Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicis... more Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicists have argued that this means they have moral value. However, law’s appreciation of individual animals as subjects with greater protection has been slow, despite the extreme threats that animals face today from human sources like climate change impacts and industrial exploitation. Personhood has been heralded by some as a new legal status to protect animals, but the meaning of “legal personhood” has been neglected. Most recently, New York’s highest court decided in a case of first impression that an elephant named Happy is not a legal person and does not have a right to liberty—over two important dissents.
This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their legal “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights as a matter of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require stronger legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood in law is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, considering their species-based capabilities, and correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold any right. Basic rights are not enough by themselves to justify legal personhood, but recognizing them may lead to personhood for animals in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.
Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicis... more Growing scientific evidence shows that vast numbers of nonhuman animals are sentient, and ethicists have argued that this means they have moral value. However, law’s appreciation of individual animals as subjects with greater protection has been slow, despite the extreme threats that animals face today from human sources like climate change impacts and industrial exploitation. Personhood has been heralded by some as a new legal status to protect animals, but the meaning of “legal personhood” has been neglected. Most recently, New York’s highest court decided in a case of first impression that an elephant named Happy is not a legal person and does not have a right to liberty—over two important dissents.
This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their legal “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights as a matter of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require stronger legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood in law is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, considering their species-based capabilities, and correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold any right. Basic rights are not enough by themselves to justify legal personhood, but recognizing them may lead to personhood for animals in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.
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Papers by Ethan Prall
This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their legal “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights as a matter of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require stronger legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood in law is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, considering their species-based capabilities, and correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold any right. Basic rights are not enough by themselves to justify legal personhood, but recognizing them may lead to personhood for animals in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.
This Article offers a new synthesis of views regarding the moral status of animals, their legal “basic rights,” and the relationship between basic rights and legal personhood. I argue that sentient animals have moral status that requires recognition of basic rights as a matter of justice, which may lead to legal personhood over the long term. First, I argue that at least sentient animals have moral status and are subjects of justice who require stronger legal protections. Then, I assess a new “bundle theory” of legal personhood that shows that personhood in law is a cluster concept composed of multiple “incidents.” I argue that American law should better recognize basic rights to bodily integrity, liberty, and probably life for sentient animals, considering their species-based capabilities, and correct a mistaken view that personhood is the simple ability to hold any right. Basic rights are not enough by themselves to justify legal personhood, but recognizing them may lead to personhood for animals in time. To inform litigation, I also show how the bundle theory helps to explain the important disagreement between the judges in Happy’s case. Finally, I suggest that both legislatures and judges can work to enhance animal legal rights, and perhaps eventually legal personhood, in the United States.