Videos by Karol Lenart
According to actualism there are no merely possible individuals. Instead there are only actually ... more According to actualism there are no merely possible individuals. Instead there are only actually existing ersatz individuals. In addition, some actualists claim that there are no de re possibilities for merely possible individuals, but all such possibilities are de dicto (general). In order to motivate this view some actualists appeal to counterpart theory. In my talk I present how this can be done. However, counterpart actualist theory suffers from some issues. A most popular one is that counterpart actualist cannot explain possibility of indiscernibles. I argue that actualist can avoid this problem once she introduces a variant of metaphysical anti-haecceitism. 49 views
Thesis Chapters by Karol Lenart
Doctoral Dissertation, 2023
According to actualism about possible worlds everything that exists is actual. Possible worlds an... more According to actualism about possible worlds everything that exists is actual. Possible worlds and individuals are actually existing abstract parts of the actual world. Aristotelian actualism is a view that there are only actual individuals but no possible ones, nor their individual abstract representatives. Because of that, our actualist account of modality should differ depending on whether it concerns actual individuals or possible ones. The main goal of the dissertation is to develop a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian actualism.
Chapter 1 explains basic issues associated with the possible world approach to modality. I overview modal realist and actualist views on possible worlds and explain why I support the actualist approach. Subsequently, I introduce a distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian actualism, and discuss some semantic issues associated with actualism as such.
In Chapter 2 I argue that Aristotelian actualism, modeled on linguistic ersatzism, is preferable over its Platonic counterpart. Subsequently, I propose a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian ersatzism which is based on a claim that our modal concepts work differently for actual and possible individuals. In order to explain that claim I introduce three specific differences concerning modal features of actual and possible individuals: (a) Representational Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented differently by possible worlds; (b) Metaphysical Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented by possible worlds as having different metaphysical nature; (c) Modal Difference, which says while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. I propose to interpret those differences in terms of the doctrines of haecceitism, antihaecceitism and existentialism. There is however no consensus on how those views should be characterized. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on providing a precise characterization of those doctrines.
Chapter 3 focuses on the doctrines of modal haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I view as opposite accounts of how possible worlds represent possibilities. According to modal haecceitism what possible worlds say about particular individuals does not supervene on what they say qualitatively. Modal antihaecceitism is a denial of such a claim.
Chapter 4 concerns metaphysical haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I take to be alternative accounts of the fundamental structure of reality. For the metaphysical haecceitist reality contains irreducible singular facts, while for the metaphysical antihaecceitist reality is purely qualitative and general.
Chapter 5 focuses on an argument between existentialists and antiexistentialists. Existentialists claim that there are contingent singular propositions, while antiexistentialists deny that. I defend existentialism against antiexistentialist counterarguments, as well as criticize some of the antiexistentialist accounts of singular propositions modeled on the notion of individual essence.
In Chapter 6, by appealing to the results of investigations conducted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I reconsider Representational, Metaphysical and Modal Differences. According to a view that I propose: (a) Representational Difference entails (extreme) modal haecceitism for actual individuals but (extreme) modal antihaecceitism for possible individuals; (b) Metaphysical Difference entails metaphysical haecceitism (individualism) for actual individuals, but metaphysical antihaecceitism (generalism) for possible individuals; finally (c) Modal Difference entails existentialism: while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. In Chapter 6, I also explain the implications of those views for the various issues, including transworld identity, essentialism, or the modal status of modal space.
Lastly, Chapter 7 overviews some semantic and metaphysical applications of Aristotelian ersatzism. I explain how it manages to accommodate Kripkean semantics and how it is able to account for the possibilities of indiscernibles, alien individuals and iterated modalities. I also address some possible objections to my proposal, including an issue of implicit representation and the Humphrey objection.
Papers by Karol Lenart
Przegląd Psychologiczny, Dec 31, 2023
Przegląd Psychologiczny, Dec 31, 2023
Philosophia, 2021
According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of ... more According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection fr...
Acta Analytica, 2020
In this paper, I discuss a connection between quidditism and the Lewisian principle of recombinat... more In this paper, I discuss a connection between quidditism and the Lewisian principle of recombination. I begin by reconstructing a typical characterisation of a Lewisian principle of recombination, followed by an explanation of quidditism. In the remainder, I argue that a proponent of a Lewisian principle of recombination cannot endorse quidditism without some important modifications of her view.
