• 1 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, “Policy Paper: UK Digital Strategy,” last updated (...)
• 2 Idem.

1The United Kingdom (UK)’s digital economy is one of the most significant and fastest‑growing sectors in the country, and ranks amongst the leading digital economies worldwide, particularly within Europe. In 2019, the digital sector contributed over 150 billion pounds to the British economy and by 2021, investment in technology reached an all-time high as British start-ups and scale-ups raised 27.4 billion pounds.¹ This figure was twice as much as that in Germany (14.7 billion) and nearly thrice as much as that in France (9.7 billion).² In the context of withdrawal from the European Union (EU), it is therefore understandable that the UK has been carefully examining the opportunities and challenges of regulatory and innovative freedoms outside the EU framework.

• 3 Julian Madrazo and Damian Tambini, “Using the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) to Assess Media Plurali (...)
• 4 Media Reform Coalition, Who Owns the UK Media? 2025 Report, May 2025, p.2, [online] < https://www.m (...)
• 5 Peter Humphreys, “Regulation for Media Pluralism: Issues in Ownership and Competition,” in Joe Andr (...)

2Although the UK has been energetic in promoting economic and innovative aspects of the digital economy since withdrawing from the EU, regulatory and policy attention specifically aimed at the impact of digital platforms on media plurality has lagged behind in comparison with issues such as competition, data protection and online safety. In its first report since the end of the transition period for withdrawal, the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) found that the UK was near the high-risk threshold.³ Areas of concern included a lack of transparency in media ownership, a high concentration of media providers, as well as economic pressures on journalism. Additionally, in its latest 2025 report, the advocacy group Media Reform Coalition found that a mere three companies (DGM Media, News UK and Reach) dominate ninety percent of the UK’s national newspaper market and account for more than forty percent of total audience reach for the country’s top fifty online news brands.⁴ This marks a twenty-percent increase in market concentration since 2014. Ever-increasing levels of media concentration and consolidation in the UK have been caused by deregulation policies in a market-driven, liberalizing approach, and facilitated by the arrival of cable and satellite media in the 1980s, as well as digital broadcasting in the late 1990s. This policy shift was promoted under New Labour (1997-2010) and the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, as well as by the UK Office of Communication (Ofcom).⁵

• 6 See for example: António Fonseca and Jorge Louçã, “Topology and Dynamics of Narratives on Brexit Pr (...)
• 7 See for instance: Martin Moore and Gordon Ramsey, UK Media Coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum Campa (...)
• 8 Ibid.

3The UK’s withdrawal from the EU marks a turning point for regulatory alignment. There has been extensive research on behavioural aspects of the media including coverage, discourse, framing, and narratives around Brexit, as well as the role of journalism and misinformation. The focus has been on topics including – but not limited to – dishonesty, fear, Euroscepticism, nationalism, the economy, the establishment, immigration, sovereignty.⁶ Such research has demonstrated that Brexit-related discourse was wrapped up in emotion as fear of uncertainty appealed to pathos rather than logos.⁷ In particular, the national British press have been criticized for highly partisan reporting in the build-up to the Brexit referendum and how this may have contributed to growing Euroscepticism in favour of Vote Leave.⁸

• 9 Mariia Aleksevych and Tales Tomaz, “Network Analysis for Media Ownership: A Methodological Proposal (...)
• 10 Petros Iosifidis, "Pluralism and Concentration of Media Ownership: Measurement Issues,” in Javnos – (...)
• 11 Helen Strong and Rebecca Wells, “Brexit-related Food Issues in the UK Print Media: Setting the agen (...)

4Relevant literature in communication studies and political science demonstrates that media ownership structures are not neutral in that they shape news agendas, framing, and political discourse. In particular, research referring to network and concentration measures shows that concentrated ownership affects audience influence and the dissemination of viewpoints across media systems, particularly in hybrid digital environments.⁹ Political economy perspectives further link concentrated ownership to reduced pluralism and partisan biases in coverage. For example, Petros Iosifidis has argued that economic power and pluralism are closely linked in media markets and that concentrated ownership raises risks to diversity and the free flow of information.¹⁰ Foundational theories in political communication, such as agenda‑setting, explain how the prominence and framing of issues in the news reflect editorial and ownership priorities, thereby influencing public issue salience.¹¹ These insights help contextualize findings from media studies that focus on Brexit by suggesting that the partisan narratives identified in the national press were not just editorial choices but also a reflection of wider structural features of the UK media system. This helps to explain how certain frames and narratives have dominated the Brexit debate.

