
Aysel Dogan
Aysel Dogan has been Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Kocaeli University, since 2013. Dogan's research interests are Philosophy of Science, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social and Political Philosopy. She is the author of many articles
, especially in the field of Political Philosophy.
Supervisors: Prof. Erdinç Sayan and Prof. Loren Lomasky
Address: Department of Philosophy, Kocaeli University
, especially in the field of Political Philosophy.
Supervisors: Prof. Erdinç Sayan and Prof. Loren Lomasky
Address: Department of Philosophy, Kocaeli University
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Papers by Aysel Dogan
political conception of justice as fairness to the relations among peoples at the
international level. Rawls argues that not all peoples accept liberal values,1 but
this does not require liberal peoples to leave all nonliberal peoples2 outside the
international community—the society of peoples endorsing the law of peoples. If
a society is not aggressive and is respectful to human rights, and yet nonliberal
such as a “decent hierarchical society,”3 liberal peoples can tolerate it, and
delegates of liberal peoples accept to enter into an international original position
with its delegates. Rawls then contend that delegates of decent hierarchical
societies would agree on a set of principles of international law, such as the
principle of non-intervention, respect for treatises and human rights.
The distinction Rawls made between political liberalism and
Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division.
Keywords:: Kant; Rawls; right; good; human honor; teleological; deontological; just
political conception of justice as fairness to the relations among peoples at the
international level. Rawls argues that not all peoples accept liberal values,1 but
this does not require liberal peoples to leave all nonliberal peoples2 outside the
international community—the society of peoples endorsing the law of peoples. If
a society is not aggressive and is respectful to human rights, and yet nonliberal
such as a “decent hierarchical society,”3 liberal peoples can tolerate it, and
delegates of liberal peoples accept to enter into an international original position
with its delegates. Rawls then contend that delegates of decent hierarchical
societies would agree on a set of principles of international law, such as the
principle of non-intervention, respect for treatises and human rights.
The distinction Rawls made between political liberalism and
Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division.
Keywords:: Kant; Rawls; right; good; human honor; teleological; deontological; just