Books by Edward Kanterian
Introduction (editors).
1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey (H... more Introduction (editors).
1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey (Hans-Johann Glock).
2. Wittgenstein’s Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices (Katherine Morris).
3. Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein (P. M. S. Hacker).
4. The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Therapy, Nachlass (Alois Pichler).
5. Ways of Reading Wittgenstein: Observations on Certain Uses of the Word ‘Metaphysics’ (Joachim Schulte).
6. Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker (Hilary Putnam).
7. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism (A. W. Moore).
8. Simples and the Idea of Analysis in the Tractatus (Marie McGinn).
9. Words, Waxing and Waning: Ethics in/and/of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Stephen Mulhall).
10. The Uses of Wittgenstein’s Beetle: Philosophical Investigations §293 and Its Interpreters (David G. Stern).
11. Bourgeois, Bolshevist or Anarchist?: The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Ray Monk).
12. Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism (Alice Crary).
Bibliography.
Index.
Abstract:
A theory of descriptive names is developed and defended against several objections. De... more Abstract:
A theory of descriptive names is developed and defended against several objections. Descriptive names pose an interesting challenge to any theory of reference, since they possess features of both proper names and definite descriptions, i.e. of expressions which are often considered to be radically different from each other. These features are referentiality and descriptive sense. The thesis takes as its point of departure Gareth Evans’s theory of descriptive names, improves upon it and discusses several other authors and related theories along the way.
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the topic and an abstract of the main lines of argument. Chapter 2 argues that descriptive names possess both referential status and descriptive sense, and that these qualities constitute the two most basic elements of the notion of descriptive reference (which is contrasted with Russellian reference). It is demonstrated that not all names introduced by description are descriptive names, a claim which is given additional substance by a comparison between Evans’s and Kripke’s accounts of such names. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two major challenges to the possibility of descriptive names. Chapter 3 explores the possibility of a truth-conditional theory of meaning for descriptive names, but it is shown that if we follow Evans’s suggestion that the semantic value of a descriptive name is to be construed according to model theory – namely, as an entity distinct from the referent (a set) – such a theory will result in treating descriptive names as predicates, and thus eliminate them qua referring expressions. Similar accounts given by other authors are also examined and found to be problematic. I conclude by rejecting the model-theoretic notion of semantic value. Chapter 4 addresses a second challenge, posed by the fact that if a descriptive name has a descriptive sense, then given a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, descriptive names must be quantifier phrases, and thus, again, non-referring expressions. It is argued that if this is true, then the use of negative free logic is unnecessary. Using the idea of rigidified descriptions, it is shown that Evans’s arguments, based on modality and simplicity considerations, fail to save both the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names while semantically dissociating them from descriptions. I show that descriptive names can be treated as shorthand for rigidified descriptions and thus semantically on a par with the latter, which, as I demonstrate, is still consistent with Evans’s own (convincing) solution of the puzzle of the contingent a priori. Nevertheless, this still does not guarantee the referentiality of descriptive names. Chapter 5 defends the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names by offering arguments in favour of a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Several negative arguments undermining the most influential defences of Russellianism are given and three positive accounts of referring descriptions, Wettstein’s, Sainsbury’s and Strawson’s, are critically discussed, finally settling, with some proviso, for Strawson’s. In the course of this discussion, topics such the attributive-referential distinction and semantic presupposition and metalinguistic negation are investigated. Finally, the principles of a ‘Fregean’ free logic for Strawsonian semantics are sketched, and I suggest ways in which a truth theory could be expressed by means of these principles. Chapter 6 summarises the achievements, sketches possible research concerning descriptive names and concludes that the analysis of descriptive names is useful in at least three ways: it provides us with means to, first, solve problems that arise from the introduction of artificial expressions such as descriptive names (e.g. the problem of the contingent a priori), second, to better understand our natural language and its relation to formal theories of meaning, and, last but not least, to give a strong rationale for a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Chapter 7 includes the bibliography.