• 13 Ibid.
• 14 Ibid.
• 15 Department for Business and Trade, “Research and Analysis: List of REUL and Assimilated Laws,” last (...)
• 16 House of Lords (UK), Broadcasting (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, Hansard, column, 1556, 6^t (...)
• 17 Information Commissioner’s Office, Data Protection and the EU in Detail, 9^th September 2019, p.7, [ (...)
• 18 See for example: Richard Arnold, “Divergence of UK Law from EU Law After Brexit: The Example of Int (...)
• 19 The Open Internet Access (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018.
• 20 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Guidance: The eCommerce Directive and the UK,” 5^th Januar (...)

9However, the said Act also aimed to ensure continuity and minimize disruption during the transition period “by copying over the entire body of EU law onto the UK’s post-exit statute book”¹³ and by creating a new category of domestic law, known as retained EU law (REUL), elements of which could subsequently be amended, replaced or appealed by the UK Parliament.¹⁴ Much of media-related EU-law was retained at the time of the Withdrawal Agreement. Relevant key areas included broadcasting, data, copyright, telecoms – encompassing net neutrality – and, to some extent, online platforms.¹⁵ More specifically, broadcasting rules regarding advertising, minors and content were covered by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD).¹⁶ Data regulation in relation to user data, marketing and analytics was retained as the UK General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).¹⁷ Many EU-derived rules regarding content use and licensing – under the Satellite and Cable Directive, Database Directive and Information Society Directives – were retained. However, some elements lost effect or changed.¹⁸ Telecoms and net neutrality were covered by Open Internet Access Regulations.¹⁹ Online platform services including liability for intermediaries were only partially retained with modifications as per the E-Commerce Directive.²⁰

• 21 Graeme Cowie, House of Commons Library Research Briefing: Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) A (...)
• 22 Out of 6,911 assimilated law instruments formerly known as REUL, 2,532 have been revoked or reforme (...)

10Divergences in media regulation between the UK and the EU may be understood as either active or passive. Active divergences arise when the UK deliberately amends rules whereas passive divergences occur when recent EU updates are not followed, thus producing differences by omission. These patterns reflect the mechanisms of UK post-Brexit reform, which has been implemented through new primary legislation, temporary delegated powers under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and delegated powers in other Acts. Between January 2021 and July 2023, just over a fifth of REUL was amended, repealed, replaced, or simply expired.²¹ This figure has risen to over thirty-five percent as of mid-2025 and the procedure remains ongoing.²²

• 23 European Audiovisual Observatory, “Brexit: The Impact on the Audiovisual Sector,” Strasbourg: Europ (...)
• 24 House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, “The Potential Impact of Brexit on t (...)
• 25 Ibid.

11The aforementioned process of amending, repealing or replacing REUL poses a risk of reciprocity gaps in areas that necessitate mutual recognition between EU member states.²³ However, media-related variance has thus far been treated with caution due to economic and cultural considerations with the EU. Points for vigilance in this respect have been highlighted in a committee report, published by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Department in January 2018, and pertaining to the potential impact of Brexit on the creative industries, tourism and the digital single market.²⁴ Indeed, between 2017 and 2023, the focus of this department included building a digital economy. Specific issues for the creative industries included exposure to EU markets, laws, intellectual property regimes and country of origin rules, which were all being questioned by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.²⁵

• 26 See for instance: Her Majesty’s Government, UK Government Response to the European Commission Consu (...)
• 27 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, “Thirty-Seventh Report of Session 2017-19, 11^th Septe (...)
• 28 European Association for Viewers’ Interests, “Brexit: The Loss of the Audiovisual Market on the EU (...)
• 29 Ibid.
• 30 Agnes Schneeberger, “Audiovisual Media Services in Europe: Supply Figures and AVMSD Jurisdiction Cl (...)
• 31 Ibid.

