• 2 Interview with L., Oxford for Europe, Zoom call, 4 July 2025.

1Leaving the European Union (EU) weakened Britain abroad, divided it at home, and jeopardised the party that delivered it. Former conservative Prime Minister John Major describes Brexit as a geopolitical act of self-harm and a moral miscalculation, marking the erosion of the UK’s post-war political consensus. His warning resonates with activists such as L., activist from Oxford for Europe who emphasised the ongoing need to “keep banging that drum that Brexit has been a disaster for young people, for businesses, for unity and solidarity on our continent.”2

• 3 NRM is a grassroots campaign advocating for the UK’s return to the European Movement. Founded in 20 (...)
• 4 David A. Snow and Diana M. Moss, “Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamic (...)

2Despite its spontaneous and amateur origins in 2016, the pro-European grassroots movement remains active almost a decade later. The fourth National Rejoin March (NRM)3 planned for June 2026, symbolises this resilience. As Snow and Moss observe, spontaneity and organisation are not incompatible4: local groups have persisted despite political setbacks, notably the collapse of the People’s Vote campaign (PV) in 2019. Once fuelled by anger and disappointment, the movement has adapted and survived in an adverse political climate, keeping Europe visible in public debate. One may argue that anger is the starting point of a longer emotional trajectory.

• 5 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta (eds.), Passionate Politics, The University of (...)
• 6 James M. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1997.

3Emotions occupy a central role in shaping mobilisation, participation, and organisational persistence. Treated as irrational residues or background conditions up until the 1990s, authors such as Goodwin et al.5 and Jasper6 have conceptualised emotions as integral to political meaning-making and continued collective action. Emotions are not merely a component of activism; they actively structure how grievances are interpreted, how commitment is maintained, and how movement endure beyond moments of crisis. In the context of Brexit, anger can thus be understood as a response not only to policy outcomes but to perceived threats to democracy, openness, and political identity.

• 7 This dynamic was fully theorised by Sobolewska and Ford’s Brexitland, which shows how demographic c (...)
• 8 Matthew, J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 referendum, Brexit and the left behind: An Aggregat (...)
• 9 Adam Fagan and Stijn van Kessel, The Failure of Remain, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2023.
• 10 Ibid, p. 140.
• 11 Verena K. Brändle, Charlotte Galpin and Hanz-Jörg Trenz, “Brexit as ‘politics of division’: social (...)
• 12 Kai Steemers, “The United Kingdom’s Rejoin movement: A Post-Brexit analysis of framing strategies”, (...)

4While existing scholarship on Brexit and anti-Brexit mobilisation has largely focused on voter attitudes, identity politics,7 economic restructuring8, and movement failure,9 recent research has emphasised the limits of pro-European mobilisation in the UK following the referendum. Although a small number of recent studies have begun to address anti-Brexit mobilisation, systematic analyses of pro-European activism (particularly its grassroots forms) remain scarce in the broader Brexit and social movement literature. Fagan and van Kessel argue that the Remain movement ‘did not manage to galvanise sufficient support and influence to stop Brexit’ and failed at conveying a powerful message to their audience.10 Brändle et al. show that pro-European campaigning, particularly on social media, remained largely reactive and polarised, struggling to articulate positive and future-oriented narratives beyond opposition to Brexit.11 Similarly, Steemers points to the difficulties faced by pro-Remain initiatives in translating grassroots mobilisation into sustained political influence under constrained institutional conditions.12 Taken together, these contributions tend to assess pro-European activism primarily through its immediate impact on national debates, leaving less attention to its longer-term organisational continuity and locally embedded practices. However, there is reason to suggest that the grassroots have succeeded in creating a strong pro-European network. This article reorients the analysis towards the durability and local embeddedness of pro-European mobilisation. It may be inferred that defending the status quo (EU membership) can be a meaningful political position and the absence of viable alternatives is not synonymous with failure.

• 13 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, “Framing political opportunity” in Doug MacAdam et al. (eds) (...)
• 14 Rick Harmes, Localism and the Design of Political Systems, Routledge, 2021, p. 15.
• 15 Keith Shaw, “The Rise of Resilient Local Authority?”, Local Government Studies, Vol. 1, No. 20, 201 (...)

