Liberals, anarchists and others have long regarded command and coercion as being especially probl... more Liberals, anarchists and others have long regarded command and coercion as being especially problematic ways of getting someone to act, as raising a question about the legitimacy of such directive authorities but it remains unclear why being ordered about is any worse than being subject to social rules, rules that require us to behave in various ways. I argue that someone who demands your obedience seeks to assume responsibility for your compliance. That is why the claims of a ruler threaten our liberty as those of binding social rules do not.
It is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral ... more It is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral codes (though we can of course say they are "imperfect") which do not employ the notion of a right …. Human actions in such systems would be evaluated or criticised as compliances with prescriptions or as good or bad, right or wrong, wise or foolish, fitting or unfitting, but no one in such a system would have, exercise, or claim rights, or violate or infringe them. 1
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Responsibility, 2023
There are considerations – excuses – which reduce or eliminate responsibility for wrongdoing and ... more There are considerations – excuses – which reduce or eliminate responsibility for wrongdoing and so shield us from blame without casting doubt on the wrongfulness of our conduct. Many think that these excuses reflect the agent's incapacity to do the right thing in the face of duress, provocation, exhaustion etc. I shall suggest that the crucial thing is rather how much control one ought to exercise over one’s action, a requirement specified in a standard of culpability. This standard is distinct from the rules of conduct that determine what is right or wrong and it is often conventional. For example, social roles like that of soldier, engineer or parent have distinctive standards of culpability as well as rules of conduct associated with them and it is these standards which determine the range of excuses available to those who breach the rules of conduct.
PROPERTY AND AUTHORITY Almost all human societies recognise property in some form and in most of ... more PROPERTY AND AUTHORITY Almost all human societies recognise property in some form and in most of them that includes personal property, property owned by individuals. To my mind, the prevalence of personal property indicates that it serves some individual interest, that owning things is good for us as individuals. Individual ownership puts people in authority over the things around them, it is good for individuals to have authority of that sort and a system of personal property can be justified, at least in part, by the fact that it serves that interest. In the first section of this paper, I'll expound and develop the idea that it is good for people to be in authority over the things around them because it is good for them to have control over those things. Call this the control interest hypothesis. I’ll suggest that the control interest hypothesis can’t provide a complete account of the property rights that we recognise. According to the authority interest hypothesis, personal property matters at least in part because it gives individuals control over a certain aspect of their normative situation, namely the rights and obligations both they and others have in respect of the things around them. In the final section of the paper, I develop and defend this hypothesis.
This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promi... more This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of ‘wicked commands’.
Burge maintains that human beings are entitled to accept the testimony of other human beings simp... more Burge maintains that human beings are entitled to accept the testimony of other human beings simply in virtue of the fact that we are all rational believers. Reid maintains that human testimony depends on distinctive features of human psychology that may not be shared by all rational creatures. I argue that, on this point, Reid is correct. The transmission of belief (and so knowledge) exploits our human emotional psychology and in particular the impact the expression of emotion makes on other humans. It would not work among rational creatures with a different emotional psychology. I conclude by criticising the assurance model of testimony.
Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or el... more Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to subject ourselves to such norms by forming beliefs. And being subject to the relevant norms may be good for us whether or not conformity to those norms is good for us. In particular, beliefs serve our interest in being subject to the norms that govern our emotions. Unless I believe that John stole my bike, whilst I can hope or fear that he did but I cannot be pleased or angry that he did. Having the capacity for this sort of emotional engagement with things that matter to us is a human good, even though we may suffer from the exercise of that capacity.
Intellectualists maintain that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ough... more Intellectualists maintain that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do. Here I discuss an important exception to that claim, namely habitual agency. Action on habit is often regarded as a form of reflex or even as compulsive behaviour but much habitual agency is both intentional and free. Still it is true that, in so far as we act out of habit, we have no capacity to determine what we do by making a judgement about whether we ought to be doing it. Habitual agency is nonetheless free because we have the capacity to determine whether we act out of habit by making a judgement about whether or not the habit is a virtue. So an intellectualist view of practical freedom can be applied to habitual agency.
Some acts (mala in se) are wrong prior to any social prohibition (e.g. murder). Other acts (mala ... more Some acts (mala in se) are wrong prior to any social prohibition (e.g. murder). Other acts (mala prohibita) are wrong only once socially prohibited (e.g. traffic violations). This paper considers certain obligations of care that parents owe to their children and children to their parents. Violations of these familial obligations are like paradigm mala prohibita in that they are wrongs created by social convention. But, it is argued, they are unlike paradigm mala prohibita in that their prohibition is not justified merely by the desirable consequences of prohibiting them but also by the value of the prohibition itself.