13Reduced visibility and artistic exchange weaken informal cultural diplomacy and the UK’s status as a cultural hub. There have already been some negative impacts due to the UK’s separation from the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), which is the main body for regulating broadcasting and video on-demand services across member states.²⁶ Since Brexit, UK-based broadcasters no longer benefit from AVMSD coordination, which makes it more difficult to access European audiences. In the absence of the country-of-origin principle, the cost and regulation of broadcasting British content into the EU is higher and more complex.²⁷ Given that UK creative works no longer automatically qualify as European works under the EU’s AVMSD, they are less frequently selected in quota-mandated parts of catalogues or programming blocks.²⁸ Ofcom has retained quotas but these no longer include European works and they are not secured by EU legislation.²⁹ The European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) has reported that the European share of television channels originating from the UK and aimed at non-domestic markets has dropped by fifty-eight percent between 2018 and 2020.³⁰ During the same period, EU competitors have also benefited from the void created by UK-based channels leaving the country: a third of television channels departing from the UK have migrated to the Netherlands and Spain.³¹ However, the latest EAO reports available from 2022 to 2024 do not specify the share of television channels originating from the UK and aimed at non-domestic markets and there does not appear to be any publicly available data regarding this elsewhere.

• 32 House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, “Promoting Wales for Inward Investment: Written Evidence (...)

14The UK’s ability to exercise soft power in the EU through cultural influence since Brexit has also been affected by the loss of full participation in Creative Europe, which is the EU’s main funding programme for the cultural and creative sectors. There has been a reduction in co-productions and cross-border cultural projects involving UK arts institutions, filmmakers and broadcasters. Since Creative Europe participation has been cut off, it is difficult to make direct comparisons post-Brexit. However, early data suggests financial and artistic losses. The UK Trade and Business Commission estimates that the country’s creative industries may have missed out on approximately 184 million euros’ worth of EU funding, based on the percentage of funds obtained in the last cycle.³²

• 33 House of Commons, “EU Trading Relationship,” 24^th April 2025, Hansard, vol. 765, column 520WH, [onl (...)
• 34 Ibid.

15During a recent April 2025 House of Commons exchange on the creative industries and EU divergence on security and trading relations, Martin Rhodes, Labour MP for Glasgow North, warned that regulatory divergence impedes UK‑EU cultural exchange and creates barriers for creative professionals.³³ He emphasized the impact of diverging regulations on the creative industries, given that these sectors contribute around 11.2 billion pounds annually to the UK economy and employ nearly 283,000 people. He also stressed that divergent regulations across each EU member state create administrative and financial barriers, especially for emerging and smaller artists, hindering cultural exchange and economic opportunity.³⁴

• 35 Nick Fitzpatrick et al., “Impact of Brexit on the Media, Sport and Entertainment Industries,” 21^st (...)
• 36 British Film Institute, “BFI and Film Industry Welcome Landmark Move with Increased Expenditure Cre (...)
• 37 His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, “Policy Paper: Additional Tax Relief for Visual Effects (VFX),” (...)
• 38 British Film Commission, “The UK’s Audio-Visual Expenditure Credit (AVEC),” no date, consulted on 2 (...)
• 39 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, “Guidance: Business Rates: Film Studio Relie (...)

16Divergence from EU-derived law, including culturally sensitive fields such as media, has thus raised costs and challenges. It is not yet clear whether there are any strong benefits in diverging from EU-derived law. There are, however, claims about potential benefits such as the UK’s ability to introduce a legal framework that would allow courts to award predetermined, capped, damages for intellectual property infringements rather than the current system of compensatory damages, which make it expensive to enforce one’s intellectual property rights.³⁵ The UK government is still considering options through consultation and subsequent policy development at this stage. However, withdrawal from the EU has made it possible for the UK government to enact some policies that arguably benefit culturally sensitive sectors such as media, whether directly or indirectly. Examples in the creative sector include Independent Film Tax Credit,³⁶ enhanced Visual Effects (VFX) Tax Credit,³⁷ Audio-Visual Expenditure Credit reforms³⁸ and business rate relief for studios.³⁹ These measures aim to promote UK production, domestic content and help the UK compete internationally. However, any causal link with Brexit remains ambiguous as domestic tax and financial incentives are policies that might have been possible from within the EU. These policies may be partially enabled by freedom from legal and regulatory constraints as a non-EU member but it cannot be claimed outright that they are only possible because of divergence from EU-law. In any case, the claimed benefits of Brexit mostly appear to be of an economic and competitive nature.

