Papers by wided mattoussi
Journal of cleaner production, Apr 1, 2024
Energy Economics, Nov 30, 2023
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2010
This paper sheds light on the design of various incentive schemes to face the unsustainable groun... more This paper sheds light on the design of various incentive schemes to face the unsustainable groundwater over-pumping by farmers. The response of the Water Authority in tackling this over-exploitation will differ according to whether it uses an incentive scheme based on the individual farmer’s water use, which is his/her own private information, or it resorts to a total-water-use-based incentive schemes, where the total water use is publicly observable. Two schemes will be discussed. The first one corresponds to the framework of moral hazard in team problems where the Water Authority administers incentive schemes that do not balance the budget, thereby restoring water use efficiency. In the second scheme, the WA promotes the cooperative behavior. We show how cooperative management institutions can reduce water overuse and improve incentives for efficient water use, by inducing peer monitoring by cooperative members. We show that water overuse is more likely when punishments are weak and cooperatives are large. We also extend the basic analysis to allow for collusion in monitoring between cooperative members and compare different monitoring structures.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Jun 1, 2009
Theft of water by manipulating meters constrains economic pricing in semi-arid regions. Cooperati... more Theft of water by manipulating meters constrains economic pricing in semi-arid regions. Cooperative management can reduce theft, improving incentives for e¢ cient water use, by inducing peer monitoring. We show in a theoretical model that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments weak and cooperatives large. We show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We test the model on data from Tunisia, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. The results con…rm that well-designed incentives can reduce theft, and that constraints on monitoring costs a¤ect institutional design.
Economic Analysis and Policy
From productivity to exporting or vice versa? Evidence from the Tunisian manufacturing sector
Theft of water by manipulation of water meters is an important con-straint on the implementation ... more Theft of water by manipulation of water meters is an important con-straint on the implementation of economic pricing policies, particularly in semi-arid regions of the developing world. We show how cooperative management institutions can reduce theft, improving incentives for e ¢-cient water use, by inducing peer monitoring by cooperative members. We show in a theoretical model that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments weak, cooperatives large and the uptake of water-saving tech-nologies low. However, cooperative membership, punishment levels and technology adoption are not exogenous but are chosen by cooperative members in response to conditions that themselves inuence incentives for theft. We test the model on data from Tunisia, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs to deal with the endogene-ity of these proximate determinants of theft. The results provide strong con rmation of the ability of well designed incentives to reduce theft,...
Water Policy, 2022
Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains the implementation of water-savin... more Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains the implementation of water-saving technologies, which themselves affect the incentives for theft. Using a theoretical model of centralized management, we show that theft is more likely when water prices and monitoring costs are high and punishment levels are weak. Adoption of water-saving technologies is more likely when monitoring costs are low and water prices are high, though only within the range of low to medium prices. The basic analysis is extended to allow for collusion between cheating farmers and the monitor. In the model, we show that collusion is more likely when punishments are weak. We test the model predictions, using data from Tunisia for the years 2012–18, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. We use the inverse probability weighting (IPW) method to correct for the potential bias arising from non-random sample selection. Although the econometric evidence supports the majo...
Water Conservation - Inevitable Strategy [Working Title], Nov 30, 2021
Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the res... more Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the resource, leading to the potential aquifers' deterioration. Well designed institutional arrangements might be effective at reducing overexploitation. The objective of this research was to shed light on the design of various incentive schemes to face groundwater over-pumping ranging from individual water use-based incentive schemes, where individual withdrawals are the users' private information, to total water use-based incentive schemes, where the aggregate withdrawal is publicly observable. For the latter setting, two schemes were proposed. The first one is within the framework of moral hazard in teams, where the Water Authority administers monetary incentives that do not balance the budget, restoring thereby the full-information outcome. The second scheme promotes a cooperative management governed by a collective responsibility rule that induces peer monitoring by members. We show that groundwater overuse is more likely when monitoring costs are high, punishments are weak and cooperatives are large. We also show how the cooperative size and punishments are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We extend the basic analysis to study collusion in monitoring between cooperative members and compare different monitoring structures. The results confirm that well-designed incentives and institutions can reduce groundwater over-exploitation, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.
Water Conservation - Inevitable Strategy, 2021
Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the res... more Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the resource, leading to the potential aquifers’ deterioration. Well designed institutional arrangements might be effective at reducing over-exploitation. The objective of this research was to shed light on the design of various incentive schemes to face groundwater over-pumping ranging from individual water use-based incentive schemes, where individual withdrawals are the users’ private information, to total water use-based incentive schemes, where the aggregate withdrawal is publicly observable. For the latter setting, two schemes were proposed. The first one is within the framework of moral hazard in teams, where the Water Authority administers monetary incentives that do not balance the budget, restoring thereby the full-information outcome. The second scheme promotes a cooperative management governed by a collective responsibility rule that induces peer monitoring by members. We show that ...
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2014
Skan-der Essegaier and three anonymous referees of the journal of EEA for helpful comments on ear... more Skan-der Essegaier and three anonymous referees of the journal of EEA for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. All remaining errors are ours. Mattoussi thanks Foued Mattoussi, Souad Mattoussi and Nesrine Deymi for their substantial help in collecting data during the very hot summer of 2004 and also thanks many officials of the Direction Generale du Genie Rural of the Ministry of agriculture in Tunisia and officials of the Agricultural Regional Development Commissions of the governorates, Béja, Jendouba, Bizerte, Zaghouan and Mannouba for their help in conducting the survey.
Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi-arid r... more Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi-arid regions. Cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring. Using a theoretical model, we show that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments are weak, and cooperatives are large. We also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We test the model on data from Tunisia for the years 2001–2003, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. The results confirm that well-designed incentives can reduce theft, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.
Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi-arid r... more Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi-arid regions. Cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring. Using a theoretical model, we show that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments are weak, and cooperatives are large. We also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We test the model on data from Tunisia for the years 2001–2003, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. The results confirm that well-designed incentives can reduce theft, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design
WIDER Working Paper
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financia... more Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic, and social policy-making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
WIDER Working Paper
Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financia... more Typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic, and social policy-making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
Journal of African Economies, 2016
We analyse the dynamics of internationalisation and innovation decisions using firm-level data on... more We analyse the dynamics of internationalisation and innovation decisions using firm-level data on Tunisian manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2006. We examine whether there are complementarities between exporting and innovation investments, and whether and how these complementarities affect the firm's performance. The analysis has been conducted on two clusters of firms. The first cluster distinguishes exporters from non-exporters, and the second distinguishes fully exporting firms from others. The results are consistent with complementarities between the exporting and innovation. The results also indicate that these complementarities positively affect the firm's performance for fully exporting firms.
Comparative Studies of Industrial Development in Africa and Emerging Asia, 2016
Journal of African Economies, Dec 15, 2016
We analyse the dynamics of internationalisation and innovation decisions using firm-level data on... more We analyse the dynamics of internationalisation and innovation decisions using firm-level data on Tunisian manufacturing firms from 2004 to 2006. We examine whether there are complementarities between exporting and innovation investments, and whether and how these complementarities affect the firm's performance. The analysis has been conducted on two clusters of firms. The first cluster distinguishes exporters from non-exporters, and the second distinguishes fully exporting firms from others. The results are consistent with complementarities between the exporting and innovation. The results also indicate that these complementarities positively affect the firm's performance for fully exporting firms.
Typescript prepared by Ayesha Chari for UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financia... more Typescript prepared by Ayesha Chari for UNU-WIDER. UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social policy-making. Work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
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Papers by wided mattoussi