• 1 The consensus in politics relates to a general agreement on the values and/or the rules governing l (...)
• 2 The primary frames which help explain facts and public policies and may raise expectations about fu (...)
• 3 House of Commons (HC), Hansard, 12 January 1998, col. 33. The Constitutional Convention, gathered b (...)
• 4 Neil MacCormick, lawyer and SNP MEP, quoted by Keating Michael, ‘The UK as a Post-sovereign Polity’ (...)

1Although devolution was enacted by a Scotland Act passed at Westminster in 1998, it was founded on the sovereignty of the Scottish people, enshrined in a Claim of Right in 1988—which led to the creation of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the scheme—and reignited in a pre-legislative referendum held in September 1997. It was also grounded on principles which were supposed to characterize Scotland within the UK and to be consensual,1 especially collective, redistributive values and European integration. The EEC and then the EU provided a new ‘frame’2 for politicians seeking autonomy within a member state, with a new and comprehensive single market (for goods, service, capitals and people), devised in 1985 and enacted in 1993, and the representation of local and regional authorities by an advisory committee under the Maastricht treaty signed in 1992. According to Donald Dewar, senior member of the Convention and then Secretary of State for Scotland, the Scottish Parliament and Government would be ‘dynamic’ members of the EU, with full powers to implement EC obligations in devolved areas; the latter might occasionally ‘play a full part in negotiations alongside the UK Government’—and Scotland would gain ‘a higher profile’ in Brussels.3 Dewar then became First Minister as Labour governed with its former Convention partners, the Lib Dems. This co-existence of a quasi-sovereign Scottish Parliament (SP) and European integration in a new multi-level governance system seemed to herald an age of post-sovereignty.4

• 5 These words coined in the 1980s refer to external affairs of sub-national entities, named protodipl (...)

2From 2007, the SNP in power was even more determined to raise Scotland’s European profile given its aim, full independence ‘in the EU’, a slogan endorsed in 1988 as the party declined to join the Convention. Paradiplomacy turned into protodiplomacy.5 First Minister Alex Salmond secured a ‘mandate’ (i.e. a majority of seats in the SP) to request permission from the UK Government to hold a referendum on independence in 2014. The EU was a key issue, praised both by pro-independence campaigners (SNP and Greens) and by unionists (Labour, LibDems and Conservatives). 55 percent of Scottish voters opted for staying in the UK, and thus in the EU. Then, in the 2016 referendum, 62 percent rejected Brexit, while 52 percent of UK voters backed this outcome.

• 6 Stephen Gethins, SNP, HC, Hansard, 25.04.25. This proved a major difference with Brexiteers in Engl (...)

3During the following decade, SNP-led Scottish governments (SG) maintained a pro-European rhetoric, during the negotiations leading to Brexit in early 2020 and exit from the single market one year later, and afterwards. Their leaders, Nicola Sturgeon (2014-2023), Humza Yousaf (2023-2024) and then John Swinney, sought consensual positions within the SP (to promote Scottish interests and values), while instrumentalizing the issue to serve their independence agenda. Brexit threatened the quasi-sovereignty of the SP in the UK, as well as the foundations of independence, based on ‘pooling and sharing sovereignty’.6 They were backed by the Scottish Greens, which turned into a formal partnership between 2021 and 2023.

• 7 Academic studies shed light on various aspects such as the SG’s responses to the handling of Brexit (...)
• 8 The issue was handled by Michael Russell, Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europ (...)

5This article is a contribution to studies about the impact of Brexit on Scottish politics. Such issues have been explored at length to put emphasis on the growing polarisation, fuelled and shaped by politicians in the run-up to the referenda on independence and Brexit.7 This research is grounded on about 70 debates held in the SP from 2016 to 2025, at key stages of the Brexit process and related issues. It is based on motions, regarded as summaries of views at a particular time, which may entrench divisions or incite to compromise depending on the way they are worded and amended. Official positions on motions, espoused and voiced by leaders, ministers,8 and party spokespersons, their articulations, and occasional dissent, are thus analysed, in order to identify a collective Scottish interest, legitimized by the outcome of the 2016 referendum, beyond party politics. Shifts over time are also acknowledged as rifts between politicians widened when the UK left the EU. The article contends that the existence of a common pro-European discourse in the SP became elusive, which makes Scotland less distinctive in the UK ten years after the referendum on Brexit.

• 9 Scottish Parliament (SP), OR, 26 May 2016.

7Even though European policies were reserved matters, MSPs could voice opinions through non-binding motions. They opposed Brexit, and the adverse consequences for Scotland of UK decisions. Prior to the referendum, 106 MSPs (out of 129) had passed a motion calling for Scotland and the rest of the UK to remain in the EU, including all SNP, Green and LibDem MSPs, 21 Labour MSPs out of 24 and 23 Conservatives out of 31.9 Two days after the referendum, 92 MSPs passed the SG motion which read:

• 11 SG, Scotland’s Place in Europe, Edinburgh, 2016, chapter 3.