• 40 Parliament (UK), “Committee Launch Post-Brexit Regulatory Divergence Inquiry,” 14^th June 2022 [onli (...)
• 41 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, “Regulating After Brexit,” letter addressed to the Se (...)

17In June 2022, the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee launched a formal inquiry (Regulating after Brexit) to evaluate the benefits and challenges of diverging from EU-derived regulations, implicitly including culturally-sensitive sectors like media.⁴⁰ In its May 2024 preliminary conclusions and tentative recommendations,⁴¹ the said committee advocated strategic oversight and inquiry into divergence impacts across sectors, as well as calling for caution when rewriting or revoking regulations that affect international trade. It found that diverging from EU-derived law can bring benefits, particularly in areas where the UK has either few or no overlapping EU regulations or where it has a comparative international advantage. As such, financial services and artificial intelligence are seen as priority areas. However, the committee did not – and has not since – made any specific recommendations that address altering the UK’s regulatory regime for broadcasting or online media services. Nor did it carry out a specific quantitative risk-analysis of how divergence from EU media regulation including separation from the AVMSD has or will continue to affect UK media providers and market competitiveness in broadcasting, streaming and content regulation: The questions raised by the committee thus far tend to deal with clarity, consequences and risk areas, rather than figures or thorough cost-benefit risk assessments.

• 42 Competition Act 1998 (UK), [online] < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/contents >
• 43 Enterprise Act 2002 (UK), [online] < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents >
• 44 Competition and Markets Authority, Written Evidence to the House of Lords EU Internal Market Sub-Co (...)

19At the time of the withdrawal agreement, two foundational pieces of legislation were already in place to ensure the British media industry remain competitive, diverse and free from undue concentration of power. On the one hand, the Competition Act 1998 sought to address anti-competitive practices and the abuse of dominant market positions in the UK.⁴² It was intended to prevent any single company from monopolizing the industry, promote diversity and choice, as well as ensure fair pricing. On the other hand, the Enterprise Act 2002⁴³ focused on merger control and public interest considerations. It aimed to ensure media plurality and regulate mergers. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) argued that Brexit did not necessarily require any change to existing competition policy, including merger control. In its written evidence submitted to an inquiry regarding the implications of Brexit on UK competition policy, the regulator claimed that continuing with the same approach would provide stability and predictability for business.⁴⁴

• 45 Media Reform Coalition, pp. 1-12.
• 46 See for instance: Anthony Seely, “Research Briefing: Media Ownership and Competition Law: The BSkyB (...)

20However, the CMA’s position ignores long-running problems with the application of the aforementioned legislation, particularly with respect to media plurality, the influence of foreign state-owned investors and changing media landscape dynamics. One of the most significant threats to media plurality is the potential for mergers and acquisitions, which can lead to a reduction in the number of independent media outlets. Although the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002 do provide frameworks to address anti-competitive practices and promote competition in the UK economy, including the media, they have been insufficient to guarantee media plurality in practice. The Competition Act 1998 focuses on competition but does not specifically deal with media plurality, in the sense of diverse viewpoints and ownership within the media landscape. The Enterprise Act 2002 introduced a public interest test for media mergers, allowing government to intervene in cases where media plurality was at risk of compromise. However, the threshold for the public interest test is high and is only triggered when deemed necessary by the Secretary of State. This means decisions may be inconsistent in practice. As stated previously, the Media Reform Coalition has reported ever-rising levels of media concentration over the past decade. In 2015, this advocacy group highlighted the fact that just three companies dominated seventy-one percent of the UK’s national newspaper market – a figure rising to eighty percent when online readers were included – and that six conglomerates accounted for eighty percent of all local newspaper titles.⁴⁵ It was also reported that television was increasingly being dominated by large US-based corporations. In particular, Rupert Murdoch’s 21^st Century Fox owned 39.1 percent of Sky plc., which was by far the UK’s biggest broadcaster in terms of its 7.6-billion-pound revenue in 2014. Yet this did not prevent Murdoch from making a highly controversial bid for BSkyB during the period 2010-2011.⁴⁶

• 47 European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, “Notice to Stakeholders: Withdrawal of the (...)
• 48 Ibid.
• 49 Michael Grenfell, “Speech: The CMA in Turbulent Times – Where we Are and Where we’re Going,” 11^th M (...)
• 50 Kyriakos Fountoukakos et al., Global Competition Review, Europe, Middle East and Africa Antitrust R (...)
• 51 Ibid.
• 52 Competition and Markets Authority, “Press Release: CMA to Increase Competition Cooperation with Int (...)