The question of toleration, of whether we should express disapproval at wrongdoing, is distinguis... more The question of toleration, of whether we should express disapproval at wrongdoing, is distinguished from the question of accommodation, of whether we should interfere with such wrongdoing. Liberal doctrines of accommodation invoke the value of autonomy. A doctrine of toleration is proposed that is based instead on the value of civility, on the (non-instrumental) value of suppressing the public expression of disapproval. Civility is of value within various relationships, a point illustrated by an examination of friendship. This doctrine of tolerance as civility is needed to explain practices of toleration among illiberal peoples and it suggests a way of extending such practices to others who do not value personal autonomy.
A reply to four commentators in a Book Symposium on 'Shaping the Normative Landscape' forthcoming... more A reply to four commentators in a Book Symposium on 'Shaping the Normative Landscape' forthcoming in Jurisprudence (2015) Vol. 6 No.2.
The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (... more The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs 'at will'. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.
A number of authors from Grotius onwards have proposed that a binding promise transfers a right f... more A number of authors from Grotius onwards have proposed that a binding promise transfers a right from promisor to promisee. The promisee now has the right, previously possessed by the promisor, to determine whether the promisor performs the act mentioned in their promise. This proposal runs into problems of detail. The chapter first reformulates the theory so as to avoid these problems. It then considers a more fundamental difficulty raised by Hume and argues that the reformulated theory succumbs to Hume’s critique. The point is illustrated by way of a detailed discussion of the difference between consent and choice. Finally, a new theory of promising based on the idea of an authority interest is proposed.
The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypoth... more The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of scepticism hangs entirely on the coherence of the sceptical hypotheses.
Liberals, anarchists and others have long regarded command and coercion as being especially probl... more Liberals, anarchists and others have long regarded command and coercion as being especially problematic ways of getting someone to act, as raising a question about the legitimacy of such directive authorities but it remains unclear why being ordered about is any worse than being subject to social rules, rules that require us to behave in various ways. I argue that someone who demands your obedience seeks to assume responsibility for your compliance. That is why the claims of a ruler threaten our liberty as those of binding social rules do not.
It is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral ... more It is still important to remember that there may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral codes (though we can of course say they are "imperfect") which do not employ the notion of a right …. Human actions in such systems would be evaluated or criticised as compliances with prescriptions or as good or bad, right or wrong, wise or foolish, fitting or unfitting, but no one in such a system would have, exercise, or claim rights, or violate or infringe them. 1
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Responsibility, 2023
There are considerations – excuses – which reduce or eliminate responsibility for wrongdoing and ... more There are considerations – excuses – which reduce or eliminate responsibility for wrongdoing and so shield us from blame without casting doubt on the wrongfulness of our conduct. Many think that these excuses reflect the agent's incapacity to do the right thing in the face of duress, provocation, exhaustion etc. I shall suggest that the crucial thing is rather how much control one ought to exercise over one’s action, a requirement specified in a standard of culpability. This standard is distinct from the rules of conduct that determine what is right or wrong and it is often conventional. For example, social roles like that of soldier, engineer or parent have distinctive standards of culpability as well as rules of conduct associated with them and it is these standards which determine the range of excuses available to those who breach the rules of conduct.
PROPERTY AND AUTHORITY Almost all human societies recognise property in some form and in most of ... more PROPERTY AND AUTHORITY Almost all human societies recognise property in some form and in most of them that includes personal property, property owned by individuals. To my mind, the prevalence of personal property indicates that it serves some individual interest, that owning things is good for us as individuals. Individual ownership puts people in authority over the things around them, it is good for individuals to have authority of that sort and a system of personal property can be justified, at least in part, by the fact that it serves that interest. In the first section of this paper, I'll expound and develop the idea that it is good for people to be in authority over the things around them because it is good for them to have control over those things. Call this the control interest hypothesis. I’ll suggest that the control interest hypothesis can’t provide a complete account of the property rights that we recognise. According to the authority interest hypothesis, personal property matters at least in part because it gives individuals control over a certain aspect of their normative situation, namely the rights and obligations both they and others have in respect of the things around them. In the final section of the paper, I develop and defend this hypothesis.
