and Europe on the activities of the Mojahedin-e Khalq; and 4) the assurance that the regime replacing the Taliban in Afghanistan would not be hostile to Iran.
(This paper is being made available to academia.edu more than a decade after its presentation at the CIRA Conference because the arguments presented have retained their salience and are very much part of the debate on all sides about a nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. Its detailed documentation from Israeli and Iranian media sources provide a useful timeline leading up to the current debate.)