Papers by Bonnie J. Palifka
The seventh Academia against Corruption in the Americas (ACA) Conference will be hosted by Observ... more The seventh Academia against Corruption in the Americas (ACA) Conference will be hosted by Observatorio Fiscal, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colombia (hybrid format), on May 21-23, 2025. As the title suggests, this is an international, interdisciplinary forum for the academic anti-corruption community to share research results and teaching experiences. ACA has three main goals: 1. to enrich and promote multidisciplinary research on corruption and anti-corruption in the Americas. 2. to promote the inclusion of courses or sub-topics on corruption in university curricula. 3. to form a research and teaching network in the Americas. (See our group on LinkedIn.) We accept three types of submissions: 1. research on corruption and anticorruption, especially in the Americas 2. didactic tools and examples of teaching corruption and anticorruption 3. anticorruption tools and initiatives from civil society.
Corruption and Government
Corruption thwarts development and human flourishing. For this reason, target 16.5 of the Sustain... more Corruption thwarts development and human flourishing. For this reason, target 16.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 16.5) exhorts nations “to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms.” The current metrics, however, are ill-defined and limited in scope, neither specifying “substantially” nor encompassing “all its forms.” Thus, unlike other targets, the indicators fail to measure the phenomenon adequately or to define the conditions under which the target is reached. Furthermore, countries are expected to provide the relevant data; so far, they have not done so.
Is there a better way to measure compliance with SDG 16.5? Specifically, we ask: what are “all [the] forms” of corruption; what does “substantial” corruption reduction mean; and what data are available to enable its measurement? We propose a new Multidimensional Index of Progress Against Corruption (MIPAC) to measure countries’ achievement of SDG 16.5. Employing non-proprietary datasets and the multidimensional methodology popular in the poverty literature, the MIPAC takes into account 21 types of corruption and provides a count of the types of corruption in which each country has advanced significantly since 2015. The MIPAC allows us to distinguish better between countries’ improvement and to identify the types of corruption (dimensions) in which each country needs to make more progress.
We find that 137 of 186 countries improved significantly on at least one dimension between 2015 and 2022; the highest score is 13. Unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index, which shows global stagnation, the MIPAC reveals 652 country-dimensions that have improved substantially, encouraging countries to make further improvements. The dimensions on which the most countries improved (66 countries each) are police bribery and bribery related to red tape, while the least progress was made in legislative corruption, with only five countries improving substantially in this area. This index is replicable on an annual basis and represents a potential standard for setting anti-corruption goals beyond 2030.
Veritas: revista de filosofía y teología, Dec 1, 2018
Resumen Los estudiantes universitarios pueden contribuir a la calidad de la democracia de su país... more Resumen Los estudiantes universitarios pueden contribuir a la calidad de la democracia de su país en la medida en que aprendan a distinguir cómo la corrupción se instala en su práctica cotidiana, la combatan y se comprometan a estar atentos a la honestidad de sus acciones y la veracidad de su discurso. Describimos las implicaciones de comprender a la democracia como gobierno por discusión y pasamos a proponer a la razón pública como el sine qua non de una democracia que busca hacer justicia social y que requiere ciudadanos dispuestos a debatir ideas con honestidad y rigor crítico, con debates públicos y pasión por la verdad. Estas ideas las contrastamos con los hallazgos de una encuesta sobre corrupción aplicada anualmente a estudiantes universitarios.
Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jul 21, 2020
Journal of Economic Psychology, Feb 1, 2009
The effects of personality on earnings are still relatively unknown. Using a unique database, I e... more The effects of personality on earnings are still relatively unknown. Using a unique database, I examine the effects of eleven personality traits on compensation among college graduates in Mexico. With matched employee-supervisor surveys, I show that self-assessments and supervisor assessments of the same traits differ, and estimate the marginal effects of each on compensation. Consistent with previous studies on personality and earnings, regressions using self-assessments reveal Motivation traits to be the strongest predictors of compensation. Using supervisor assessments, however, I find that Openness to Experience has stronger impacts on compensation than does Motivation. The inclusion of supervisor assessments provides important information about how personality influences income directly, a unique feature of this essay.
