Papers by Sharmistha Dhar
What faculty of our mind is best suited to endow us with all that is required to carry forth our ... more What faculty of our mind is best suited to endow us with all that is required to carry forth our moral enterprise? In other words, what are the cognitive resources that subserve the moral mind? This is a core empirical question, raised much to the delight of the investigative inquisitiveness of the moral psychologists.But the philosophical connection to this problem can be traced back to as far in time as that of Plato the main tenet of whose tripartite theory of soul was that the
rational element of the soul is like the charioteer who holds sway over his two horses – the manageable one, i.e. the spirited element and the unwieldy one, i.e. the vegetative, emotionally unruly element of the soul. And the era of reason-emotion debate begins, percolating into the field of moral beliefs that we inculcate and judgments that we pronounce. The mainstay of this short paper is a comparative analysis of two recently emerging theoretical frameworks claimed to
be underlying moral judgments – one espoused by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt claims that moral judgment is primarily elicited unconsciously by affectdriven intuition and the other put forward by philosopher Shaun Nichols attempts to highlight the conscious deliberation about moral rules. After critical analysis of both the views, this work suggests that a syncretic approach to the aetiological
theorization about moral judgment may provide some silver lining.
Keyword: moral judgment, moral dilemma, moral dumbfounding, moral
intuition, moral rule.
Out of their zeal to solve the antediluvian debate between reason
and emotion, a group of philoso... more Out of their zeal to solve the antediluvian debate between reason
and emotion, a group of philosophers have recently started to give
much coverage to the role of affect, if there is any, in manipulating our
moral judgment, drawing upon and themselves conducting folk-psychological research in the area of moral reasoning. Some of them are acclaimed Sentimentalists. But there are philosophers like Shaun Nichols who are on the lookout of some wherewithal to bridge the gap between reason and emotion. They contend that affect is a prime factor that enables us to distinguish moral norm violations from non-moral violations. Moreover, affect almost imperceptibly shapes the cultural viability of not just moral norms but also non-moral norms that engender abhorrence, if transgressed. The paper aims to capture some of their arguments in support of the hypothesis that affect shapes our ability to make moral appraisal.
Volum editat cu sprijinul CNCSIS, grant nr. 423/2007, cu tema Paradoxurile implicaţiei stricte.
The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will
consists in examining whethe... more The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will
consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed thatindeterministic causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent. The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and
processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action, arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommodating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-eventcausal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these
two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them, the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the ‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causation and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The
next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed,
thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psychological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective.
In this short piece of work, an attempt has been made to revisit the skepticism
about free will, ... more In this short piece of work, an attempt has been made to revisit the skepticism
about free will, which has historically been directed to it due to certain mistaken
assumptions about determinism and iron it out. Determinism is often conflated with
fatalism, and this is where the skepticism about the possibility of agential autonomy
and control begins. If fatalism is true with respect to volitional actions of agents, then
there is no point in planning or choice making as fatalism dissolves the idea of control.
The main argument proposed in this work consists in showing that even though
deterministic causation involves the possibility of a single unique outcome as a
necessary consequence of the antecedent conditions and the governing laws of nature,
the history of rational behaviour of every agent can be explained within a global
deterministic kind of causal framework. If rightly interpreted, it provides a glimpse
into how different courses of action remain feasibly open to an agent at a given time.
The concept of free will has been outlined first to enable the reader to see later that
looking at the doctrine of determinism with the right kind of mindset only reveals its
pro-free will nature.
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Papers by Sharmistha Dhar
rational element of the soul is like the charioteer who holds sway over his two horses – the manageable one, i.e. the spirited element and the unwieldy one, i.e. the vegetative, emotionally unruly element of the soul. And the era of reason-emotion debate begins, percolating into the field of moral beliefs that we inculcate and judgments that we pronounce. The mainstay of this short paper is a comparative analysis of two recently emerging theoretical frameworks claimed to
be underlying moral judgments – one espoused by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt claims that moral judgment is primarily elicited unconsciously by affectdriven intuition and the other put forward by philosopher Shaun Nichols attempts to highlight the conscious deliberation about moral rules. After critical analysis of both the views, this work suggests that a syncretic approach to the aetiological
theorization about moral judgment may provide some silver lining.