21Until the end of the transition period on 31^st December 2020, EU law applied fully to and within the United Kingdom. This meant that media mergers were examined exclusively by the European Commission under EU merger regulation, as per the EU one-stop-shop principle.⁴⁷ However, as of 1^st January 2021, this principle has ceased to apply.⁴⁸ The UK’s CMA has since acted independently from the European Commission and only refers to law that is applicable in the UK.⁴⁹ A proposed merger can still be reviewed by the European Commission as well as the UK’s CMA if it crosses both EU and UK thresholds.⁵⁰ However, this is assuming that both jurisdictions have applicable thresholds and that both parties choose – or are required – to notify each other.⁵¹ No cooperation protocol with the European Commission was agreed upon before the end of the transition period, despite both agencies expressing this to be a priority policy area. Yet the CMA had already sought to increase cooperation in the field of competition with four of its international counterparts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, as demonstrated by an agreement to improve cooperation on investigations, signed on 2^nd September 2020.⁵²

• 53 Michael Grenfell, “Speech: A View from the CMA: Brexit and Beyond,” 16^th May 2018, [online] < https (...)
• 54 Ibid.
• 55 Cleary Gottlieb, “UK Competition Law: Monthly Report,” January 2018, p.1, [online] < https://www.cl (...)
• 56 Michael Grenfell, “Speech: A View from the CMA: Brexit and Beyond.”

22As the main competition regulator in the UK, the CMA is expected to promote competitive markets and deal with unfair behaviour. Launched in 2013, it became fully operational the following year, thereby replacing the Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading. In a keynote speech delivered at the Advanced EU competition law conference in 2018, CMA Executive Director of Enforcement Michael Grenfell discussed four aspects of Brexit in relation to the said organization.53 He summarized concerns raised by competition practitioners including uncertainty risks for businesses if the UK were to decide to diverge from EU norms in competition enforcement.54 Uncertainty in this context refers to unknown outcomes and incomplete information on the predictability spectrum, which is essential to businesses when evaluating projects. The CMA had spent much of 2017 preparing for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and considering how best to establish the agency as a world leader in its field.55 Grenfell highlighted questions regarding the impact of the duplication or absence of investigations by the UK’s CMA into mergers and anti-competitive practices in parallel to EU investigations, a potential lack of funding for CMA activities, as well as scope for divergence from EU legal precedent.56

• 57 His Majesty’s Treasury, “Budget 2020,” [online] < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget (...)
• 58 Jason Furman, Unlocking Digital Competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, March (...)
• 59 Ibid., pp.12, 91.
• 60 Ibid., p.132.
• 61 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, The Cair (...)

23Given the long-running issues regarding underenforcement against digital mergers in the UK, the British government announced – in March 2020 – that it would follow the six strategic recommendations from a March 2019 report by the Digital Competition Expert Panel (the Furman Review).57 This review dealt with concerns over competition in digital markets and recommended setting up a digital markets’ unit for oversight.58 Data was collected showing that in the decade prior to 2019, five major digital platforms (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft) had made over four hundred acquisitions globally and yet none were blocked and very few were even considered by the UK’s CMA or equivalent bodies in other countries.59 Despite this, the Furman review stated it did not seek to explore questions “such as the possible implications of the digital economy for individuals’ privacy, democracy, or independence and accountability of the media,” as it claimed these issues were being dealt with in other fora.60 This is rather incomprehensible given that regulation of the digital economy has undeniable implications for media freedom, pluralism, and freedom of expression. Furthermore, discussion of these issues in other fora has in reality been highly limited. The 2019 Cairncross Review only lightly touched on these matters, mainly as a by-product of supporting a diverse, sustainable news sector, and did not openly propose media plurality regulation.61 Ofcom actively engages with media plurality issues but does not have broad regulatory power over platforms in the manner of competition regulator. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport has led policy initiatives on media plurality – including funding for public interest journalism, local news and digital news innovation – but does not regulate directly. None have provided a complete regulatory solution for media plurality in the digital age.

