Papers Political Philosophy by Tim Meijers
Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics , 2022
In this paper, we explore four features that could potentially render animal population axiology ... more In this paper, we explore four features that could potentially render animal population axiology and ethics significantly different from human population axiology and ethics. We begin with the need for and challenges to multispecies population ethics. We then look at the claim that many animals—as opposed to humans—may not have a life worth living. We also consider whether animal species extinction raises distinct issues that differ from human extinction. Finally, we explore whether the means of shaping population size and composition meet ethical standards more easily in the case of animals than in the case of humans. Perhaps measures to reach a demographic goal have a lower bar to clear in the case of animals: restricting procreation or ending lives may be easier to justify when it comes to animals. We conclude that once we abandon (standard) speciesism, none of these four features renders animal population axiology and ethics significantly different from human population axiology and ethics.
Philosophy Compass, 2021
The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglec... more The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglected element in contemporary theories of justice. This has left several crucial questions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as why some particular agents are responsible for realizing justice, how their contribution towards realizing justice should be understood, and what role agents such as activists and community leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the landscape of these kinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should distinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizing justice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not responsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it, and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committed to realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporate agents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice.
Journal of Value Inquiry , 2020
Having children is an important aspect of peoples’ lives. I will take the intuition that there is... more Having children is an important aspect of peoples’ lives. I will take the intuition that there is something valuable about procreation as a starting point, and asks whether we can appeal to the value of procreation when engaged in liberal justification.
This is an important question philosophically speaking, but it also has important implications. There is a lively debate, both in philosophy and society at large, about constraints on the right to procreate as well as about government family policies. The strength and the nature of the interest people have in procreation has implications for both of these debates. We cannot take a position, for example, on the permissibility of procreation in the light of sustainability issues, without a view on the value in procreation. In this paper I offer such an account.
Economics and Philosophy , 2020
This article asks whether firms should contribute to the costs of procreation and parenthood.... more This article asks whether firms should contribute to the costs of procreation and parenthood. We explore two sets of arguments. First, we ask what the principle of fair play – central in parental justice debates – implies. We argue that if one defends a pro-sharing view, firms are required to shoulder part of the costs of procreation and parenthood. Second, we turn to the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We argue that compensating firms for costs they incur because their employees decide to procreate or parent may undermine some of the incentives leading to (statistical) discrimination in the workplace.
Critical Review of International Political and Social Philosophy (CRISPP), 2019
Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessa... more Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by focusing on only one dimension of what matters – luck equality – it proves very difficult to draw political implications in cases where several values are in tension. We believe however that normative political philosophy must have the ambition, in one way or another, to guide political action. Hence, in this paper we make a negative and a positive point. Negatively, we argue that the inability to offer recommendations on what to strive for potentially weakens Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's account of luck egalitarianism. In order not to be irrelevant for political practice, a more serviceable version of luck egalitarianism that would allow for all-things-considered judgments is needed. Positively, we examine two possible routes towards such a view. One would be to stick to pluralism, but to discuss possible clashes and find a rule of regulation in each case. Another would consist in giving up value pluralism by identifying an over-arching value or principle that would arbitrate between different values in cases where there are clashes. We suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality carries the potential for such an overarching principle.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2019
Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessar... more Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by focusing on only one dimension of what matters – luck equality – it proves very difficult to draw political implications in cases where several values are in tension. We believe that normative political philosophy must have the ambitionto guide political action. Hence, in this paper we make a negative and a positive point. Negatively, we argue that the inability to offer recommendations on what to strive for potentially weakens Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s account of luck egalitarianism. In order not to be irrelevant for political practice, a more serviceable version of luck egalitarianism that would allow for all-things-considered judgments is needed. Positively, we examine two possible routes toward such a view. One would be to stick to pluralism, but to discuss possible clashes and find a rule of regulation in each case. Another would consist in giving up value pluralism by identifying an over-arching value or principle that would arbitrate between different values. We suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality carries the potential for such an overarching principle.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics , 2018
A wide range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy fall under the heading of "inter... more A wide range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy fall under the heading of "intergenerational justice," such as questions of justice between the young and the old, obligations to more-or-less distant past and future generations, generational sovereignty, and the boundaries of democratic decision-making. These issues deserve our attention first because they are of great social importance. Solving the challenges raised by aging, stable pension funding, and increasing healthcare costs, for example, requires a view on what justice between age groups demands. Climate change, resource depletion, environmental degradation, population growth, and the like, raise serious concerns about the conditions under which future people will have to live. What kind of world should we bequest to future generations? Second, this debate has theoretical significance. Questions of intergenerational justice force reconsideration of the fundamental commitments (on scope, pattern, site, and currency) of existing moral and political theories. The age-group debate has led to fundamental questions about the pattern of distributive justice: Should we care about people's lives considered as whole being equally good? This has implausible implications. Can existing accounts be modified to avoid such problematic consequences?
