Books and Edited Volumes by Grzegorz Kuca
Digital Transformation and the Economics of Banking Economic, Institutional, and Social Dimensions, 2023
In the Polish legal system, the electronic money institution is regulated above all in the Paymen... more In the Polish legal system, the electronic money institution is regulated above all in the Payment Services Act of 19 August 2011. This article aims to conceptualise the notion of an electronic money institution, the rules on which it is based, its functions in economic activities, and the rights and obligations of the entities involved in the functioning of this institution. All these issues are discussed as elements of FinTech sector regulation, taking into account the ontic, praxeological and attribution analysis of electronic money. This chapter presents certain demands aimed at the Polish legislature, which result from the analysis of selected regulations connected with the electronic money institution. In particular, the electronic money institution’s growing economic significance in Poland should be emphasised. It is the consequence of the fact that one of the most distinctive features of developed market economies is their “non-cash character”. It causes certain problems for the Polish legislature. For example, users of electronic money should be strongly protected from digital fraud. The Polish legislature has taken this issue into consideration by inserting (among other things) the requirement to present information about the electronic money institution honestly and intelligibly (see Article 132i of the Payment Services Act). However, regulations in this area are not perfect and for this reason, this Chapter contains proposals to change some of these regulations.
Zagadnienia omawiane przez poszczególnych Autorów są ważne i aktualne, a wielowątkowość podjętych... more Zagadnienia omawiane przez poszczególnych Autorów są ważne i aktualne, a wielowątkowość podjętych tematów oraz spojrzenie na nie zarówno przez prawników, jak i ekonomistów wyróżniają tę publikację spośród innych. Należy podkreślić, że obowiązujące w Polsce przepisy prawa finansowego są bardzo złożone, często niespójne i niejasne, a ich mnogość oraz duży stopień skomplikowania utrudniają funkcjonowanie wszystkim podmiotom, których dotyczą, i stają się źródłem ryzyka dla uczestników stosunków prawno-finansowych, zwłaszcza podatników. Rozwiązania zastosowane w sytuacji aktualnego kryzysu związanego z pandemią wymagają udoskonalenia, na co zwracają uwagę wszyscy Autorzy poszczególnych opracowań.
Z recenzji prof. dr hab. Jadwigi Glumińskiej-Pawlic
This book discusses contemporary accountability and transparency mechanisms by presenting a selec... more This book discusses contemporary accountability and transparency mechanisms by presenting a selection of case studies.
The authors deal with various problems connected to controlling public institutions and incumbents’ responsibility in state bodies. The work is divided into three parts. Part I: Law examines the institutional and objective approach. Part II: Fairness and Rights considers the subject approach, referring to a recipient of rights. Part III: Authority looks at the functional approach, referring to the executors of law. Providing insights into increasing understanding of various concepts, principles, and institutions characteristic of the modern state, the book makes a valuable contribution to the area of comparative constitutional change.
Godny podkreślenia jest wysoki poziom merytoryczny poszczególnych artykułów, stanowiący pokłosie ... more Godny podkreślenia jest wysoki poziom merytoryczny poszczególnych artykułów, stanowiący pokłosie dobrego warsztatu badawczego Autorów. Sam zaś warsztat badawczy to efekt umiejętnego połączenia wiedzy wypływającej z gruntownego przygotowania teoretycznego ze znajomością praktyki rzemiosła prokuratorskiego. Podkreślenia wymaga również odwaga Autorów w doborze tematów, ich uczciwość i rzetelność w podejściu do przedmiotu badań, a nade wszystko świadomość znaczenia prokuratury w ramach wolnościowo-demokratycznego porządku ustrojowego. I właśnie z szacunku dla prokuratury wynikają gorzkie i pisane ku przestrodze słowa, które kreślą pełen pesymizmu wizerunek jej zmian na przestrzeni ostatnich kilku lat. Jednocześnie każdy z Autorów w mniejszym lub większym stopniu próbuje wlać nadzieję w czytelnicze serca, szkicując kierunki zmian w obrębie prokuratury, żeby określenie „reforma” nie wywoływało znów mimowolnych skojarzeń z fasadą, zza której wyłaniają się politycznie motywowane plany destrukcji prokuratury, lecz tym razem stało się uczciwą reformą w duchu zapewnienia prokuraturze wystarczającej niezależności w dziele realizacji jej głównych zadań.
Oxford University Press, 2020
Oxford University Press, 2019
![Research paper thumbnail of Budget Procedure in Contemporary Constitutional Law. A Comparative Analysis by the Example of EU Member States [Procedura budżetowa we współczesnym prawie konstytucyjnym. Analiza porównawcza na przykładzie państw UE ]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/55616357/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Wolters Kluwer, 2018
1. Scientific objective
The book’s scientific objective is to answer the question as to whethe... more 1. Scientific objective
The book’s scientific objective is to answer the question as to whether the scope and methods of budget procedure regulation in EU Member States’ constitutions sufficiently ensure the optimal, formal conditions for carrying out this regulation. Answering this question requires explaining the following, more detailed, issues:
1) How should the notion of ‘budget procedure’ be understood, and, within that scope, how should the particular stages and phases of the procedure be understood?
2) What premises determine the existence and form of a budget procedure, and how can it be optimized?
3) Is a budget procedure shaped by budget principles, the form and status of budget acts, and participants in the budget procedure? If yes, to what extent?
4) How are scopes of activities and competences divided among participants in the budget procedure? How far may one participant interfere in the sphere reserved for another participant?
