Forthcoming/Drafts by Christof Rapp
The Human Body and the Role of Erect Posture. Aristotle's Parts of Animals IV.1, 2022
In PA IV.10 Aristotle compares the human anatomy to the anatomy of other blooded, live-bearing an... more In PA IV.10 Aristotle compares the human anatomy to the anatomy of other blooded, live-bearing animals with regard to their external, non-uniform parts. Of all these animals, Aristotle states, human beings alone have hands and arms instead of front-legs due to their erect posture. He associates the erect posture with human beings’ alleged divine nature, exhibited in their intellectual capacities. This poses two challenges that Aristotle addresses in the remainder of PA IV.10: first to show how most distinctive features of the human body (e.g. broad chests, fleshy buttocks, big feet, hands) can ultimately be traced back to the erect posture and second to account for the assumed connection between upright posture and intellectual capacities. Regarding the latter point the present chapter shows why, according to Aristotle, unimpaired thinking requires the upright posture and why the upright posture again requires a certain proportion between the upper and the lower bodily part.
Ancient moral philosophy provides several entry points for partialist concerns regarding family m... more Ancient moral philosophy provides several entry points for partialist concerns regarding family members, friends, and fellow citizens. The prominence of friendship in many ancient texts makes it easy to identify partialist strands, according to which agents are not only permitted but even expected to display a special concern for the well-being of those close to them. Thus, partialism, broadly conceived, is not considered incompatible with morality. However, this does not imply that these ancient theories are committed to strict partialism or anti-impartialism. Many authors, for example, mention demands of justice that are intrinsically connected with impartial decisions and distributions; it is a commonplace that judges should be impartial and that affectionate relations with
Virtue as a Mean. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II.3 (forthcoming)
Why and in what sense is virtue supposed to be a mean. In this paper I discuss the Eudemians Ethi... more Why and in what sense is virtue supposed to be a mean. In this paper I discuss the Eudemians Ethics version of this argument, which seems be more straightforward (and, thus, in a way less ambiguous) than the version in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The uploaded paper is the draft version I presented at the 21st Symposium Aristotelicum held in Athens 2017
One of the main attractions of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the part of the work that deals with the p... more One of the main attractions of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the part of the work that deals with the pathê tês psychês – which have come to be called the affections of the soul or the emotions. Aristotle seems to assume that it is possible for a rhetorician to manipulate the feelings of his audience. The interest of these chapters mainly derives from the striking analyses of particular types of emotions; some of the thoughts Aristotle presents about anger, pity, shame and envy seem to be applicable down to the present day. At the same time, however, these chapters are somehow disappointing from a philosophical point of view, since most of the assumptions Aristotle makes about the nature of the emotions, about the impact of emotions on our judgment, and about how emotions come about are nowhere articulated – let alone argued for – in a coherent way. This lack of theoretical interest is typical of major parts of Aristotle's Rhetoric. It is has often been explained in terms of the pragmatic nature of such rhetorical manuals or handbooks. This is certainly part of the truth. Another part of the truth that I would like to add is this: in the first two books of the Rhetoric, we find the ambitious attempt to create a complete art of rhetoric mainly by means of dialectic: Aristotle applies and adjusts the dialectical inventory to the specific requirements of public speech, and draws up several catalogues of topoi that are meant to carve up the field of what is possibly persuasive. Obviously, it would be unfair to expect such an endeavor to engage in detailed theory-building.
I read versions of this paper in San Francisco (2012), Pisa (2013) and Paris, Nanterre (2017). It doesn't include references to scholarly literature etc. yet, but the main thesis is stable. David Konstan wrote a very valuable reply to this draft.
