Papers by Chad M Stevenson
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2024
Abstract: One intuition which motivates subjectivist theories about meaning in life is the anti-a... more Abstract: One intuition which motivates subjectivist theories about meaning in life is the anti-alienation intuition, i.e., that for a life to be meaningful it must engage with the person whose life it is. This article contends that the anti-alienation, and the subjectivist theories it motivates, are best understood as tracking fulfilment in life; an axiologically distinct evaluative dimension a life can have which stands apart from meaning.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2024
What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life maint... more What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life maintain that the consequences of that life confer meaning upon it. This article advances one such theory: welfarism about meaning in life. According to this view, a life is conferred meaning if, and only if, and then only insofar as, it promotes or protects the well-being of other welfare subjects. The purpose of this article is to show why welfarism about meaning in life is the most plausible theory about meaning in life. What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life, broadly construed, maintain that a life is conferred meaning when that life brings about some relevant state-of-affairs. The more a life contributes to those relevant states-of-affairs, the more meaningful that life is. This article advances one such theory, specifically welfarism about meaning in life (hereafter WML). According to this view, meaning is conferred upon a life if, and only if, then only insofar as, it promotes and/or protects the well-being of other welfare subjects. The purpose of this article is to show why WML is the most plausible theory about meaning in life. This article proceeds as follows. I begin (§2) by outlining how the literature broadly comes to grips with the concept of meaning in life. Next (§3) I sketch out existing consequentialist theories about meaning in life and how this family of theories avoids some classic trappings which ensnare its ethical counterpart. I then (§4) sketch out WML, what motivates it, and how it vindicates our intuitions about important data points, giving it initial plausibility. The remainder (§5) of the article is dedicated to responding to objections.
Philosophia, 2024
What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature... more What is the relationship between meaning in life and luck? One popular view within the literature is that resultant luck vitiates meaning; that if the relevant state-of- affairs is primarily the result of luck, chance, or happenstance, rather than the person’s actions, then no meaning is conferred. Call this the anti-luck constraint. In this article it is argued that we should reject the anti-luck constraint. Two types of cases, often cited as examples in favour of the anti-luck constraint, are examined: the lucky idiot and the incompetent villain. Such lives, it is contended, can be meaningful even when the relevant states-of-affairs are primarily the product of resultant luck.
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023
Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful... more Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don't live meaningful lives, but morality is irrelevant for meaning. First, it is argued moral monsters live meaningless lives not because of immoral actions per se, but rather the harm they cause. Second, that moral monsters can live meaningful lives confuses meaningfulness with significance. Significance, I propose, is conferred upon a life when one's actions impact others' well-being for good or ill. On the view, moral monsters live meaningless but significant lives.
Philosophical Papers, 2022
It is widely held that for a life to be conferred meaning it requires the appropriate type of age... more It is widely held that for a life to be conferred meaning it requires the appropriate type of agency. Call this the agency requirement. The agency requirement is primarily motivated in the philosophical literature by the assumption that there is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that humans have the capacity for meaning whereas animals do not; and that difference must come down to their agency or lack thereof. This paper aims to undercut the motivation for the agency requirement by arguing our pre-theoretical intuitions actually run opposite; that ani- mals, and even objects, can have meaningful lives/existences. The argument is twofold. First I extend an existing argument for animals as having a capacity for meaning to objects. Second, I argue maintaining that only humans have the capacity for meaning results in the more counter- intuitive upshot that all animals and objects have, by definition, meaningless existences. Since we pre-theoretically believe that anything can be meaningful - even things which by definition lack agency - then we have strong reason for being sceptical about an agency requirement for meaning in life.
Utilitas, 2018
While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread 'anti-hedonist' intuition to prefe... more While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread 'anti-hedonist' intuition to prefer reality to an experience-machine, hedonists have marshaled empirical evidence that shows such an assumption to be unfounded. Results of several experience machine variants indicate there is no widespread anti-hedonist intuition. From these findings, hedonists claim Nozick's argument fails as an objection to hedonism. This paper suggests the argument surrounding experience-machines has been misconceived. Rather than eliciting intuitions about what is prudentially valuable, these intuitive judgments are instead calculations about prudential payoffs and tradeoffs. This position can help explain the divergence of intuitions people have about experience-machines.
Drafts by Chad M Stevenson
Traditionally, philosophers assume wellbeing is a one-dimensional phenomenon. In this paper I adv... more Traditionally, philosophers assume wellbeing is a one-dimensional phenomenon. In this paper I advance the unorthodox view that wellbeing is two-dimensional. This 'bipartite distinction' draws a line between how a person is 'going' and that very same person is 'doing'. I explain how the ambiguity of ordinary welfare inquiries conflates these two dimensions of wellbeing (doing-well and going-well) before explaining how welfare inquiries, assessments, and judgments support my view. I consider several refinements as to what it means for the good life to be bipartite, before settling upon the conclusion that doing-well and going-well are different dimensions of the same concept.
Intuitively, a life improving over time is better than a life that deteriorates over time-even if... more Intuitively, a life improving over time is better than a life that deteriorates over time-even if both lives come to the same additive total of momentary welfare. What explains our intuition about these different lives? One influential view argues the former has a better 'shape' than the latter, shape being the distribution of momentary welfare over a lifetime. This view hypothesizes that the shape of a life is a valuable feature of a person's lifetime welfare. This paper rejects the shape of a life hypothesis and side with story theories, a story theory being any theory stating narrative-relations (or meaning) give shape the appearance of value. Yet story theorists are divided on how to understand the relationship between narrative-relations and momentary welfare, giving rise to a number of counter-intuitive results. The aim of this paper is to advance a novel story theory named 'the poker-hand view,' that gives a principled account to resolve these issues.
This paper surveys a number of competing taxonomies within the philosophy of well-being. I begin ... more This paper surveys a number of competing taxonomies within the philosophy of well-being. I begin by sketching out the subject matter of well-being and the purpose of a taxonomy. I then proceed by reviewing each taxonomy systematically; describing their classificatory structure and explaining their perceived strengths and weaknesses. I finish by giving a speculative explanation as to why there are various taxonomies: that particular classificatory divisions might better support some theories of well-being over others. If so, it would make sense to pick a taxonomy that supported one's own favored theory of well-being and reject any taxonomy that might place said theory into disrepute.
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Papers by Chad M Stevenson
Drafts by Chad M Stevenson