Crime Law and Social Change, Mar 1, 2015
To attempt to summarize the last 40 years' research in several disciplines on why corruption exis... more To attempt to summarize the last 40 years' research in several disciplines on why corruption exists is ambitious in itself. To do so in less than 100 pages is daring. Yet that is precisely what Tina Søreide does skillfully in Drivers of corruption: A brief review Søreide [1]. In five short chapters, she takes us on a whirlwind tour of the economic theories and evidence regarding the conditions that are conducive to corruption, while incorporating and highlighting important insights drawn from political science, law, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. The result is a bold and insightful introduction to corruption that is useful to scholars, practitioners, and laypersons alike. This book was commissioned by the World Bank and financed by the African Development Bank, in the context of the multi-organizational World Forum on Law, Justice, and Development. Its announced purpose is to serve as a foundation to guide policymakers in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs): by understanding the incentives, conditions, and contexts that lead to corruption, the IFIs will be able to identify potential problems before they occur and design better lending and other funding contracts, in order to prevent (rather than punish) corruption in the projects they fund. The final product, however, is sure to please a much wider audience. In the Introduction (Chapter 1), Søreide defines corruption and briefly explains why it is problematic. The basic definition she provides in the first line-B…the word corruption refers to how individuals entrusted with authority to make decisions on behalf of the organization misuse their position for personal gain^-is a good paraphrase of what has become a standard definition. Although she mentions and explains many types of corruption throughout the text (see, for example, the Bglossary^on pages 2-3), from the outset the working definition of corruption is bribery. This is, I believe, a mistake. In many parts of the world, conflicts of interest and crony capitalism are at least as problematic as bribery. Often, various types of corruption occur simultaneously, each encouraging or enabling the other. Fortunately, many of these other types are included throughout. While revealing graphically the wide regional disparities in several types of
The persistence of corruption has been explained by inherited reputation, collusion, and external... more The persistence of corruption has been explained by inherited reputation, collusion, and externalities. This paper offers an alternative explanation: workers self-select into jobs with or without bribes, depending on their propensity to corruption. Three single-period cases and one career choice model incorporating both risk and uncertainty are examined for the existence of separating equilibria. The effect of wages on bribery and possible implications for labor supply in distinct markets are considered.
Corruption and Government
Corrupt incentives exist because state officials have the power to allocate scarce benefits and i... more Corrupt incentives exist because state officials have the power to allocate scarce benefits and impose onerous costs. Because scarcity lies at the heart of corrupt deals, basic insights derived from microeconomics can help structure efforts to reduce corruption. This chapter and the next focus on incentive-based reforms that reduce the benefits or increase the costs of malfeasance. This chapter considers the following reform options: program elimination, privatization, reform of public programs, administrative reform, the deterrent effect of anticorruption laws, and procurement systems. Program Elimination The most straightforward way to limit corruption is to eliminate corruption-laden programs. If the state has no authority to restrict exports or license businesses, this eliminates a source of bribes. If a subsidy program is eliminated, the bribes that accompanied it will disappear as well. If price controls are lifted, market prices will express scarcity values. In general, reforms that increase the competitiveness of the economy will help reduce corrupt incentives (Ades and Di Telia 1995,1997b: 514). Some public programs work so poorly that they function principally as bribe-generating machines for officials. Structures that allow officials unfettered discretion are particularly likely sources of payoffs, especially if citizens and firms have no recourse. In such cases program elimination is sometimes better than more subtle reform strategies. For example, the licenses and permissions needed to set up businesses and continue them in operation may have no sound policy justification.