On the one hand, … Aristotle's treatise Categories is always referred to when it comes to the dis... more On the one hand, … Aristotle's treatise Categories is always referred to when it comes to the distinction of essential and accidental predication. If P is SAID-OF S, it says what S (essentially) is. If A is IN S, it characterizes S with respect to one of the nine non-substantial categories, i.e. says how S is, where it is, etc. On the other hand, … Aristotle's Categories is a mostly classificatory treatise, most probably affiliated to Aristotle's Topics, which is about dialectic, not about metaphysics or (first) philosophy proper. As a treatise of this sort, is it likely to introduce the 'ontologically loaded' notion of essence (Paolo Crivelli 2017) and able, in the first place, to carry the 'heavy metaphysical baggage' of essential predication (Stephen Menn 2018)? More than that: To the extent that our knowledge about Aristotelian essentialism is informed by the presumably most authoritative work on Aristotelian metaphysics, i.e. the work known as 'Aristotle's Metaphysics', we have reason to expect essences … − … to be identical with forms, − … to be exclusive to substances (and are assumed to be one possible sense of ousia), − … to be a cause or principle, e.g. in the sense that they are the cause/principle of the being of each substance. While the Categories … − … does not even mention forms (nor matter, since it does not include a theory of material constitution), − … does not restrict the supposedly essential predication to substances, − … does not speak of causes/principles and lacks any causal/explanatory language.
In this paper I discuss some issues concerning essentialism in Aristotle’s Categories. Why would... more In this paper I discuss some issues concerning essentialism in Aristotle’s Categories. Why would it be important, in the first place, to dedicate a paper to the notion of essence in the Categories and in the Topics? Well, when Book VII of Aristotle’s Metaphysics starts unfolding the notion of essence, it keeps referring to regimentations that apparently derive from the writings collected under the heading Organon. This is of particular interest, because the writings of the Organon do not engage with hylomorphism, while the essentialism of the Metaphysics culminates in the claim that forms are the essences of all things. Thus, the sortal essentialism in the writings of the Organon seems to be distinct from the Metaphysics’ views about essential forms, but still plays a role in framing and preparing the latter theory. Also, within the Organon it makes a major difference whether one refers to the role of essences within the theory of explanation in the Posterior Analytics, or whether one refers to the Categories and Topics that are little interested in causes and explanations.
Sections 1-3 are mostly preparatory; they try to set the stage for what follows. Section 3 addresses a, as I think, pressing worry, namely that neither the Categories nor the Topics are meant to belong to Aristotle’s first philosophy (or to what we would call ‘metaphysics’). How come then that they do deal with essences at all? Or, to put it differently, what could be the status of the notion of essence in works that are dedicated to the method of dialectics?
Section 4 introduces the difference that has become known as the difference between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication. Sections 5 and 6 address exegetical problems that have the potential to obscure or to question this difference. In section 6, in particular, I suggest an interpretation of Aristotle’s terminology that admits a consistent reading of the whole treatise, resisting the temptations of ‘apostate’ readings).
Sections 7-9 turn to the notion of substance in the Categories, to primary and secondary substances and to the underlying criteria of substancehood. On the one hand, it is crucial for a substance to be a substrate, in particular a substrate-for-inherence. On the other hand, secondary substances have a job in ‘revealing’ what a primary substance is. In this latter context, the Categories touches upon the notion of essence and implies at least two important essentialist claims, although in a very compressed way (as, e.g. the comparison to the Topics shows). Perhaps one of the major upshots of this paper (concerning the differences between the Metaphysics and Categories/Topics with regard to essence) is formulated towards the end of section 9, where the differences between the secondary substances of the Categories and the substantial forms of the Metaphysics become obvious; whereas the latter ones are the cause-of-being of a compound substrate, the former ones just ‘reveal’, ‘disclose’ or ‘exhibit’ what a primary substance essentially is.
The concluding section 10 browses the Categories for hints to the idea that at least some attributes – be they contingent, necessary or generically necessary – are by their nature connected with the essential kind of their substrate. I suggest that the Categories’ famous distinction between being SAID OF and being IN (traditionally glossed as the difference between essential and accidental predication) is not so much about necessary and non-necessary predication, but about the difference between species membership and the possession of properties.
Recent by Christof Rapp
“Concepts and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, in: Gabor Betegh / Voula Tsouna (eds.), Concepts in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024, 147-177..), Concepts in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 147-177., 2024
Aristotle does not have a single or technical term for what we would call a ‘concept’. However, h... more Aristotle does not have a single or technical term for what we would call a ‘concept’. However, he often touches upon several of the above-mentioned questions and problems. Above all, he displays a vital interest in the meaning of general terms and he often refers to the phenomenon that terms can have different meanings that are to be distinguished.