5The post-referendum period has been widely characterised as one of political closure for pro-European mobilisation. However, Gamson and Meyer’s13 insight that opportunities are framed rather than given helps explain why local activism nevertheless persisted, as groups shifted their strategic orientation from national policy change to locally meaningful forms of engagement. In other words, these actors sustained mobilisation beyond the collapse of the Remain campaign. In doing so, the article extends existing accounts of movement failure and constraint by theorising localism as a mechanism of movement resilience, demonstrating how grassroots durability can coexist with (and partially offset) unfavourable national political opportunity structures. According to Harmes, localism acts as an “intermediate support” structure, enabling individuals, groups, and neighbourhoods “to survive, prosper and flourish more effectively.” 14For Shaw, “resilience has […] been associated with characteristics such as flexibility, innovation, managing risk and adapting to changed circumstances.”15 Localism enabled pro-European groups to sustain mobilisation despite national-level defeat, thereby theorising durability as an outcome of strategic reframing rather than favourable institutional conditions.

• 16 We will retain Alger and Mendlovitz’s definition of “grass-roots”: “… grass-roots seems to cover ev (...)

9Groups were selected on the basis of their sustained engagement within the movement and their involvement in activities such as webinars, roundtables, and marches. Furthermore, the sample was designed to capture diverse perspectives by including both national leaders and local activists, thereby offering insight into how campaign management at the national level has affected grassroots mobilisation.16

• 17 James M. Jasper, op. cit., p. 5
• 18 Catherine Corrigall-Brown, Patterns of Protest, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 20 (...)

11Particular attention is paid to the emotional registers through which activists interpret Brexit and justify continued engagement, especially expressions of anger that are channelled into routine, place-based activism. Interviewees frequently articulated anger at Brexit not primarily as a demand for immediate policy reversal, but as a moral response to perceived democratic loss, misinformation, and exclusion, which in turn made locak, face-to-face activism appear both meaningful and achievable. The patterns observed in pro-European grassroots mobilisation resonate with the importance of localism and everyday engagement in sustaining political participation. Hasanov and Zuidema’s analysis of grassroots mobilisation shows that political relevance does not necessarily stem from the articulation of radical alternatives or immediate policy change or as Jasper puts it: “[r]ather than simply or directly changing what they dislike – which may not be possible – [social movements] also express their contempt and outrage over existing practices.”17 What matters is the capacity of local initiatives to maintain participation, anchor political values in place, and keep movements active overtime. Read in this light, the post-referendum trajectory of pro-European groups18 appears less as a failure to renew a political project than as a form of sustained, locally embedded activism operating under conditions of institutional close.

• 19 European Movement United Kingdom (EMUK) is the non-profit, cross-party, non-party organisation and (...)

12It is worth noting that the movement continues to function within a two-tier structure comprising local and national organisations. Since 2019, the European Movement UK (EMUK)19 has taken a supervisory role in coordinating the campaign. As was already the case in 2018, grassroots activists have contributed to criticise what they perceive as the organisation’s top-down approach – a dynamic that will be discussed further in Part Three.

• 20 Kathleen M. Blee and Verta Taylor, “Semi-Structured Interviewing in Social Movement Research” in Be (...)

13Semi-structured interviews were chosen because they “are particularly useful for understanding social movement mobilization from the perspective of movement actors or audiences.”20 This method is especially appropriate for studying loosely structured and volunteer-based organisations. It provides a comprehensive view of the movement as it stands in 2025, while also tracing its evolution since 2016. Engaging activists in discussion about campaign strategy revealed nuanced understandings of the movement’s aims, outcomes, which often vary between organisations.

• 21 “[T]here was no coherent strategy among activists about how the case for remaining in the EU would (...)

15Finally, this research contributes to ongoing debates concerning the effectiveness of grassroots strategies in maintaining the visibility of the EU in British political discourse since the UK’s formal withdrawal in 2020. As outlined in Part Three, the study also explores activists’ capacity to identify and address the campaign’s weaknesses. Asking whether they have reconsidered aspects of their narrative (often criticised as incoherent) helped to illuminate the extent to which such reflections have been well integrated into current campaign agendas.21

• 22 Toby Helm and Jennifer Rankin, “‘I sense Brussels is ready to be bold and ambitious’: hope mixes wi (...)
• 23 Elena Remigi, In Limbo: Brexit testimonies from EU citizens in the UK, CreateSpace Independent Publ (...)
• 24 “People need a place to live their lives, and that place becomes an intimate part of the lives peop (...)