5) Are the constitutional rules concerning the stages of projecting, passing, executing and supervising the execution of a state budget precise? Do they correspond to the present conditions and constitutional practice?
The research assesses extant legal regulations for budget procedure by adopting and implementing the following detailed goals: 1) reconstructing the notion of budget procedure and its elements, as well as determining the regulations involved within that scope; 2) identifying and systemising theoretical and practical problems resulting from the present regulation of budget procedure; 3) presenting the legal regulations that are currently in force and indicating which of them can and should be included in each contemporary constitution (de lege fundamentale ferenda).
The study concentrates on budget procedure regulations in the constitutional laws of the EU Member States. As of 1 January 2016, the EU Member States have been included in comparative research. Therefore, the constitutional provisions of the 28 EU Member States will be analysed, with particular reference given to the specificity of the British constitutional system, where there is no typical, written constitution and where numerous procedures and institutions, which cannot be found in continental Europe, have developed.
The basis for this study’s hypothesis and particular theses is the assumption that budget procedures must be created to provide efficient, effective passing of the state budget. Referring to that assumption, the author built the following research hypothesis (H): ‘Constitutional regulation of budget procedures among EU Member States does not ensure the optimal, formal conditions necessary for passing state budgets. Moreover, their partiality and lack of precision result in practical problems. In this situation, it is worth considering the possibility of constitutionalising some elements of budget procedures – applying the achievements (constitutional regulations) of other EU Member States – as well as implementing new legal solutions, which could eliminate issues. It is, therefore, necessary to give new consideration to constitutional regulations regarding budget procedures. How these issues are regulated generally determines correct substantial development, and, when detailed legal constructions function together, they further guarantee that budget procedures are carried out efficiently and effectively. Because EU requirements must be met by Member States, they should (and, perhaps, they shall) be implemented in national legislation’.
2. Structure
This dissertation is comprised of an introduction, four substantive chapters and a section defining the paper’s conclusions and de lege ferenda postulates. Chapter 1, entitled ‘Notions, phases and determinants of a budget procedure’, contains Subchapter 1, entitled ‘Characteristics of definition conditions for budget procedure and budget process’, in which the author distinguishes between the following notions: ‘procedure’, ‘process’ and ‘proceedings’. He draws attention to different approaches to these notions in particular legal areas (administrative, civil, financial, criminal and constitutional law). Then, he specifies the meaning of the term ‘budget procedure’, creating a definition fitting the basic condition of definition correctness, which is specified in the principle definition: fit per genus et differentiam specificam. He also defines differentia specifica for the notion ‘budget procedure’, which should be included in the content of definiens explaining definiendum. Thus, the author conceptualises ‘budget procedure’. He also considers the scope and content of procedural regulations and characterises budget procedure strategies (top-down, bottom-up and top-down/bottom-up). Then, in Subchapter 2, ‘Stages of budget procedure, phases of budget process, budget cycle’, he states that significant complication in budget procedures necessitates making crucial distinctions, so the proceedings governing the budget procedures may be classified as logically and substantially correct parts, stages or sections. The author also holds that the basic mean of division is obviously a dichotomous division made according to opposite features, which enable distinguishing the stage of budget passing from the stage of state budget execution (dichotomous division). However, considering the subjective criterion, the author distinguishes between three budget procedure stages: projecting, passing and executing (trichotomous division). He also delineates phases of budget processes (behavioural approach), which take place in particular stages. Following this discussion, in Subchapter 3, ‘Determinants of budget procedure, as well as notions of ‘budget procedure’ and ‘state budget’ in the constitutions of EU Member States’, the author describes budget procedure determinants, which are: budget principles, form and significance of the budget act and participants in the budget procedure. At the end of this section, the author references constitutional regulation of budget procedures, as well as constitutional frames of the notion of state budgets. Building from this, in Subchapter 4, ‘Conclusions’, eight partial conclusions could be drawn regarding the theoretical aspects of budget procedures.
After having delineated the three budget procedure stages, the author, logically, chose to include three chapters discussing those stages. Chapter 2, entitled ‘Projecting a state budget’, considers: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at elaborating a budget proposal; 2) entities’ competences in state budget projecting; 3) the legal effects of failing to provide a budget proposal; and 4) conclusions, which provide eleven points summarising the previously outlined issues. Chapter 3, which is dedicated to ‘Passing a state budget’, discusses: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at passing state budgets; 2) entities’ competences in state budget passing; 3) the legal effects of failing to pass a state budget; and 4) conclusions, which provide nine points summarising the described issues. Chapter 4, the final chapter, covers the scope of ‘State budget execution’ and is comprised of: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at executing a state budget (i.e., introductory remarks, characteristics of proceedings’ objects, rules of execution in a substantive approach, entities’ competences in state budget passing); 2) the control of state budget execution (i.e., the governmental or ministerial responsibility for budgetary affairs within the scope of preparing reports concerning state budget execution, the role of supreme audit bodies and parliament’s hearing the report and either granting or refusing to grant discharge); 3) independent bodies, which monitor the state’s financial stability (i.e., fiscal councils, parliamentary budget offices); and 4) conclusions, which provide eight points summarising the discussed issues.