Filozofia Nauki, 2020
The paper is a survey of contemporary quidditism, understood as two interrelated metap... more The paper is a survey of contemporary quidditism, understood as two interrelated metaphysicalpositions — recombinatorial quidditism, which is an account of the nature of possibilities, andindividuation quidditism, which is concerned with the problem of how to individuate properties.I have three aims: to examine the commitments and consequences of both views, to investigatethe relationships between them, and to sketch the logic of the dispute between structuralism andquidditism. I explain how these views relate to Ramseyan humility, according to which we cannotknow the fundamental structure of the world
Axiomathes, https://rdcu.be/bR3hl, 2020
According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide.... more According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceit-ism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight.
Analiza i Egzystencja, 2019
In this article I defend a view according to which facts that express metaphysical grounding are ... more In this article I defend a view according to which facts that express metaphysical grounding are grounded in essences of properties involved into a given grounding relationship. To justify this view, first, I present some reasons for a claim that metaphysical grounding is grounded. In the next step I discuss two theories that explain what are the grounds for grounding: a theory that involves a notion of a superinternal relation and a theory that uses a notion of essences of properties. I argue that later theory is preferable over the former.
Hybris (44), 2019
A standard contemporary formulation essentialism defines essential properties with a help of a co... more A standard contemporary formulation essentialism defines essential properties with a help of a concept of possible worlds. It is often argued that in order to use possible worlds effectively, facts about transworld identity of individuals need to be determined. In this paper I discuss how essentialist might attempt the issue of transworld identity of
individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is, haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a detailed analysis of different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a haecceitist.
It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it i... more It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual schema of transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendentalego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology
and to overcome the aporia presented.
In this paper I discuss the theory of bare particular and the problem of individuation. The main ... more In this paper I discuss the theory of bare particular and the problem of individuation. The main purpose of the analysis is to defend the bare particular theory of individuation from classical and new objections. The article has following structure: in introduction I explain the problem of individuation and systematize current debate on this issue. Chapter 1 consist of the comparison of the bundle theory and the bare particular theory understood as opposite theories of individuality of particulars. The purpose of chapter 1 is to show motivations for acceptance of the bare particular theory over the bundle theory. The main part of the paper is chapter 2 in which I explain the fundamental assumptions of the bare particular theory and resist main objections against it. I conclude that the condition of possibility of overcoming the objections from overpopulation and infinite regress is the modification of the bare particular theory into some form of the identity theory.
Celem artykułu jest przyjrzenie się sposobowi w jaki współczesna teoria esencjalizmu metafizyczne... more Celem artykułu jest przyjrzenie się sposobowi w jaki współczesna teoria esencjalizmu metafizycznego, oparta na pojęciu modalności de re oraz prawd koniecznych aposteriori, wyjaśnia problem istoty. Stanowisko to scharakteryzowane zostaje jako esencjalizm sztywnego odniesienia (ESO), gdyż w strukturę modalności de re zaangażowana jest akceptacja teorii sztywności nazw własnych oraz analiza w terminach światów możliwych. Zdaniem autora, ESO nie jest adekwatną teorią esencjalistyczną ponieważ schemat generujący sądy esencjalistyczne zaproponowany przez zwolenników ESO jest niepoprawnie skonstruowany. Struktura tego schematu, ujętego jako mechanizm generowania sądów esencjalistycznych (MGSE) zawiera trzy elementy: (1) ostensywną definicję, (2) twierdzenie empiryczne oraz (3) warunek tożsamości. W artykule wykazuje się problematyczność wszystkich tych elementów, zaś całe rozumowanie w ramach MGSE uznane zostaje za wikłające się w problem petitio principii. Wnioskiem jest stwierdzenie, że ESO oparty o schemat MGSE nie jest adekwatną teorią esencjalizmu.
Talks by Karol Lenart
Wystąpeinie w ramach zebrania Zakładu Ontologii Instytutu Filozofii UJ, 2022
Językowy erzacyzm w kwestii światów możliwych i możliwych indywiduów utożsamia je konstrukcjami z... more Językowy erzacyzm w kwestii światów możliwych i możliwych indywiduów utożsamia je konstrukcjami zbudowanymi ze zdań światotwórczego języka. Jednym z wyzwań stojących przed językowym erzacyzmem (oraz innymi wariantami erzacyzmu) jest zapewnienie warunków prawdziwości dla pewnych intuicyjnych stwierdzeń na temat możliwości. Zaliczają się do nich stwierdzenia dotyczące: (1) możliwości istnienia obcych indywiduów, (2) możliwości istnienia jakościowo nieodróżnialnych, lecz numerycznie różnych obcych indywiduów, (3) iterowanych możliwości dotyczących obcych indywiduów. W wystąpieniu przedstawiam generalistyczną metafizykę possibiliów dla językowego erzacyzmu oraz pokazuję w jaki sposób wyjaśnia ona wyżej wymienione możliwości. Argumentuję, że generalistyczne wyjaśnienie owych możliwości jest lepsze od obecnie dostępnych alternatywnych wyjaśnień.