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Mar 5, 2016
Corruption describes a relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state off... more Corruption describes a relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant actors; in other cases private actors are the most powerful forces. The relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall impact of corruption on society and the distribution of the gains between bribers and bribees. Analysis of corruption is part of the ongoing and inconclusive debate about which form of government is most conducive to economic growth. Although wealthy countries do tend to be democracies, there is no simple statistical relationship between growth and democratic government. The reason for this is not difficult to fathom – “democracy” is simply too general a term to capture the range of government forms that come under that rubric. Furthermore, a government structure that works well in one country may be dysfunctional in another context. Widespread, entrenched corruption is one form of dysfunction. Is the establishment of democracy an anticorruption strategy? The desire for reelection constrains the greed of politicians. The protection of civil liberties and free speech, which generally accompanies democratic electoral processes, makes open and transparent government possible. In contrast, nondemocratic states are especially susceptible to corrupt incentives because their rulers have the potential to organize government with few checks and balances. But this contrast is too sharp. One need look no further than some state and local governments in the United States to find well-established corrupt systems that compare quite well with autocratic systems. For example, the former mayor of Detroit, Kwame Kilpatrick, helped drive the city into bankruptcy with his racketeering, including directing at least $84 million in city contracts to a personal friend. Rod Blagojevich, former governor of Illinois, was impeached and is currently serving a prison sentence (the fourth recent Illinois governor to go to jail) for trying to “auction off” the Senate seat left open when Barack Obama became president. Payoff scandals have implicated elected politicians in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Italy, Korea, and Japan, to name just a few. Corruption is common at the local government level in France and Germany. The former prime minister of Croatia, Ivo Sanader, was found guilty of accepting more than $13 million in bribes from an oil company and a bank, to dominate the respective industries in Croatia. Clearly, democratic forms do not always succeed in checking corruption.
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Papers by Bonnie J. Palifka
Is there a better way to measure compliance with SDG 16.5? Specifically, we ask: what are “all [the] forms” of corruption; what does “substantial” corruption reduction mean; and what data are available to enable its measurement? We propose a new Multidimensional Index of Progress Against Corruption (MIPAC) to measure countries’ achievement of SDG 16.5. Employing non-proprietary datasets and the multidimensional methodology popular in the poverty literature, the MIPAC takes into account 21 types of corruption and provides a count of the types of corruption in which each country has advanced significantly since 2015. The MIPAC allows us to distinguish better between countries’ improvement and to identify the types of corruption (dimensions) in which each country needs to make more progress.
We find that 137 of 186 countries improved significantly on at least one dimension between 2015 and 2022; the highest score is 13. Unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index, which shows global stagnation, the MIPAC reveals 652 country-dimensions that have improved substantially, encouraging countries to make further improvements. The dimensions on which the most countries improved (66 countries each) are police bribery and bribery related to red tape, while the least progress was made in legislative corruption, with only five countries improving substantially in this area. This index is replicable on an annual basis and represents a potential standard for setting anti-corruption goals beyond 2030.
Is there a better way to measure compliance with SDG 16.5? Specifically, we ask: what are “all [the] forms” of corruption; what does “substantial” corruption reduction mean; and what data are available to enable its measurement? We propose a new Multidimensional Index of Progress Against Corruption (MIPAC) to measure countries’ achievement of SDG 16.5. Employing non-proprietary datasets and the multidimensional methodology popular in the poverty literature, the MIPAC takes into account 21 types of corruption and provides a count of the types of corruption in which each country has advanced significantly since 2015. The MIPAC allows us to distinguish better between countries’ improvement and to identify the types of corruption (dimensions) in which each country needs to make more progress.
We find that 137 of 186 countries improved significantly on at least one dimension between 2015 and 2022; the highest score is 13. Unlike the Corruption Perceptions Index, which shows global stagnation, the MIPAC reveals 652 country-dimensions that have improved substantially, encouraging countries to make further improvements. The dimensions on which the most countries improved (66 countries each) are police bribery and bribery related to red tape, while the least progress was made in legislative corruption, with only five countries improving substantially in this area. This index is replicable on an annual basis and represents a potential standard for setting anti-corruption goals beyond 2030.
Submission deadline: July 10, 2023
Decisions announced: August 4, 2023
We invite professors, researchers, and civil society organizations from all disciplines to submit proposals in
• English at https://app.oxfordabstracts.com/stages/6214/submitter
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Register at the link provided in the PDF document.
Deadline extended to January 15