![Research paper thumbnail of Constitution of Georgia [ Konstytucja Gruzji ]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/42640709/thumbnails/1.jpg)
W lutym 1993 r. parlament powołał Komisję Konstytucyjną, której zadaniem było opracowanie nowej k... more W lutym 1993 r. parlament powołał Komisję Konstytucyjną, której zadaniem było opracowanie nowej konstytucji. Na czele Komisji stanął Eduard Szewardnadze, przewodniczący parlamentu, pełniący równocześnie funkcję głowy państwa. W skład Komisji weszli także przedstawiciele frakcji parlamentarnych oraz grupa ekspertów. Komisja rozpatrzyła 12 projektów konstytucji wniesionych przez grupowania polityczne, ośrodki naukowe oraz organizacje społeczne. Spośród wielu zgłaszanych propozycji dotyczących systemu rządów dominowały te, które odwoływały się do założeń systemu parlamentarnego oraz systemu półprezydenckiego (mieszanego). Po długiej debacie Komisja zgodziła się na tzw. model Chicago, ale został on odrzucony przez prezydenta Szewardnadze, który polecił przygotować nowy projekt odwołujący się do „tradycji” rosyjskiego systemu rządów. W rezultacie 2 lipca 1995 r. Komisja przyjęła projekt nowej konstytucji, a następnie przekazała go pod obrady parlamentu. Dnia 24 sierpnia 1995 r. parlament uchwalił pierwszą konstytucję niepodległej Gruzji.
![Research paper thumbnail of Zasada podziału władzy w Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku [The Principle of the Separation of Powers in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997], Warszawa 2014, pp. 356.](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/42907920/thumbnails/1.jpg)
W książce podniesiono jedno z fundamentalnych zagadnień polskiego systemu konstytucyjnego, jakim ... more W książce podniesiono jedno z fundamentalnych zagadnień polskiego systemu konstytucyjnego, jakim jest zasada podziału władzy przyjęta przez ustrojodawcę, wraz z założeniem równowagi władz, za podstawę ustroju Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (art. 10 ust. 1 konstytucji z 1997 r.). Pozostaje ona jedną z zasad naczelnych funkcjonowania i organizacji systemu organów państwowych RP. W książce przedstawiono najczęściej spotykane sposoby rozumienia teorii podziału władzy oraz ewolucję ujęć zasady podziału władzy w projektach i propozycjach rozważanych w toku prac Komisji Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego (1994-1997). Zasadnicze znaczenie dla wywodów Autora mają interpretacje art. 10 konstytucji oraz charakterystyka pozycji organów władz ustawodawczej, wykonawczej
i sądowniczej. W oparciu o jednolity schemat analizy organów każdej z wyodrębnionych władz Autor przedstawia funkcjonalne i organizacyjne aspekty zasady podziału władzy, a następnie charakteryzuje stosowane przez te organy „hamulce” (instrumenty powstrzymywania) wobec innych władz. Ważne miejsce zajmuje też omówienie konstytucyjnych instrumentów (form) współdziałania władz.
Papers by Grzegorz Kuca
Państwo i Prawo , 2024
The aim of the article is to analyse the principle of universality as one of the basic budgetary ... more The aim of the article is to analyse the principle of universality as one of the basic budgetary principles, which is understood as a postulate to include in the budget full amounts of all state revenues and expenditures, i.e. gross financing of all units of the public finance sector. In particular, this article discusses the essence, functions, and infringements of the principle of universality, including the role and importance of the funds operating within Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK). The conducted analysis shows that it remains necessary to restore the importance of the principle of universality, which will be impossible without a consolidation of public finances by means of reduction of the off-budget economy through the inclusion of BGK funds in the budget statute. Only in this way will it become possible to restore the due prominence of the state budget and ensure proper implementation of the
parliamentary supervision function and, in the long term, the accountability
of public authorities in the field of public finances.
Studia Politologiczne, 2023
Celem artykułu jest analiza problematyki parlamentarnej kontroli budżetu państwa oraz wykazanie p... more Celem artykułu jest analiza problematyki parlamentarnej kontroli budżetu państwa oraz wykazanie problemów związanych z realizacją tej kontroli. W szczególności omówiono rolę Sejmu w zakresie kontroli wstępnej (ex ante) dotyczącej zgodności projektu ustawy budżetowej z prawem, kontroli bieżącej (ex dure) polegającej na ocenie wykonywania ustawy budżetowej oraz kontroli następczej (ex post) obejmującej ocenę wykonania ustawy budżetowej. Przeprowadzona analiza pozwoliła na wykazanie, że właściwa realizacja parlamentarnej kontroli budżetowej będzie niemożliwa bez reformy systemu finansów publicznych polegającej na zapewnieniu sporządzania niezależnych prognoz makroekonomicznych stanowiących podstawę do przygotowania projektów planów finansowych państwa, zmniejszeniu liczby form organizacyjno-prawnych publicznej gospodarki finansowych, rezygnacji z wykazywania długu publicznego w dwóch różnych ujęciach oraz zmiany zasad udzielania absolutorium. Z tego punktu widzenia należy podjąć działania zmierzające do nadania tej kontroli należytej rangi, tak by nie pozostawała mitem kontroli fiskalnej.
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji zasady podziału władzy i jej wpływu na sądownictwo ko... more Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji zasady podziału władzy i jej wpływu na sądownictwo konstytucyjne. Autor zwraca uwagę na determinanty pozycji ustrojowej sądownictwa konstytucyjnego. Po pierwsze, na dość oczywisty, ale nieeksponowany dotychczas w nauce prawa fakt braku uwzględnienia miejsca i roli sądownictwa konstytucyjnego w Monteskiuszowskiej doktrynie podziału władzy. Po drugie, na wpływ brytyjskiej teorii suwerenności parlamentu, która oznaczała, że normy stanowione przez parlament, przy najmniej teoretycznie, są niczym nieograniczone. Po trzecie, na francuską umowę społeczną Jana Jakuba Rousseau odwołująca się do woli powszechnej, która nie może być kwestionowana przez żaden organ pozaparlamentarny. Na tym tle omawia poszczególne kanony podziału władzy stwierdzając, że najtrudniejszą i zarazem najbardziej sporną z teoretycznego punktu widzenia jest kwestia utożsamiania zasady podziału władzy z równowagą władz. Pozwala to na stwierdzenie, że włączenie sądownictwa kons...