This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promi... more This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of ‘wicked commands’.
Burge maintains that human beings are entitled to accept the testimony of other human beings simp... more Burge maintains that human beings are entitled to accept the testimony of other human beings simply in virtue of the fact that we are all rational believers. Reid maintains that human testimony depends on distinctive features of human psychology that may not be shared by all rational creatures. I argue that, on this point, Reid is correct. The transmission of belief (and so knowledge) exploits our human emotional psychology and in particular the impact the expression of emotion makes on other humans. It would not work among rational creatures with a different emotional psychology. I conclude by criticising the assurance model of testimony.
Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or el... more Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to subject ourselves to such norms by forming beliefs. And being subject to the relevant norms may be good for us whether or not conformity to those norms is good for us. In particular, beliefs serve our interest in being subject to the norms that govern our emotions. Unless I believe that John stole my bike, whilst I can hope or fear that he did but I cannot be pleased or angry that he did. Having the capacity for this sort of emotional engagement with things that matter to us is a human good, even though we may suffer from the exercise of that capacity.
Intellectualists maintain that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ough... more Intellectualists maintain that practical freedom is a capacity to act on our view of what we ought to do. Here I discuss an important exception to that claim, namely habitual agency. Action on habit is often regarded as a form of reflex or even as compulsive behaviour but much habitual agency is both intentional and free. Still it is true that, in so far as we act out of habit, we have no capacity to determine what we do by making a judgement about whether we ought to be doing it. Habitual agency is nonetheless free because we have the capacity to determine whether we act out of habit by making a judgement about whether or not the habit is a virtue. So an intellectualist view of practical freedom can be applied to habitual agency.
Some acts (mala in se) are wrong prior to any social prohibition (e.g. murder). Other acts (mala ... more Some acts (mala in se) are wrong prior to any social prohibition (e.g. murder). Other acts (mala prohibita) are wrong only once socially prohibited (e.g. traffic violations). This paper considers certain obligations of care that parents owe to their children and children to their parents. Violations of these familial obligations are like paradigm mala prohibita in that they are wrongs created by social convention. But, it is argued, they are unlike paradigm mala prohibita in that their prohibition is not justified merely by the desirable consequences of prohibiting them but also by the value of the prohibition itself.
The question of toleration, of whether we should express disapproval at wrongdoing, is distinguis... more The question of toleration, of whether we should express disapproval at wrongdoing, is distinguished from the question of accommodation, of whether we should interfere with such wrongdoing. Liberal doctrines of accommodation invoke the value of autonomy. A doctrine of toleration is proposed that is based instead on the value of civility, on the (non-instrumental) value of suppressing the public expression of disapproval. Civility is of value within various relationships, a point illustrated by an examination of friendship. This doctrine of tolerance as civility is needed to explain practices of toleration among illiberal peoples and it suggests a way of extending such practices to others who do not value personal autonomy.
A reply to four commentators in a Book Symposium on 'Shaping the Normative Landscape' forthcoming... more A reply to four commentators in a Book Symposium on 'Shaping the Normative Landscape' forthcoming in Jurisprudence (2015) Vol. 6 No.2.
The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (... more The hypothesis that belief aims at the truth has been used to explain three features of belief: (1) the fact that correct beliefs are true beliefs, (2) the fact that rational beliefs are supported by the evidence and (3) the fact that we cannot form beliefs 'at will'. I argue that the truth-aim hypothesis cannot explain any of these facts. In this respect believing differs from guessing since the hypothesis that guessing aims at the truth can explain the three analogous features of guessing. I conclude that, unlike guessing, believing is not purposive in any interesting sense.
A number of authors from Grotius onwards have proposed that a binding promise transfers a right f... more A number of authors from Grotius onwards have proposed that a binding promise transfers a right from promisor to promisee. The promisee now has the right, previously possessed by the promisor, to determine whether the promisor performs the act mentioned in their promise. This proposal runs into problems of detail. The chapter first reformulates the theory so as to avoid these problems. It then considers a more fundamental difficulty raised by Hume and argues that the reformulated theory succumbs to Hume’s critique. The point is illustrated by way of a detailed discussion of the difference between consent and choice. Finally, a new theory of promising based on the idea of an authority interest is proposed.
The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypoth... more The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of scepticism hangs entirely on the coherence of the sceptical hypotheses.
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Papers by David Owens