Major publications by Alan Hamlin
PART I Democratic desires 2 On human nature: beyond homo economicus 17 3 Moral dispositions 34 4 ... more PART I Democratic desires 2 On human nature: beyond homo economicus 17 3 Moral dispositions 34 4 Economising on virtue 51 5 Political mechanisms 67 6 Mechanisms and dispositional choice 87 7 Problems of democratic politics 98 PART II Democratic devices 8 Voting and elections 9 Political representation 10 Political parties 11 The separation of powers 12 The division of power Bibliography Index vii 3.1 The reliance predicament page 5.1 The reliance predicament again 5.2 The reliance predicament with purely egoistic enforcement 5.3 The reliance predicament with possibly virtuous enforcement 6.1 The social value of virtue 6.2 Wage determination in sector P 8.1 Instrumental demand curves 8.2 Expressive equilibrium ± a unimodal case 8.3 Expressive equilibrium ± a bimodal case 8.4a Expressive voting with a pivotal individual 8.4b Expressive voting without a pivotal individual 8.5 Expressive voting in two dimensions with many voters 8.6 Mixed expressive and instrumental voting 9.1 The optimal degree of representation 9.2 Representation and decision rules 9.3 Representation and agenda setting 10.1 Winner takes all and winner takes most 11.1 Autocratic government 11.2 A separation of powers 12.1 One-dimensional division of power 12.2 A two-dimensional division of power viii
Public Choice, 1998
There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream in... more There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options, rather like cheering at a football match. This paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium, and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account. We also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting, and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics.
Political Studies Review, 2012
Microeconomics and the Public Economs examines the debate over the public economy, scrutinizing p... more Microeconomics and the Public Economs examines the debate over the public economy, scrutinizing problems such as constitutional bias, bureaucratic inefficiency of the private sector and public economy firms. The authors raise essential theoretical and empirical issues for believers ...
British Journal of Political Science, 2011
Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, 2019
British Journal of Political Science, Jan 1, 1999
British Journal of Political Science, 2004
We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism that attempts to uncover a foundatio... more We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism that attempts to uncover a foundation of what is often taken to be an anti-foundationalist position. We identify a bias in favour of the status quo as a key component of the conservative disposition and address the question of the justification of such a conservative disposition, and the circumstances in which the widespread adoption of such a disposition might be normatively desirable. Our analysis builds on a structural link between the economist's traditional emphasis on questions of feasibility and the conservative's attachment to the status quo.
The Monist, 2016
We distinguish three forms of conservatism and focus attention on the form in which conservatives... more We distinguish three forms of conservatism and focus attention on the form in which conservatives identify and recognize a value not recognised by non-conservatives. Starting from an attempt to rescue conservative values by G.A. Cohen, we provide an analysis of the requirements of such a conservative position and a formulation in terms of state-relative evaluation.
Analysis, Oct 1, 2006
The object of this paper is to draw attention to a distinction not often discussed in substantive... more The object of this paper is to draw attention to a distinction not often discussed in substantive ethical theory. It is though, we think, a distinction of some importance. The distinction is that between an ethical idealist and her opposite. The latter might go by a number of names (pragmatist, realist, expedient) but we shall use the term 'conservative', for reasons to be explained.
Journal of Political Ideologies, 2014
Constitutional Political Economy, 2013
2013) argues for the recognition of a form of analytic radicalism that is a mirror image of the a... more 2013) argues for the recognition of a form of analytic radicalism that is a mirror image of the analytic conservatism we outlined in Hamlin (2004, 2006), so that while a conservative disposition reflects an underlying convex value function, a radical disposition reflects an underlying concave value function. We have no issue with this basic point which we see as entirely consistent with our earlier contribution, and we might complete the set by pointing to a neutral disposition reflecting an underlying linear value function, and to more complex dispositions that might be, for example, locally radical (concave) and more globally conservative (convex). 1 While we welcome Taylor's basic point, we wish to respond to other aspects of his note. On the one hand we wish to stress that while we see the conservative disposition we discussed as a plausible and widespread disposition, we do not see it as being required either by logic or by rationality, and neither do we see it as being determined by the circumstances of particular 1 As in the familiar case in which individuals may be risk-preferring with respect to relatively small financial risks while being risk-averse with respect to larger financial risks, so that they simultaneously gamble and insure.
Journal of Political Philosophy, Jan 1, 1995
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Jan 1, 2006
Constitutionl Political Economy, 2002
We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that de... more We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested motivations in the in-period context to relatively general-interest decision making in the constitutional context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to relate to essentially political settings where decision making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions that are insulated from popular voting.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2007
We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of... more We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose leaders expressively. We characterize the equilibria of the instrumental choice model and also argue that leadership elections may overemphasise the role of expressive considerations in the choice of leader, and that this may result in increased conflict between groups.
Public Choice, Jan 1, 2004
Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, 2019
Constitutional Political Economy, 2014
The Reason of Rules stands as a key text in the development of Constitutional Political Economy. ... more The Reason of Rules stands as a key text in the development of Constitutional Political Economy. While the achievements of the book in further shifting attention towards the constitutionalist perspective and providing a wide ranging discussion of the demand for rules are acknowledged, I suggest that the account of rules provided there and which still forms the core of much constitutionalist discussion in the Buchanan tradition seems limited. This paper revisits the analysis of rules in order to offer a broader perspective that is still consistent with the central ambitions of The Reason of Rules and Constitutional Political Economy more generally.
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Major publications by Alan Hamlin