![Research paper thumbnail of Problem deprecjonowania budżetu państwa [The Problem of Deprecating the State Budget]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/93071856/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Państwo i Prawo, Oct 10, 2022
Celem artykułu jest analiza form i metod deprecjonowania budżetu państwa jako najwyższego rangą p... more Celem artykułu jest analiza form i metod deprecjonowania budżetu państwa jako najwyższego rangą planu finansowego uwzględniającego planowane dochody i wydatki państwa na następny rok budżetowy oraz zaproponowanie sposobów przywrócenia budżetowi państwa odpowiedniej rangi związanej z jego szczególnym charakterem oraz centralną pozycją w systemie finansów publicznych. W szczególności omówiono kompetencje budżetowe rządu i parlamentu na tle zasady podziału władzy, zawartość budżetu państwa i ustawy budżetowej oraz zjawisko debudżetyzacji finansów publicznych umożliwiające wydatkowanie środków publicznych z pominięciem budżetu państwa oraz stosowanie różnego rodzaju form wykonywania dopuszczających wykazanie wydatków w innych okresach niż są faktycznie ponoszone. Przeprowadzona analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że zjawisk tych nie można ograniczyć ani tym bardziej wyeliminować z wykorzystaniem instrumentów kontroli budżetowej określanej coraz częściej mianem mitu kontroli fiskalnej. Zjawiskom tym towarzyszą rekordowe przyrosty długu publicznego, które były spowodowane zaciąganiem zobowiązań na finansowanie zadań związanych z przeciwdziałaniem pandemii COVID-19. W podsumowaniu proponuje się wprowadzenie określonych zmian pozwalających ograniczyć, a nawet wyeliminować wskazane problemy.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the forms and methods of depreciating the state budget as the highest-ranking financial plan taking into account the planned state revenues and expenditures for the next budget year, and to propose ways to restore the state budget to its proper rank related to its special character and central role in the system of public finances. In particular, it discusses the budgetary powers of the government and parliament against the background of the principle of the separation of powers, the content of the state budget and the budget law, as well as the phenomenon of debudgetization of public finances, which allows expending public funds without regard to the state budget and using various forms of execution enabling expenditure to be shown in periods other than those actually incurred. The analysis leads to the conclusion that these phenomena cannot be reduced, let alone eliminated, with the use of budgetary control instruments increasingly commonly referred to as the myth of fiscal control. These phenomena are accompanied by record increases in public debt, which were caused by incurring liabilities to finance tasks related to countering the COVID-19 pandemic. In conclusion, a proposal is made to introduce changes which will limit or even eliminate the abovementioned problems.
Liverpool Law Review, 2016
This article examines the institution of the public hearing in contemporary constitutional system... more This article examines the institution of the public hearing in contemporary constitutional systems. After considering the public hearing in light of the concept of deliberative democracy, the authors present various normative and practical measures implemented in selected countries. It is claimed that public deliberation affects the quality of legislation and makes it more legitimate. The public hearing as a stage in the legislative procedure requires a mature reciprocal dialogue between individuals and the state authorities as well as a readiness to reach appropriate decisions. The authors argue that to make the public hearing more effective, the law-maker or its organs should have a duty to inform the opinion about the extent to which the public proposals have been taken into account.
P. Mikuli, G. Kuca (eds), Accountability and the Law Rights, Authority and Transparency of Public Power, Routledge, 2022
This chapter elaborates on the monograph’s purpose and introduces its central issues. The editors... more This chapter elaborates on the monograph’s purpose and introduces its central issues. The editors of the volume believe that the term ‘accountability’ may be interpreted very broadly. This notion includes various procedures for assessing individual behaviours of incumbents of state organs in the performance of their duties (comprising punitive ailments and rewards that they may befall), mechanisms involving reporting on this performance (reporting), and instruments that refer to material (organisational) substrates of a state organ or the whole branch of government. The relationship between accountability and transparency is elucidated, and the ideas included in the contributions are presented. The editors express their hope that the chapters included in this volume answer questions concerning the efficiency of accountability and transparency mechanisms and procedures from the perspective of consolidated democratic systems as well as various tendencies of democratic decay and infringement on the rule of law.
Accountability and the Law
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Books and Edited Volumes by Grzegorz Kuca
Z recenzji prof. dr hab. Jadwigi Glumińskiej-Pawlic
The authors deal with various problems connected to controlling public institutions and incumbents’ responsibility in state bodies. The work is divided into three parts. Part I: Law examines the institutional and objective approach. Part II: Fairness and Rights considers the subject approach, referring to a recipient of rights. Part III: Authority looks at the functional approach, referring to the executors of law. Providing insights into increasing understanding of various concepts, principles, and institutions characteristic of the modern state, the book makes a valuable contribution to the area of comparative constitutional change.
