Papers by Andrew Brower Latz
Gillian Rose
The Literary Encyclopedia, 2024
Brief introduction to her work and thought.
Should devices replace paper? The student experience
Impact, 2023
Misrecognitions: Gillian Rose and the Task of Political Theology, 2018
in Misrecognitions: Gillian Rose and
the Task of Political Theology ed. by Joshua Davis (Eugene,... more in Misrecognitions: Gillian Rose and
the Task of Political Theology ed. by Joshua Davis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, in press).
3 vols., ed. by Werner Bonefeld, Beverley Best, Chris O’Kane and Neil Larsen (London: Sage, 2018).
Long form review of Colin Crouch's 'The Knowledge Corrupters.'
The adjective 'indescribable' performs a one-word contradiction. Nevertheless, by the early ninet... more The adjective 'indescribable' performs a one-word contradiction. Nevertheless, by the early nineties it had become widely believed in certain post-structuralist philosophical circles that the Holocaust was indescribable and unknowable. Carolin Emcke argues in her latest book, Because it is Sayable: On Witness and Justice, that not only are genocide, atrocities and violent crimes describable, knowable and communicable, but the victims of such crimes often want their stories to be told and heard, and it is a matter of justice for society to hear them. (As Emcke's book has not yet been translated into English all quotations in the following are my own translations). The late Gillian Rose had already taken aim at such post-structuralist views in 1994 in a presentation called 'Beginnings of the day-Fascism and representation'. One of the mistakes of such philosophy, she argued, was conflating pat answers with comprehension. The Holocaust itself is not ineffable, and to claim as much, and then to infer from the claim that 'representation' itself is somehow fatally inadequate and even to blame for what happened, does not help. Indeed, 'the argument for the overcoming of representation, in its aesthetic, philosophical and political versions, converges with the inner tendency of Fascism itself,' wrote Rose, insofar as it makes criticism all the more difficult to carry out. Rose accused these philosophers of a pseudo-religious, misty-eyed failure to think clearly about how best to respond to the horrors of the twentieth century, which she dubbed 'Holocaust piety'. In its stead she urged 'Holocaust ethnography'. Rose had some influence on those who study artistic representations of the Holocaust but she did not carry the day in the field of continental philosophy
Network Externalities and the Disaster of Brexit
This article examine Rose’s claim in Hegel Contra Sociology that Hegel’s philosophy, properly und... more This article examine Rose’s claim in Hegel Contra Sociology that Hegel’s philosophy, properly understood, is able to provide a better way to do sociology. It understands this claim as one of method and metatheory: by better appreciating the logic of sociology and the social nature of logic, and the relationship between theory and metatheory, social theory may be less prone to make certain errors. Rose found in Hegel’s logic and phenomenology the way to such understanding. By pushing Rose’s work in a direction she did not explicitly take it, this article shows how it nevertheless addresses some central debates in sociological theory. It finds that her version of Hegelian conceptual knowing can speak to and cope with issues of logic and the sociology of knowledge, the repeated recurrence of contradictions and antinomies in sociology, and issues of emergence and the social totality. It finds a possible source of the repeated recurrence of positivism in sociology suggested by Rose’s critique of neo-Kantianism: faulty methodological self-understanding. Rose’s work on social theory can then be seen as in part offering a better account of what good sociology already does. While in no way imagining that this approach does justice to the whole of Rose’s thought, it shows her fiercely theoretical work is effective not only in philosophy but also in sociology, which is consistent with her dismay at their disciplinary separation.
NB Telos owns the copyright.
NB proof only, not for citation.
Rose argues that sociology grounds itself on a problematic mix... more NB proof only, not for citation.
Rose argues that sociology grounds itself on a problematic mixture of neo-Kantian transcendental logic and Hegelian conceptual logic, but only the latter can provide the epistemology and normativity that social theory needs. Methodological clarity, she urges, could help avoid certain temptations and reductions within social theory. Examining her critique of neo-Kantian sociology and, briefly, Hegelian conceptual logic, substantiates this view.
PROOF ONLY. NOT FOR CITATION.
The British social philosopher Gillian Rose (1947–1995) developed, ... more PROOF ONLY. NOT FOR CITATION.
The British social philosopher Gillian Rose (1947–1995) developed, in Dialectic of Nihilism, a way of posing the problem of ideology by showing the dependence of philosophical and social thought on historical legal concepts. She termed it ‘jurisprudential wisdom’ and through it aimed to expose unexamined presuppositions within philosophical consciousness and thereby to perform ideology critique on such consciousness. This article examines Rose’s version of ideology critique, first by setting out its context within post-Kantian thought and Rose’s own intellectual project. It then tackles in detail Rose’s view that Roman law significantly shapes Kant’s form of rationality as a whole. It concludes that her argument is suggestive and highlights important features of Kant’s thought, but that it ultimately fails as an ideology critique. It does not follow that Rose’s form of ideology critique via jurisprudence fails as a whole; on the contrary, it retains plausibility. Rose’s misfire against Kant is a salutary lesson in the dangers of ideology critique and Kant’s survival of Rose’s attack is important for the assessment of his philosophy.
