Papers by Thomas Atchison
Iowa State University Summer Symposium on Science Communication, 2012
I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face gr... more I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at an accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options and in identifying trustworthy sources of information. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. I argue that a highly polluted information environment can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking.' Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task.
Iowa State University Summer Symposium on Science Communication
Manipulative communication (communication that "pushes people's buttons," works at an unconscious... more Manipulative communication (communication that "pushes people's buttons," works at an unconscious level, and bypasses critical thinking) is often regarded as unethical because it fails to respect rational autonomy. But, if we take seriously the extent to which people are only very imperfectly rational, we may need to rethink this norm and the associated conception of autonomy.
I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face gr... more I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at an accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options and in identifying trustworthy sources of information. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. I argue that a highly polluted information environment can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking.' Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task.
Between Scientists & Citizens: Proceedings of a Conference at Iowa State University
I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face gr... more I briefly present empirical findings suggesting that citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at an accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options and in identifying trustworthy sources of information. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. I argue that a highly polluted information environment can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking.’ Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task.
Talks by Thomas Atchison
"For several decades the idea of false consciousness has been reviled and rejected on a variety o... more "For several decades the idea of false consciousness has been reviled and rejected on a variety of grounds by empirically-minded social scientists, by skeptical philosophers of several bents, and by activists. This paper attempts to provide a clarification and qualified defense of the concept as a tool of critical social theory, broadly understood as a social theory that aims to be useful to people who are oppressed or disadvantaged.
I suggest that there is a concept of false consciousness that is common to writers representing diverse social movements (not only Marxists, but also feminists, gay liberationists, anti-colonialists, etc.). False consciousness typically involves four elements: It is false; it is produced by an oppressive social system and, in turn, it supports or reinforces that system; it conceals or misidentifies people's real interests; and it is typical of the state of mind of some significant social group. Each of these elements is problematic and requires some explication.
I argue that 1) it is possible to identify a form of consciousness as false or ideological without presupposing any objectionable Enlightenment metaphysics or grand narratives of progress; 2) contrary to the sort of feminism that insists that 'every women's experience is valid', it is not necessarily arrogant or offensive to say that someone is mistaken; 3) contrary to an over-simple Humean picture of the mind, it is wrong to think of desires, wants, needs, etc., as unmotivated and uncriticizable; 4) contrary to those who claim that any use of a concept of 'real' or 'objective interests' must be arbitrary or authoritarian or essentialist, the notion can be explained in a suitably pluralistic and contextual way. Real interests cannot be identified with preferences (however idealized or informed) nor with needs or capabilities (a la Aristotle or Nussbaum), but they can be approached through Elizabeth Anderson’s so-called “rational attitude” theory of value. However, this does require an acknowledgement that dogmatic and over-simple identifications of class interests or the interests of women, for example, cannot be supported. And I argue throughout that critical theories betray their emancipatory intentions and undermine the epistemic grounds for attributing false consciousness, if their methods are not participatory or dialogical (as opposed to manipulative or even educative).
"
"Citizens need to know something, on even the most minimal view of their role in a democratic soc... more "Citizens need to know something, on even the most minimal view of their role in a democratic society. Some would hold, ambitiously, that they ought to know enough to participate meaningfully in self-government. Others would say that it is enough if they can learn that the elites they have been passively allowing to rule (by voting or not voting) are no longer serving them well enough and it is time to 'throw the bums out'. Even this last, minimal, view, though, requires citizens to know when their interests are no longer being served (and perhaps a bit about why). And this may not be so easy to know.
In this paper I briefly (very briefly, since I think the point is widely understood) present findings from public opinion research, political psychology and media studies, suggesting that time-constrained citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at even a minimally accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. (For example, a recent Pew Center poll reports that college educated Republicans in the US are more likely to reject the findings of climate science than less educated party members, while college-educated Democrats move in the opposite direction. In a 2003 PIPA study, Kull, et al., report that for most US news sources, people who paid more attention to the news were more likely to have misconceptions related to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.) This suggests that the problem is not, as it is sometimes said to be, mainly due to apathy or to a (possibly rational) decision to ignore political affairs. It is a problem even for those who are making some significant efforts to inform themselves.
It is tempting to suppose that these dismal facts are the result of epistemic vices, perhaps culpable failures to reason well or to inquire honestly. But, building on an argument made by Thomas Kelly in his 2008 J.Phil paper "Disgreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization," I argue that reasonable choices (about who to trust and about how to assess new evidence) can lead to poor epistemic results. Moreover, unfavorable epistemic conditions (a highly polluted information environment wherein one is naturally led to trust unreliable sources) can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking,' at least when combined with plausible time and resource constraints and a realistic picture of human cognition. Tentatively, I conclude that there are no solutions to these problems at the individual level short of requiring what we might call heroic or supererogatory epistemic effort.
Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task. This is partly a matter of a properly functioning media system (and proper norms of journalistic practice -- norms that would lead to a trustworthy press, which would help to identify trustworthy experts), but it may also be a matter of brute epistemic luck, since we will inevitably trust before we are able to figure out who is worthy of our trust.