The book’s scientific objective is to answer the question as to whether the scope and methods of budget procedure regulation in EU Member States’ constitutions sufficiently ensure the optimal, formal conditions for carrying out this regulation. Answering this question requires explaining the following, more detailed, issues:
1) How should the notion of ‘budget procedure’ be understood, and, within that scope, how should the particular stages and phases of the procedure be understood?
2) What premises determine the existence and form of a budget procedure, and how can it be optimized?
3) Is a budget procedure shaped by budget principles, the form and status of budget acts, and participants in the budget procedure? If yes, to what extent?
4) How are scopes of activities and competences divided among participants in the budget procedure? How far may one participant interfere in the sphere reserved for another participant?
5) Are the constitutional rules concerning the stages of projecting, passing, executing and supervising the execution of a state budget precise? Do they correspond to the present conditions and constitutional practice?
The research assesses extant legal regulations for budget procedure by adopting and implementing the following detailed goals: 1) reconstructing the notion of budget procedure and its elements, as well as determining the regulations involved within that scope; 2) identifying and systemising theoretical and practical problems resulting from the present regulation of budget procedure; 3) presenting the legal regulations that are currently in force and indicating which of them can and should be included in each contemporary constitution (de lege fundamentale ferenda).
The study concentrates on budget procedure regulations in the constitutional laws of the EU Member States. As of 1 January 2016, the EU Member States have been included in comparative research. Therefore, the constitutional provisions of the 28 EU Member States will be analysed, with particular reference given to the specificity of the British constitutional system, where there is no typical, written constitution and where numerous procedures and institutions, which cannot be found in continental Europe, have developed.
The basis for this study’s hypothesis and particular theses is the assumption that budget procedures must be created to provide efficient, effective passing of the state budget. Referring to that assumption, the author built the following research hypothesis (H): ‘Constitutional regulation of budget procedures among EU Member States does not ensure the optimal, formal conditions necessary for passing state budgets. Moreover, their partiality and lack of precision result in practical problems. In this situation, it is worth considering the possibility of constitutionalising some elements of budget procedures – applying the achievements (constitutional regulations) of other EU Member States – as well as implementing new legal solutions, which could eliminate issues. It is, therefore, necessary to give new consideration to constitutional regulations regarding budget procedures. How these issues are regulated generally determines correct substantial development, and, when detailed legal constructions function together, they further guarantee that budget procedures are carried out efficiently and effectively. Because EU requirements must be met by Member States, they should (and, perhaps, they shall) be implemented in national legislation’.
2. Structure
This dissertation is comprised of an introduction, four substantive chapters and a section defining the paper’s conclusions and de lege ferenda postulates. Chapter 1, entitled ‘Notions, phases and determinants of a budget procedure’, contains Subchapter 1, entitled ‘Characteristics of definition conditions for budget procedure and budget process’, in which the author distinguishes between the following notions: ‘procedure’, ‘process’ and ‘proceedings’. He draws attention to different approaches to these notions in particular legal areas (administrative, civil, financial, criminal and constitutional law). Then, he specifies the meaning of the term ‘budget procedure’, creating a definition fitting the basic condition of definition correctness, which is specified in the principle definition: fit per genus et differentiam specificam. He also defines differentia specifica for the notion ‘budget procedure’, which should be included in the content of definiens explaining definiendum. Thus, the author conceptualises ‘budget procedure’. He also considers the scope and content of procedural regulations and characterises budget procedure strategies (top-down, bottom-up and top-down/bottom-up). Then, in Subchapter 2, ‘Stages of budget procedure, phases of budget process, budget cycle’, he states that significant complication in budget procedures necessitates making crucial distinctions, so the proceedings governing the budget procedures may be classified as logically and substantially correct parts, stages or sections. The author also holds that the basic mean of division is obviously a dichotomous division made according to opposite features, which enable distinguishing the stage of budget passing from the stage of state budget execution (dichotomous division). However, considering the subjective criterion, the author distinguishes between three budget procedure stages: projecting, passing and executing (trichotomous division). He also delineates phases of budget processes (behavioural approach), which take place in particular stages. Following this discussion, in Subchapter 3, ‘Determinants of budget procedure, as well as notions of ‘budget procedure’ and ‘state budget’ in the constitutions of EU Member States’, the author describes budget procedure determinants, which are: budget principles, form and significance of the budget act and participants in the budget procedure. At the end of this section, the author references constitutional regulation of budget procedures, as well as constitutional frames of the notion of state budgets. Building from this, in Subchapter 4, ‘Conclusions’, eight partial conclusions could be drawn regarding the theoretical aspects of budget procedures.
After having delineated the three budget procedure stages, the author, logically, chose to include three chapters discussing those stages. Chapter 2, entitled ‘Projecting a state budget’, considers: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at elaborating a budget proposal; 2) entities’ competences in state budget projecting; 3) the legal effects of failing to provide a budget proposal; and 4) conclusions, which provide eleven points summarising the previously outlined issues. Chapter 3, which is dedicated to ‘Passing a state budget’, discusses: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at passing state budgets; 2) entities’ competences in state budget passing; 3) the legal effects of failing to pass a state budget; and 4) conclusions, which provide nine points summarising the described issues. Chapter 4, the final chapter, covers the scope of ‘State budget execution’ and is comprised of: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at executing a state budget (i.e., introductory remarks, characteristics of proceedings’ objects, rules of execution in a substantive approach, entities’ competences in state budget passing); 2) the control of state budget execution (i.e., the governmental or ministerial responsibility for budgetary affairs within the scope of preparing reports concerning state budget execution, the role of supreme audit bodies and parliament’s hearing the report and either granting or refusing to grant discharge); 3) independent bodies, which monitor the state’s financial stability (i.e., fiscal councils, parliamentary budget offices); and 4) conclusions, which provide eight points summarising the discussed issues.
i sądowniczej. W oparciu o jednolity schemat analizy organów każdej z wyodrębnionych władz Autor przedstawia funkcjonalne i organizacyjne aspekty zasady podziału władzy, a następnie charakteryzuje stosowane przez te organy „hamulce” (instrumenty powstrzymywania) wobec innych władz. Ważne miejsce zajmuje też omówienie konstytucyjnych instrumentów (form) współdziałania władz.
