Papers by Théogène Havugimana
Estudos Kantianos [EK]
In his essay, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (1784), Kant cla... more In his essay, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (1784), Kant claims that the history of mankind should reflectively be understood as a process thanks to which the human race ‘as a whole’ gradually approximates its terminus ad quem, i.e., the establishment of “a moral whole” (ein moralisch Ganze). (IaG AA 8:21). In objection to the empirical standpoint adopted by historiographers’ account of natural history, Kant shows that his intention is far from elaborating a “history…written merely empirically” (IaG AA 8:30), i.e., “history which concerns itself with the narration of… appearances” (IaG AA 8:17).
Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, 2017
(Book) The Immediacy of Mystical Experience in the European Tradition, Springer , 2017
Any claim about a possible immediate experience of God raises the question of the conditions of t... more Any claim about a possible immediate experience of God raises the question of the conditions of the possibility of experience in general (epistemologically speaking) and, especially, the immediate experience of God. The central issue is whether the former (general) and latter (specific) conditions are congruent or not. From within Kant's theory of intuitions in his Critique of Pure
Ethical Perspectives , 2018
Abstract. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals has been the subject of several ongoing
discussions in po... more Abstract. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals has been the subject of several ongoing
discussions in political realism. This article engages with Raymond Geuss’
explicit refutation of Kant’s metaphysical foundations of politics. It contends
that the key argument missed by Geuss is Kant’s Copernican Revolution in
moral (ethical and political) practical theory. This means, Kant’s most innovative
discovery of the fact that first, human reason can be pure, that is it contains
a pure principle; second, pure reason can be practical, that is it can
immediately determine the will (self-legislation). In showing that this discovery
is the most basic ground upon which the universal principle of right is derived,
this article argues that Kant succeeds to connect politics to the core principle
of his system of critical moral philosophy. It is thus claimed that the causal
primacy of the law of pure practical reason does not make Kant’s argument
disconnected from political reality. It rather, teleologically speaking, shows
how the entire race of human rational beings constantly fulfils its political duty
to progressively achieve, despite countless historical obstacles, its spirit of
freedom as autonomy.
Keywords. Kant, Raymond Geuss, political realism, normativity, reason,
autonomy
Estudos Kantianos, 2017
In his essay, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (1784), Kant cla... more In his essay, “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” (1784), Kant claims that the history of mankind should reflectively be understood as a process thanks to which the human race ‘as a whole’ gradually approximates its terminus ad quem, i.e., the establishment of “a moral whole” (ein moralisch Ganze). (IaG AA 8:21). In objection to the empirical standpoint adopted by historiographers’ account of natural history, Kant shows that his intention is far from elaborating a “history…written merely empirically” (IaG AA
8:30), i.e., “history which concerns itself with the narration of… appearances” (IaG AA 8:17). Noticeably, Kant is not rejecting natural history as such. He rather acknowledges the role of (human) nature in the constant approximation of the highest goal of humanity. In his endeavor to “furnish…a philosophical history” (philosophische Geschichte) (IaG AA 8:31), ‘nature’ is given credit of being a means to the continual progress of the realization of freedom in the stage of empirical history. (Cf. IaG AA 8:19; ZeF AA 8:360-368). The problem is how Kant’s criticism of “history…written merely empirically” (IaG AA 8:30) and his emphasis on the role of nature in the moral progress of humanity fit together without contradicting each other. In three steps, this paper aims at showing, based on the mediating function of the idea of moral progress, that there is no contradiction in the foregoing claims.
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Papers by Théogène Havugimana
discussions in political realism. This article engages with Raymond Geuss’
explicit refutation of Kant’s metaphysical foundations of politics. It contends
that the key argument missed by Geuss is Kant’s Copernican Revolution in
moral (ethical and political) practical theory. This means, Kant’s most innovative
discovery of the fact that first, human reason can be pure, that is it contains
a pure principle; second, pure reason can be practical, that is it can
immediately determine the will (self-legislation). In showing that this discovery
is the most basic ground upon which the universal principle of right is derived,
this article argues that Kant succeeds to connect politics to the core principle
of his system of critical moral philosophy. It is thus claimed that the causal
primacy of the law of pure practical reason does not make Kant’s argument
disconnected from political reality. It rather, teleologically speaking, shows
how the entire race of human rational beings constantly fulfils its political duty
to progressively achieve, despite countless historical obstacles, its spirit of
freedom as autonomy.
Keywords. Kant, Raymond Geuss, political realism, normativity, reason,
autonomy
8:30), i.e., “history which concerns itself with the narration of… appearances” (IaG AA 8:17). Noticeably, Kant is not rejecting natural history as such. He rather acknowledges the role of (human) nature in the constant approximation of the highest goal of humanity. In his endeavor to “furnish…a philosophical history” (philosophische Geschichte) (IaG AA 8:31), ‘nature’ is given credit of being a means to the continual progress of the realization of freedom in the stage of empirical history. (Cf. IaG AA 8:19; ZeF AA 8:360-368). The problem is how Kant’s criticism of “history…written merely empirically” (IaG AA 8:30) and his emphasis on the role of nature in the moral progress of humanity fit together without contradicting each other. In three steps, this paper aims at showing, based on the mediating function of the idea of moral progress, that there is no contradiction in the foregoing claims.
discussions in political realism. This article engages with Raymond Geuss’
explicit refutation of Kant’s metaphysical foundations of politics. It contends
that the key argument missed by Geuss is Kant’s Copernican Revolution in
moral (ethical and political) practical theory. This means, Kant’s most innovative
discovery of the fact that first, human reason can be pure, that is it contains
a pure principle; second, pure reason can be practical, that is it can
immediately determine the will (self-legislation). In showing that this discovery
is the most basic ground upon which the universal principle of right is derived,
this article argues that Kant succeeds to connect politics to the core principle
of his system of critical moral philosophy. It is thus claimed that the causal
primacy of the law of pure practical reason does not make Kant’s argument
disconnected from political reality. It rather, teleologically speaking, shows
how the entire race of human rational beings constantly fulfils its political duty
to progressively achieve, despite countless historical obstacles, its spirit of
freedom as autonomy.
Keywords. Kant, Raymond Geuss, political realism, normativity, reason,
autonomy
8:30), i.e., “history which concerns itself with the narration of… appearances” (IaG AA 8:17). Noticeably, Kant is not rejecting natural history as such. He rather acknowledges the role of (human) nature in the constant approximation of the highest goal of humanity. In his endeavor to “furnish…a philosophical history” (philosophische Geschichte) (IaG AA 8:31), ‘nature’ is given credit of being a means to the continual progress of the realization of freedom in the stage of empirical history. (Cf. IaG AA 8:19; ZeF AA 8:360-368). The problem is how Kant’s criticism of “history…written merely empirically” (IaG AA 8:30) and his emphasis on the role of nature in the moral progress of humanity fit together without contradicting each other. In three steps, this paper aims at showing, based on the mediating function of the idea of moral progress, that there is no contradiction in the foregoing claims.