Keyword: moral judgment, moral dilemma, moral dumbfounding, moral
intuition, moral rule.
and emotion, a group of philosophers have recently started to give
much coverage to the role of affect, if there is any, in manipulating our
moral judgment, drawing upon and themselves conducting folk-psychological research in the area of moral reasoning. Some of them are acclaimed Sentimentalists. But there are philosophers like Shaun Nichols who are on the lookout of some wherewithal to bridge the gap between reason and emotion. They contend that affect is a prime factor that enables us to distinguish moral norm violations from non-moral violations. Moreover, affect almost imperceptibly shapes the cultural viability of not just moral norms but also non-moral norms that engender abhorrence, if transgressed. The paper aims to capture some of their arguments in support of the hypothesis that affect shapes our ability to make moral appraisal.
consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed thatindeterministic causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent. The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and
processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action, arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommodating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-eventcausal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these
two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them, the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the ‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causation and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The
next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed,
thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psychological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective.
about free will, which has historically been directed to it due to certain mistaken
assumptions about determinism and iron it out. Determinism is often conflated with
fatalism, and this is where the skepticism about the possibility of agential autonomy
and control begins. If fatalism is true with respect to volitional actions of agents, then
there is no point in planning or choice making as fatalism dissolves the idea of control.
The main argument proposed in this work consists in showing that even though
deterministic causation involves the possibility of a single unique outcome as a
necessary consequence of the antecedent conditions and the governing laws of nature,
the history of rational behaviour of every agent can be explained within a global
deterministic kind of causal framework. If rightly interpreted, it provides a glimpse
into how different courses of action remain feasibly open to an agent at a given time.
The concept of free will has been outlined first to enable the reader to see later that
looking at the doctrine of determinism with the right kind of mindset only reveals its
pro-free will nature.
rational element of the soul is like the charioteer who holds sway over his two horses – the manageable one, i.e. the spirited element and the unwieldy one, i.e. the vegetative, emotionally unruly element of the soul. And the era of reason-emotion debate begins, percolating into the field of moral beliefs that we inculcate and judgments that we pronounce. The mainstay of this short paper is a comparative analysis of two recently emerging theoretical frameworks claimed to
be underlying moral judgments – one espoused by moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt claims that moral judgment is primarily elicited unconsciously by affectdriven intuition and the other put forward by philosopher Shaun Nichols attempts to highlight the conscious deliberation about moral rules. After critical analysis of both the views, this work suggests that a syncretic approach to the aetiological
theorization about moral judgment may provide some silver lining.
Keyword: moral judgment, moral dilemma, moral dumbfounding, moral
intuition, moral rule.
and emotion, a group of philosophers have recently started to give
much coverage to the role of affect, if there is any, in manipulating our
moral judgment, drawing upon and themselves conducting folk-psychological research in the area of moral reasoning. Some of them are acclaimed Sentimentalists. But there are philosophers like Shaun Nichols who are on the lookout of some wherewithal to bridge the gap between reason and emotion. They contend that affect is a prime factor that enables us to distinguish moral norm violations from non-moral violations. Moreover, affect almost imperceptibly shapes the cultural viability of not just moral norms but also non-moral norms that engender abhorrence, if transgressed. The paper aims to capture some of their arguments in support of the hypothesis that affect shapes our ability to make moral appraisal.
consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed thatindeterministic causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent. The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and
processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action, arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommodating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-eventcausal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these
two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them, the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the ‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causation and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The
next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed,
thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psychological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective.
about free will, which has historically been directed to it due to certain mistaken
assumptions about determinism and iron it out. Determinism is often conflated with
fatalism, and this is where the skepticism about the possibility of agential autonomy
and control begins. If fatalism is true with respect to volitional actions of agents, then
there is no point in planning or choice making as fatalism dissolves the idea of control.
The main argument proposed in this work consists in showing that even though
deterministic causation involves the possibility of a single unique outcome as a
necessary consequence of the antecedent conditions and the governing laws of nature,
the history of rational behaviour of every agent can be explained within a global
deterministic kind of causal framework. If rightly interpreted, it provides a glimpse
into how different courses of action remain feasibly open to an agent at a given time.
The concept of free will has been outlined first to enable the reader to see later that
looking at the doctrine of determinism with the right kind of mindset only reveals its
pro-free will nature.