Papers by Grzegorz Kuca
parliamentary supervision function and, in the long term, the accountability
of public authorities in the field of public finances.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the forms and methods of depreciating the state budget as the highest-ranking financial plan taking into account the planned state revenues and expenditures for the next budget year, and to propose ways to restore the state budget to its proper rank related to its special character and central role in the system of public finances. In particular, it discusses the budgetary powers of the government and parliament against the background of the principle of the separation of powers, the content of the state budget and the budget law, as well as the phenomenon of debudgetization of public finances, which allows expending public funds without regard to the state budget and using various forms of execution enabling expenditure to be shown in periods other than those actually incurred. The analysis leads to the conclusion that these phenomena cannot be reduced, let alone eliminated, with the use of budgetary control instruments increasingly commonly referred to as the myth of fiscal control. These phenomena are accompanied by record increases in public debt, which were caused by incurring liabilities to finance tasks related to countering the COVID-19 pandemic. In conclusion, a proposal is made to introduce changes which will limit or even eliminate the abovementioned problems.
Z recenzji prof. dr hab. Jadwigi Glumińskiej-Pawlic
The authors deal with various problems connected to controlling public institutions and incumbents’ responsibility in state bodies. The work is divided into three parts. Part I: Law examines the institutional and objective approach. Part II: Fairness and Rights considers the subject approach, referring to a recipient of rights. Part III: Authority looks at the functional approach, referring to the executors of law. Providing insights into increasing understanding of various concepts, principles, and institutions characteristic of the modern state, the book makes a valuable contribution to the area of comparative constitutional change.
The book’s scientific objective is to answer the question as to whether the scope and methods of budget procedure regulation in EU Member States’ constitutions sufficiently ensure the optimal, formal conditions for carrying out this regulation. Answering this question requires explaining the following, more detailed, issues:
1) How should the notion of ‘budget procedure’ be understood, and, within that scope, how should the particular stages and phases of the procedure be understood?
2) What premises determine the existence and form of a budget procedure, and how can it be optimized?
3) Is a budget procedure shaped by budget principles, the form and status of budget acts, and participants in the budget procedure? If yes, to what extent?
4) How are scopes of activities and competences divided among participants in the budget procedure? How far may one participant interfere in the sphere reserved for another participant?
5) Are the constitutional rules concerning the stages of projecting, passing, executing and supervising the execution of a state budget precise? Do they correspond to the present conditions and constitutional practice?
The research assesses extant legal regulations for budget procedure by adopting and implementing the following detailed goals: 1) reconstructing the notion of budget procedure and its elements, as well as determining the regulations involved within that scope; 2) identifying and systemising theoretical and practical problems resulting from the present regulation of budget procedure; 3) presenting the legal regulations that are currently in force and indicating which of them can and should be included in each contemporary constitution (de lege fundamentale ferenda).
The study concentrates on budget procedure regulations in the constitutional laws of the EU Member States. As of 1 January 2016, the EU Member States have been included in comparative research. Therefore, the constitutional provisions of the 28 EU Member States will be analysed, with particular reference given to the specificity of the British constitutional system, where there is no typical, written constitution and where numerous procedures and institutions, which cannot be found in continental Europe, have developed.
The basis for this study’s hypothesis and particular theses is the assumption that budget procedures must be created to provide efficient, effective passing of the state budget. Referring to that assumption, the author built the following research hypothesis (H): ‘Constitutional regulation of budget procedures among EU Member States does not ensure the optimal, formal conditions necessary for passing state budgets. Moreover, their partiality and lack of precision result in practical problems. In this situation, it is worth considering the possibility of constitutionalising some elements of budget procedures – applying the achievements (constitutional regulations) of other EU Member States – as well as implementing new legal solutions, which could eliminate issues. It is, therefore, necessary to give new consideration to constitutional regulations regarding budget procedures. How these issues are regulated generally determines correct substantial development, and, when detailed legal constructions function together, they further guarantee that budget procedures are carried out efficiently and effectively. Because EU requirements must be met by Member States, they should (and, perhaps, they shall) be implemented in national legislation’.