Wystąpeinie w ramach zebrania Zakładu Ontologii Instytutu Filozofii UJ, 2021
Według (analitycznego) egzystencjalizmu, sądy jednostkowe zależą ontologicznie od indywiduów, któ... more Według (analitycznego) egzystencjalizmu, sądy jednostkowe zależą ontologicznie od indywiduów, które opisują. Na przykład, sąd [Sokrates jest mądry] zależy ontologicznie od tego, czy Sokrates istnieje. Według anty-egzystencjalistów, zależność ontologiczna tego rodzaju sprawia, że egzystencjalizm nie jest w stanie wyjaśnić możliwości nieistnienia indywiduów. W wystąpieniu pokrótce przedstawiam różne odpowiedzi jakie egzystencjalista może udzielić na ten problem. Uważam, że najlepszym z dostępnych rozwiązań jest rozwiązanie wyróżniające dwa sposoby, na które sąd może być prawdziwy według świata możliwego: jakiś sąd może być prawdziwy w świecie (true in) oraz o świecie (true at). Niektórzy anty-egzystencjaliści uważają, że takie rozróżnienie jest nieuzasadnione. W wystąpieniu zamierzam podważyć ten zarzut, wykazując racje przemawiające za przyjęciem tego rozróżnienia. Racje, które zamierzam przedstawić będą implikowały pewien szczególny, aktualistyczny pogląd na naturę światów możliwych, który nazywam Arystotelejskim.
In this paper I defend a thesis that essentialism entails haecceitism. First, I briefly reconstru... more In this paper I defend a thesis that essentialism entails haecceitism. First, I briefly reconstruct both theories and show why often they are interpreted as opposites. Next, I introduce anti-haecceitism, a view according to which facts about transworld identity of individuals can be fully explained by qualitative properties of individuals. In the next step, I argue that essentialism cannot be connected with anti-haecceitism, because purely qualitative description of individuals leaves matters about transworld identity vague. It is observed that such indeterminacy is unacceptable for essentialists, because essentialistic modal propositions – modalities de re – require facts about transworld identity to be metaphysically determined. As a result, essentialists need to accept haecceitism, a view according to which facts about transworld identity of individuals are primitive and unanalysable in terms of qualitative descriptions.
Aktualizm jest teorią zgodnie z którą wszystko co istnieje jest aktualne. Oczywiście świat aktual... more Aktualizm jest teorią zgodnie z którą wszystko co istnieje jest aktualne. Oczywiście świat aktualny mógłby być inny niż jest, jednak zamiast realnie istniejących światów możliwych oraz możliwych indywiduów w obrębie świata aktualnego istnieją tzw. erzace (lub surogaty) światów możliwych oraz możliwych indywiduów. Aktualista broniąc swojego stanowiska musi jednak wyjaśnić: (a) uprzywilejowanie świata aktualnego; (b) możliwość istnienia tzw. obcych indywiduów; (c) określić warunki prawdziwości dla tzw. iterowanych modalności. W wystąpieniu zamierzam zaproponować nową interpretację aktualizmu, która zapewnia interesujące wyjaśnienia dla tych zagadnień. Proponuję sformułować aktualizm w ramach debaty między haecceityzmem a antyhaecceityzmem. Na potrzeby tego przedsięwzięcia zamierzam odróżnić modalne oraz metafizyczne warianty haecceityzmu i antyhaecceityzmu. Następnie scharakteryzuję aktualizm jako stanowisko przyjmujące prawdziwość modalnego i metafizycznego haecceityzmu w dziedzinie świata aktualnego oraz modalny i metafizyczny antyhaecceityzm w dziedzinie światów możliwych (ujętych jako erzace).
An orthodox view on grounding implies that if some facts ground another fact, then
the obtaining ... more An orthodox view on grounding implies that if some facts ground another fact, then
the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Some argue against such orthodoxy by showing
that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. One of the most recent
and the strongest argument against the orthodox view relies on the observation that if restricted
accidental generalisations (for example: “All swans in Switzerland are white”) are grounded in their
instances, then they are examples of facts that are not necessitated by their grounds. In this paper I
defend the orthodox view against such argument. In order to achieve that I discuss a relationship
between grounding and essence. I distinguish general and individual essences and claim that if
grounding holds in virtue of the latter kind of essences, then it is possible to resist the argument from
restricted accidental generalisations against necessary character of grounding.