"
Dad's papers by Thomas Atchison
Description/Abstract Short cylindrical charges were detonated in drill holes in rock to determine... more Description/Abstract Short cylindrical charges were detonated in drill holes in rock to determine the effect that decoupling (defined as the ratio of the radius of the hole to the radius of the charge) has on the strain-generating abilities of explosions in rock. The ...
THIS PAPER SHOWS THE POTENTIAL ABILITY OF TECHNOLOGIC FORECASTING TO MEET FUTURE DEMANDS IN RAPID... more THIS PAPER SHOWS THE POTENTIAL ABILITY OF TECHNOLOGIC FORECASTING TO MEET FUTURE DEMANDS IN RAPID EXCAVATION THROUGH THE ACCELERATION OF EXCAVATION RATES BY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN RELATED TECHNOLOGIC FIELDS. IT ALSO BRIEFLY REVIEWS THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARPA (ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY) ROCK MECHANICS AND RAPID EXCAVATION PROGRAM. ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO RESEARCH PROJECTS EITHER COMPLETED OR UNDERWAY. THE PROGRESS OF THE APPLIED RESEARCH CONTRACTS IN THE ROCK DISINTEGRATION ELEMENT OF THE PROGRAM IS SUMMARIZED AND THE DIRECTIONS OF FUTURE RESEARCH ARE DISCUSSED. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT IS REVIEWED. MAJOR EMPHASIS OF THE PROGRAM IS DIRECTED TOWARD THE ROCKS WHICH ARE TOO HARD OR ABRASIVE FOR EXCAVATION WITH AVAILABLE BORING MACHINES. DETAILS ARE GIVEN OF THE PROGRAM FRAMEWORK AND MANAGEMENT. IN ADDITION TO THE LABORATORY AND FIELD PHASES OF TESTING THE FEASIBILITY OF THREE CATEGORIES OF NOVEL CONCEPTS (THERMAL ENERGY PROCESSES; HYDRAULIC IMPACT; AND COMB...
Description/Abstract Short cylindrical charges were detonated in drill holes in rock to determine... more Description/Abstract Short cylindrical charges were detonated in drill holes in rock to determine the effect that decoupling (defined as the ratio of the radius of the hole to the radius of the charge) has on the strain-generating abilities of explosions in rock. The ...
THE FOLLOWING PAPERS WERE PRESENTED IN PART I: BLASTING AND DYNAMIC ROCK MECHANICS, G. B. CLARK; ... more THE FOLLOWING PAPERS WERE PRESENTED IN PART I: BLASTING AND DYNAMIC ROCK MECHANICS, G. B. CLARK; EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS IN BLASTING RESEARCH, W. I. DUVALL, T. C. ATCHISON, AND D. E. FOGELSON; COMPUTER CALCULATIONS OF EXPLOSION - PRODUCED CRATERS, J. T. CHERRY; PULSE PROPAGATION IN ROCKS, W. GOLDSMITH; AND STRAIN WAVE THEORY IN ROCK BLASING, A. M. STARFIELD. A DISCUSSION IS APPENDED. /TRRL/
Drilling and Production Practice, 1952
Page 1. Progress Report on Well-shooting ~esearch ABSTRACT Bureau of Mines field and laboratory t... more Page 1. Progress Report on Well-shooting ~esearch ABSTRACT Bureau of Mines field and laboratory tests made during 1950 as part of its research program on oil-and gas-well shooting are described. Instrumented shots in ...
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Papers by Thomas Atchison
Talks by Thomas Atchison
I suggest that there is a concept of false consciousness that is common to writers representing diverse social movements (not only Marxists, but also feminists, gay liberationists, anti-colonialists, etc.). False consciousness typically involves four elements: It is false; it is produced by an oppressive social system and, in turn, it supports or reinforces that system; it conceals or misidentifies people's real interests; and it is typical of the state of mind of some significant social group. Each of these elements is problematic and requires some explication.
I argue that 1) it is possible to identify a form of consciousness as false or ideological without presupposing any objectionable Enlightenment metaphysics or grand narratives of progress; 2) contrary to the sort of feminism that insists that 'every women's experience is valid', it is not necessarily arrogant or offensive to say that someone is mistaken; 3) contrary to an over-simple Humean picture of the mind, it is wrong to think of desires, wants, needs, etc., as unmotivated and uncriticizable; 4) contrary to those who claim that any use of a concept of 'real' or 'objective interests' must be arbitrary or authoritarian or essentialist, the notion can be explained in a suitably pluralistic and contextual way. Real interests cannot be identified with preferences (however idealized or informed) nor with needs or capabilities (a la Aristotle or Nussbaum), but they can be approached through Elizabeth Anderson’s so-called “rational attitude” theory of value. However, this does require an acknowledgement that dogmatic and over-simple identifications of class interests or the interests of women, for example, cannot be supported. And I argue throughout that critical theories betray their emancipatory intentions and undermine the epistemic grounds for attributing false consciousness, if their methods are not participatory or dialogical (as opposed to manipulative or even educative).
