
Y. Gurur Sev
PhD in Sociology (Istanbul University)
PhD in Philosophy (Galatasaray University)
PhD in Philosophy (Galatasaray University)
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Papers by Y. Gurur Sev
The allegations that Aristotle was a soul-body dualist, and that he believed in the immortality and/or the transmigration of the soul, are not compatible with the arguments of his work On the Soul, especially with the first book. In the first book, Aristotle tries to refute the monist position by arguing that if the soul is reduced to the body, there would be no principle of life, distinguishing the body from a corpse. Aristotle rejects the dualist position by claiming that even the affections of the soul that are regarded as peculiar to it are not independent/separable from the body and asserting that these affections are inherent in a matter [logos enylos]. Even the geometrical figures have more independence from the body than the affections of the soul have. The affections are rather like “snub” which cannot be thought separately from the nose it signifies. The soul is the actuality [entelekheia] of the body that keeps it ready to be in activity [energeia]. Thus, it is neither reducible to nor separable from the body. This study aims to present Aristotle’s position, which is neither monist nor a dualist one.
In Silla (668-935), i.e. the first kingdom to unite the Korean Peninsula under a single roof, within the bone-rank system [kol-p'um] that discriminates the nobles from commoners, and among the nobles the dynasty from bureaucracy, "bone" manifests itself as the underlying subject of nobility. According to this bone-rank system, those who were born a "sacred bone" [sŏng-gol] consisted the highest stratum, those who were born a "true bone" [chin-gol] were of the second rank. Kings and queens were supposed to belong to the sacred bone caste. The relatives of the dynasty and the ministers constituted the true bone caste. And below them, and above the commoners [p'yŏng-min], there were the "head rank" [tu-p'um] caste that consisted of six levels. In like manner, white bone-dark bone dichotomy determines who is noble and who is not in Turks and in Genghis Khan Empire, i.e., nobility is an attribute of bone regarding being white or not. For in Turks and Genghis Han Empire, "white bone" signifies nobles; whereas "dark bone" signifies commoners. This remarkable similarity is a sign that the Turks and the Koreans have more in common, along with nomadism, the monotheistic belief in the God of Heaven(s) (i.e. Blue Sky or Tengri) and Altay language. This humble work aims at grounding this point mentioned.
In Parmenides, one of the late dialogues of Plato which is seen as the toughest in terms of following the arguments, conveys a legendary conversation between old Parmenides, his disciple middle-aged Zeno and young Socrates. The answer to the question whether it was possible for such a meeting to happen in Athens is still controversial. In a neglected part of the dialogue, Parmenides tells young Socrates that if one denies the existence of the forms of things, and does not assign one form for each being, there will not be a place to turn his/her head/mind (dianoia), and the opportunity to carry the discussion (dialegesthai) on will be long gone. He says that this one will not know what to do with philosophy and advises Socrates to exercise and train himself/herself in matters which seems useless and is called empty rhetoric by the majority―otherwise the truth would slip out of hand. This humble work aims at reading this very part of the dialogue not only as an argument that proves the existence of the forms, but also as an important passage that expresses the conditions for the possibility of philosophizing and makes hidden references to Parmenides’ poem On Nature.
The mechanism of sensation is thoroughly examined in Aristotle's work On the Soul where he grounds the soul as the principle of life and where he focuses especially on animal soul. Hereunder, sensing is receiving the form of the sensible body without its matter. Form, here, signifies the proportion [logos] of the mixture of elements that constitute the sensible. By the movement called sensing, sensory organ receives the proportion from the sensible, and becomes similar to it. Sensation [aisthêsis] is the difference between the natural proportion of the sensor and the proportion of the sensible that it receives and becomes. Discriminating [krinein] this difference belongs to the sense and may be called "perception." There are five special senses that have their own kind of sensible objects. On the other hand, there are some sensibles like motion that can be sensed by more than one senses. They are called "common sensibles" and they are sensed by "something which is common" or "common sense" [koinê aisthêsis]. Also, distinguishing the exclusive objects of special senses belongs to the common sense. Again, sensing being sensing, i.e., consciousness is another duty of this common sense. There are the remnants of the sensations which are reanimated when the sensible is beyond the range of sensing. This process is carried out by imagination [phantasia]. By doing so, imagination prepares images as materials for the appetite of all animals and for the reasoning of human beings. It has been thought that these two are separate faculties of the soul. However, the schism between common sense and imagination is not that sharp as mentioned.
