ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instan... more ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that ... more is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that person of an infinite, nonrepeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. The reductio argument is the argument to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one is justified in any proposition, because there will be an infinite chain of reasons supporting any proposition (and similarly, a chain supporting its negation). Four ways of defending infinitism against the reductio argument are considered and found wanting: Peijnenburg and Atkinson's use of probabilistic chains of reasons; Klein's concept of emergent justification; Aikin's insistence that there be non-propositional input in the justification of any proposition; and Klein's use of the distinction between reasons that are and are not available to a person. I contend that, in the absence of some further defence, the reductio argument makes infinitism untenable.
Publisher Summary Foundationalism claims that the justification of most of our beliefs depend on ... more Publisher Summary Foundationalism claims that the justification of most of our beliefs depend on the justification of other beliefs, but to the exception, and that there are some beliefs (referred to as basic or foundational) that are justified for a person at a time and do not depend for their being justified on any other beliefs of that person being justified. Allowing the transitivity of dependence, foundationalism also states that all non-basic beliefs depend their justifiedness basic beliefs. Such an account of foundationalism may be natural, but if one wishes to think of coherence theories as rivals of foundationalism, it would be completely unsatisfactory because most coherence theories assert the existence of basic beliefs and have other beliefs depending on them for justification. Foundationalism is a theory that asserts the existence of basic beliefs. The main concern of this chapter is with the concept of dependence as it is found in the context of foundationalist theories, and in the more general context of the infinite regress argument.
A collection of ten, mostly previously unpublished, papers by Douglas Gasking, Boyce Gibson Profe... more A collection of ten, mostly previously unpublished, papers by Douglas Gasking, Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne from 1966 to 1976. Gasking studied under Wittgenstein and made his difficult work available to a wide philosophical audience. He inspired a generation of Australian philosophers.
... Consider the claim that person A is justified in belief p. Now p's being justified (unde... more ... Consider the claim that person A is justified in belief p. Now p's being justified (understand throughout: for A) either depends on A's being justified in some further belief q, or it does not. ... lieving, or even simply come to believe, that a particular one of our beliefs is justified or not. ...
Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow, in their article 'The Validation of Induction'
(Pargetter and... more Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow, in their article 'The Validation of Induction'
(Pargetter and Bigelow 1997; all page references below not otherwise attributed are to this paper), propose an extremely radical account of inductive arguments. I shall discuss and attempt to refute the main contentions of this rich and interesting paper.
A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know (little or) nothing.’ Call this the... more A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know (little or) nothing.’ Call this the skeptical use of the word ‘know.’ In apparent contradiction of the skeptic's claims, almost all of us firmly ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. We use the word ‘know’ and its cognates frequently and fluently in largely untroubled communication with our fellows. We make judgments ascribing knowledge to ourselves and others. Furthermore, faced with the same situation and needing to make a judgment about whether to ascribe knowledge or not, we agree on the whole with each other's ascriptions (and withholdings and doubtful cases). For the sake of a term, and being careful to neglect any stray connotations it may carry, let us call this the cognitivist use of ‘know.’
Infinitism, in contrast to foundationalism and coherentism, claims that justification in any prop... more Infinitism, in contrast to foundationalism and coherentism, claims that justification in any proposition requires the availability of an infinite chain of propositional reasons, each providing a justificatory reason for its successor in the chain. Both infinitists and some critics of the theory have at times noted the possibility that the theory may have sceptical consequences for doxastic justification. It is argued here that, for reasons that appear not to have been previously appreciated, sceptical results very definitely do follow from infinitism. On one construal of infinitism, this constitutes a reductio of the theory. On an alternative construal, infinitists may embrace the sceptical conclusion, but in doing so, will take on all the problems that scepticism faces.
ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instan... more ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
The idea of epistemic dependence is this: in some cases, a person’s being
justified (at a time, ... more The idea of epistemic dependence is this: in some cases, a person’s being
justified (at a time, in a given situation) in one belief, p, will epistemically
depend on that person’s being justified in another belief, q. For short:
justifiedness in p depends on justifiedness in q; or even shorter: Jp dep Jq. The
main point to be made in this paper is that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to give a coherent analysis of this apparently innocent and
perspicuous notion. Consequential doubt is cast on the very intelligibility of
some large issues about the structure of our systems of justified beliefs - in
particular the debate between foundationalists and coherentists. In Section 1 of
this paper I will outline the role of epistemic dependence in these structural
debates.
In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you m... more In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there are no duties to oneself can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
Epistemic infinitism, advanced in different forms by Peter Klein, Scott Aikin, and David Atkinson... more Epistemic infinitism, advanced in different forms by Peter Klein, Scott Aikin, and David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that person of an infinite, nonrepeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. The reductio argument is the argument to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one is justified in any proposition, because there will be an infinite chain of reasons supporting any proposition (and similarly, a chain supporting its negation). Four ways of defending infinitism against the reductio argument are considered and found wanting: Peijnenburg and Atkinson's use of probabilistic chains of reasons; Klein's concept of emergent justification; Aikin's insistence that there be non-propositional input in the justification of any proposition; and Klein's use of the distinction between reasons that are and are not available to a person. I contend that, in the absence of some further defence, the reductio argument makes infinitism untenable.
ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instan... more ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that ... more is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that person of an infinite, nonrepeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. The reductio argument is the argument to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one is justified in any proposition, because there will be an infinite chain of reasons supporting any proposition (and similarly, a chain supporting its negation). Four ways of defending infinitism against the reductio argument are considered and found wanting: Peijnenburg and Atkinson's use of probabilistic chains of reasons; Klein's concept of emergent justification; Aikin's insistence that there be non-propositional input in the justification of any proposition; and Klein's use of the distinction between reasons that are and are not available to a person. I contend that, in the absence of some further defence, the reductio argument makes infinitism untenable.
Publisher Summary Foundationalism claims that the justification of most of our beliefs depend on ... more Publisher Summary Foundationalism claims that the justification of most of our beliefs depend on the justification of other beliefs, but to the exception, and that there are some beliefs (referred to as basic or foundational) that are justified for a person at a time and do not depend for their being justified on any other beliefs of that person being justified. Allowing the transitivity of dependence, foundationalism also states that all non-basic beliefs depend their justifiedness basic beliefs. Such an account of foundationalism may be natural, but if one wishes to think of coherence theories as rivals of foundationalism, it would be completely unsatisfactory because most coherence theories assert the existence of basic beliefs and have other beliefs depending on them for justification. Foundationalism is a theory that asserts the existence of basic beliefs. The main concern of this chapter is with the concept of dependence as it is found in the context of foundationalist theories, and in the more general context of the infinite regress argument.
A collection of ten, mostly previously unpublished, papers by Douglas Gasking, Boyce Gibson Profe... more A collection of ten, mostly previously unpublished, papers by Douglas Gasking, Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne from 1966 to 1976. Gasking studied under Wittgenstein and made his difficult work available to a wide philosophical audience. He inspired a generation of Australian philosophers.
... Consider the claim that person A is justified in belief p. Now p's being justified (unde... more ... Consider the claim that person A is justified in belief p. Now p's being justified (understand throughout: for A) either depends on A's being justified in some further belief q, or it does not. ... lieving, or even simply come to believe, that a particular one of our beliefs is justified or not. ...
Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow, in their article 'The Validation of Induction'
(Pargetter and... more Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow, in their article 'The Validation of Induction'
(Pargetter and Bigelow 1997; all page references below not otherwise attributed are to this paper), propose an extremely radical account of inductive arguments. I shall discuss and attempt to refute the main contentions of this rich and interesting paper.
A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know (little or) nothing.’ Call this the... more A skeptic will from time to time make such claims as ‘We know (little or) nothing.’ Call this the skeptical use of the word ‘know.’ In apparent contradiction of the skeptic's claims, almost all of us firmly ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. We use the word ‘know’ and its cognates frequently and fluently in largely untroubled communication with our fellows. We make judgments ascribing knowledge to ourselves and others. Furthermore, faced with the same situation and needing to make a judgment about whether to ascribe knowledge or not, we agree on the whole with each other's ascriptions (and withholdings and doubtful cases). For the sake of a term, and being careful to neglect any stray connotations it may carry, let us call this the cognitivist use of ‘know.’