8In January 2017, as Prime Minister Theresa May announced that she intended to leave the single market and the customs union (a ‘hard’ Brexit), 86 MSPs passed the SG motion based on its December 2016 White paper11:

• 13 SP, OR, 7 February 2017.

9The following month, 90 MSPs opposed the triggering of Article 50 as ‘the UK Government […] [had] refused to give a guarantee on the position of EU nationals in the UK, has left unanswered […] questions covering many policy areas regarding the full implications of withdrawal from the single market […]’.13

• 16 SP, OR, 5 December 2018, 24 September 2019.
• 17 The Supreme Court upheld an earlier Court of Session ruling that Boris Johnson had acted unlawfully (...)
• 18 Alex Neil (SNP) abstained on the TCA. Elaine Smith (Labour) sided with the Conservatives in 2017.

12MSPs also questioned, through SG statements, the methods used by Prime Ministers, be they Theresa May’s negotiations with the EU, or Boris Johnson’s attempt to prorogue Parliament while he was negotiating a second deal.16 Joanna Cherry, a senior lawyer and an SNP MP, successfully challenged the latter before the Supreme Court.17There was hardly any dissent amongst SNP, Green, or Labour and Lib Dem MSPs.18 Membership of the single market, for the UK as a whole or for Scotland (with a differentiated solution), was an essential part of motions. But positions then became more nuanced, depending on individual leaders and on the wider British context.

• 19 Neil Findlay, Leonard’s Brexit spokesman, advocated a ‘noncommittal’ position, which was bitterly o (...)

14While Scottish Labour backed membership under Kezia Dugdale, her successors were reluctant to dissociate from UK leaders who remained cautious. Richard Leonard (from December 2017) talked about ‘access’. He was a Eurosceptic like Jeremy Corbyn, while the party was Europhile, and did not manage to come to terms with the resulting ambivalence.19 Pro-EU Anas Sarwar (from March 2021) merely evoked ‘closer links’, which was compatible with Keir Starmer’s commitment to improve on the Conservatives’ hard Brexit. However, in late 2020, the TCA was endorsed by Labour MPs but rejected by Labour MSPs who opted for the majority motion at Holyrood.

• 20 M. Russell, SP, OR, 25 October & 1 December 2018.
• 21 MSPs Andy Wightman and Ross Greer (Greens), MP Joanna Cherry (SNP), MEPs Catherine Stihler (Labour) (...)
• 22 89 MSPs voted for the Green motion SP, OR, 27 March 2019. Alex Neil dissented.

15The legitimacy of the outcome of negotiations also raised debates. The Lib Dems called for a second vote very early. The SNP first ruled out a move that could be requested after a second independence referendum, before embracing it to avoid the damages of a ‘blindfold’ Brexit (without any deal).20 It joined the People’s Vote UK Campaign in late 2018. Scottish Labour only followed suit six months later after losing its last MEPs in the May election to the European Parliament. Within a few hours, Leonard announced his U-turn, fearing a wipe-out of his party unable to respond to diverging pressures. All three parties would have advocated a Remain vote. Some SNP and Scottish Labour politicians brought a legal challenge before the European Court of Justice, which ruled that Article 50 could be revoked.21 The campaign demanded a repeal unless a second vote was held, with widespread support in the SP.22 It collapsed in late 2019.

• 23 SP, OR, 28 June 2017.
• 24 She deplored the ‘constitutional one-upmanship’ and the loss of years to Brexit. Davidson Ruth, ‘Fo (...)
• 25 SP, OR, 30 October 2019.

16The Conservatives, by then the second-largest party at Holyrood, gradually distanced themselves from the consensus. In June 2016, Ruth Davidson requested ‘access’, and ‘maximisation’ of Scotland’s trade and abstained.23 From early 2017, she backed the UK leadership without concealing her growing impatience,24 and her MSPs voted against all SG’s motions. They put forward the economic benefits derived from the British market (three or four times higher than from EU membership), as well as the legitimacy of the UK-wide result, while other MSPs referred to the vote in Scotland. As for differentiation, Davidson argued against the separate arrangement for Northern Ireland under May as she was keen on defending Scottish interests. Her successors Jackson Carlaw and Douglas Ross did not challenge Johnson’s protocol, which triggered questions in the SP about their principles (Russell) and their commitment to the Union (Rennie).25

• 26 Sturgeon, 2016.

17In the aftermath of the referendum, Nicola Sturgeon stated that Scotland’s democratic interest was at stake, as the nation had not voted for Leave.26 A few days before Brexit, Cabinet Secretary Mike Russell, regretted that Scotland was ‘dragged out’ against the ‘clear instruction of the Scottish people’ and made it clear that Scotland would rejoin the EU:

• 28 European Parliament, 22 March 2019.