Conference Presentations [in polish] by Karol Lenart
W wystąpieniu zostanie poddany analizie współczesny model esencjalizmu metafizycznego zwany esenc... more W wystąpieniu zostanie poddany analizie współczesny model esencjalizmu metafizycznego zwany esencjalizmem modalnym (EM). W ramach EM zwykło się istotę definiować następująco: F jest istotą x’a, jeżeli (i) F jest własnością i (ii) x posiada F we wszystkich światach możliwych w których x istnieje. Teza polemiczna względem przedstawionej definicji będzie opierała się na negacji jej pierwszego członu (i), wedle którego istota rzeczy musi posiadać charakter własności. Argumentacja rozpocznie się od uwagi terminologicznej dotyczącej tego, jak rozumieć pojęcie własności oraz czy możliwe jest zastąpienie w definicji EM pojęcia własności pojęciem alternatywnym. W celu zbadania tych możliwości, analizie zostanie poddana zasada identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych (tzw. zasada Leibniza – ZL), będąca podstawowym narzędziem generowania prawd esencjalnych w teorii EM. W związku z tym, negacja ZL (za którą będzie się argumentować) okaże się być warunkiem możliwości zbudowania alternatywnej definicji istoty rzeczy. Jeżeli bowiem ZL nie jest prawdziwa, to możliwe jest by dwa byty posiadające te same własności, były różnymi od siebie przedmiotami. Przyjęcie takiej możliwości oznacza akceptację niejakościowych różnic między przedmiotami, które zapewniają ich nieidentyczności przy równoczesnej tożsamości jakościowej (tj. pod względem własności). Te niejakościowe różnice zdefiniowane zostaną jako ta-otość (thisness), w przeciwieństwie do różnic jakościowych, określonych mianem takowości (suchness). Ostatni etap wystąpienia będzie prezentacją dwóch sposobów rozumienia zależności między obiema charakterystykami przedmiotów. Możliwości są następujące: (a) ta-otość superweniuje logicznie na takowości oraz (b) ta-otość nie superweniuje logicznie na takowości. Przedstawione zostaną argumenty na rzecz prawdziwości wariantu (b).
Uploads
Videos by Karol Lenart
Thesis Chapters by Karol Lenart
Chapter 1 explains basic issues associated with the possible world approach to modality. I overview modal realist and actualist views on possible worlds and explain why I support the actualist approach. Subsequently, I introduce a distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian actualism, and discuss some semantic issues associated with actualism as such.
In Chapter 2 I argue that Aristotelian actualism, modeled on linguistic ersatzism, is preferable over its Platonic counterpart. Subsequently, I propose a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian ersatzism which is based on a claim that our modal concepts work differently for actual and possible individuals. In order to explain that claim I introduce three specific differences concerning modal features of actual and possible individuals: (a) Representational Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented differently by possible worlds; (b) Metaphysical Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented by possible worlds as having different metaphysical nature; (c) Modal Difference, which says while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. I propose to interpret those differences in terms of the doctrines of haecceitism, antihaecceitism and existentialism. There is however no consensus on how those views should be characterized. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on providing a precise characterization of those doctrines.
Chapter 3 focuses on the doctrines of modal haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I view as opposite accounts of how possible worlds represent possibilities. According to modal haecceitism what possible worlds say about particular individuals does not supervene on what they say qualitatively. Modal antihaecceitism is a denial of such a claim.
Chapter 4 concerns metaphysical haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I take to be alternative accounts of the fundamental structure of reality. For the metaphysical haecceitist reality contains irreducible singular facts, while for the metaphysical antihaecceitist reality is purely qualitative and general.
Chapter 5 focuses on an argument between existentialists and antiexistentialists. Existentialists claim that there are contingent singular propositions, while antiexistentialists deny that. I defend existentialism against antiexistentialist counterarguments, as well as criticize some of the antiexistentialist accounts of singular propositions modeled on the notion of individual essence.
In Chapter 6, by appealing to the results of investigations conducted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I reconsider Representational, Metaphysical and Modal Differences. According to a view that I propose: (a) Representational Difference entails (extreme) modal haecceitism for actual individuals but (extreme) modal antihaecceitism for possible individuals; (b) Metaphysical Difference entails metaphysical haecceitism (individualism) for actual individuals, but metaphysical antihaecceitism (generalism) for possible individuals; finally (c) Modal Difference entails existentialism: while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. In Chapter 6, I also explain the implications of those views for the various issues, including transworld identity, essentialism, or the modal status of modal space.