Papers by Edward Kanterian
Hegel's Thought in Europe, 2013
Sinn Und Form, 2008
... | Ayuda. Über den unterschiedlichen Wahrheitsgehalt von Holocaust-Tagebüchern. Autores:Edward... more ... | Ayuda. Über den unterschiedlichen Wahrheitsgehalt von Holocaust-Tagebüchern. Autores:Edward Kanterian; Localización: Sinn und form, ISSN 0037-5756, Vol. 60, Nº. 3, 2008 , pags. 343-352. © 2001-2010 Universidad de La Rioja · Todos los derechos reservados. ...
European Journal of Philosophy, 2014
Philosophical Investigations, 2011
Philosophical Investigations, 2014
Philosophical Investigations, 2009
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2011
This article explores the possibility of locating an ‘ethics of memory’ respecting commission of ... more This article explores the possibility of locating an ‘ethics of memory’ respecting commission of mass atrocities via the link between justice, truth and memory. First, it suggests a typology for memory in relation to justice in its retributive and restorative aspects. Second, it explores how so-called ‘memory-justice’ arises in the course of international proceedings—and particularly given its significance under the Rome Statute—by considering, critically, the international community's ability to repair or restitute injury by engaging in memory in ‘the right way’. Lastly, it suggests limitations of memory-justice of which only some can be overcome. The challenges and arguments for a ‘categorical imperative’ for memory are left for a subsequent treatment, but arguments in law and practical ethics will be suggested in favour of properly approaching memory in pursuit of justice, with profound consequences for the nascent Court and sister tribunals, in their efforts to break the cycle of conflict in affected regions, and rid the world of the worst crimes known to humanity.
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Books by Edward Kanterian
1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey (Hans-Johann Glock).
2. Wittgenstein’s Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices (Katherine Morris).
3. Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein (P. M. S. Hacker).
4. The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Therapy, Nachlass (Alois Pichler).
5. Ways of Reading Wittgenstein: Observations on Certain Uses of the Word ‘Metaphysics’ (Joachim Schulte).
6. Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker (Hilary Putnam).
7. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism (A. W. Moore).
8. Simples and the Idea of Analysis in the Tractatus (Marie McGinn).
9. Words, Waxing and Waning: Ethics in/and/of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Stephen Mulhall).
10. The Uses of Wittgenstein’s Beetle: Philosophical Investigations §293 and Its Interpreters (David G. Stern).
11. Bourgeois, Bolshevist or Anarchist?: The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Ray Monk).
12. Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism (Alice Crary).
Bibliography.
Index.
A theory of descriptive names is developed and defended against several objections. Descriptive names pose an interesting challenge to any theory of reference, since they possess features of both proper names and definite descriptions, i.e. of expressions which are often considered to be radically different from each other. These features are referentiality and descriptive sense. The thesis takes as its point of departure Gareth Evans’s theory of descriptive names, improves upon it and discusses several other authors and related theories along the way.
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the topic and an abstract of the main lines of argument. Chapter 2 argues that descriptive names possess both referential status and descriptive sense, and that these qualities constitute the two most basic elements of the notion of descriptive reference (which is contrasted with Russellian reference). It is demonstrated that not all names introduced by description are descriptive names, a claim which is given additional substance by a comparison between Evans’s and Kripke’s accounts of such names. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two major challenges to the possibility of descriptive names. Chapter 3 explores the possibility of a truth-conditional theory of meaning for descriptive names, but it is shown that if we follow Evans’s suggestion that the semantic value of a descriptive name is to be construed according to model theory – namely, as an entity distinct from the referent (a set) – such a theory will result in treating descriptive names as predicates, and thus eliminate them qua referring expressions. Similar accounts given by other authors are also examined and found to be problematic. I conclude by rejecting the model-theoretic notion of semantic value. Chapter 4 addresses a second challenge, posed by the fact that if a descriptive name has a descriptive sense, then given a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, descriptive names must be quantifier phrases, and thus, again, non-referring expressions. It is argued that if this is true, then the use of negative free logic is unnecessary. Using the idea of rigidified descriptions, it is shown that Evans’s arguments, based on modality and simplicity considerations, fail to save both the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names while semantically dissociating them from descriptions. I show that descriptive names can be treated as shorthand for rigidified descriptions and thus semantically on a par with the latter, which, as I demonstrate, is still consistent with Evans’s own (convincing) solution of the puzzle of the contingent a priori. Nevertheless, this still does not guarantee the referentiality of descriptive names. Chapter 5 defends the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names by offering arguments in favour of a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Several negative arguments undermining the most influential defences of Russellianism are given and three positive accounts of referring descriptions, Wettstein’s, Sainsbury’s and Strawson’s, are critically discussed, finally settling, with some proviso, for Strawson’s. In the course of this discussion, topics such the attributive-referential distinction and semantic presupposition and metalinguistic negation are investigated. Finally, the principles of a ‘Fregean’ free logic for Strawsonian semantics are sketched, and I suggest ways in which a truth theory could be expressed by means of these principles. Chapter 6 summarises the achievements, sketches possible research concerning descriptive names and concludes that the analysis of descriptive names is useful in at least three ways: it provides us with means to, first, solve problems that arise from the introduction of artificial expressions such as descriptive names (e.g. the problem of the contingent a priori), second, to better understand our natural language and its relation to formal theories of meaning, and, last but not least, to give a strong rationale for a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Chapter 7 includes the bibliography.
