Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -without argum... more Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -without argument -that chances are probabilities. I argue that there is nothing in the pretheoretic or "folk concept" of chance that forces this structure on chances.
There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty ent... more There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty enters science, focusing on uncertainty in climate science and weather prediction. I then show how we cope with some of these sources of error through sophisticated modelling techniques. I show how we maintain confidence in the face of error.
R. I. G. Hughes’ book The Theoretical Practices of Physics presents an interesting approach to th... more R. I. G. Hughes’ book The Theoretical Practices of Physics presents an interesting approach to the philosophy of science, by analysing particular texts in the physics literature (journal articles, textbooks, classic works) in much the same way literary criticism analyses novels, poems and so on. Often when philosophers look at scientific texts, they seem to abstract away from what is actually said in order to extract the “theory” and then philosophise on the basis of this rarefied object. Hughes’ approach is to look at what physicists really write and see what conclusions to draw on that basis. In his own words: “I shall examine the theoretical practices as they appear in physics journals… I treat the publications as texts; and thereby cast the philosopher of science in the role of critic” (p. 5). What then, is the purpose of this exercise in criticism? Hughes suggests that this approach allows us to address the following question: “given that these practices are successful, what is th ...
Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -without argum... more Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed -without argument -that chances are probabilities. I argue that there is nothing in the pretheoretic or "folk concept" of chance that forces this structure on chances.
There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty ent... more There are different kinds of uncertainty. I outline some of the various ways that uncertainty enters science, focusing on uncertainty in climate science and weather prediction. I then show how we cope with some of these sources of error through sophisticated modelling techniques. I show how we maintain confidence in the face of error.
R. I. G. Hughes’ book The Theoretical Practices of Physics presents an interesting approach to th... more R. I. G. Hughes’ book The Theoretical Practices of Physics presents an interesting approach to the philosophy of science, by analysing particular texts in the physics literature (journal articles, textbooks, classic works) in much the same way literary criticism analyses novels, poems and so on. Often when philosophers look at scientific texts, they seem to abstract away from what is actually said in order to extract the “theory” and then philosophise on the basis of this rarefied object. Hughes’ approach is to look at what physicists really write and see what conclusions to draw on that basis. In his own words: “I shall examine the theoretical practices as they appear in physics journals… I treat the publications as texts; and thereby cast the philosopher of science in the role of critic” (p. 5). What then, is the purpose of this exercise in criticism? Hughes suggests that this approach allows us to address the following question: “given that these practices are successful, what is th ...
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Papers by Seamus Bradley