2. Structure
This dissertation is comprised of an introduction, four substantive chapters and a section defining the paper’s conclusions and de lege ferenda postulates. Chapter 1, entitled ‘Notions, phases and determinants of a budget procedure’, contains Subchapter 1, entitled ‘Characteristics of definition conditions for budget procedure and budget process’, in which the author distinguishes between the following notions: ‘procedure’, ‘process’ and ‘proceedings’. He draws attention to different approaches to these notions in particular legal areas (administrative, civil, financial, criminal and constitutional law). Then, he specifies the meaning of the term ‘budget procedure’, creating a definition fitting the basic condition of definition correctness, which is specified in the principle definition: fit per genus et differentiam specificam. He also defines differentia specifica for the notion ‘budget procedure’, which should be included in the content of definiens explaining definiendum. Thus, the author conceptualises ‘budget procedure’. He also considers the scope and content of procedural regulations and characterises budget procedure strategies (top-down, bottom-up and top-down/bottom-up). Then, in Subchapter 2, ‘Stages of budget procedure, phases of budget process, budget cycle’, he states that significant complication in budget procedures necessitates making crucial distinctions, so the proceedings governing the budget procedures may be classified as logically and substantially correct parts, stages or sections. The author also holds that the basic mean of division is obviously a dichotomous division made according to opposite features, which enable distinguishing the stage of budget passing from the stage of state budget execution (dichotomous division). However, considering the subjective criterion, the author distinguishes between three budget procedure stages: projecting, passing and executing (trichotomous division). He also delineates phases of budget processes (behavioural approach), which take place in particular stages. Following this discussion, in Subchapter 3, ‘Determinants of budget procedure, as well as notions of ‘budget procedure’ and ‘state budget’ in the constitutions of EU Member States’, the author describes budget procedure determinants, which are: budget principles, form and significance of the budget act and participants in the budget procedure. At the end of this section, the author references constitutional regulation of budget procedures, as well as constitutional frames of the notion of state budgets. Building from this, in Subchapter 4, ‘Conclusions’, eight partial conclusions could be drawn regarding the theoretical aspects of budget procedures.
After having delineated the three budget procedure stages, the author, logically, chose to include three chapters discussing those stages. Chapter 2, entitled ‘Projecting a state budget’, considers: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at elaborating a budget proposal; 2) entities’ competences in state budget projecting; 3) the legal effects of failing to provide a budget proposal; and 4) conclusions, which provide eleven points summarising the previously outlined issues. Chapter 3, which is dedicated to ‘Passing a state budget’, discusses: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at passing state budgets; 2) entities’ competences in state budget passing; 3) the legal effects of failing to pass a state budget; and 4) conclusions, which provide nine points summarising the described issues. Chapter 4, the final chapter, covers the scope of ‘State budget execution’ and is comprised of: 1) rules of proceedings aimed at executing a state budget (i.e., introductory remarks, characteristics of proceedings’ objects, rules of execution in a substantive approach, entities’ competences in state budget passing); 2) the control of state budget execution (i.e., the governmental or ministerial responsibility for budgetary affairs within the scope of preparing reports concerning state budget execution, the role of supreme audit bodies and parliament’s hearing the report and either granting or refusing to grant discharge); 3) independent bodies, which monitor the state’s financial stability (i.e., fiscal councils, parliamentary budget offices); and 4) conclusions, which provide eight points summarising the discussed issues.
i sądowniczej. W oparciu o jednolity schemat analizy organów każdej z wyodrębnionych władz Autor przedstawia funkcjonalne i organizacyjne aspekty zasady podziału władzy, a następnie charakteryzuje stosowane przez te organy „hamulce” (instrumenty powstrzymywania) wobec innych władz. Ważne miejsce zajmuje też omówienie konstytucyjnych instrumentów (form) współdziałania władz.
parliamentary supervision function and, in the long term, the accountability
of public authorities in the field of public finances.
The aim of the paper is to analyse the forms and methods of depreciating the state budget as the highest-ranking financial plan taking into account the planned state revenues and expenditures for the next budget year, and to propose ways to restore the state budget to its proper rank related to its special character and central role in the system of public finances. In particular, it discusses the budgetary powers of the government and parliament against the background of the principle of the separation of powers, the content of the state budget and the budget law, as well as the phenomenon of debudgetization of public finances, which allows expending public funds without regard to the state budget and using various forms of execution enabling expenditure to be shown in periods other than those actually incurred. The analysis leads to the conclusion that these phenomena cannot be reduced, let alone eliminated, with the use of budgetary control instruments increasingly commonly referred to as the myth of fiscal control. These phenomena are accompanied by record increases in public debt, which were caused by incurring liabilities to finance tasks related to countering the COVID-19 pandemic. In conclusion, a proposal is made to introduce changes which will limit or even eliminate the abovementioned problems.
the position and activity of the Constitutional Tribunal. As a result, within
the period from November 2015 to December 2016, six so-called corrective
acts, prepared by the party Law and Justice, as regards the Constitutional
Tribunal were passed. During the crisis there were numerous manifestations
of both supporters and opponents to changes in the Tribunal.
Several other important statutes were enacted that year, pertaining to: a
media statutes package, the law on public prosecutor’s office, the state assistance
in upbringing of the children act, an amendment to the act on retirement
and benefit, the antiterrorist act. A serious challenge for the juridical
authorities in 2016 were the legal consequences of the conflict
which occurred in connection to the dispute regarding the Constitutional
Tribunal. That fact influenced the Supreme Court which declared that
judgments publicly announced, even not promulgated, are binding for the
court in the juridical sphere.