Essential Predication in Aristotle’s Categories: A Defence”, in: David Bronstein, Thomas Johanson, Michael Peramatzis (eds.), Essays in Honour of David Charles, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2024, 143-167., 2024
Aristotle's Categories is a treatise that is mostly concerned with classifications. Many ancient ... more Aristotle's Categories is a treatise that is mostly concerned with classifications. Many ancient commentators saw the Categories as closely connected with the Topics and some of the earliest mentions of this treatise in antiquity even used the title Before the Topics instead of Categories, thus indicating that it was seen as a sort of propaedeutic to the Topics, and thus as closely related to Aristotle's method of dialectic. Still, the Categories offers a series of claims, most notably claims associated with the concept of substance (ousia) that we would rate as straightforwardly 'metaphysical' ones. This is the reason why the Categories' claims about substance are regularly and inevitably compared to the presumably most authoritative treatise on all questions concerning Aristotelian metaphysics, namely Aristotle's Metaphysics-even though this latter treatise is dedicated to an entirely different project. Far from the Categories' mostly classificatory interest (and far from, perhaps, merely contributing to the art of dialectic), the Metaphysics is meant to unfold Aristotle's most ambitious project of first philosophy, aiming at the identification of the first principles and causes of everything.
“The Octopoid Soul. Stoic Responses To Aristotle’s Soul-Body Hylomorphism”, in: David Charles (ed.), The Tradition of Aristotelian Hylomorphism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2023, 83-105., 2023
Aristotelian hylomorphism-for plausible reasons. 1 As is commonly known, Stoic philosophers devel... more Aristotelian hylomorphism-for plausible reasons. 1 As is commonly known, Stoic philosophers developed a peculiar physical theory, which also provided the background for their account of the soul. It is owing to this peculiar physics and owing to Stoic ontology that the soul cannot be incorporeal. In this respect the Stoic account of the soul is markedly different from both Platonic and Aristotelian psychology and similar to the Epicurean antidualist and materialist position. Still, in spite of these fundamental differences, not only to Platonic dualism but also to Aristotelian hylomorphism, it turns out on closer examination that there are remarkable similarities to Aristotle-especially to the Aristotle of the Parva Naturalia, De Motu Animalium and De Generatione Animalium. With regard to some of these similarities the Stoics even seem to be indebted to the Aristotelian legacy. More than that, in some respects the similarities to the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition seem to be more profound than the ties to the similarly anti-dualist and materialist theorems of the Epicureans-for example, because Epicurean materialism immediately implies the mortality of the soul, while the Stoics are not inclined to draw this conclusion 2 and sometimes describe the relation between the ruling part of rational beings to the animal's body in terms that are rather reminiscent of Platonic dualism than of material reductionism. In particular, or so I am going to suggest, the idea of a centralized soul 3 that stretches out to the animal's peripheral sense organs like the tentacles of an octopus 4 bears a significant resemblance to Aristotle's 1 I would like to thank Francesco Ademollo, David Charles, Reier Helle, Brad Inwood and Francesca Masi for very helpful oral and written comments on the first draft of this paper. 2 See Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 15.20.6 = SVF 2.809 = LS 53W. 3 I owe this notion to Corcilius/Gregoric 2013, who outlined what they called the 'centralized incoming and outgoing motions' (CIOM) model. 4 See Aetius 4.21.2 = SVF 2.836 = LS 53H. 2 cardiocentric model of the soul, according to which the whole animal body is alive in virtue of the agency of the soul residing in the animal's heart or in its analogous part. This resemblance includes, among other things, several anatomic and embryological details, the processing of incoming and outgoing impulses, 5 the reference to some version of the connate pneuma with its peculiar motions, certain arguments for cardiocentrism, the role of the rational soul and its identification with a rational animal's true self and, on a more abstract level, the philosophical challenge to reconcile a centralized and unified, centrally located soul with the soul's responsibility for the cohesion and animation of the animal's body as a whole. In other words, the idea that significant aspects of Stoic