Filantropie op de grens van overheid en markt, 2019
In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar de filantropie vanuit het perspectief van de filoso- fie – in het... more In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar de filantropie vanuit het perspectief van de filoso- fie – in het bijzonder de politieke filosofie en de ethiek. Een belangrijke taak van de filosofie is het scheppen van conceptuele helderheid, en dat is waar we in para- graaf 1 mee beginnen: het beschrijven van de voorwaarden waaraan een goede definitie zou moeten voldoen, en het toepassen van die criteria op de definitie van ‘filantropie’. In paragraaf 2 bespreken we de belangrijkste waarden en morele principes die we moeten gebruiken om de filantropie ethisch te beoordelen. In para- graaf 3 stellen we de vraag of we een morele plicht hebben tot filantropie, en zo ja, hoeveel we zouden moeten weggeven en aan welke doelen. In paragraaf 4 introduceren we het onderscheid tussen de ideale samenleving en de niet-ideale samenleving, en bespreken we hoe over de ethiek van filantropie na te denken in de niet- ideale samenleving. Paragraaf 5 stelt dezelfde vraag maar dan over de ideale samenleving, die rechtvaardig en democratisch is. We sluiten af met een conclusie.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 2017
While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophe... more While different worries about population size are present in public debates, political philosophers often take population size as given. This paper is an attempt to formulate a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian approach to population size: does it make sense to speak of 'too few' or 'too many' people from the point of view of justice? It argues that, drawing on key features of liberal egalitarian theory, several clear constraints on demographic developments-to the extent that they are under our control-can be formulated. Based on these claims, we can clarify both the grounds and content of our obligations to future generations.
Human Rights and Sustainability , 2016
In this chapter I ask whether the right to procreate may be limited for sustainability reasons. I... more In this chapter I ask whether the right to procreate may be limited for sustainability reasons. I argue that an unlimited right to procreate is not plausible, but I offer several arguments why a limited understanding of the right is. First, people have important interest in the renewal of generations. Therefore, at least sufficient procreation should be allowed for to guarantee the existence of society over time. Second, procreation is important because parent-child relationships involve important goods for many people. This points to a right to one child per couple. Taking these two considerations into account, a sustainability strategy that (morally) requires people to have only one child may be justified. However, taking into account global poverty, I argue that because having less children is often very costly for the global poor, there are good reasons to exempt them from limits on procreation.
Papers on Courts & Punishment by Tim Meijers
The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, 2020
This chapter discusses a communicative advantage for ‘defiant defendants’, otherwise known as the... more This chapter discusses a communicative advantage for ‘defiant defendants’, otherwise known as the ‘inequality of arms reversed’. A common critique of international criminal justice is that international criminal trials, when faced with high-profile and charismatic defendants, are basically doomed: either they silence the defendant’s political rhetoric and become show trials, or they let the defendant speak of the bias and inconsistencies in their institutional set-up, thus equally imperilling their legitimacy. This chapter argues that international criminal courts are not doomed by the reverse inequality: the communicative outcomes of international criminal trials remain contingent. For instance, prosecutors can make arguments that are politically and culturally attuned to local audiences. Moreover, the procedure of the trial can influence the defendant’s attitude. This chapter contends that it is possible for prosecutors and judges to acknowledge the political dimension of internat...
Ethics & International Affairs, 2016
This article addresses the question what—if anything—we can and should expect from the practice o... more This article addresses the question what—if anything—we can and should expect from the practice of international criminal justice. It argues that neither retributive nor purely consequentialist, deterrence-based justifications give sufficient guidance as to what international criminal courts should aim to achieve. Instead, the legal theory of expressivism provides a more viable (but not unproblematic) guide. Contrary to other expressivist views, this article argues for the importance of the trial, not just the punishment, as a form of expressivist messaging. Specifically, we emphasize the communicative aspect of the judicial process. The final section, acknowledging the limited success of international criminal justice so far in terms of fulfilling its expressivist potential, diagnoses the main obstacles to, and opportunities for, expressivist messaging in the contemporary practice of international criminal justice.
International Journal of Transitional Justice , 2012
This article examines the discourses of the prosecution and the defence in the case of Charles Ta... more This article examines the discourses of the prosecution and the defence in the case of Charles Taylor before the Special Court for Sierra Leone. It contributes to current debates about the legitimacy and utility of international criminal justice, which have tended to neglect the examination of actual trials, and particularly the role of the defence. We draw on the legal doctrine of ‘expressivism’ to theorize the connection between normative legitimacy, actual support and the utility of international criminal justice as dynamic and partly determined in court. We conclude that the Taylor trial demonstrates three interrelated obstacles to the fulfilment of the expressivist promise: that a tension between criminal proceedings against a single person and truth telling about mass violence necessarily exists; that discourses do not appeal to all audiences equally, and that those which appeal to western audiences are likely to be privileged; and that these weaknesses will usually be exposed and exploited by the defence, weakening the legitimacy of case and court. In order to develop expressivism as an empirical theory, the elements of the actors, the audiences and the stage in the posited ‘courtroom drama’ require further research.