18The metaphor of the light was also used by Alyn Smith MEP when he left the European Parliament: ‘From the Scottish perspective—and every single party are united around this view—the Best Brexit is no Brexit. […] If we are removed from our family of nations against our will […], I’m asking you to leave a light on so we can find our way home’.28

• 29 SP, OR, 9 May 2023.

19Every opportunity was seized to reiterate Scotland’s European credentials after Brexit. The SNP never missed Europe day in early May to mark the anniversary of the Schuman declaration. In 2023, Cabinet Secretary Angus Robertson made a statement: ‘The SG will keep fighting for the values and standards that we hold dear and for a Europe that is green and prosperous as well as united and diverse—a Europe that, above all, stands for co-operation and peace. […] It is an ideal […] to which we will return’.29

• 31 SP, OR, 23 April 2025.

21Likewise, in April 2025, Angus Robertson stated: ‘Through our engagement with international partners, we demonstrate our commitment to democracy, the rule of law and co-operation between nations, enshrined in the United Nations charter […] Many of those values are also those of our friends in the EU’.31 Debates were held to commemorate Brexit. On its fifth anniversary, Clare Adamson’s motion read:

• 33 SP, OR, 18 May 2025.

22The SNP could rely on the Greens who repeatedly made the case for rejoining, with stronger words, contending that the new geopolitical outlook (the US no longer being a ‘credible ally’) made it ‘more urgent’.33 Yet Alba, the party founded by Alex Salmond, was more cautious; its only MSP from 2023, Ash Regan, did not back the SNP, her former party.

• 34 Swinney, SP, OR, 23 April 2025.
• 35 SP, OR, 28 June 2022.
• 36 SP, OR, 15 May 2025.
• 37 Ibid..

23Although SNP leaders admitted that ‘the vast majority of members in the chamber ‘share[d] the founding values of the EU,34 they drew a line between their party and unionist ones. In June 2022, as she announced a new strategy for independence, Nicola Sturgeon described Labour as ‘more of a pale imitation than a genuine alternative (to the Tories)’, adding ‘Labour [would] not take Scotland back into the EU or even the single market, and neither [would] the Liberal Democrats […]’.35 Such criticisms did not wane when Labour came to power at UK level and promised a reset. The partnership signed with the EU was dismissed by the SNP (Angus Robertson denounced Labour’s red lines on the single market, the customs union and freedom of movement) and by the LibDems (as ‘ardent’ Europeans, they reckoned that the ‘UK’s place [was] in Europe).36 By then, the Scottish Conservatives had turned against the EU. Their new leader Russell Findlay claimed that Labour’s deal meant ‘capitulation’, while the SNP intended to ‘surrender’ sovereignty.37

• 38 whatscotlandthinks.org.

24The SG’s position was supported by public opinion, with a growing proportion claiming that Britain was wrong to leave (from 57 percent in 2017 to 68 percent in late 2023 according to YouGov), and a decrease in the proportion of people willing to vote Leave in another referendum (from 39 percent in 2017 to 25 percent in 2022, with 10 percent undecided, according to Norstat).38 But a quarter of respondents remained hostile to the EU.

• 39 On 16 October 2017, first time in eight months. Yet ministerial co-operation had been expected. SP, (...)
• 40 Respectively SP, OR, 7 January 2017, 8 January 2020, 30 December 2020.
• 41 SP, OR, 25 January 2017. The SG was party to the proceedings, first based on a question over the ne (...)

27British governments dealt with Brexit without involving sub-national entities, which was at odds with previous practice, and would have substantial implications for the devolved settlements. Consultations were scarce and disregarded. UK ministers held few Joint ministerial committees on exit negotiations (JMC-EN) meetings, and used them to inform the SG of decisions already made.39 All legislative consent motions (LCMs) on UK bills ratifying agreements signed with the EU were rejected by the SP (supra), which had no impact on final decisions.40 In early 2017, the Supreme Court dismissed them as political conventions, leading Russell to conclude that this ‘reinforce[d] the supremacy of Westminster and its immunity from constraint by law or courts or respect for this Parliament’.41

• 42 SP, OR, 20 May 2025.

28Although Keir Starmer was committed to resetting these relationships, when it came to negotiating a partnership with the EU, there was only one meeting with Scottish ministers, shortly before the summit, and drafts had not been shared beforehand. Robertson claimed this was an ‘affront to devolution’.42

• 43 SP, OR, 12 September 2017.
• 44 SP, OR, 15 May 2018.

29However, Brexit would have a substantial impact on devolved matters. On the one hand, as for repatriated competences, although many of them related to devolved policy areas (such as agriculture and fisheries), the initial EU Withdrawal Bill (EUWB) drafted by the British Government granted all of them to the UK authorities, in order to devise British policies. As Russell put it in September 2017, ‘All matters that are currently decided co-operatively among 28 EU member states would be unilaterally decided by only one: the UK Government’.43 There was an outcry at Holyrood as most devolved fields at stake were wholly run by the SP. The Scottish Conservatives thus offered mediation. The Bill was amended by the House of Lords, with 101 policy areas related to devolved matters repatriated to the SG, except 24 of them, on a temporary basis, to ensure cohesion. The LCM was still rejected by 93 MSPs, because of constraints on devolved powers, through secondary legislation (not subjected to LCMs).44 Only the Conservatives praised the additional powers granted to the SP.

• 45 SP, OR, 24 September 2019.

30These limitations would enable the negotiations of common frameworks in areas which intersected, with possible policy divergences, such as fisheries, environment or food labelling. However, the SG’s consent was not compulsory; as Michael Russell put it, ‘the context, the deal with the EU and goodwill’ would matter, while most MSPs expected flexibility to be used to retain strong EU alignment in Scotland.45 The Conservatives feared sub-national vetoes.

• 46 SP, OR, 7 October 2020.

31Two years later, Boris Johnson’s Government unexpectedly introduced an Internal Market Bill which was founded on non-discrimination for goods traded within the UK. This generated an outcry in Scotland since distinctive legislation, enacting higher standards, would be rendered ineffective. Labour and LibDem MSPs were as angry as SNP and Green ones. In October 2020, 90 MSPs rejected the LCM on a Bill that would reduce and constrain the powers of the SP‒ironically, Michael Russell then praised common frameworks ‘based on the principles of equal negotiation’ which had enabled ‘progress’.46 The Conservatives considered the bill as necessary for elements not covered by common frameworks.

• 47 Kate Forbes, deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for the Economy and Gaelic, SP, OR, 19 Feb (...)
• 48 Ibid. Meanwhile, she had given guarantees to Scottish businesses, and she faced a motion of no-conf (...)

32In 2024, Starmer launched a review of the Internal Market Act, while the SG called for a repeal.47 Lorna Slater, Green co-leader and former Minister for Green Skills, the Circular Economy, and Biodiversity, recalled that she had been forced to drop her Deposit Return Scheme, as the UK Government ‘refused to grant [the exemption for glass] at the 11th hour’.48 While the LibDems supported the SG, Labour stood by the UK Government, like the Conservatives who referred to pre-Brexit processes that did not require LCMs on EU regulations.

• 49 SP, OR, 1 December 2018. Their first EU Withdrawal (Legal Continuity) Scotland Bill, securing the o (...)
• 50 SP, OR, 22 December 2020.
• 51 SP, OR, 23 February 2023.
• 52 SP, OR, 8 June 2023.

33On the other hand, existing EU law gave rise to two further disputes. First, securing continuity was a priority. 90 MSPs passed an EU Withdrawal (Continuity) Scotland) Bill in December 2020, before the end of the transition period with no formal agreement (yet) over the future relationship.49 Ministers could keep pace with EU law when it was in ‘Scotland’s best interests’, and incorporate into Scots law guiding principles on the environment to replace ‘protections’ lost after Brexit.50 Second, in February 2023, 84 MSPs voted against the LCM on the UK Retained EU law (Revocation and Reform) Bill which aimed at repealing EU law unless it was explicitly preserved. Robertson denounced the ‘risks’ of deregulation and ‘divergence from high standards in the EU’.51 The Bill was then amended to revoke a list of retained EU law, which could include devolved areas. Robertson insisted that ‘the bill [was] about trying to take control at Westminster, as if other sources of legal rules (EU, ECHR, SP) [were] illegitimate’.52

• 53 SP, OR, 25 October 2017.
• 54 SP, OR, 7 June 2022.
• 55 SG, Continuity Act Annual Report 2024, Edinburgh, 2024.

34Labour, Lib Dem and Green MSPs backed the SG, describing Brexit as an ‘act of self-harm’, a ‘disaster’, while the Conservatives praised an opportunity to ‘remove outdated law’ and asserted that concerns were ‘overplayed’.53 Yet all unionists encouraged the SG to enforce the Continuity Act instead of playing politics.54 Clarifications were thus provided: alignment would be used when it could have a ‘meaningful effect on standards that support[ed] the well-being of the people of Scotland’.55 Subordinate legislation would be able to keep devolved Scots law aligned with EU law as it developed (environment).

• 56 Sturgeon, 2016, op. cit.
• 57 SP, OR, 28 January 2025.
• 58 Forbes, SP, OR, 13 June 2024.

35In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, Sturgeon reckoned that devolution would have to be protected from the adverse consequences of Brexit, focusing in particular on Scotland’s economic and social interests, as well as the solidarity to face global challenges, and have influence in the world.56 A majority of MSPs agreed with her. Leaving the single market, the market for half of international exports and the home of most new immigrants into Scotland, would impoverish the nation. MSPs put forward motions quoting available figures, such as Clare Adamson in January 2025, detailing losses in public revenues for Scotland (£2.3 billion every year), reductions in goods exports from the UK, adding that other problems were exacerbated by Brexit (supply chains and trade routes) leading to higher imports costs fuelling a new cost of living crisis. Brexit also continued to pose significant barriers to migrations, including in ‘vital public services’ [especially the NHS and the care sector], and for ‘young people’s right to live, work and study in 27 European nations’.57 In addition, EU funds, which had supported research and development, apprenticeships, small businesses, and resettling Ukrainian refugees, would be lost.58 The UK Government’s Levelling up Fund was inadequate and allowed direct interference in devolved areas.

• 59 SG motion, 25 October 2017.
• 60 Respectively SP, OR, 17 January 2017, 24 April 2019.
• 61 SG, Migration. Helping Scotland Prosper, Edinburgh, 2020. A Bill was lodged by Stephen Gethins MP i (...)

36The SG also feared a decrease in the workforce, as EU immigration had been essential to address the skills gap and ageing. The SP wanted to guarantee ‘rights to continue to live and work, without application nor charge’, thus sending a clear message.59 The UK Government was only committed to safeguarding interests, which satisfied the Conservatives. As future EU immigrants would be treated like other foreign nationals, Sturgeon made repeated calls for further devolution ‘to protect [Scottish] interests’.60 She expected Russell to find common ground with other parties, especially Labour over employment law, or even immigration, while quoting promises made by Brexiteer Michael Gove in 2016. This later turned into calls for a Scottish ‘visa’, tailored to meet Scotland’s specific needs within the UK.61 Yet although Labour and the LibDems praised immigrants, they were satisfied with UK policies based on a list of occupation shortages in Scotland.

• 62 SP, OR, 20 May 2025.

37The SG regarded the partnership negotiated by Keir Starmer in 2025 as an improvement, with less constraining sanitary and phytosanitary checks, enhanced energy and climate co-operation, as well as new prospects for mutual recognition of professions and youth mobility scheme, while adding that no agreement could replace losses resulting from Brexit.62

• 63 MSPs pointed to decisions made for immigrants (Angela Constance, Cabinet Secretary for Communities, (...)
• 64 Paul O’Kane (Labour), or Shirley-Anne Somerville, Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice, SP, OR, 10 (...)

38Besides, Brexit was a threat for human rights since the UK would leave the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, while membership of the Council of Europe’s ECHR was questioned by some senior Conservatives. MSPs pointed to legal factors (the ECHR being incorporated into the Scotland Act 1998) and political ones (their commitments to uphold these rights).63 Only the Conservatives trusted decisions made by a British Parliament which would recover its sovereignty. After Brexit, MSPs still held debates in December every year to mark the anniversary of the UN’s Declaration on Human Rights, and they set out to incorporate some UN Conventions into Scots law, beginning with that on the Rights of the Child, in late 2023. They repeatedly claimed that Scotland was on a different path, distinct from Brexit.64

• 65 SP, OR, 30 April 2025.
• 66 The fund’s apportionment is based on Scotland’s share of the population through the Barnett formula (...)

39However, unlike most people in Scotland, fishermen did not regard Brexit as a loss. But fisheries highlight the complexity of the European issue. The majority of seafood caught in British waters is caught off Scottish coasts, before being exported. As a result, the single market was attractive for the processing industry, with the free movement of goods and people. The TCA involved costly checks at the border, and potential waste at the outset, when IT systems were not in place. The deal signed by Keir Starmer was welcomed for improving ‘the ability to get products from Scotland to the EU’ with less red tape, according to the motion which received majority support.65 Yet the SNP and the Lib Dems remained critical of a migration policy which failed to respond to Scotland’s needs. They denounced the loss of financial support with the new UK fishing and coastal growth fund compared to previous EU funding. 66

• 67 SP, OR, 14 January 2021.
• 68 SP, OR, 20 May 2025.
• 69 Idem. Jim Sillars held similar views, denouncing a meeting between the SG and Michel Barnier, which (...)

40In addition, access to Scottish waters had long been disputed by fishermen who backed Brexit, without making any gains. Indeed, access for EU boats was still allowed beyond 6 nautical miles. British quotas increased, and were then allocated by each government, but individuals were no longer freely allowed to buy and swap them within the EU. In addition, negotiations still had to be conducted between neighbouring countries to preserve resources (though with automatic representation of Scotland). Fergus Ewing, Cabinet Secretary for Rural Economy and Tourism, thus claimed that the UK was far from the ‘sea of opportunities’ promised in 2016.67 In 2025, Robertson talked about a ‘tie-up’ for another 12 years,68 a discourse held by the SNP against every British government since 1973. Conversely, the Scottish Conservatives contended that the SG favoured European interests over British ones.69 Yet as they represented fishing coasts, they had to admit that the Brexit deal was not flawless (quotas, access).