philosophy of mind might deserve to be mentioned as part of the history of Aristotelian hylomorphism is only surprising if we associate Aristotle's soul-body hylomorphism exclusively with the claims that the soul is the form or the entelecheia of a living body; for in these respects, it is easy to see that the Stoics deliberately deviate from the Aristotelian theory by emphasising that the soul is corporeal or even a localizable body. However, there are strong reasons for assuming that there is more to Aristotelian soul-body hylomorphism than just the claim that the soul is the form or entelecheia of the animal's body. Above all, Aristotle's soul-body hylomorphism commits him to explaining how exactly the soul is able to perform its various functions within the animal's body. And in conformity with key theorems of hylomorphism, it is clear that the soul (with the notable exception of the intellectual soul) could perform none of its functionsnutritive, generative/reproductive, sentient/perceptual, locomotive-without an appropriate body or bodily part. All these functions are said to require something like a central hub within
“Tod im Garten: Sterblichkeit und Todesfurcht bei Epikur und den Epikureern“, in: Franz-Josef Bormann (ed.) : Tod und Sterben, Berlin/Boston 2024, 45-62. , 2024
Spätestens seit Sokrates war der Tod und die Todesfurcht ein Thema praktisch aller Moralphilosoph... more Spätestens seit Sokrates war der Tod und die Todesfurcht ein Thema praktisch aller Moralphilosophen der griechisch-römischen Antike. Da Sokrates sowohl das Todesurteil als auch die Vollstreckung desselben ohne erkennbaren emotionalen Zusammenbruch akzeptierte und selbst die Möglichkeit zur Flucht, die ihn vor der Todesstrafe bewahrt hätte, ausschlug, galt Sokrates als Vorbild dafür, wie man furchtlos dem Tod begegnet. Für die nachfolgenden Philosophen bedeutete das eine doppelte Herausforderung: Welche theoretische Annahmen über den Tod muss man machen, um die
“Logic in Ancient Rhetoric”, in: Luca Castagnoli/Paolo Fait (eds.) Cambridge Companion to Ancient Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2023, 263-282., 2023
in: Luca Castagnoli/Paolo Fait (eds.) Cambridge Companion to Ancient Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge ... more in: Luca Castagnoli/Paolo Fait (eds.) Cambridge Companion to Ancient Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2023, 263-282.
“What’s wrong with philosophical history of philosophy?” in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31.5 (2023), 1056-1065., 2023
“The Liaison between Analytic and Ancient Philosophy“, in: Marcel van Ackeren (ed.), Philosophy and the Historical Perspective, (= Proceedings of the British Academy 214), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018, 120-139., 2018
“Heart and Soul in Aristotle’s De Generatione II”, in: Sabine Föllinger (ed.), Aristotle’s Generation of Animals ― a Comprehensive Approach“, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2022, 269-318., 2022
Commentators have had a hard time trying to reconcile Aristotle's claim that the soul is the fo... more Commentators have had a hard time trying to reconcile Aristotle's claim that the soul is the form (eidos) or actuality (entelecheia) of an organic body with the idea that the soul is located in some particular part of the body. At first glance, these two strands within Aristotle's psychology might indeed seem to be mutually incompatible, for it seems strange to say of the soul that it is the formal unifying principle of the entire animal, as De Anima II 1 does, if its presence within the body is actually restricted to a particular organ. It has been suggested, most notably by Nuyens and Ross, 1 that these are two different and indeed irreconcilable strands of Aristotle's thinking and that they should be assigned to different phases of Aristotle's philosophical development. Such an approach would put the treatise Generation of Animals in a quite awkward position, since the treatise is clearly committed to both soul-body hylomorphism (the view that the soul is the form, and thus the entelecheia, of an organic body) and to cardiocentrism (the view that the most important psychic faculties reside in the heart). For some decades the developmental view held by Nuyens and Ross was extremely influential, but it has more recently gone out of fashion. Still, and regardless of what we think about this developmental approach, it seems still worth considering, first, how Aristotle argues for this privileged role of the heart, second, how he conceives of the presence of the soul within the heart and, third, whether this kind of presence of the soul within the heart gives us a clue as to how a centrally located soul is apt to make the entire animal a living being.