The allegations that Aristotle was a soul-body dualist, and that he believed in the immortality and/or the transmigration of the soul, are not compatible with the arguments of his work On the Soul, especially with the first book. In the first book, Aristotle tries to refute the monist position by arguing that if the soul is reduced to the body, there would be no principle of life, distinguishing the body from a corpse. Aristotle rejects the dualist position by claiming that even the affections of the soul that are regarded as peculiar to it are not independent/separable from the body and asserting that these affections are inherent in a matter [logos enylos]. Even the geometrical figures have more independence from the body than the affections of the soul have. The affections are rather like “snub” which cannot be thought separately from the nose it signifies. The soul is the actuality [entelekheia] of the body that keeps it ready to be in activity [energeia]. Thus, it is neither reducible to nor separable from the body. This study aims to present Aristotle’s position, which is neither monist nor a dualist one.
In Silla (668-935), i.e. the first kingdom to unite the Korean Peninsula under a single roof, within the bone-rank system [kol-p'um] that discriminates the nobles from commoners, and among the nobles the dynasty from bureaucracy, "bone" manifests itself as the underlying subject of nobility. According to this bone-rank system, those who were born a "sacred bone" [sŏng-gol] consisted the highest stratum, those who were born a "true bone" [chin-gol] were of the second rank. Kings and queens were supposed to belong to the sacred bone caste. The relatives of the dynasty and the ministers constituted the true bone caste. And below them, and above the commoners [p'yŏng-min], there were the "head rank" [tu-p'um] caste that consisted of six levels. In like manner, white bone-dark bone dichotomy determines who is noble and who is not in Turks and in Genghis Khan Empire, i.e., nobility is an attribute of bone regarding being white or not. For in Turks and Genghis Han Empire, "white bone" signifies nobles; whereas "dark bone" signifies commoners. This remarkable similarity is a sign that the Turks and the Koreans have more in common, along with nomadism, the monotheistic belief in the God of Heaven(s) (i.e. Blue Sky or Tengri) and Altay language. This humble work aims at grounding this point mentioned.
In Parmenides, one of the late dialogues of Plato which is seen as the toughest in terms of following the arguments, conveys a legendary conversation between old Parmenides, his disciple middle-aged Zeno and young Socrates. The answer to the question whether it was possible for such a meeting to happen in Athens is still controversial. In a neglected part of the dialogue, Parmenides tells young Socrates that if one denies the existence of the forms of things, and does not assign one form for each being, there will not be a place to turn his/her head/mind (dianoia), and the opportunity to carry the discussion (dialegesthai) on will be long gone. He says that this one will not know what to do with philosophy and advises Socrates to exercise and train himself/herself in matters which seems useless and is called empty rhetoric by the majority―otherwise the truth would slip out of hand. This humble work aims at reading this very part of the dialogue not only as an argument that proves the existence of the forms, but also as an important passage that expresses the conditions for the possibility of philosophizing and makes hidden references to Parmenides’ poem On Nature.
The mechanism of sensation is thoroughly examined in Aristotle's work On the Soul where he grounds the soul as the principle of life and where he focuses especially on animal soul. Hereunder, sensing is receiving the form of the sensible body without its matter. Form, here, signifies the proportion [logos] of the mixture of elements that constitute the sensible. By the movement called sensing, sensory organ receives the proportion from the sensible, and becomes similar to it. Sensation [aisthêsis] is the difference between the natural proportion of the sensor and the proportion of the sensible that it receives and becomes. Discriminating [krinein] this difference belongs to the sense and may be called "perception." There are five special senses that have their own kind of sensible objects. On the other hand, there are some sensibles like motion that can be sensed by more than one senses. They are called "common sensibles" and they are sensed by "something which is common" or "common sense" [koinê aisthêsis]. Also, distinguishing the exclusive objects of special senses belongs to the common sense. Again, sensing being sensing, i.e., consciousness is another duty of this common sense. There are the remnants of the sensations which are reanimated when the sensible is beyond the range of sensing. This process is carried out by imagination [phantasia]. By doing so, imagination prepares images as materials for the appetite of all animals and for the reasoning of human beings. It has been thought that these two are separate faculties of the soul. However, the schism between common sense and imagination is not that sharp as mentioned.