17January 2025 marked the fifth anniversary of the UK’s departure from the EU, yet public sentiment remains divided over what many felt was an undemocratic watershed.22 Emotions have been central to the pro-European movement, which mobilised nationwide immediately after the Brexit referendum. Numerous personal accounts, notably In Limbo23, attest to the emotional distress experienced by EU citizens living in the UK after the 2016 referendum.24

• 25 Adam Fagan and Stjin van Kessel, op. cit.
• 26 Verena Brändle et al., op. cit.

19While Fagan and van Kessel25 emphasise the failure of Remain mobilisation to reverse the outcome of the referendum thanks to an impactful narrative and effective alternatives, and Steemers highlights the strategic constraints facing post-Brexit activism, there is ground to argue that, nevertheless, anger retained explanatory force at the local level, where it was reframed as a motivation for civic presence, organisational maintenance, and community engagement. According to Brändle et al.,26 social media activism was shaped by a polarising “politics of divisions,” in which pro-European actors remained largely reactive, defensive, and oriented towards debunking Brexit lies rather than articulating a positive or future-oriented vision. Nevertheless, activists have adapted their repertoires beyond social media campaigning in the immediate post-referendum period to sustain mobilisation, maintain developed networks, and reorient collective action over time. This may indicate that what appears as discursive stagnation at the level of online debate may well coexist with significant organisational continuity and future-looking activity at the grassroots level.

• 27 See testimonies of EU citizens living in the UK gathered in Elena Remigi’s book, op. cit.

20Emotions such as anger are not fixed or self-exhausting forces but rather shaped within social interactions and organisational contexts. Drawing on work on emotions in social movements, we treat anger not as episodic outrage but as a durable moral emotion that shapes strategic choices, organisational forms, and scale of action. Goodwin et al. and Jasper’s conceptualisation of emotions as integral to collective action shows that anger is not a fleeting reaction to political defeat, but a moral emotion that can be reworked by grassroots organisations into ongoing engagement, collective identity, and long-term mobilisation. Analytically, anger is examined through activists’ narratives of loss, injustice, and democratic exclusion, and through the practices these narratives sustain at the local level.27

• 28 Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta (eds.), op. cit., p. 10.
• 29 William A. Gamson, Encounters With Unjust Authorities, Homewood, III Dorsey Press, 1982.
• 30 James M. Jasper and Jane D. Poulsen, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Net (...)

21As Goodwin et al. note in Passionate Politics, emotions such as anger can catalyse mobilisation but rarely sustain it unless transformed into enduring commitments like solidarity, pride, or moral conviction.28 Anger, a response to perceived injustice29 (in this case, Brexit) was vital to the movement’s formation but risked devolving into frustration or burnout. Rather than fuelling escalation, and while anger may initially take the form of moral shock,30 movements must actively work to stabilise it through routine, low-threshold forms of participation, allowing activists to remain engaged over time without the burnout associated with national mobilisation. Pro-European campaigners therefore sought to channel anger into solidarity and pride, successfully creating communities where supporters felt seen and understood. Activists expressed European pride through symbols (flags, face paint, placards) and through local groups offering solidarity and shared purpose. The enduring hope of one day rejoining the EU continues to unify and motivate them.

• 31 James Tilley and Sara B. Hobolt, “Losers’ consent emotions in the aftermath of the Brexit referendu (...)
• 32 Ibid.

23Tilley and Hobolt question the notion that naturally leads to “losers’ consent.”31 In the Brexit context, anger and acceptance are not correlated: remainers, labelled “sore losers,” challenged what they perceived as an unfair outcome – “an unchecked ‘tyranny of the majority.’”32 Contrary to Tilley and Hobolt’s argument that angry losers cling to their parties or elites cues, pro-European activists formed cross-party groups and engaged deeply with political issues. Since main political parties accepted the referendum result, grassroots anger did not originate from elites but from within communities themselves, illustrating a distinct emotional dynamic.

• 33 Stronger In for short.
• 34 Before becoming chair of EMUK, Mike Galsworthy was the founder of Scientists for EU and Healthier i (...)
• 35 Interview with Mike Galsworthy, European Movement UK, Zoom call, 18 September 2025.
• 36 Robert Saunders, Yes to Europe!, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 379.
• 37 Interview with G., London4Europe, Zoom call, 12 July 2025.

24Britain Stronger In Europe33 (the government’s official remain campaign) was a monolithic, top-down organisation that stifled grassroots involvement. Mike Galsworthy, chair of EMUK34, recalled that “it had no real veterans, no real history, no real community behind it,”35 operating merely as a Westminster outfit. In contrast, Vote Leave and Leave.EU empowered local branches nationwide. As Saunders observes, Stronger In failed to adapt and tailor its message to local communities, offering a one-note, elitist appeal disconnected from the electorate.36 A London4Europe activist confirmed that the campaign disregarded grassroots feedback, deepening the sense of detachment.37

• 38 Alexandra Bulat, How Does Local-Level Contact Shape Attitudes Towards EU Migrants?, UCL School of S (...)

28Despite limited national influence, pro-European grassroots groups persisted locally. Research on political participation approaches localism as a shift in the scale of engagement rather than a retreat from political involvement. Bulat’s work shows that when national politics is experienced as indifferent or unresponsive, local settings become key sites for maintaining a sense of political agency, collective voice, and meaningful participation.38 Rather than signalling passivity, status quo-oriented activism may reflect a deliberate effort to protect democratically valued arrangements perceived as under threat. One may argue that pro-European activism appears as a form of political engagement aimed at preserving democratic horizons under conditions of acute polarisation and political loss.

• 39 Cambridge for Europe was set up before 2016 and when the government launched its official campaign, (...)
• 40 Full Fact, “37% of the UK electorate voted for Brexit”, Full Fact, 5 March 2025, available online: (...)
• 41 Colin Gordon, “The Brexit New Year: adversaries and alliances, morals for Remainers”, Grassroots fo (...)

29The anti-Brexit mobilisation was unprecedented in scope. Prior to the referendum, only a handful of groups, such as Cambridge for Europe, existed.39 After the result, indignation surged, and new local groups calling themselves “for Europe” proliferated across the country. For many, the referendum result was undemocratic: 33.6 million votes, only 17.4 million (37% of voters) supported leaving the EU.40 Activists viewed Brexit as “an act of violence, against truth and democracy, against human lives and ties, against civility and public decency.”41 Anger and disillusionment thus fuelled a spontaneous mobilisation seeking to reclaim democratic agency from what many saw as a hijacked process.

• 42 Adam Fagan and Stijn van Kessel, op. cit. p. 4.
• 43 One must not forget that the referendum on EU’s membership was supposed to be advisory and not bind (...)

30Grassroots activists rejected Britain Stronger In Europe (later Open Britain), which urged acceptance of the result and staying in the Single Market. Many groups joined the expanding EMUK or the newly formed Britain for Europe, while others remained independent. Their primary focus was to debunk Brexit falsehoods42 and demand a democratic say on any deal – a “People’s Vote.”43

• 44 Martin Fletcher, “Inside the Headquarters of Britain’s anti-Brexit Brigade”, The New Stateman, 30 M (...)
• 45 It is important to mention that PV campaigned for a soft Brexit with the option to remain in the Si (...)

31As Brexit negotiations faltered, the movement expanded. National coordination centred in London under Open Britain, which merged later into the People’s Vote campaign.44 However, tensions soon emerged. Local groups criticised PV’s tight control over messaging and its reluctance to embrace an explicitly pro-European identity. 45Galsworthy recalled PV’s lack of coordination, such as failing to inform grassroots activists of its national bus tour events.

• 46 Rowland Manthrope, “Remain Facebook pages ‘professionalised’ by £100,000 campaign”, Sky News, 3 Sep (...)

32By 2019, amid Boris Johnson’s prorogation of Parliament, grassroots activism reached its peak. Local groups aimed to scrutinise the Brexit deal, demand a public vote, and prevent a Johnson-led election. Since PV withheld funding, Galsworthy independently raised £400,000 to develop local groups’ online infrastructure, enabling them to mobilise nationwide.46 Their Facebook networks quadrupled, coordinating protests against Johnson’s handling of Brexit and demonstrating unprecedented cohesion. EMUK’s support for local groups enabled activists to translate affective opposition into organisational continuity, illustrating how anger can sustain action even under conditions of political closure.

• 47 Mustafa Hasanov and Christian Zuidema, “Local collective action for sustainability transformations: (...)
• 48 Ibid.
• 49 Stijn van Kessel and Adam Fagan, “Defending Europe from below: pro- European activism in Germany an (...)

33Despite limited access to national political influence, scholarship on local collective action further suggests that the political significance of grassroots mobilisation should not be assessed solely through national policy change or the articulation of comprehensive alternative programmes. Hasanov and Zuidema’s study examines local collective action in community energy initiatives and reveals that local collective action often operates according to a logic of durability and continuity, prioritising community participation, organisational learning, and the maintenance of collective capacity overtime.47 Localism therefore functions as a strategic mode of engagement that allows movements to embed future-oriented commitments in everyday practices rather than in abstract political blueprints: “[l]ocalism supports the idea that local initiatives can create a shared sense of urgency to push the current situation in the direction of desirable future pathways.”48 Pro-European activism can therefore be perceived as a successful campaign in its ability to sustain democratic attachment under conditions of rupture rather than focussing on its capacity to articulate radical alternatives as illustrated through pro-EU German grassroots organisation Pulse of Europe in Fagan and van Kessel’s comparative study.49

• 50 The remain vote was fragmented whereas the Conservative Party showed a unified front, confident to (...)
• 51 “March for Change is a campaigning organisation all about citizen empowerment in the political issu (...)
• 52 BBC News, “Anti-Brexit protesters hold ‘No to Boris’ march”, 20 July 2019, available online:< https (...)
• 53 Best for Britain, “’No to Boris. Yes to Europe’ Demo on July 20th”, 20 July 2019, available online: (...)
• 54 Jonathon Read, “All you need to know about the March for Change protest in London”, The New World, (...)
• 55 Prior to the referendum campaign, EMUK was a social dining organisation which had no interest whats (...)

34Johnson’s electoral victory and PV’s internal dispute marked a turning point.50 To preserve momentum, Galsworthy and Tom Brufatto launched March for Change51 as a “safety net” for grassroots coordination under the PV umbrella. PV, however, withheld its endorsement. Nevertheless, on 20 July 2019, activists marched under the banner “No to Boris, Yes to Europe”52 to “show the […] Prime Minister, the country and the world that [they wanted] to stop the Brexit chaos.”53 This demonstration epitomised the movement’s pride and determination to defend Europeanism itself.54 As PV collapsed at the end of the year of 2019, EMUK assumed leadership of the fragmented movement. Its membership model allowed local groups to receive funding, ensuring the campaign’s continuity.55 Yet many activists withdrew, and groups have since operated with fewer members and resources. Still, the persistence of local networks demonstrates how emotions resilience (particularly pride and solidarity) transformed initial anger into a durable, values-based European identity.

• 57 Matthew Smith, “Nine years after the EU referendum, where does public opinion stand on Brexit?”, Yo (...)
• 58 Petitions, “Apply for the UK to rejoin the EU fully - do not just ‘reset’ the relationship”, UK Gov (...)

36The idea of Brejoin – reversing Brexit – has recently entered public discourse. While only a minority prioritises it,57 the issue remains polarised along party lines. For grassroots campaigners, however, keeping Europe central to political debate remains essential. The 2024 general election, which brought Labour back to power, revived pro-EU hopes. However, shifting the party towards a more explicit pro-European position has proved difficult: in July 2025, responding to the petition “Apply for the UK to rejoin the EU fully – do not just ‘reset’ the relationship,” Labour confirmed its intention to pursue a new partnership with the EU while ruling out rejoining.58 This third and last section explores the new direction the grassroots have taken since 2020 and is essentially based on interviews with activists. It highlights both their achievements and the persistent difficulties of collaboration with EMUK, which has become the umbrella organisation of the pro-European network. Although pro-European actors have identified and attempted to learn from the shortcomings of the Remain campaign, the movement’s resilience and adaptability remain significant achievements given the enduring challenges of coordination at the national level.

• 59 Adam Fagan and Stijn van Kessel, op. cit., 2023.
• 60 Kai Steemers, op. cit.

37Steemers’s study of NRM analyses 1,018 Twitter posts to assess how the movement frames its message. Similarly to Fagan and van Kessel,59 the author observes the weak resonance of the pro-European narrative in post-Brexit Britain. The economic argument – linking the UK’s stagnation to successive Conservative governments – is well developed and internally consistent. Yet, Steemers notes the overreliance on economic reasoning, calling instead for a more emotionally engaging narrative grounded in democratic values and mobility. He concludes that the movement has yet to articulate a unified, persuasive story about rejoining and must transition from an anti-Brexit coalition to a forward-looking vision of a renewed membership.60

• 61 The national campaign to stay in the EEC in 1975 had a strong emotional dimension insisting on the (...)

