Drafts by Jeff D'Souza PhD
This paper explores the unique realities and effects of Covid19 as experienced in the global Nort... more This paper explores the unique realities and effects of Covid19 as experienced in the global North and global South with special reference to Canada and subSaharan Africa; it also examines the moral responsibilities countries have towards their own people and the duty they have to work together to minimise and mitigate the devastating effects of the pandemic worldwide. We illuminate the importance of countries sharing their own world views, strengths, and expertise, and learning from one another in order to better situate all in tackling the pandemic. We argue that it is only insofar as all countries work collaboratively commensurate to each party's capacity to contribute towards the tackling of the Covid19 pandemic that we may truly be said to be "all in this together".
One of the longest standing objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is the Self ... more One of the longest standing objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is the Self Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of motivation is that the virtuous agent acts virtuously ultimately because doing so is constitutive of, or promotes, her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the three existing approaches adopted by virtue ethicists to address this objection, and demonstrate that they all fall short due to their insistence on conceiving of the virtuous agent’s ultimate end in a way that is good for her. I then go on to develop a new account – what I call the “Altruistic Eudaimonist Account of Motivation” – on which the virtuous agent is motivated to act virtuously because she appreciates and understands that the human good consists chiefly in a life of excellent moral activity, and not because doing so is good for her.
One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Object... more One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent's motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner's attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner's view from two of Anne Baril's criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner's lines. Opposition toward the standard neo-Aristotelian account of motivation is not new. Shortly after the revival of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in the late 1950s, philosophers have argued that the standard account of moral motivation offered by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists is unacceptably self-regarding and egoistic. 1 In response to this criticism, many virtue ethicists have attempted to show that their standard account does not fall prey to such an objection. are correct, the charge still stands. 2 In this paper, I begin by briefly laying out the standard neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation, and then go on to flesh out the worry that such an account is unacceptably self-regarding-I call this worry the 'self-absorption objection.' In the second section, I draw on the work of Christopher Toner to introduce what I take to be the most fruitful approach aimed at addressing the self-absorption objection. This approach shifts the virtuous agent's ultimate motivation from a life that is good for her, to a life that is good for her, qua human. In the third and fourth sections, I examine two objections levied against Toner's approach: namely, that (1) his account is un-Aristotelian, and that
One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objec... more One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two criticisms: namely, that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.
For published version, see: https://www.pdcnet.org/jpr/onlinefirst
Abstract: Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at o... more Abstract: Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism, on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neoAristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human goodness – as they say – “all the way down.”
Papers by Jeff D'Souza PhD
Trends in psychiatry and psychotherapy, 2021
Journal of Philosophical Research
One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Object... more One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent’s motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two of Anne Baril’s criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: ... more This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: the self-absorption objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is for the sake of and/or is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the various attempts made by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to address the self-absorption objection and argue that they all fall short for one reason or another. I contend that the way forward for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists is to reject the view that the virtuous agent ought to organize her life in a way that is ultimately good for her, and instead adopt a more expansive conception of her ultimate end, one in which no special preference is given to her own good.
One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Object... more One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent’s motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two of Anne Baril’s criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.
The American Catholic Philosophic Quarterly, 2018
This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: ... more This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: the self-absorption objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is for the sake of and/or is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the various attempts made by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethi-cists to address the self-absorption objection and argue that they all fall short for one reason or another. I contend that the way forward for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists is to reject the view that the virtuous agent ought to organize her life in a way that is ultimately good for her, and instead adopt a more expansive conception of her ultimate end, one in which no special preference is given to her own good. "The good man is a lover of good, not a lover of self; for he loves himself only, if at all, because he is good."-Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1212b18-20
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Drafts by Jeff D'Souza PhD
For published version, see: https://www.pdcnet.org/jpr/onlinefirst
Papers by Jeff D'Souza PhD
For published version, see: https://www.pdcnet.org/jpr/onlinefirst