“Two Levels of Aristotle’s Ontology”, in: Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 22 (2022) (= Per una storia (e preistoria) dell'ontologia, edited by Francesco Fronterotta and Alice Ragni), 39-69., 2022
“Two Levels of Aristotle’s Ontology”, in: Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 22 (2022) (= Per una storia (e preistoria) dell'ontologia, edited by Francesco Fronterotta and Alice Ragni), 39-69., 2022
Undisputably, Aristotle holds a unique place in the history of ontology. The 'inquiry into being ... more Undisputably, Aristotle holds a unique place in the history of ontology. The 'inquiry into being qua being' might be seen as the historically first attempt to formulate a comprehensive metaphysical theory based on the notion of being, even though, of course, Aristotle's interest in the notion of being followed close upon Plato's response to the Eleatic challenge. In what follows I want to suggest that within Aristotle's well-known contribution to the history of ontology two different levels should be kept apart, an analytic-critical and a constructive level. On the first level Aristotle mainly provides analytic-critical tools for overcoming the main problems of all dealings with the notions of being and to be, while the second level consists in Aristotle's ambitious project of conducting first philosophy (i.e. the specific part of his philosophy that is meant to continue the old and time-honoured project of identifying what Aristotle calls 'first principles and causes') as ontology, i.e. as an inquiry into being qua being. The main rationale behind the suggestion to keep these two levels apart is the possibility
„Aristotle on Things and Super-Things”, in: Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics 18 (2019) (=The Question of Things edited by Francesco Marrone), 15-36., 2019
Abstract: Does Aristotle’s terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of ... more Abstract: Does Aristotle’s terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of the notion of thing? Naturally, one might think of Aristotle’s notion of being, which is meant to capture everything that is. However, ‘being’ in Aristotle seems to be significantly broader than what we take to be a ‘thing’. I will take up a thesis introduced and defended by Rainer-Wolfgang Mann, namely that Aristotle is actually the inventor of the notion of thing in that his Categories conceptualized the distinction between properties on the one hand and their bearers, individual substances, on the other. It will be argued though that Aristotle, when conceptualizing things as bearers of properties, depicts a notion that is actually stronger than what we usually mean by ‘thing’.
“The Inner Resting Point and the Common Cause of Animal motion in Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, Chapter 1“, in: Ch. Rapp/O. Primavesi (eds.), Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium. Proceedings of the XIX. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2020, 203-39., 2020
“Joints and Movers in the Cliffhanger Passage at the end of Aristotle, De Anima III.10”, in: Gweltaz Guyomarc'h, Claire Louguet, Charlotte Murgier (eds.), Aristote et l’âme humaine. Lectures De De Anima III offertes à Michel Crubellier, Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters 2020, 273-302., 2020
At the end of De Anima III.10 Aristotle mentions the bodily instrument by which desire moves th... more At the end of De Anima III.10 Aristotle mentions the bodily instrument by which desire moves the animal's body. For more details he refers the reader to a different project that, he says, deals with functions that are common to body and soul. He adds a few lines that are supposed to give a preview of the main points of this other project; according to this preview motion is initiated where the end- and the starting point are the same - as in a joint or hinge. The paper tries to identify the treatise to which this cross-reference refers and to make sense of the suprising emphasis on the role of joints.
“The Planetary Nature of Mankind. A Cosmological Perspective on Aristotle’s Anthropology”, in: Geert Keil, Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2019, 77-96., 2019
An important strand in Aristotle’s anthropological thinking concerns the conviction that human be... more An important strand in Aristotle’s anthropological thinking concerns the conviction that human beings have something in common with divine entities: although they are bodily beings they have a share in thinking or reasoning. For Aristotle, the conditio humana is characterized by the fusion of the bodily nature on the one side and their intellectual, god-like nature on the other. In his famous discussion of the two best forms of living, i.e. the theoretical life and political life, Aristotle derives a preference for the life of theory from the perfectionist principle that men should live “in accordance with the best in them”, i.e. in accordance with their capacity to reason. At the same time he says that this is the divine way of living. Taken together these two assumptions seem to apply that Aristotle adheres to a version of the Platonic “homoiosis toi theoi – becoming like a god” – although he sometimes relativizes this principle by pointing to the competing principle that we should live in accordance with what is peculiar to human beings, i.e. the combination of bodily and intellectual existence.