"
In this paper I briefly (very briefly, since I think the point is widely understood) present findings from public opinion research, political psychology and media studies, suggesting that time-constrained citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at even a minimally accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. (For example, a recent Pew Center poll reports that college educated Republicans in the US are more likely to reject the findings of climate science than less educated party members, while college-educated Democrats move in the opposite direction. In a 2003 PIPA study, Kull, et al., report that for most US news sources, people who paid more attention to the news were more likely to have misconceptions related to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.) This suggests that the problem is not, as it is sometimes said to be, mainly due to apathy or to a (possibly rational) decision to ignore political affairs. It is a problem even for those who are making some significant efforts to inform themselves.
It is tempting to suppose that these dismal facts are the result of epistemic vices, perhaps culpable failures to reason well or to inquire honestly. But, building on an argument made by Thomas Kelly in his 2008 J.Phil paper "Disgreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization," I argue that reasonable choices (about who to trust and about how to assess new evidence) can lead to poor epistemic results. Moreover, unfavorable epistemic conditions (a highly polluted information environment wherein one is naturally led to trust unreliable sources) can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking,' at least when combined with plausible time and resource constraints and a realistic picture of human cognition. Tentatively, I conclude that there are no solutions to these problems at the individual level short of requiring what we might call heroic or supererogatory epistemic effort.
Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task. This is partly a matter of a properly functioning media system (and proper norms of journalistic practice -- norms that would lead to a trustworthy press, which would help to identify trustworthy experts), but it may also be a matter of brute epistemic luck, since we will inevitably trust before we are able to figure out who is worthy of our trust.
"
Dad's papers by Thomas Atchison
I suggest that there is a concept of false consciousness that is common to writers representing diverse social movements (not only Marxists, but also feminists, gay liberationists, anti-colonialists, etc.). False consciousness typically involves four elements: It is false; it is produced by an oppressive social system and, in turn, it supports or reinforces that system; it conceals or misidentifies people's real interests; and it is typical of the state of mind of some significant social group. Each of these elements is problematic and requires some explication.
I argue that 1) it is possible to identify a form of consciousness as false or ideological without presupposing any objectionable Enlightenment metaphysics or grand narratives of progress; 2) contrary to the sort of feminism that insists that 'every women's experience is valid', it is not necessarily arrogant or offensive to say that someone is mistaken; 3) contrary to an over-simple Humean picture of the mind, it is wrong to think of desires, wants, needs, etc., as unmotivated and uncriticizable; 4) contrary to those who claim that any use of a concept of 'real' or 'objective interests' must be arbitrary or authoritarian or essentialist, the notion can be explained in a suitably pluralistic and contextual way. Real interests cannot be identified with preferences (however idealized or informed) nor with needs or capabilities (a la Aristotle or Nussbaum), but they can be approached through Elizabeth Anderson’s so-called “rational attitude” theory of value. However, this does require an acknowledgement that dogmatic and over-simple identifications of class interests or the interests of women, for example, cannot be supported. And I argue throughout that critical theories betray their emancipatory intentions and undermine the epistemic grounds for attributing false consciousness, if their methods are not participatory or dialogical (as opposed to manipulative or even educative).
"
In this paper I briefly (very briefly, since I think the point is widely understood) present findings from public opinion research, political psychology and media studies, suggesting that time-constrained citizens in contemporary democracies face great difficulties in arriving at even a minimally accurate picture of the world and of the relevant policy options. Unfortunately, these difficulties do not seem to diminish with more education or with more effort and attention. (For example, a recent Pew Center poll reports that college educated Republicans in the US are more likely to reject the findings of climate science than less educated party members, while college-educated Democrats move in the opposite direction. In a 2003 PIPA study, Kull, et al., report that for most US news sources, people who paid more attention to the news were more likely to have misconceptions related to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.) This suggests that the problem is not, as it is sometimes said to be, mainly due to apathy or to a (possibly rational) decision to ignore political affairs. It is a problem even for those who are making some significant efforts to inform themselves.
It is tempting to suppose that these dismal facts are the result of epistemic vices, perhaps culpable failures to reason well or to inquire honestly. But, building on an argument made by Thomas Kelly in his 2008 J.Phil paper "Disgreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization," I argue that reasonable choices (about who to trust and about how to assess new evidence) can lead to poor epistemic results. Moreover, unfavorable epistemic conditions (a highly polluted information environment wherein one is naturally led to trust unreliable sources) can defeat the sorts of strategies generally recommended to individuals under the label 'critical thinking,' at least when combined with plausible time and resource constraints and a realistic picture of human cognition. Tentatively, I conclude that there are no solutions to these problems at the individual level short of requiring what we might call heroic or supererogatory epistemic effort.
Finally, I consider what sort of institutional or systemic conditions would be necessary to provide citizens with a manageable epistemic task. This is partly a matter of a properly functioning media system (and proper norms of journalistic practice -- norms that would lead to a trustworthy press, which would help to identify trustworthy experts), but it may also be a matter of brute epistemic luck, since we will inevitably trust before we are able to figure out who is worthy of our trust.
"