In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that ... more In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that it is ‘always the mark of a good soul’ (5:298) to take an ‘immediate interest’ in natural beauty because it indicates a moral interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. In the same pages, however, he denies the possibility of a similarly morally significant interest in artistic beauty. This paper argues that according to his own theory of fine art Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty. In the pages that immediately follow his discussion of immediate interest Kant defines artistic beauty as the joint product of a ‘natural gift’ of genius and a freely exercised discipline of skill and taste. This commits him to the claim that artistic beauty embodies and expresses a harmony between nature and freedom in the productive act of a human being, and thus to the claim that one can take an immediate and morally significant interest in artistic beauty, just as much as in natural beauty.
Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings uni... more Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings universally recognize the moral law, that “what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone.” Namely, Kant’s account of education often paints it as a precondition for recognizing the ‘ought’ of the moral law – for what in the second Critique he calls the “subjective practicality” of the law. I ask whether for Kant it is possible for a person who has received no moral education to be a moral agent, that is, to be objectively obligated by the moral law. Kant’s account of education and moral development partially answers this question, and shows him to be committed to a social conception of the achievement of the minimal capacity for practical reasoning that is a precondition for moral obligation.
I argue that despite Kant’s a priori defense of the possibility of pure judgments of taste, he is... more I argue that despite Kant’s a priori defense of the possibility of pure judgments of taste, he is committed to skepticism about individual judgments of taste. That is, the claim that any particular aesthetic judgment is pure can be no less tentative for him than is a causal judgment for a skeptic like Hume. I will show that the skeptical doubt that arises concerning individual judgments of taste is related to but distinct from the kind of epistemic problem that arises in Kant’s account of moral judgment concerning the possibility of knowing one’s own motivations. I will further argue that this necessarily tentative epistemic position of pure judgments of taste is not a failing or fault in Kant’s theory of taste, but a systematic feature of his aesthetics that underwrites his account of beauty as a sensible representation of moral ideas.
Kant and Hume share an assessment of the epistemic position of the critic confronting a work of a... more Kant and Hume share an assessment of the epistemic position of the critic confronting a work of art, and this position is a central epistemic problem for both of their aesthetics. However, it has a different significance for each of them. For Hume it is a problem he approaches with a familiarly skeptical solution. For Kant, however, it becomes a systematic feature of his aesthetics, playing a crucial role in his account of beauty’s capacity to be a sensible representation of moral ideas.
In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that ... more In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that it is ‘always the mark of a good soul’ (5:298) to take an ‘immediate interest’ in natural beauty because it indicates a moral interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. In the same pages, however, he denies the possibility of a similarly morally significant interest in artistic beauty. This paper argues that according to his own theory of fine art Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty. In the pages that immediately follow his discussion of immediate interest Kant defines artistic beauty as the joint product of a ‘natural gift’ of genius and a freely exercised discipline of skill and taste. This commits him to the claim that artistic beauty embodies and expresses a harmony between nature and freedom in the productive act of a human being, and thus to the claim that one can take an immediate and morally significant interest in artistic beauty, just as much as in natural beauty.
Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings uni... more Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings universally recognize the moral law, that “what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone.” Namely, Kant’s account of education often paints it as a precondition for recognizing the ‘ought’ of the moral law – for what in the second Critique he calls the “subjective practicality” of the law. I ask whether for Kant it is possible for a person who has received no moral education to be a moral agent, that is, to be objectively obligated by the moral law. Kant’s account of education and moral development partially answers this question, and shows him to be committed to a social conception of the achievement of the minimal capacity for practical reasoning that is a precondition for moral obligation.
I argue that despite Kant’s a priori defense of the possibility of pure judgments of taste, he is... more I argue that despite Kant’s a priori defense of the possibility of pure judgments of taste, he is committed to skepticism about individual judgments of taste. That is, the claim that any particular aesthetic judgment is pure can be no less tentative for him than is a causal judgment for a skeptic like Hume. I will show that the skeptical doubt that arises concerning individual judgments of taste is related to but distinct from the kind of epistemic problem that arises in Kant’s account of moral judgment concerning the possibility of knowing one’s own motivations. I will further argue that this necessarily tentative epistemic position of pure judgments of taste is not a failing or fault in Kant’s theory of taste, but a systematic feature of his aesthetics that underwrites his account of beauty as a sensible representation of moral ideas.
Kant and Hume share an assessment of the epistemic position of the critic confronting a work of a... more Kant and Hume share an assessment of the epistemic position of the critic confronting a work of art, and this position is a central epistemic problem for both of their aesthetics. However, it has a different significance for each of them. For Hume it is a problem he approaches with a familiarly skeptical solution. For Kant, however, it becomes a systematic feature of his aesthetics, playing a crucial role in his account of beauty’s capacity to be a sensible representation of moral ideas.
Uploads
Papers by Joseph Cannon
Talks by Joseph Cannon