Infinitism, in contrast to foundationalism and coherentism, claims that justification in any prop... more Infinitism, in contrast to foundationalism and coherentism, claims that justification in any proposition requires the availability of an infinite chain of propositional reasons, each providing a justificatory reason for its successor in the chain. Both infinitists and some critics of the theory have at times noted the possibility that the theory may have sceptical consequences for doxastic justification. It is argued here that, for reasons that appear not to have been previously appreciated, sceptical results very definitely do follow from infinitism. On one construal of infinitism, this constitutes a reductio of the theory. On an alternative construal, infinitists may embrace the sceptical conclusion, but in doing so, will take on all the problems that scepticism faces.
ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instan... more ABSTRACT In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
The idea of epistemic dependence is this: in some cases, a person’s being
justified (at a time, ... more The idea of epistemic dependence is this: in some cases, a person’s being
justified (at a time, in a given situation) in one belief, p, will epistemically
depend on that person’s being justified in another belief, q. For short:
justifiedness in p depends on justifiedness in q; or even shorter: Jp dep Jq. The
main point to be made in this paper is that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to give a coherent analysis of this apparently innocent and
perspicuous notion. Consequential doubt is cast on the very intelligibility of
some large issues about the structure of our systems of justified beliefs - in
particular the debate between foundationalists and coherentists. In Section 1 of
this paper I will outline the role of epistemic dependence in these structural
debates.
In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you m... more In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there are no duties to oneself can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
Epistemic infinitism, advanced in different forms by Peter Klein, Scott Aikin, and David Atkinson... more Epistemic infinitism, advanced in different forms by Peter Klein, Scott Aikin, and David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires the availability to that person of an infinite, nonrepeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. The reductio argument is the argument to the effect that infinitism has the consequence that no one is justified in any proposition, because there will be an infinite chain of reasons supporting any proposition (and similarly, a chain supporting its negation). Four ways of defending infinitism against the reductio argument are considered and found wanting: Peijnenburg and Atkinson's use of probabilistic chains of reasons; Klein's concept of emergent justification; Aikin's insistence that there be non-propositional input in the justification of any proposition; and Klein's use of the distinction between reasons that are and are not available to a person. I contend that, in the absence of some further defence, the reductio argument makes infinitism untenable.
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Papers by Tim Oakley
(Pargetter and Bigelow 1997; all page references below not otherwise attributed are to this paper), propose an extremely radical account of inductive arguments. I shall discuss and attempt to refute the main contentions of this rich and interesting paper.
justified (at a time, in a given situation) in one belief, p, will epistemically
depend on that person’s being justified in another belief, q. For short:
justifiedness in p depends on justifiedness in q; or even shorter: Jp dep Jq. The
main point to be made in this paper is that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to give a coherent analysis of this apparently innocent and
perspicuous notion. Consequential doubt is cast on the very intelligibility of
some large issues about the structure of our systems of justified beliefs - in
particular the debate between foundationalists and coherentists. In Section 1 of
this paper I will outline the role of epistemic dependence in these structural
debates.
can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.
(Pargetter and Bigelow 1997; all page references below not otherwise attributed are to this paper), propose an extremely radical account of inductive arguments. I shall discuss and attempt to refute the main contentions of this rich and interesting paper.
justified (at a time, in a given situation) in one belief, p, will epistemically
depend on that person’s being justified in another belief, q. For short:
justifiedness in p depends on justifiedness in q; or even shorter: Jp dep Jq. The
main point to be made in this paper is that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to give a coherent analysis of this apparently innocent and
perspicuous notion. Consequential doubt is cast on the very intelligibility of
some large issues about the structure of our systems of justified beliefs - in
particular the debate between foundationalists and coherentists. In Section 1 of
this paper I will outline the role of epistemic dependence in these structural
debates.
can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.