• 70 SP, OR, 21 March 2017.
• 71 This section enables UK ministers to amend the list of reserved matters (such as constitutional mat (...)

44Shortly after the Brexit referendum, Sturgeon had hinted that independence might be the only solution for Scotland to remain in the EU, before focusing on a ‘soft’ Brexit. When May opted for a hard one, she argued that in a union based on consent, the people of Scotland should exercise their ‘right of self-determination’.70 Her motion requested an order based on Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998, similar to the 2012 one.71 It gained majority backing, thanks to SNP and Green MSPs. Yet it was turned down by May and contributed to losses of SNP seats in the June 2017 General Election. Independence plans were put on hold.

• 72 SP, OR, 24 April 2019. The Citizens Assembly’s report focused on bread-and-butter issues, both deci (...)

46In April 2019, as May’s deal still failed to get Parliament’s support, Sturgeon announced a Referendum Bill to set rules for any referendum held in Scotland on a devolved matter, which could later include the power to hold one on independence, along with a citizens’ assembly to help find consensus after ‘the polarisation of debate caused by the Brexit experience’, ‘tasked with considering challenges’ for the future.72

• 73 SP, OR, 10 December 2019.
• 74 SP, OR, 29 January 2020.

47In December 2019, the SG published another White Paper requesting a Section 30 order, for the Conservatives had just secured an overall majority in the House of Commons which would enable the Withdrawal Agreement to be approved. 68 MSPs passed the Referendum Bill.73 Two days before Brexit, 64 MSPs endorsed Sturgeon’s motion requesting permission for a second independence referendum.74

• 75 SP, OR, 28 June 2022.

49Unionist MSPs did not support a referendum grounded on the sovereignty of the people, unlike in 2012.75 They forcibly argued that the country should no longer face divisive referenda, in order to concentrate on urgent, social issues‒though constitutional change was only ruled out by the Conservatives. They had little sympathy for bills associated with independence, the Referendum Bill (voted down by all, bar two Labour MSPs) and the citizens’ assembly (rejected by the LibDems, approved by Labour to ‘move forward’, while the Conservatives abstained). They were satisfied with the ruling over a consultative referendum.

• 76 SG, Your Right to Decide, Edinburgh, 2025, p. 1.
• 77 A permanent statutory provision (like the one for Northern Ireland) was also contemplated, Dugdale (...)

50In 2025, Swinney returned to traditional ground, calling for an SNP majority in the SP, in order to request leave to hold a second referendum.76 However, others contended that the mandate should result from a majority of votes for pro-independence MSPs. Alba claimed that the SG should then be more assertive.77

• 78 SP, OR, 24 April 2019, 29 January 2020.
• 79 SG, An Independent Scotland in the EU, Edinburgh, 2023.

52Links were explicit in parliamentary speeches. In April 2019, Sturgeon said: ‘independence would allow us to protect our place in Europe’, while in January 2020, Russell described a second referendum as an ‘opportunity to move on from Brexit’.78 This was underpinned by a whole series of white papers on independence under Sturgeon and Yousaf. In the 2023 one on the EU, Cabinet Secretary Robertson argued that independence was ‘the only route back to the EU for Scotland’. The summary listed 40 consequences of rejoining for individuals, businesses, and Scotland. All of them were positive opportunities, introduced by verbs like ‘benefit’, ‘access’, ‘boost’, ‘represent’, ‘contribute’, ‘participate’ and ‘take advantage’.79

• 80 SP, OR, 28 March 2017, 29 January 2020.
• 81 SP, OR, 28 June 2022.

53Yet in their motions on independence, intended to get wider support, SNP ministers refrained from mentioning EU membership. Brexit first gave a timeframe as far as pledges were concerned, since it would be easier to hold a referendum before severing all links with the EU. In 2017, the motion read: ‘between the autumn of 2018, when there is clarity over the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, and around the point at which the UK leaves the EU in spring 2019’. In early 2020, the referendum was to be held by the end of the year, before Scotland left the single market.80 After Brexit, there was a shift, as independence was said to be about values. In June 2022, Sturgeon talked about ‘the opportunity to build a wealthier, greener, fairer nation; to be outward-looking’ in a referendum held in October 2023.81

• 82 SP, OR, 22 March 2017, 18 September 2024.
• 83 SP, OR, 22 March 2017.
• 84 Sillars, 2024, op. cit., p. 252.

54The Greens were more outspoken: the referendum was ‘necessary’ given the Prime Minister’s decision to negotiate a hard exit’ (2017), then because of the ‘undermining of the SP’ (2024).82 Yet, there was no unanimity within the independence movement. The SNP had a Eurosceptical tradition, which dominated its campaign during the 1975 referendum and was still voiced in later years before being silenced in 1988 with the official endorsement of the slogan ‘independence in Europe’. Yet, in March 2017, Alex Neil, an SNP MSP, expressed dissent for the first time. He contended that a Yes Vote in an independence referendum could not be interpreted as a ‘mandate to join the EU’, as austerity from London and from Brussels were ‘equally damaging’.83 Several campaigners would be satisfied with EEA/EFTA membership, like Alba or Sillars who blamed his former party for polarising positions.84

• 85 Schnapper Pauline, ‘From One Referendum to Another. The Scottish Dimension to the Problem over Euro (...)
• 86 Paun Akash, Sergeant Jess, Kane James, Jack Maddy Thimont, Shuttleworth Kelly, Scottish Independenc (...)

55However, after the 2014 referendum, the SNP never addressed the issues which had deterred some voters then, and which later turned into hurdles because of Brexit and the new geopolitical outlook. As for entry, the SNP merely expected more goodwill from the European Commission and from large member states than in 2014,85 given the shock created by Brexit. Yet an independent Scotland might not recover the favourable terms that UK governments had gained over the years, especially over the amount of the contribution to the European budget or the currency‒the SNP had long ruled out joining the euro, and did not commit to creating a currency in the short term.86 Securing data-sharing could also prove difficult while Scotland was unlikely to enter the Schengen area because of the Common Travel Area in the British Isles.

• 87 Hayward Katy, McEwen Nicola, An EU Border across Britain: Scotland’s Borders after Independence, Lo (...)

56Brexit would generate a hard border with the rest of the UK, Scotland’s main trading partner, with checks, delays and customs duties.87 Years had been required to avoid one in Ireland. SNP ministers expected similar goodwill through negotiations, pointing to the close relationships between Sweden and Norway (although the latter was in the single market). Even if a trade deal were negotiated, it would be less comprehensive than the single market and would be unlikely to cover services, which accounted for the greatest proportion of trade. Being in the same customs union as the rest of the UK would prevent any distinctive trade policy.

• 88 Curtice John, How Brexit Changed Scotland’s Constitutional Debate, Scottish Centre for Social resea (...)

58Finally, Brexit did not prove to be an electoral asset. There was no surge in support for independence. Public opinion remained polarised with 46-48 percent prepared to vote for it. A growing majority of pro-independence respondents were in favour of EU membership (59 percent, compared to 48 percent in 2016).88 But an increasing number turned to other parties than the SNP. On many issues (free movement of goods, voice in the world, economy), while the EU seemed to be better than the UK, less than half of respondents were enthusiastic.

• 89 SG, Scotland’s Global Affairs Framework, Edinburgh, 2022.
• 90 Sturgeon Nicola, Frankly, London, Macmillan, 2025, p. 305.
• 91 SP, OR, 10 May 2022.

59From 2017, the SG published global affairs frameworks.89 The aim was to promote an internationalist outlook as a ‘good global citizen’, underpinned by values. The Labour/LibDem coalitions in power between 1999 and 2007 had already displayed an international outlook, through links with Malawi. SNP governments were more assertive in the run-up to the 2014 referendum and in response to the 2016 one.90 They also attempted to integrate their international strategies with their domestic policy priorities (women’s place, inequalities, climate change) to highlight a continuum. The EU was at the core of these ambitions. As Robertson put it, ‘Scotland was woven into [its] fabric’ as a member, a willingness to remain aligned with its law,91 along with common values and priorities.

• 92 SG, First Minister’s Speech at French National Assembly, Edinburgh, 2019.
• 93 SG, An Independent Scotland’s Place in the World, 11, Edinburgh, 2024, p. 44.

61In 2019, Nicola Sturgeon opened up the office in Paris with a meeting with Nathalie Loiseau, then Minister for European affairs, and a hearing before the Foreign Affairs committee of the French National Assembly. She put emphasis on the SG’s ‘pride’ to welcome French citizens, and its willingness to ‘stand up for their rights’.92 She talked about values, material interests (trade, FDI, renewables) and independence. Angus Robertson opened up an office in Copenhagen (2022), building on relationships forged prior to the 2014 referendum. He underlined common problems (rural areas) and responses (social policies), shared interests (energy, fish) and geopolitical outlook. An independent Scotland would be ‘a strategic sub-Arctic hub’.93

• 94 Ivan McKee, Minister for Trade, Innovation and Finance, SP, OR, 26 January 2021.
• 95 Maggie Chapman, SP, OR, 24 February 2022.
• 96 SP, OR, 10 June 2021.

62The SG articulated its own ‘vision’ for trade, based ‘on inclusive growth, sustainability, well-being, net zero and good governance’, thus defining the country.94 Then it endorsed the UK’s free ports, calling them green because green technologies and fair work would be promoted, but the Greens remained unconvinced.95 Unionist MSPs welcomed new investment but they questioned the focus on independence, and the substance beyond the rhetoric on human rights (LibDems).96

• 97 SP, OR, 14 March 2023.

63Unionist MSPs backed the SG to promote Scotland’s own interests in trade deals negotiated by the UK Government. All of them (bar the Conservatives) rejected the LCMs on the free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand, both because of the contents (standards in agriculture) and the process (Scottish authorities could be bypassed, on matters that they had handled before Brexit, like procurement).97 The SNP also (unsuccessfully) demanded the devolution of trade talks in devolved matters.

• 98 Dellepiane Sébastien, Reinsberg Bernard, ‘Paradiplomacy as Nation-building: the Politics of Scotlan (...)

65Brexit raised legal, political and economic issues, framed in rational and emotional ways, ranging from Scotland’s interests and the devolved settlement, to a rhetoric about a power grab and betrayals. Politicians took for granted the nation’s European commitments, as a defining component of the imagined community.98 This fuelled the discourse about Scotland’s specificities in the UK. However, no party attempted to halt Brexit, including the SNP which was more assertive than its rivals, and debates were centred on the single market. Moreover, Brexit did not trigger a process leading to independence, contrary to expectations nurtured at a senior level in the SNP. Dissent was voiced within the party for the first time, without becoming a dividing line, as some of those who disagreed joined Alba.

• 99 HL, Select Committee on the Constitution, Respect and Co-operation: Building a Stronger Union for t (...)
• 100 This would be necessary. Kenny Michael, Rycroft Philip, Sheldon Jack, Union at the Crossroads. Can (...)

66Brexit, a foreign issue, turned into a domestic one, as the SP intended to preserve its autonomy and to limit damages. Although criticisms were instrumentalized by the SNP, they were upheld by committees in the British Parliament with little sympathy for the nationalist party,99 and shared with the Welsh Government run by Labour. The SNP turned to unionists to define a collective interest, beyond party politics, which was no easy task as the Scottish Conservatives returned to a traditional view of sovereignty confined to Westminster, while Scottish Labour struggled to defend a post-sovereign vision under a Labour Prime Minister. There was no appetite for a debate on the distribution of competences, or strategic co-operation.100

• 101 This had been underlined long before Brexit. Alexandre-Collier Agnès, ‘L’instrumentalisation de l’U (...)
• 102 The White Paper released in October 2025 downplayed the possible border with England as being a ‘no (...)

67By 2025, while the dominant political discourse remained pro-European, the European issue served political purposes.101 Only the SNP and some of its pro-independence allies advocated membership of the EU. The SNP was prepared to back initiatives such as the LibDems’ plan for a bespoke customs union between the UK and the EU. But rejoining was promoted as an asset over Scottish Labour. Furthermore, the SNP did not mention the ongoing changes within the EU in response to new global threats, which might make re-entry more difficult.102 In addition, actions remained framed in a national perspective, based on Scottish interests, with little use of the Continuity Act and reliance on the UK Government to secure advantages, such as lower customs duties from the US presidency than the EU.

• 103 Survation polls, Hawkey Dave, Boyd Stephen, Great Expectations. Rejuvenating the National Debate in (...)
• 104 62 percent of Scottish respondents wanted the UK to stay out of the EU in in/out questions and 23 p (...)
• 105 47 percent against 80 percent, SSA, Curtice and Birtwistle, op. cit., p. 23. This growing distrust (...)
• 106 Some even questioned ECHR membership and the support granted to asylum seekers in Scotland. In 2025 (...)

68The rise of Reform UK was a new and significant factor. While UKIP used to peak at 1 percent of the vote, Reform UK gained 7 percent at the 2024 General Election, and was credited with 20 percent of voting intentions for the May 2026 elections to the Scottish Parliament according to polls published in late 2025.103 Public opinion in Scotland was no longer immune to its anti-immigration stance and did not regard rejoining the EU as a priority.104 John Swinney seemed to be willing to build up the difference with the hard right party and to take advantage of it, as his government renewed its commitment to rejoining the EU ‘as soon as possible’ after independence. But the Scottish Government was far less trusted than at the outset of devolution.105 British parties were in competition to retain unionist votes. The Scottish Conservatives, who were already losing voters to Reform UK, embraced hardline positions over the EU and over immigration, close to those of their English counterpart, which fuelled unease within their own ranks.106 Although Scottish Labour was expected to suffer from defections, like in the rest of the UK, it backed Starmer’s policies and did not offer any specific perspectives in these reserved matters, still struggling between two nationalisms.