Kate Schick's book is a strong and welcome addition to the fairly small secondary literature on G... more Kate Schick's book is a strong and welcome addition to the fairly small secondary literature on Gillian Rose, one of the more unjustly neglected social philosophers of recent years. It is part of Schick's aim to rectify this situation by prompting a kind of rediscovery of Rose… Kate Schick works as a radical political theorist, which discipline is arguably closer to the heart of Rose's thought than the religious element or the postmodern continental philosophy picked up by Shanks and Lloyd. Schick's major contribution in comparison to these earlier works is twofold: to contextualize Rose thoroughly within both speculative Hegelian philosophy and Adornian critical theory (rather than only the former), and to show the power of Rose's thought for political theory.
The published and ecclesial work of Andrew Shanks, Manchester Cathedral's canon theologian, has b... more The published and ecclesial work of Andrew Shanks, Manchester Cathedral's canon theologian, has been driven over the last twenty years by a concern to promote the sacrality of the "solidarity of the shaken." This solidarity across confessions is based on openness to difficult realities and is sometimes induced by historical and political trauma. Shanks sees Hegel as interested in how to build political community that is maximally open to and "respectful of thoughtful dissent" and public debate (157), or how best to promote and give traction to the solidarity of the shaken.
Written in reaction to Carys Moseley, ‘Rowan Williams as Hegelian Political Theologian: Resacrali... more Written in reaction to Carys Moseley, ‘Rowan Williams as Hegelian Political Theologian: Resacralising Secular Politics’, The Heythrop Journal, (early view, first published online 2nd February 2012 (53 (3), pp.362-81)), this response expresses my strong disagreements with Moseley in what I hope is a courteous and gracious manner.
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Papers by Andrew Brower Latz
the Task of Political Theology ed. by Joshua Davis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, in press).
NB Telos owns the copyright.
Rose argues that sociology grounds itself on a problematic mixture of neo-Kantian transcendental logic and Hegelian conceptual logic, but only the latter can provide the epistemology and normativity that social theory needs. Methodological clarity, she urges, could help avoid certain temptations and reductions within social theory. Examining her critique of neo-Kantian sociology and, briefly, Hegelian conceptual logic, substantiates this view.
The British social philosopher Gillian Rose (1947–1995) developed, in Dialectic of Nihilism, a way of posing the problem of ideology by showing the dependence of philosophical and social thought on historical legal concepts. She termed it ‘jurisprudential wisdom’ and through it aimed to expose unexamined presuppositions within philosophical consciousness and thereby to perform ideology critique on such consciousness. This article examines Rose’s version of ideology critique, first by setting out its context within post-Kantian thought and Rose’s own intellectual project. It then tackles in detail Rose’s view that Roman law significantly shapes Kant’s form of rationality as a whole. It concludes that her argument is suggestive and highlights important features of Kant’s thought, but that it ultimately fails as an ideology critique. It does not follow that Rose’s form of ideology critique via jurisprudence fails as a whole; on the contrary, it retains plausibility. Rose’s misfire against Kant is a salutary lesson in the dangers of ideology critique and Kant’s survival of Rose’s attack is important for the assessment of his philosophy.
the Task of Political Theology ed. by Joshua Davis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, in press).
NB Telos owns the copyright.
Rose argues that sociology grounds itself on a problematic mixture of neo-Kantian transcendental logic and Hegelian conceptual logic, but only the latter can provide the epistemology and normativity that social theory needs. Methodological clarity, she urges, could help avoid certain temptations and reductions within social theory. Examining her critique of neo-Kantian sociology and, briefly, Hegelian conceptual logic, substantiates this view.
The British social philosopher Gillian Rose (1947–1995) developed, in Dialectic of Nihilism, a way of posing the problem of ideology by showing the dependence of philosophical and social thought on historical legal concepts. She termed it ‘jurisprudential wisdom’ and through it aimed to expose unexamined presuppositions within philosophical consciousness and thereby to perform ideology critique on such consciousness. This article examines Rose’s version of ideology critique, first by setting out its context within post-Kantian thought and Rose’s own intellectual project. It then tackles in detail Rose’s view that Roman law significantly shapes Kant’s form of rationality as a whole. It concludes that her argument is suggestive and highlights important features of Kant’s thought, but that it ultimately fails as an ideology critique. It does not follow that Rose’s form of ideology critique via jurisprudence fails as a whole; on the contrary, it retains plausibility. Rose’s misfire against Kant is a salutary lesson in the dangers of ideology critique and Kant’s survival of Rose’s attack is important for the assessment of his philosophy.