38The 2016 Remain campaign’s technocratic tone remains a cautionary example.61 As an activist from Oxford for Europe reflected:

• 63 Colin Gordon, “Reflection on the Grassroots for Europe Conference”, Grassroots for Europe, 11 Febru (...)

39In January 2020, Grassroots for Europe (GfE) convened its ‘Where Now for Remain’ national conference, bringing together over 200 local groups and 500 activists. The meeting concluded that the movement must operate from the bottom up: local groups should lead while national bodies provide coordination and support. Activists resolved to avoid “wasteful rivalries” and to build “creative, dynamic, functional and flexible” structures in cooperation with campaigns advocating for constitutional reform, equality, climate action, and public services.63

• 64 Grassroots would for instance hand out the leaflets produced by the national organisation. Addition (...)

40Since 2020, the grassroots have sought to promote a more positive and historically grounded narrative, re-emphasising the EU’s origins as a peace project. However, a persistent dilemma remains between national coordination and local flexibility. Activists recall that PV’s 2018 attempt to centralise the campaign was counterproductive. As of 2025, the unresolved question is whether unity of message or local diversity offers a more effective strategy. During the referendum, EMUK was a minor actor while local groups carried the campaign. Today, local groups maintain their autonomy but acknowledge EMUK’s importance in coordinating national-level messaging.64

• 65 Interview with L., op. cit.

41Nonetheless, a recurrent frustration among activists concerns the absence of a strong parliamentary voice advocating closer relations with the EU. L. from Oxford for Europe noted that the movement is “less vocal than it should be,” partly because “no major politician now speaks openly as a pro-European.65” Without such representation, street-level campaigning can appear disconnected from formal politics. As a result, many local groups have shifted towards strategies aimed at localising the European debate: linking Brexit’s effects to constituency-level issues such as employment, healthcare, or trade. GfE has consequently sought to promote a forward-looking message that underscores what Europe can offer the UK, tailoring communication strategies to specific audiences. This localisation may, paradoxically, prove to be a productive adaptation: by embedding the European question in local realities, activists are redefining what democratic engagement looks like in a post-Brexit polity.

• 66 Stijn van Kessel and Adam Fagan, op. cit., 2023.

42The deeply localised character of British political culture has encouraged pro-European grassroots activism to develop through place-based networks and interpersonal ties, privileging endurance and access over immediate political influence.66 Yet, the British media’s limited coverage of local pro-European initiatives makes it difficult for activists to reach wider audiences. For many, continued engagement constitutes both resistance and therapy.

• 67 Interview with P., op. cit.
• 68 Matthew Ward, “Rethinking social movement micromobilization: Multi-stage theory and the role of soc (...)
• 69 Deborah G. Martin et al., “What Counts as Activism?: The Role of Individuals in Creating Change”, W (...)
• 70 Interview with L., op. cit.

43Oxford for Europe argues that storytelling is more persuasive than data: “what wins people over are personal stories – families or fishermen affected by Brexit. Those are what cut through.”67 Personalisation and localisation are central to effective outreach. By conceptualising micromobilisation as a multi-stage and ongoing process, Ward shifts attention away from binary participation outcomes towards the relational, emotional, and identity-based mechanisms that foster participation in the long run.68 Pro-European grassroots groups continued activity relies less on large-scale recruitment than on dense social ties, repeated low-cost participation, and the maintenance of politicised identity at the local level. G. from London4Europe reported that his most successful fundraising appeal was one that included his personal narrative, echoing Martin et al.’s argument that social change emerges from local networks and informal interactions.69 Analogously, L. from Oxford for Europe stresses that campaigns must resonate with local contexts: “In Oxford we can focus on students; in Hertfordshire it might be farming. Different places, different messages.”70 In this sense, localism operated as an affective stabiliser: by embedding anger in familiar places, social ties, and low-threshold activities, groups were able to sustain mobilisation without the escalation or burnout associated with national-level protest.

• 71 Verta Taylor, “Social Movement Continuity: the Women’s Movement in Abeyance”, American Sociological (...)