Human Rights Quarterly , 2013
This article examines the discourses of prosecution and defence in the case of Radovan Karadžić b... more This article examines the discourses of prosecution and defence in the case of Radovan Karadžić before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It contributes to current debates about the legitimacy and utility of international criminal justice, which have tended to neglect the examination of actual trials, and particularly the role of the defence. We draw on the legal doctrine of "expressivism", which treats trials as theatrical, message-sending spectacles, to theorise the connection between normative legitimacy, actual support and utility of international criminal justice as dynamic, and partly determined in court. We conclude that the defence by Karadžić disrupts and thwarts the pedagogical messaging intended by expressivism to a considerable extent, and reflect on the generalizability of our findings by considering the elements of the actors, audiences, and the stage in the posited "courtroom drama".
Book Reviews by Tim Meijers
Political Studies Review, 2014
Bookreview: Unfit for the Future (by Persson and Savalescu
Political Studies Review, 2013
Thesis & Edited Volumes by Tim Meijers
Routledge, 2020
his edited volume offers a critical discussion of luck egalitarianism – one of the most prominent... more his edited volume offers a critical discussion of luck egalitarianism – one of the most prominent views in contemporary political philosophy – through an exploration of the theory of one of its leading proponents, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.
When (if ever) can inequalities in how well peoples’ lives go be justified? Luck egalitarianism provides an appealing answer: inequalities are just if, and only if, they are the result of the exercise of individual responsibility. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen lucidly defends and specifies this view in his own book Luck Egalitarianism. The authors in this volume offer a critical discussion of the key features of his view. They discuss disagreements within views which assign an important role to responsibility. They go on to push the limits of luck egalitarianism: what about inequalities between us and the dead? And inequalities between groups? Finally, they criticize some of the central tenets of luck egalitarianism, including its tendency to avoid action-guiding judgements and its focus on distributions rather than interpersonal relations.
This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
People create new people. This rather obvious and seemingly trivial fact raises a range of import... more People create new people. This rather obvious and seemingly trivial fact raises a range of important and complex questions in moral and political philosophy. I argue that certain demographic developments are better than others from the point of view of justice: at the very least, we need to make sure the size of future generations is compatible with sustainable just institutions. Crucial when thinking about population size, population policies and moral limits to procreation, is the question of what – if anything – makes procreation particularly valuable. By an appeal to the role that future generations play in our lives and to goods of parenthood, I defend an account of the value of procreation. I explore the implications of this account for the role fertility reduction can play in making the world more sustainable. In addition, I ask who should carry to costs of parenthood and procreation, and explore in particular the grounds on which firms could be said to have an obligation to contribute. Finally, I ask what – if anything – can justify the practice of including new-borns as full members of society, while at the same time refusing citizenship to many prospective immigrant. What makes them different? I reject several candidate arguments, and argue that the grounds on which the practice can be defended are both limited and surprising. Taken together, the five chapters in this thesis aim to contribute to a more complete account of justice in procreation. It investigates what liberal egalitarian theories of justice require in the domain of procreation, and evaluates several principles that should inform our individual and collective decisions around the creation and the accommodation of new people.(FILO - Philosophie) -- UCL, 201
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Papers Political Philosophy by Tim Meijers
This is an important question philosophically speaking, but it also has important implications. There is a lively debate, both in philosophy and society at large, about constraints on the right to procreate as well as about government family policies. The strength and the nature of the interest people have in procreation has implications for both of these debates. We cannot take a position, for example, on the permissibility of procreation in the light of sustainability issues, without a view on the value in procreation. In this paper I offer such an account.
Papers on Courts & Punishment by Tim Meijers
Book Reviews by Tim Meijers
Thesis & Edited Volumes by Tim Meijers
When (if ever) can inequalities in how well peoples’ lives go be justified? Luck egalitarianism provides an appealing answer: inequalities are just if, and only if, they are the result of the exercise of individual responsibility. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen lucidly defends and specifies this view in his own book Luck Egalitarianism. The authors in this volume offer a critical discussion of the key features of his view. They discuss disagreements within views which assign an important role to responsibility. They go on to push the limits of luck egalitarianism: what about inequalities between us and the dead? And inequalities between groups? Finally, they criticize some of the central tenets of luck egalitarianism, including its tendency to avoid action-guiding judgements and its focus on distributions rather than interpersonal relations.
This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.
This is an important question philosophically speaking, but it also has important implications. There is a lively debate, both in philosophy and society at large, about constraints on the right to procreate as well as about government family policies. The strength and the nature of the interest people have in procreation has implications for both of these debates. We cannot take a position, for example, on the permissibility of procreation in the light of sustainability issues, without a view on the value in procreation. In this paper I offer such an account.
When (if ever) can inequalities in how well peoples’ lives go be justified? Luck egalitarianism provides an appealing answer: inequalities are just if, and only if, they are the result of the exercise of individual responsibility. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen lucidly defends and specifies this view in his own book Luck Egalitarianism. The authors in this volume offer a critical discussion of the key features of his view. They discuss disagreements within views which assign an important role to responsibility. They go on to push the limits of luck egalitarianism: what about inequalities between us and the dead? And inequalities between groups? Finally, they criticize some of the central tenets of luck egalitarianism, including its tendency to avoid action-guiding judgements and its focus on distributions rather than interpersonal relations.
This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy.