Papers by Samuel Kimpton-Nye
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2024
Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manife... more Necessity, but not possibility, is typically thought to be rare and suspicion-worthy. This manifests in an asymmetry in the burden of proof incurred by modal claims. In general, claims to the effect that some proposition is impossible/necessary require significant argumentative support and, in general, claims to the effect that some proposition is possible/contingent are thought to be justified freely or by default. Call this the possibility bias. In this paper, I argue that the possibility bias is not epistemically justified. We should regard possibility with at least as much suspicion, that is to say as incurring at least as much of an explanatory demand, as necessity. In fact, I suggest that we might even be justified in reversing the burden of proof asymmetry and adopting a necessity bias. This has quite radical implications for philosophical methodology and hence for many first-order philosophical concerns.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2024
Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are
powers and, correspondingl... more Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are
powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to
which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in
which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their
disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their
recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true
source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts of these
authors and their followers onto more pressing foundational issues in the
metaphysics of powers.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2024
This paper responds to Friend's (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws... more This paper responds to Friend's (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science and the structure of modal space.
Philosophical Studies, 2022
This paper defends an account of the laws of nature in terms of irreducibly modal properties (aka... more This paper defends an account of the laws of nature in terms of irreducibly modal properties (aka powers) from the threat posed by functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. It thus shows how powers theorists can avoid ad hoc explanations and resist an inflated ontology of powers and governing laws. The key is to understand laws not as flowing from the essences of powers, as per Bird (2007), but as features of a description of how powers are possibly distributed, as per Demarest (2017), Kimpton-Nye (2017, 2021) and Williams (2019); call this the Powers-BSA. This underappreciated powers-based account of laws is continuous with actual scientific practice and thereby quite naturally accommodates functional laws, conservation laws and symmetries. This paper thus positions the Powers-BSA as the leading anti-Humean account of the relationship between laws and properties.
Synthese, 2022
Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal: that properties are po... more Some philosophers maintain that physical properties are irreducibly modal: that properties are powers. Powers are then employed to provide explanations of other phenomena of philosophical interest such as laws of nature and modality. There is, however, a dispute among powers theorists about how far the powers ontology extends: are all manner of properties at all levels of fundamentality powers or are powers only to be found among the fundamental properties? This paper argues that the answer to this question depends on the details of the metaphysics of powers. More specifically, this paper argues that if one understands powers as qualitative grounds of dispositions (call this qualitative dispositional essentialism), as opposed to properties whose essences are constituted by dispositions (as orthodox dispositional essentialists would have it), then all properties, be they fundamental or macro, are powers, i.e., pandispositionalism is true. The Conclusion: If qualitative dispositional essentialism is true, then pandispositionalism is true, is significant because there is increasing concern that orthodox dispositional essentialism is explanatorily deficient and perhaps even incoherent, meaning that qualitative dispositional essentialism is gaining increasing support in the literature on powers. All things considered, then, it is beginning to look more likely that pandispositionalism is true simpliciter.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties... more This paper shows how a niche account of the metaphysics of laws of nature and physical properties—the Powers-BSA—can underpin both a sense in which the laws are metaphysically necessary and a sense in which it is true that the laws could have been different. The ability to reconcile entrenched disagreement should count in favour of a philosophical theory, so this paper constitutes a novel argument for the Powers-BSA by showing how it can reconcile disagreement about the laws’ modal status. This paper also constitutes a defence of modal necessitarianism, the interesting and controversial view according to which all worlds are nomologically identical, because it shows how the modal necessitarian can appease the orthodox contingentist about laws.
Philosophical Studies
Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physi... more Dispositional Essentialism is a unified anti-Humean account of the metaphysics of low-level physical properties and laws of nature. In this paper, I articulate the view that I label Canonical Dispositional Essentialism (CDE), which comprises a structuralist metaphysics of properties and an account of laws as relations in the property structure. I then present an alternative anti-Humean account of properties and laws (still somewhat in the dispositional essentialist spirit). This account rejects CDE’s structuralist metaphysics of properties in favour of a view of properties as qualitative grounds of dispositions and it rejects CDE’s view of laws as relations in favour of a view of laws as features of an efficient description of possible property distributions. I then defend this view over CDE on the grounds that it can overcome an explanatory shortcoming of CDE and that it achieves a level of continuity with science that CDE fails to achieve. The upshot of this paper is a significant...
The Philosophical Quarterly
Philosophy of Science
Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature... more Substantive counterlegal discourse poses a problem for those according to whom the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. I discern two types of necessitarianism about laws: Dispositional Essentialism and Modal Necessitarianism. I argue that Handfield (2004)'s response to the problem of counterlegals cannot help the Modal Necessitarian, according to whom all possible worlds are identical with respect to the laws. I thus propose a fictionalist treatment of counterlegals. Fictions are not limited by metaphysical possibility, hence, fictionalism affords the Modal Necessitarian the means to account for the apparent substance of counterlegals even granting the metaphysical necessity of the laws.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2019
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world... more Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard about the nature of the hardcore actualist's modal reality and how radically this departs from possible worlds orthodoxy. Once we achieve this departure, the prospects of a hardcore actualist validation of S5 look considerably brighter. This paper thus strengthens hardcore actualism by arguing that it can indeed validate S5–arguably the most popular logic of metaphysical modality–and, in the process, it elucidates the very nature of modality according to this revisionary, but very attractive, modal metaphysics.
PhD thesis, King's College London, 2018
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 2018
According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents ... more According to hardcore actualism (HA), all modal truths are grounded in the concrete constituents of the actual world. In this paper, I discuss some problems faced by HA when it comes to accounting for certain alleged possibilities of non‐existence. I focus particular attention on Leech (2017)'s dilemma for HA, according to which HA must either sacrifice extensional correctness or admit mere possibilia. I propose a solution to Leech's dilemma, which relies on a distinction between weak and strong possibility. It remains the case, however, that HA cannot capture certain iterated de re possibilities of non‐existence and that it is committed to a stock of necessary existents. But I still think that the virtues of the view outweigh these costs.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , 2017
I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully com... more I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully combined with what has typically been thought of as a Humean account of laws, namely the best system account, made popular by David Lewis (e.g., 1983, 1986, 1994). In this paper I provide the details of what I argue is the most defensible account of Humean laws in an unHumean world. This package of views has the benefits of upholding scientific realism, whilst doing without any suspect metaphysical entities to account for natural law. I conclude by arguing that the Humean laws-unHumean ontology package is well placed to provide an account of objective, non-trivial chances, a famous stumbling block for the Humean laws-Humean ontology package developed by Lewis.
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Papers by Samuel Kimpton-Nye
powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to
which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in
which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their
disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their
recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true
source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts of these
authors and their followers onto more pressing foundational issues in the
metaphysics of powers.
powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to
which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in
which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their
disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their
recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true
source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts of these
authors and their followers onto more pressing foundational issues in the
metaphysics of powers.