44While EMUK must project a clear national message, the broader movement benefits from differentiated communication adapted to local realities. London4Europe emphasises the need to connect pro-European activism to wider causes such as climate action or democratic reform. Constructing a positive and forward-looking narrative of European engagement remains an ongoing endeavour. Whereas Fagan and van Kessel emphasise the weak and largely indirect transmission of pro-European grassroots demands into party politics, it is crucial to reconceptualise post-Brexit pro-European mobilisation through the lens of abeyance,71 showing how locally embedded organisations function as movement holding structures that preserve identities, networks, and activist capacities during periods of elite non-alignment and constrained political opportunity.

• 72 Yorkshire Bylines, “The Davis Downside Dossier”, 1 January 2021, available online: <https://yorkshi (...)
• 73 David Davis, “Next Steps in Leaving the European Union”, Hansard, Volume 615: debated on Monday 10 (...)
• 74 Interview with Mike Galsworthy, op. cit.

45One major initiative was Bylines, launched by Mike Galsworthy and the Yorkshire for Europe Group in April 2020. Frustrated with mainstream media, they developed a citizen journalism platform to showcase local experiences of Brexit. Bylines compiled the David Davis dossier,72 a collection documenting Brexit’s negative impacts, directly countering the 2016 assertion that “there will be no downside to Brexit at all, and considerable upsides.”73 The initiative has since evolved towards the Citizen Journalism Trust, designed to institutionalise community-based reporting and encourage contributions from students, refugees, and marginalised communities. Although Galsworthy acknowledges limited media reach, he sees Bylines as a foundation for revitalising local activism: “we need to move beyond small, white, middle-class campaign–bring in broader communities and make the movement feel energetic again.”74 Bylines embodies a strategic adaptation to non-receptive political and media environments. Rather than attempting to compete directly with mainstream media, activists translated their frustration into the creation of an alternative communicative platform rooted in local experience.

• 75 APPG on Europe was formally registered on 20 November 2024. Officers and secretaries are mostly MPs (...)
• 76 Interview with C., Oxford for Europe, Zoom call, 10 July 2025.

46A further achievement has been the establishment of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Europe (APPG) in October 2024.75 This cross-party body reopens institutional channels between the UK and the EU and provides activists with new access to parliamentarians: “we can talk to them and get them to listen to our ideas and our campaigns.”76 From a grassroots perspective, this is a success not because it signals immediate policy change, but because it restores lines of communication between pro-Europeans and parliamentarians. The APPG provides a focal point through which dispersed groups can translate local concerns into parliamentary dialogue, reinforcing activists’ sense that their continued mobilisation still resonates within formal political arenas.

• 77 The idea would be for instance to participate in one of their climate walks, link up with them and (...)

47Lastly, London4Europe’s creation of SELFE (South East London for Europe — pronounced “selfie”), further illustrates renewal at local level. The federation links branches across South East London and collaborates with businesses, climate movements,77 and through the European Parliament Ambassador School Programme (EPAS). It has successfully recruited newly retired supporters, reflecting an expanding demographic base. SELFE’s model – locally anchored yet outward-looking – embodies the evolving identity of the movement. SELFE shows how localism functions as a source of regeneration rather than fragmentation. By federating neighbourhood branches and forging links with schools, businesses, and climate organisations, one may argue that SELFE has enabled grassroots groups to expand their social reach while remaining territorially anchored.

• 78 Interview with L., op. cit.
• 79 Kai Steemers, op. cit.
• 80 Interview with C., op. cit.
• 81 Andy Pye, “The importance of pro-European Tories to rejoining the EU”, London4Europe, 11 January 20 (...)

49The collapse of the Remain campaign was largely due to its neglect of the grassroots. PV’s centralised strategy alienated local groups that, in retrospect, constituted the movement’s most dynamic element. As one activist observed: “the grassroots were quite disparate and lacked coordination. If felt like a lot of people wanted the stage and the microphone, but not enough of a consolidated voice.”78 Tensions persist, as Steemers notes, with “[i]nternal divergence over the correct course of action” continuing to undermine coherence.79 Yet most activists agree that the movement has avoided major factional conflict.80 EMUK and Oxford for Europe now coordinate effectively through regular online meetings, and London4Europe praises EMUK’s renewal under Galsworthy’s leadership, including cooperation with pro-European Conservatives. D. from London4Europe contends that rebuilding a pro-European strand within the Conservative Party is “a strategic precondition for any possible re-entry.”81

• 82 Some members of Oxford for Europe are also involved in groups such as Make Votes Matter or Compass, (...)
• 83 Patrick English and Dylan Difford, “YouGov MRP shows a Reform UK government a near-certainty if an (...)
• 84 Carole Hagan, “The European Movement 2025: growing the grassroots”, Central Bylines, 20 March 2025, (...)