Papers by Edward Kanterian
1. Perspectives on Wittgenstein: An Intermittently Opinionated Survey (Hans-Johann Glock).
2. Wittgenstein’s Method: Ridding People of Philosophical Prejudices (Katherine Morris).
3. Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein (P. M. S. Hacker).
4. The Interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations: Style, Therapy, Nachlass (Alois Pichler).
5. Ways of Reading Wittgenstein: Observations on Certain Uses of the Word ‘Metaphysics’ (Joachim Schulte).
6. Metaphysical/Everyday Use: A Note on a Late Paper by Gordon Baker (Hilary Putnam).
7. Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism (A. W. Moore).
8. Simples and the Idea of Analysis in the Tractatus (Marie McGinn).
9. Words, Waxing and Waning: Ethics in/and/of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Stephen Mulhall).
10. The Uses of Wittgenstein’s Beetle: Philosophical Investigations §293 and Its Interpreters (David G. Stern).
11. Bourgeois, Bolshevist or Anarchist?: The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Ray Monk).
12. Wittgenstein and Ethical Naturalism (Alice Crary).
Bibliography.
Index.
A theory of descriptive names is developed and defended against several objections. Descriptive names pose an interesting challenge to any theory of reference, since they possess features of both proper names and definite descriptions, i.e. of expressions which are often considered to be radically different from each other. These features are referentiality and descriptive sense. The thesis takes as its point of departure Gareth Evans’s theory of descriptive names, improves upon it and discusses several other authors and related theories along the way.
Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the topic and an abstract of the main lines of argument. Chapter 2 argues that descriptive names possess both referential status and descriptive sense, and that these qualities constitute the two most basic elements of the notion of descriptive reference (which is contrasted with Russellian reference). It is demonstrated that not all names introduced by description are descriptive names, a claim which is given additional substance by a comparison between Evans’s and Kripke’s accounts of such names. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with two major challenges to the possibility of descriptive names. Chapter 3 explores the possibility of a truth-conditional theory of meaning for descriptive names, but it is shown that if we follow Evans’s suggestion that the semantic value of a descriptive name is to be construed according to model theory – namely, as an entity distinct from the referent (a set) – such a theory will result in treating descriptive names as predicates, and thus eliminate them qua referring expressions. Similar accounts given by other authors are also examined and found to be problematic. I conclude by rejecting the model-theoretic notion of semantic value. Chapter 4 addresses a second challenge, posed by the fact that if a descriptive name has a descriptive sense, then given a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, descriptive names must be quantifier phrases, and thus, again, non-referring expressions. It is argued that if this is true, then the use of negative free logic is unnecessary. Using the idea of rigidified descriptions, it is shown that Evans’s arguments, based on modality and simplicity considerations, fail to save both the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names while semantically dissociating them from descriptions. I show that descriptive names can be treated as shorthand for rigidified descriptions and thus semantically on a par with the latter, which, as I demonstrate, is still consistent with Evans’s own (convincing) solution of the puzzle of the contingent a priori. Nevertheless, this still does not guarantee the referentiality of descriptive names. Chapter 5 defends the referentiality and descriptive sense of descriptive names by offering arguments in favour of a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Several negative arguments undermining the most influential defences of Russellianism are given and three positive accounts of referring descriptions, Wettstein’s, Sainsbury’s and Strawson’s, are critically discussed, finally settling, with some proviso, for Strawson’s. In the course of this discussion, topics such the attributive-referential distinction and semantic presupposition and metalinguistic negation are investigated. Finally, the principles of a ‘Fregean’ free logic for Strawsonian semantics are sketched, and I suggest ways in which a truth theory could be expressed by means of these principles. Chapter 6 summarises the achievements, sketches possible research concerning descriptive names and concludes that the analysis of descriptive names is useful in at least three ways: it provides us with means to, first, solve problems that arise from the introduction of artificial expressions such as descriptive names (e.g. the problem of the contingent a priori), second, to better understand our natural language and its relation to formal theories of meaning, and, last but not least, to give a strong rationale for a referential treatment of definite descriptions. Chapter 7 includes the bibliography.
