Philosophy

The following paper will argue that moral genius can provide a bridge between the sublime and morality. In an experience of the sublime, all acts are subsumed under the moral law, thus providing an infinity of moral acts, causing a paralysis of reason. I attempt to extricate an account of genius in Kant, building from this my own account of moral genius, and argue that moral genius is a necessary link between reason's paralysis and a moral ideal. In doing this, I will also shed light on the origin of the Kingdom of Ends as a moral ideal rooted in Kant's aesthetics. To do this, I will first analyze the ideal of beauty and its role as a symbol of morality. I will then move to archetypes and the sublime, arguing that it is the archetype of beauty-human purposiveness-that we symbolize to ourselves in the sublime. Finally, I argue that moral genius is necessary to present to us what is otherwise felt as an exhibition in the sublime, thus providing the basis for the moral ideal that is the Kingdom of Ends.

In the third Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant repudiates the argument of rational psychology that personality can be given by pure reason. He articulates his dissatisfaction with the standard accounts of the givenness of personality on the basis of numerical identity, ultimately arguing that though consciousness of identity is a formal requirement for the coherence of subjective experience, it is not enough to establish any objective logical identity of the self as a person. In this

Kant's stance on the moral status of animals is problematic to many moral philosophers who seek to reject the practical and theoretical anthropocentrism of his philosophical system. For Kant, only persons are worthy of moral respect, and animals fall short of this “elevated” standing. Kant does claim that we have duties to animals, but only indirect duties. In our indirect duties, our treatment of animals is a means to our own moral well-being, or a way to avoid moral degradation. Claiming that Kant states otherwise is a fruitless task. However, Kant's overall discussion of personality in general is one that could provide an interesting framework for a re-evaluation of a Kantian-style discussion on the moral status of animals. Personality, for Kant, involves more than a narrow conception “rationality.” I will use components of Kant's discussion of personality from the Kant's theoretical, practical, and aesthetic texts to elucidate the idea that sensus communis and communicability provides a basis for personality. With such a basis, the argument can be made that animals, too, can be considered persons to be considered within our kingdom of ends, and thus have a moral standard beyond “things” to which we owe indirect duties.

As an educator, one of my goals is to show students how philosophy permeates their lives. Through discussion and practical, contemporary examples, I strive to teach students how to read critically, how to think critically, and how to question the world around them. The fruits of this labor are not only curious minds, but also clear and precise verbal and written articulation of students' questions and thoughts. In short, I guide my students in becoming part of the process of philosophy through their own engagement with philosophy's history.

Traditionally the debate over spacetime has been seen as involving two main opponents:  Traditional Substantivalism and Relationalism.  It has only been more recently that a tertium quid, Supersubstantivalism, has emerged as a serious competitor.  In this dissertation I argue that Supersubstantivalism is in fact the best option of the three. In particular I present an abductive argument focused on parsimony and causal unification, both of which I argue are of extreme importance to explanations of this sort, that demonstrates that Supersubstantivalism is the best explanation of the nature and properties of spacetime.  After examining other considerations like the Hole Argument, I ultimately argue that the potential and seeming promise of Supersubstantivalism suggests that it very well could be the correct understanding of the nature of Spacetime, and this conclusion could have significant and far reaching changes in the academic world.

Mental causation between the material and the immaterial has been problematic for interactionist substance dualism ever since its first major proponent René Descartes. The contemporary philosopher Jaegwon Kim believes he has found an argument that shows exactly
why an immaterial event cannot be said to cause a material event; he calls this the pairing problem argument. This thesis will argue that there is actually sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that Kim’s argument is unsuccessful due to one of its premises being false. Furthermore,
this thesis will also argue that interactionist substance dualism is actually a philosophically viable alternative, and lastly ways are sketched of how one might go about constructing such a view responsibly.