The present paper draws on the anthropological remarks in De Caelo II.12, were Aristotle memorably compares planets to human beings; both, he says, carry out the greatest number of movements or actions, because both of them can reach the best possible condition, while other celestial bodies or inferior animals cannot. This is telling with regard to Aristotle’s anthropological assumptions. For human beings, there are great things to aspire to (they can even manage to temporarily partake in the divine kind of being if they manage to perform their capacity to reason and to theorize very well); however, this is an ambitious end requiring many steps and efforts. And the more steps they have to take in order to reach what is the best for them, the more they expose themselves to the risk of failure.
Uploads
Forthcoming/Drafts by Christof Rapp
The uploaded paper is the draft version I presented at the 21st Symposium Aristotelicum held in Athens 2017
I read versions of this paper in San Francisco (2012), Pisa (2013) and Paris, Nanterre (2017). It doesn't include references to scholarly literature etc. yet, but the main thesis is stable. David Konstan wrote a very valuable reply to this draft.
Sections 1-3 are mostly preparatory; they try to set the stage for what follows. Section 3 addresses a, as I think, pressing worry, namely that neither the Categories nor the Topics are meant to belong to Aristotle’s first philosophy (or to what we would call ‘metaphysics’). How come then that they do deal with essences at all? Or, to put it differently, what could be the status of the notion of essence in works that are dedicated to the method of dialectics?
Section 4 introduces the difference that has become known as the difference between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication. Sections 5 and 6 address exegetical problems that have the potential to obscure or to question this difference. In section 6, in particular, I suggest an interpretation of Aristotle’s terminology that admits a consistent reading of the whole treatise, resisting the temptations of ‘apostate’ readings).
Sections 7-9 turn to the notion of substance in the Categories, to primary and secondary substances and to the underlying criteria of substancehood. On the one hand, it is crucial for a substance to be a substrate, in particular a substrate-for-inherence. On the other hand, secondary substances have a job in ‘revealing’ what a primary substance is. In this latter context, the Categories touches upon the notion of essence and implies at least two important essentialist claims, although in a very compressed way (as, e.g. the comparison to the Topics shows). Perhaps one of the major upshots of this paper (concerning the differences between the Metaphysics and Categories/Topics with regard to essence) is formulated towards the end of section 9, where the differences between the secondary substances of the Categories and the substantial forms of the Metaphysics become obvious; whereas the latter ones are the cause-of-being of a compound substrate, the former ones just ‘reveal’, ‘disclose’ or ‘exhibit’ what a primary substance essentially is.
The concluding section 10 browses the Categories for hints to the idea that at least some attributes – be they contingent, necessary or generically necessary – are by their nature connected with the essential kind of their substrate. I suggest that the Categories’ famous distinction between being SAID OF and being IN (traditionally glossed as the difference between essential and accidental predication) is not so much about necessary and non-necessary predication, but about the difference between species membership and the possession of properties.
Recent by Christof Rapp
The present paper draws on the anthropological remarks in De Caelo II.12, were Aristotle memorably compares planets to human beings; both, he says, carry out the greatest number of movements or actions, because both of them can reach the best possible condition, while other celestial bodies or inferior animals cannot. This is telling with regard to Aristotle’s anthropological assumptions. For human beings, there are great things to aspire to (they can even manage to temporarily partake in the divine kind of being if they manage to perform their capacity to reason and to theorize very well); however, this is an ambitious end requiring many steps and efforts. And the more steps they have to take in order to reach what is the best for them, the more they expose themselves to the risk of failure.
The uploaded paper is the draft version I presented at the 21st Symposium Aristotelicum held in Athens 2017
I read versions of this paper in San Francisco (2012), Pisa (2013) and Paris, Nanterre (2017). It doesn't include references to scholarly literature etc. yet, but the main thesis is stable. David Konstan wrote a very valuable reply to this draft.
Sections 1-3 are mostly preparatory; they try to set the stage for what follows. Section 3 addresses a, as I think, pressing worry, namely that neither the Categories nor the Topics are meant to belong to Aristotle’s first philosophy (or to what we would call ‘metaphysics’). How come then that they do deal with essences at all? Or, to put it differently, what could be the status of the notion of essence in works that are dedicated to the method of dialectics?