A series of four lectures offering an introduction into Kant's philosophy through a discussion of selected topics central to his thinking about metaphysics, for instance questions such as 'Can there be a rigorous science of metaphysics?', 'Can we know how things are in themselves?', 'Can philosophy give us a priori knowledge about the world?', 'Are space and time features of things independent of us or only features of our sensibility?', 'Is there room in philosophy for the idea of a highest eing?'. The lectures are suitable for both undergraduate and graduate students.
Outline:
1 The critical project and the possibility of metaphysics
2 The analytic-synthetic distinction
3 The ideality of space and time
4 Kant's God
Main literature:
I. Kant, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763), Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Prolegomena (1783), "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?" (1786), Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793)
Secondary literature discussed:
G. Bird, The Revolutionary Kant (2006)
R. Brandt, What remains of Kant? (2010)
S. Gardner, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1999)
G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)
F. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant (1904)
A. Trendelenburg, Logical Investigations (1862)
H. Vaihinger, Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1922)
R. Walker, Kant (1978)
Ch. Wolff, Philosophia Prima, Sive Ontologia (1730)
4. Lecture
Mathematics and the synthetic a priori
(Preamble and First Part, Critique)
4.1 Overview: the path to the synthetic a priori
4.2 The problem of the starting point
4.3 Syntheticity in mathematics
4.31 What is it for mathematical knowledge to be synthetic a priori?
4.311 The example of arithmetic
4.312 Frege vs Kant
4.313 The example of geometry
4.4 The prospect of metaphysics
The analytic-synthetic distinction
3.1 Overview
3.2 Kind, source and object of metaphysical cognition
3.3 The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments
3.31 Preliminary characterisation of synthetic judgments
3.32 Analytic judgments: initial problems
3.33 The logical characterisation of analyticity
3.4 Kant’s deeper concern with the principle of contradiction (Wolff and Dissertation 1770)
3.5 Formalising the dogmatic metaphysician
The new science and the regressive method
(Preface and Preamble)
2.1 The structure of the Prolegomena
2.2 A new science (Preface)
2.3 Hegel on the circularity of critical philosophy
2.4 The analytical-regressive vs. the synthetical-progressive method (Preface and Preamble)
Structure:
1. Lecture
Prelude to the Prolegomena:
The critical project and the problem of metaphysics
1.1 The ‘critical interpretation’ and its problems
1.11 The ‘critical interpretation’: Kant’s main contribution mainly negative, the rejection of metaphysics
1.12 Evidence against the ‘critical interpretation
1.2 The problem of the noumenon: knowable after all?
1.21 Kant’s case against knowledge of the noumenon
1.22 Objection to Kant’s denial of the knowability of the noumenon
1.3 Two problematic Kantian replies from the Critique
1.31 First Kantian reply: transcendental subject has only a logical function
1.32 Second Kantian reply: categories are no special objects
1.4 A more promising reply: the synthetic a priori and its post-Critique role