Introduction: Basics of the functioning of Polish political system
(Jarosław Szymanek)
Part I. Historical, political and constitutional background
1. An outline of recent political history (Bartłomiej Zdaniuk)
2. The road to a new constitution (Jarosław Szymanek)
3. Characteristics of the Constitution of 1997 (Maria Kruk)
4. The basie principles of the political system (Grzegorz Kuca)
Part II. Democratic processes in action
5. Elections and electoral system (Bartłomiej Michalak)
6. Political parties and party system (Bartłomiej Michalak)
7. Political activity of the citizens (Mikołaj Cześnik)
8. Relations between government and opposition (Zbigniew Machelski)
9. System of governance (Jarosław Szymanek)
10. Quality of Polish democracy (Zbigniew Machelski)
Part III. Constitutional institutions
11. Institutions of direct democracy (Piotr Uziębło)
!2. The legislative power: the Sejm and the Senate (Jarosław Szymanek)
13. The executive power: the President and the Council of Ministers (Michał Bożek)
14. The judicial power: courts and tribunals (Lech Jamróz)
15. Constitutional organs of law control and protection (Krzysztof Prokop) 16. Sources of law and the legislative process (Monika Florczak-Wątor)
Part IV. Spheres of politics
17. Religious policy: relationship between state and church
(Wojciech Brzozowski)
18. Economic policy: social market economy (Adam Krzywoń)
19. Local policy: local government (Zbigniew Gromek)
20. European policy: Polands participation in the European Union
(Aleksandra Kustra)
How to Save a Constitutional Democracy – is both the title and the research problem of the newest book by T. Ginsburg and A. Z. Huq, as well an inspiration for the present article. The authors describe constitutional mechanisms that hinder or accelerate democratic erosion. A comparative analysis of many countries allows the authors to distinguish two pathways for leaving a liberal constitutional democracy: the fast path of authoritarian collapse and the slow path of democratic erosion. The authors emphasize that nowadays the dominant path is the slow one, which is a process that aggregates many less important processes using measures and methods that rarely constitute a frontal assault on one of three institutional predicates of a liberal constitutional democracy. In conclusion, they propose numerous ways of fighting democratic erosion.
Jak ocalić demokrację konstytucyjną (artykuł recenzyjny)
Jak ocalić demokrację konstytucyjną to pytanie będące zarazem tytułem, jak i problemem badawczym najnowszej książki T. Ginsburga i A.Z. Huqa stanowiącej inspirację do napisania niniejszego artykułu. Autorzy opisują mechanizmy konstytucyjne utrudniającej, jak i przyspieszające erozję demokracji. Analiza porównawcza wielu państw skłoniła autorów do wyróżnienia dwóch ścieżek wychodzenia z liberalnej demokracji konstytucyjnej: szybkiej drogi autorytarnego upadku, wolnej drogi erozji demokracji. Autorzy wskazują, że współcześnie dominuje wolna droga będąca procesem agregującym wiele pomniejszych procesów wykorzystujących środki i metody rzadko stanowiące frontalny atak jeden z trzech instytucjonalnych predykatów liberalnej demokracji konstytucyjnej. Konkludując proponują wiele sposób walki z erozją demokracji.
From the perspective of financial law, these events suggest that the financial crisis created a sustained threat to the social relations. There are at least three reasons to suspect that this is the case. Firstly, it may paralyse parliamentary activity, which is otherwise aimed at exercising citizens’ constitutional rights. Secondly, it may provide a reason for governments to restrict the execution of these rights, which—in the context of the rule of law—would be impossible under normal conditions. Thirdly, it may be used to pressure constitutional courts to rule more favourably or more leniently when governments and parliaments seek to limit citizens’ economic and social rights (i.e., when performing control of constitutionality of an act).
In the context of public debt and budget deficits, the scholarship constitutional law faces several significant questions regarding budget procedure. The paper study seeks to provide answers to the following questions:
1) Is the government required to include any budget items that cannot be altered or rejected by parliament in its budget bill?
2) to which extent does if so passing a deficit budget limit the ability of the government or parliament to prepare drafts or pass laws that imply new spending?
3) Does a deficit budget limit the government’s ability to prepare or parliament’s ability to pass laws that reduces taxes and other public levies?
4) Would the present assessment rules of constitutionally protected values be sufficiently constitutionally protected if a lawmaker were to limit one such rule in order to protect the economic security of the state?
5) In the absence of a direct constitutional provision limiting state debt (e.g., numerical fiscal rules or balanced budget rule), could the constitutional court declare a law that restricts economic and social rights unconstitutional on the grounds that it poses a threat to the economic security of the state?
6) With regard to the protection of constitutional values and provisions, must new jurisdictional instruments be developed to ensure constitutional supremacy within the system of sources of law?
7) Would an analysis of constitutional courts’ current jurisprudence conclude that the protection of state economic security as pursued by the authorities (including its parliament, government and constitutional court) has already caused excessive emphasis of this economic interpretation of the law and even the constitution itself?
The paper provide evidence that the state’s financing of citizens’ expectations is determined by its budget act, which, in addition to international agreements and other grounds resulting in third parties’ claims against the state, outlines the execution of all other laws related to finance (see: G. Kuca, Budget Procedure in Contemporary Constitutional Law. A Comparative Analysis by the Example of EU Member States, Wolters Kluwer 2018, pp. 504). A budget act is passed within a special procedure. After the financial crisis, this procedure strayed considerably from the previous theoretical model, which had entrusted governments with the right to prepare and execute the state budget and parliaments with the right to pass and control budget legislation. For example, governments assumed multiple competences pertaining to the passage and amendment of the state budget, which were formerly considered to be within the purview of parliaments. In reaction, parliaments developed forms of cooperation in budget execution; however, these have not provided a sufficient balance to government dominance. Consequently, parliamentary competences, such as the right to democratically approve the budget, have been deprived of real significance. In this context, the constitutional control of laws related to the execution of budgets and other potential financial plans by state authorities has become particularly important, especially where the implementation of legal instruments that pose a threat to the economic security of the state is involved. These challenges must be met by constitutional case-law, which must develop new juridical instruments, regarding the need of constitutional review of planning norms.