• 62 Ibid., pp.12-13.
• 63 European Commission, “Press Release: Commission Finds Apple and Meta in Breach of the Digital Marke (...)

24The Furman review did not directly focus on Brexit but provide indirect acknowledgment with respect to the UK’s future regulatory autonomy. Although the said review made recommendations for improvement regarding digital mergers, it also argued that, in comparison with other authorities worldwide, the UK’s CMA had not been outperformed in terms of identifying and preventing future harm in digital markets.⁶² It thereby suggested that the UK was not significantly behind any other international rival. However, there is evidence that undermines such an absolute claim. The EU has been particularly active through the passage of the Digital Markets Act 2022 (DMA), which imposes ex ante rules on large gatekeepers. This represents a paradigm shift away from traditional ex post enforcement. Some of the rules are thus intended to prevent harm, as demonstrated by penalties exacted against Apple Inc. and Meta Platforms in 2025.⁶³ The European Commission found that Apple Inc. had breached its anti-steering obligation and that Meta had breached its obligation to provide consumers with the choice of a service that makes less use of their personal data. The Commission fined Apple Inc. and Meta Platforms 500 and 200 million euros respectively. It has also been tackling mergers and dominance cases including high-profile antitrust cases against Google, which have led to investigations, as well as financial penalties between 2017 and 2019. Some of these might be considered as identifying and preventing future harm thanks to forward-looking remedies to inhibit recurrence.

• 64 Anna Lyle-Smythe and Madalina Secareanu, “Client Briefing: Parallel Reviews – Parallel Decisions? A (...)
• 65 Competition and Markets Authority, Meta/Kustomer, 30^th July 2021 [online] < https://www.gov.uk/cma- (...)
• 66 Competition and Markets Authority, “Press Release: CMA Clears Sony’s Acquisition of AWAL,” 16^th Mar (...)

25The complexity of the situation between the UK’s CMA and the European Commission since the withdrawal means that coordination and divergence risks have arisen regarding parallel reviews by both organizations. In 2021, approximately twenty percent of mergers examined by the CMA were also reviewed by the European Commission.⁶⁴ Divergent merger review outcomes occurred in two of the twelve cases in question: Meta/Kustomer and Veolia/Suez.⁶⁵ Differing issues or remedies also came to the fore amongst the remaining cases. Between 2020 and 2023, there have been three CMA-handled high-profile media merger reviews: The Meta Platforms acquisition of Giphy Inc., the Sony Music Entertainment acquisition of AWAL Group, and the Microsoft Corporation acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc.⁶⁶ These cases demonstrate a degree of assertiveness as the UK’s CMA has decided to block or demand remedies in the cases of Meta’s acquisition of Giphy Inc. and Microsoft Corporation’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard Inc.

• 67 Council of the European Union, “COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations with the U (...)
• 68 European Commission, “Proposal for a Decision: Explanatory Memorandum,” 19^th May 2025, COM(2025) 23 (...)

26Besides the differing legal frameworks and thresholds of the UK’s CMA and the European Commission, such divergent review outcomes may be explained by the fact that these two bodies are analysing different geographic markets, which may behave differently with respect to competitive landscape, customer base and demand patterns, as well as geography-specific business models. Negotiations for a UK-EU competition cooperation agreement only formally began following the EU Council’s decision to proceed in June 2023⁶⁷ and the said negotiations were only finalized at a technical level in October 2024.⁶⁸ To date, the agreement has not been ratified by either party, whether that be the EU Council and Parliament or the UK Parliament.

• 69 Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, [online] < https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3 (...)
• 70 Jason Furman, Unlocking Digital Competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, pp.6-8

27However, the CMA’s role has already undergone changes as per the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA 2024).69 Many of these modifications are consistent with, and can be traced back to the Furman review’s recommendations, particularly with respect to Strategic Market Status (SMS) regime, the CMA’s Digital Markets Unit and enforcement powers.70 There are major policy implications for media players, particularly for those companies specializing in content distribution, digital advertising, online news and streaming. In practice, the dominance of big tech platforms such as Google, Meta, Amazon and Apple, could be reined in through the SMS regime due to the impact of their role as gatekeepers in controlling audience reach and advertising revenue. Designation under the SMS regime would mean having to respect certain conduct requirements such as not discriminating against media competitors on their platforms, increasing transparency in advertising prices and ranking algorithms, not giving preferential treatment to their own media content and services. This could potentially level the playing field for publishers, broadcasters and other content creators who are dependent on such platforms. Dominant media players could also face greater scrutiny in the case of media mergers through new merger control powers and reporting requirements. Platform acquisitions of specialized but influential media, content or advertising tech firms, as well as vertical integration in content creation and distribution, would thereby be affected. There could also be stronger enforcement of consumer rights in media and digital subscriptions through new consumer enforcement powers.

