Papers by PUJARINI DAS
Proceedings, Jun 9, 2017
Philosophy itself is philosophizing to our experience of the world, life, or thought, and it is t... more Philosophy itself is philosophizing to our experience of the world, life, or thought, and it is truly enriching our social, political, intellectual, and emotional existence. Although, philosophers have various views on a single issue, but they still share a common interest, i.e., a critic with the comprehensive thought of approach, and therefore, 'philosophy' is a way to understand our life (not a way of life). Similarly, our life is based on the various kinds of habits and rituals (prayer, meditation, yoga, worship many deities, speaking multiple languages and symbols for communicating with each other, eating various foods with different cultural practices, etc.) due to the religious practices and people love to do these procedures to continue their existing diversity of cultures. Take an example of 'Happiness'. For understanding the true nature of happiness, there are many philosophical debates on it from both the east and west perspectives, but their underlying motto is same, i.e., the continuous practice of habits. However, this paper will mainly focus on Aristotle's understanding of 'Eudaimonia' (happiness) and the significant role of 'habits' for flourishing a happy life. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Springer India, 2018
The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it... more The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute freedom of the will, but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddha’s view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on ‘whether free will is viable in the context of the anattāvāda in Buddhism.’ It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought.
Book Reviews by PUJARINI DAS
The book, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995), by Alfred R. Mele, deals prima... more The book, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995), by Alfred R. Mele, deals primarily with two main concepts, “self-control” and “individual autonomy,” and the relationship between them. The book is divided into two parts: (1) a view of self-control, the self-controlled person, and behaviour manifesting self-control, and (2) a view of personal autonomy, the autonomous person, and autonomous behaviour. Mele (Ibid.) defines self-control as the opposite of the Aristotelian concept of akrasia, or the contrary of akrasia, which implies weakness of will, incontinence, or lack of self-control—the state of mind in which one acts against one’s better judgement. According to Mele, the concept of self-control can be approached from two perspectives: (a) how self-control affects human behaviour, and (b) how self-control-associated behavior can enhance our understanding of ‘personal autonomy’ and ‘autonomous behaviour’—personal autonomy requires self-control, and autonomous persons and autonomous behaviour are naturally found together. Therefore, I might say that self-control is essential to enhancing one’s autonomy.
In part I, we find an account of self-control where Mele argues that even an ideally self-controlled person might lack autonomy. In part II, Mele gives an explicit account of autonomy and explains what must be added to self-control to achieve autonomy. This is the pivotal claim made by Mele (dismantling the intuitively connected notions of self-control and autonomy).
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Papers by PUJARINI DAS
Book Reviews by PUJARINI DAS
In part I, we find an account of self-control where Mele argues that even an ideally self-controlled person might lack autonomy. In part II, Mele gives an explicit account of autonomy and explains what must be added to self-control to achieve autonomy. This is the pivotal claim made by Mele (dismantling the intuitively connected notions of self-control and autonomy).
In part I, we find an account of self-control where Mele argues that even an ideally self-controlled person might lack autonomy. In part II, Mele gives an explicit account of autonomy and explains what must be added to self-control to achieve autonomy. This is the pivotal claim made by Mele (dismantling the intuitively connected notions of self-control and autonomy).