51Strategic divergence also extends to priorities, as the Young European Movement (YEM) is not campaigning to rejoin. While some groups are pushing for proportional representation (PR)82 as a prerequisite for democratic renewal, others caution against making PR a condition for rejoining. Many recognise, however, that PR could prevent populist dominance by parties such as Reform UK.83 At EMUK’s third hybrid grassroots conference in March 2025, featuring Dominic Grieve and Caroline Lucas the leadership outlined a pragmatic framework – Reset, Reimagine, Rebuild and Rejoin. Deputy CEO Emma Knaggs stressed that immediate re-entry is unrealistic; instead, the UK must pursue gradual re-engagement. While some fear this strategy may dilute momentum, EMUK argues that sustained activism and economic interdependence will inevitably draw the UK closer to the EU. The conference reaffirmed the centrality of grassroots mobilisation: ongoing local work, youth engagement, social media activism, and continuous parliamentary lobbying. 84EMUK positions itself as a bridge between civic activism and political institutions. Oxford for Europe supports this gradualist approach, advocating Single Market and customs union membership as interim steps toward eventual rejoining. L. from Oxford for Europe articulates this incrementalism succinctly:

• 86 Interview with A., Youth European Movement, Zoom call, 24 September 2025

52Recruiting young activists remains a challenge. A. from YEM, the youth wing of EMUK, observed that while many young people are instinctively pro-European, they are often drawn to movements addressing more emotive issues. He concedes, however, that “grassroots activism remains essential if the movement is to succeed”. 86

• 87 Statista Research Department, “Bregret - Statistics & Facts”, 3 July 2024, available online: <https (...)
• 88 Eleni Courea, “Kemi Badenoch to criticise Theresa May and Boris Johnson ‘mistakes’”, The Guardian, (...)

54The persistence of the movement coincides with shifting public attitudes. Recent polls indicate widespread “Bregret” – regret over leaving the EU and growing recognition of Brexit’s negative consequences.87 Many Britons now regard Brexit as a political and economic failure. Even Kemi Badenoch, current Conservative leader, conceded that her predecessors had no plan to deliver Brexit and declared that “[f]or the next four years and beyond, we are going to be telling the British people the truth, even when it’s difficult to hear. […] the truth about the actions we must take to get ourselves out of this [Brexit] mess.”88 The atmosphere has grown markedly less adversarial than in 2019, reflecting a gradual normalisation of pro-European sentiment in public space. Many former Leave voters now acknowledge that Brexit has not delivered on its promises, while Remain voters largely maintain their original stance. Even among those who do not regret their vote, dissatisfaction with how Brexit was implemented has become a common refrain. In this context, grassroots campaigners play a crucial role in keeping the European question alive: by maintaining dialogue with citizens, encouraging them to challenge their MPs. Britons who do not regret their vote tend to say that Brexit was not well implemented.

• 89 Charlie Herbert, “Zack Polanski confirms Green Party would aim to take UK back into the EU”, The Lo (...)

58Finally, recent developments in party politics offer limited but notable openings. The government’s acknowledgment of Brexit’s economic damage marks a rhetorical shift, even if not a substantive policy change. While Starmer has rule out a return to full freedom of movement, his public support for closer alignment with EU Single Market and his defence of a youth mobility scheme nonetheless signal a significant shift. This discursive move can be seen as a partial victory for grassroots campaigners, whose long-term efforts to expose Brexit’s consequences have contributed to shaping public and political discourse. The UK re-association with Horizon Europe in 2024 and the announcement that the country was heading back into Erasmus+ scheme in December 2025 have been widely interpreted by pro-European actors as offering renewed hope for longer-term re-alignment with the EU. The Green Party’s recent announcement (under leader Zack Polanski) of its intention to advocate for UK’s return to the EU89 has been widely celebrated among activists. The statement, amplified on social media, is perceived as a rare moment of political resonance between grassroots mobilisation and party politics. Whether this signals a more significant reconfiguration of the post-Brexit political landscape remains to be seen. Nonetheless it suggests that grassroots persistence – through sustained local engagement and pragmatic reframing – continues to shape the contours of the debate on Britain’s future relationship with Europe.