• 71 Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (UK), [online] < https://www.legislation.gov.uk (...)
• 72 Ibid., section 70A.

28Under the UK’s DMCCA 2024, the CMA now has the power to tackle unfair consumer practices including dark patterns such as deceptive or manipulative user interfaces on streaming and news sites, as well as unfair auto-renewals of subscriptions71. The CMA can impose fines of up to ten percent of global turnover for serious breaches. More generally, the said legislation demonstrates a strategic balancing act since Brexit, between maintaining constructive relations with the EU regarding media mergers and digital markets policy, and asserting regulatory independence. There is pragmatism in the UK’s regulatory approach as the country seeks to differentiate itself. The UK has never been bound by the EU’s DMA 2022, which has the stated aim of making digital markets fairer and more contestable, as well as seeking to curb the power of large digital platforms considered to be gatekeepers in markets such as online marketplaces, search engines and social media. However, the UK’s DMCCA 2024 introduces a Digital Markets Competition Regime, which mirrors the EU’s DMA 2022 in several respects. These include the aforementioned SMS regime, which is similar to the EU’s DMA gatekeeper designation, conduct requirements and pro-competition interventions, in that it seeks to ensure fair competition and consumer protection, as well as require merger reporting. The UK’s DMCCA 2024 also attempts to improve regulation of media mergers involving foreign states, thereby aligning with concerns raised during the Brexit process about safeguarding national interests in sensitive sectors. In particular, it does so by amending the Enterprise Act 2002, lowering the threshold for the Secretary of State to be able to intervene in media mergers on public interest grounds – specifically in cases involving foreign state influence over UK newspapers and news magazines.72

• 73 Communication Act 2003 (UK), section 375, [online] < https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/c (...)
• 74 His Majesty’s Government, “Government Response to the new Consultation on a new Competition Regime (...)

29The UK has made progress, and is still in the process of reforms relating to the media merger regime and digital market sphere. Recent post-Brexit media reform has included lowering the threshold for the Secretary of State to intervene in media merger cases, on public interest grounds. These criteria include the need for accurate news presentation, free expression of opinion, a sufficient plurality of views in newspapers for each market and a sufficient plurality of individuals who control media enterprises audiences.⁷³ However, there are still meaningful policy gaps, particularly regarding media freedom from a rights-based citizen perspective. In a 2022 response to a consultation on a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, the UK government rejected the idea of broadening its objective to include citizens rather than just consumers, arguing that doing so would create confusion.⁷⁴ As such, the DMCCA 2024 focused on consumers and businesses, specifically competition issues, innovation and choice.

• 75 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Consultation Outcome: Consultation on Updating the Media (...)
• 76 Regulatory Policy Committee, “Research and Analysis: The Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving New (...)
• 77 Ibid.

30There are some recent signs of attempts to deal with this policy vacuum. In particular, the UK government held a public consultation on updating the media mergers regime, from November 2024 to January 2025, with the aim of broadening the scope of public interest considerations to include online news publications and periodical magazines, and to reflect changes in digital age news consumption.⁷⁵ The next step in the process will be the publication of updated statutory guidance, following which legislative changes and regulatory updates may be implemented.⁷⁶ However, the proposed draft regulations remain relatively limited from a rights-based citizen’s perspective. The said proposals include introducing a fifteen percent ownership threshold for foreign state-owned investors in UK newspaper and news magazine publications, as long as such investors are not able to influence the policy or strategy of the media enterprise.⁷⁷ Indeed, the regulatory measures are mainly concerned with ownership thresholds and foreign influence, rather than directly ensuring plurality of viewpoints, access to diverse sources or safeguarding democratic expression. The focus appears to be on who can invest in UK newspapers and news magazines rather than ensuring that citizens have access to a broad range of viewpoints, accuracy or independence.