Lastly, Chapter 7 overviews some semantic and metaphysical applications of Aristotelian ersatzism. I explain how it manages to accommodate Kripkean semantics and how it is able to account for the possibilities of indiscernibles, alien individuals and iterated modalities. I also address some possible objections to my proposal, including an issue of implicit representation and the Humphrey objection.
Papers by Karol Lenart
individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is, haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a detailed analysis of different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a haecceitist.
and to overcome the aporia presented.
Talks by Karol Lenart
the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Some argue against such orthodoxy by showing
that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. One of the most recent
and the strongest argument against the orthodox view relies on the observation that if restricted
accidental generalisations (for example: “All swans in Switzerland are white”) are grounded in their
instances, then they are examples of facts that are not necessitated by their grounds. In this paper I
defend the orthodox view against such argument. In order to achieve that I discuss a relationship
between grounding and essence. I distinguish general and individual essences and claim that if
grounding holds in virtue of the latter kind of essences, then it is possible to resist the argument from
restricted accidental generalisations against necessary character of grounding.
Conference Presentations [in polish] by Karol Lenart
Chapter 1 explains basic issues associated with the possible world approach to modality. I overview modal realist and actualist views on possible worlds and explain why I support the actualist approach. Subsequently, I introduce a distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian actualism, and discuss some semantic issues associated with actualism as such.
In Chapter 2 I argue that Aristotelian actualism, modeled on linguistic ersatzism, is preferable over its Platonic counterpart. Subsequently, I propose a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian ersatzism which is based on a claim that our modal concepts work differently for actual and possible individuals. In order to explain that claim I introduce three specific differences concerning modal features of actual and possible individuals: (a) Representational Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented differently by possible worlds; (b) Metaphysical Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented by possible worlds as having different metaphysical nature; (c) Modal Difference, which says while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. I propose to interpret those differences in terms of the doctrines of haecceitism, antihaecceitism and existentialism. There is however no consensus on how those views should be characterized. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on providing a precise characterization of those doctrines.
Chapter 3 focuses on the doctrines of modal haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I view as opposite accounts of how possible worlds represent possibilities. According to modal haecceitism what possible worlds say about particular individuals does not supervene on what they say qualitatively. Modal antihaecceitism is a denial of such a claim.
Chapter 4 concerns metaphysical haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I take to be alternative accounts of the fundamental structure of reality. For the metaphysical haecceitist reality contains irreducible singular facts, while for the metaphysical antihaecceitist reality is purely qualitative and general.
Chapter 5 focuses on an argument between existentialists and antiexistentialists. Existentialists claim that there are contingent singular propositions, while antiexistentialists deny that. I defend existentialism against antiexistentialist counterarguments, as well as criticize some of the antiexistentialist accounts of singular propositions modeled on the notion of individual essence.
In Chapter 6, by appealing to the results of investigations conducted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I reconsider Representational, Metaphysical and Modal Differences. According to a view that I propose: (a) Representational Difference entails (extreme) modal haecceitism for actual individuals but (extreme) modal antihaecceitism for possible individuals; (b) Metaphysical Difference entails metaphysical haecceitism (individualism) for actual individuals, but metaphysical antihaecceitism (generalism) for possible individuals; finally (c) Modal Difference entails existentialism: while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. In Chapter 6, I also explain the implications of those views for the various issues, including transworld identity, essentialism, or the modal status of modal space.
Lastly, Chapter 7 overviews some semantic and metaphysical applications of Aristotelian ersatzism. I explain how it manages to accommodate Kripkean semantics and how it is able to account for the possibilities of indiscernibles, alien individuals and iterated modalities. I also address some possible objections to my proposal, including an issue of implicit representation and the Humphrey objection.
individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is, haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a detailed analysis of different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a haecceitist.
and to overcome the aporia presented.
the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Some argue against such orthodoxy by showing
that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. One of the most recent
and the strongest argument against the orthodox view relies on the observation that if restricted
accidental generalisations (for example: “All swans in Switzerland are white”) are grounded in their
instances, then they are examples of facts that are not necessitated by their grounds. In this paper I
defend the orthodox view against such argument. In order to achieve that I discuss a relationship
between grounding and essence. I distinguish general and individual essences and claim that if
grounding holds in virtue of the latter kind of essences, then it is possible to resist the argument from
restricted accidental generalisations against necessary character of grounding.