Section 4 introduces the difference that has become known as the difference between ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication. Sections 5 and 6 address exegetical problems that have the potential to obscure or to question this difference. In section 6, in particular, I suggest an interpretation of Aristotle’s terminology that admits a consistent reading of the whole treatise, resisting the temptations of ‘apostate’ readings).
Sections 7-9 turn to the notion of substance in the Categories, to primary and secondary substances and to the underlying criteria of substancehood. On the one hand, it is crucial for a substance to be a substrate, in particular a substrate-for-inherence. On the other hand, secondary substances have a job in ‘revealing’ what a primary substance is. In this latter context, the Categories touches upon the notion of essence and implies at least two important essentialist claims, although in a very compressed way (as, e.g. the comparison to the Topics shows). Perhaps one of the major upshots of this paper (concerning the differences between the Metaphysics and Categories/Topics with regard to essence) is formulated towards the end of section 9, where the differences between the secondary substances of the Categories and the substantial forms of the Metaphysics become obvious; whereas the latter ones are the cause-of-being of a compound substrate, the former ones just ‘reveal’, ‘disclose’ or ‘exhibit’ what a primary substance essentially is.
The concluding section 10 browses the Categories for hints to the idea that at least some attributes – be they contingent, necessary or generically necessary – are by their nature connected with the essential kind of their substrate. I suggest that the Categories’ famous distinction between being SAID OF and being IN (traditionally glossed as the difference between essential and accidental predication) is not so much about necessary and non-necessary predication, but about the difference between species membership and the possession of properties.
The present paper draws on the anthropological remarks in De Caelo II.12, were Aristotle memorably compares planets to human beings; both, he says, carry out the greatest number of movements or actions, because both of them can reach the best possible condition, while other celestial bodies or inferior animals cannot. This is telling with regard to Aristotle’s anthropological assumptions. For human beings, there are great things to aspire to (they can even manage to temporarily partake in the divine kind of being if they manage to perform their capacity to reason and to theorize very well); however, this is an ambitious end requiring many steps and efforts. And the more steps they have to take in order to reach what is the best for them, the more they expose themselves to the risk of failure.
The paper works out the whole comparison to which the mentioning of the game of dice belongs. It offers a reading of the corresponding passages that avoids the perplexing consequence that certain celestial bodies move just like dice.
Published in: George Karamanolis/Vasilis Politis (eds.), Aporia in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Published in:
in: M. Harbsmeier, S. Möckel (eds.), Pathos, Affekt, Emotion, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 2009, 47-78 (GERMAN).
Published online in open access for the Digital Paul Scholten Project. Rapp, “Dispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians.” http://www.paulscholten.eu/ research/article/dispassionate-judges-encountering-hotheaded-aristotelians-2/.
A printed version is about to appear in: Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer/Nuno M.M.S.Coelho (Hgg.), Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, Dordrecht: Springer (announced for 2017, maybe 2018?)
The paper is based on my:
„Was ist aristotelisch am Aristotelischen Naturalismus“, in: Martin Hähnel (ed.): Aristotelischer Naturalismus, Stuttgart: Metzler 2017, 19-41.
“The Principles of Sensible Substance in Metaphysics Λ 2-5”, in: Christoph Horn (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda – New Essays, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter 2016, 87-118.
“Interaction of Body and Soul. What the Hellenistic Philosophers Saw and Aristotle Avoided”, in: R. King (ed.), Common to Body and Soul, Walter de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin/New York 2006, 187-208
“On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory”, in: Argumentation 27 (2013), 7-30.
“His Dearest Enemy. Heraclitus in the Aristotelian Oeuvre“, in: Enrica Fantino/Ulrike Muss/Kurt Sier/Charlotte Schubert (Hgg.): Heraklit im Kontext, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 415-438.
Forthcoming in:
”The German Chancellor, Confessional Struggles, therein Aristotle & His Allegedly Individual Forms. Georg von Hertling as an Interpreter of Aristotle“, in: Gerald Hartung/Colin G. King/Christof Rapp (eds.): Aristotelian Studies in the 19th Century, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
“The Moral Psychology of Persuasion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in: Ch. Shields (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, 589-611
“The Nature and Goals of Rhetoric”, in: G. Anagnostopoulos (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Aristotle, Blackwell, Oxford 2009, 579-595