This special interactive interdisciplinary issue of JCS on the singularity and the future relatio... more This special interactive interdisciplinary issue of JCS on the singularity and the future relationship of humanity and AI is the first of two issues centered on David Chalmers’ 2010 JCS article ‘The Singularity, a Philosophical Analysis’. These issues include more than 20 solicited commentaries to which Chalmers responds. To quote Chalmers: "One might think that the singularity would be of great interest to Academic philosophers, cognitive scientists, and artificial intelligence researchers. In practice, this has not been the case. Good was an eminent academic, but his article was largely unappreciated at the time. The subsequent discussion of the singularity has largely taken place in non-academic circles, including Internet forums, popular media and books, and workshops organized by the independent Singularity Institute. Perhaps the highly speculative flavour of the singularity idea has been responsible for academic resistance to it. I think this resistance is a shame, as the singularity idea is clearly an important one. The argument for a singularity is one that we should take seriously. And the questions surrounding the singularity are of enormous practical and philosophical concern". It is fair to say that Chalmers is the first to provide a detailed comprehensive philosophical analysis of the idea of the singularity that brings into focus not only questions about the nature of intelligence and the prospects for an intelligence explosion but also important philosophical questions about consciousness, identity and the relationship between facts and values
In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they neve... more In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they nevertheless take to heart and since we don't even know what could possibly count as a physical explanation of consciousness and since this review is influenced by my own peculiar position I will interact with this manuscript in my own peculiar way. Worse, mine is a minority position but that's what makes it fun. The article is stimulating, courageous, including its fascinating eschatological flavor and well argued. I sympathize with some of its conclusions but critical of others. Overall, this review attempts to defend a certain sane physicalism. On God and Infinity Alexandros Syrakos' "Hard Problems in the Philosophy of mind" is a passionate attempt to defend mind and personhood from those that seek to demystify these concepts. Alexandros' response is not only to argue against the prospects of physicalism but to argue for a radical view of personhood that appeals to a personal God. I agree that the current state of consciousness studies is so problematic that appealing to a 'God based explanation' is a legitimate option. I am also sympathetic to the author's view of 'persons' which combines ethics with metaphysics, in the way that religion used to, and am distrustful of a philosophy whose ethics and metaphysics are completely independent as is customary today. I am therefore interested in Levinas' metaphysics in which our 'inner-infinity' derives from realizing the other's infinity first. Levinas' 'infinity', as part of his theoretical matrix, is different than the mathematician's infinity but could be relevant to the author's pursuit. Infinity in Levinas also represents rupture and irreducible losses in representation. In calculus functions can have two kinds of discontinuity, removable and irremovable. F(x) = +1 for F(x) > 0 and F(x) =-1 for F(x) < 0 Is removable (you can set F(0) = 0). However a function like F(x) = log(x) has an irremovable discontinuity at F(0) referred to as pathological singularity. F(0) is both + andand cannot be set to zero. For a person to be as important as an inanimate universe she must harbor 'infinity'. Perhaps the realization that persons harbor infinity can be related to God based explanations. Here Alexandros may benefit from considering the connections between the claim that personhood is a 'simple substance' of sorts and claiming that this simple 'phenomenal space' is, in some way, also infinite. As a result, I am interested in theories of consciousness that view persons as 'island universes' of sorts (Pace David Lewis) and geometric structures that are finite from without but 'infinite on the inside' such as Anti de Sitter spaces (Juan Maldacena's 'Universe in a Bottle' or Escher's hyperbolic plates).
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic "phenomenal character". Providing such topic neutral explanations is "hard" enough to make a philosophical difference and yet "easy" enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical "computation" that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in "strange metals" may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate "generating" them and explain why this representational content is "nowhere to be found". I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they neve... more In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they nevertheless take to heart and since we don't even know what could possibly count as a physical explanation of consciousness and since this review is influenced by my own peculiar position I will interact with this manuscript in my own peculiar way. Worse, mine is a minority position but that's what makes it fun. The article is stimulating, courageous, including its fascinating eschatological flavor and well argued. I sympathize with some of its conclusions but critical of others. Overall, this review attempts to defend a certain sane physicalism. On God and Infinity Alexandros Syrakos' "Hard Problems in the Philosophy of mind" is a passionate attempt to defend mind and personhood from those that seek to demystify these concepts. Alexandros' response is not only to argue against the prospects of physicalism but to argue for a radical view of personhood that appeals to a personal God. I agree that the current state of consciousness studies is so problematic that appealing to a 'God based explanation' is a legitimate option. I am also sympathetic to the author's view of 'persons' which combines ethics with metaphysics, in the way that religion used to, and am distrustful of a philosophy whose ethics and metaphysics are completely independent as is customary today. I am therefore interested in Levinas' metaphysics in which our 'inner-infinity' derives from realizing the other's infinity first. Levinas' 'infinity', as part of his theoretical matrix, is different than the mathematician's infinity but could be relevant to the author's pursuit. Infinity in Levinas also represents rupture and irreducible losses in representation. In calculus functions can have two kinds of discontinuity, removable and irremovable. F(x) = +1 for F(x) > 0 and F(x) =-1 for F(x) < 0 Is removable (you can set F(0) = 0). However a function like F(x) = log(x) has an irremovable discontinuity at F(0) referred to as pathological singularity. F(0) is both + andand cannot be set to zero. For a person to be as important as an inanimate universe she must harbor 'infinity'. Perhaps the realization that persons harbor infinity can be related to God based explanations. Here Alexandros may benefit from considering the connections between the claim that personhood is a 'simple substance' of sorts and claiming that this simple 'phenomenal space' is, in some way, also infinite. As a result, I am interested in theories of consciousness that view persons as 'island universes' of sorts (Pace David Lewis) and geometric structures that are finite from without but 'infinite on the inside' such as Anti de Sitter spaces (Juan Maldacena's 'Universe in a Bottle' or Escher's hyperbolic plates).
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, th...
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate “generating” them and explain why this representational content is “nowhere to be found”. I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
The article will attempt to show that Velasquez’s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical ena... more The article will attempt to show that Velasquez’s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical enactment of some of the current debates and controversies in the philosophy of cognition and self-representation. I will focus on two very different philosophical trajectories, to which the allegory of the painting can be linked. The first, analytic, trajectory relates Las Meninas to the notion of representation and self-representation in the work of philosophers David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Uriah Kriegel and Bruce Mangan, and neurologists Bernie Baars and Rodolfo Llinas. The second, continental, trajectory begins by relating to the painting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ‘embodied self-representation’. This trajectory, which can be further linked to John Ziman’s ‘second person view’ of reality, proceeds to relate Las Meninas to Lacan’s ‘object gaze’ and the ‘unbearable fragility of representation’, ending with Bataille’s (non)concept of ‘sovereignty’ as essential yet non-represen...
While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in prepar... more While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include these reviews in the special issue of the journal. Eight of the JCS authors (plus Uziel Awret) volunteered to review one or more of the fifteen papers in Artificial Consciousness; these individual reviews were then collected together with a minimal amount of editing to produce a seamless chapter-by-chapter review of the entire book. Because the number and length of contributions to the JCS issue was greater than expected, the collective review of Artificial Consciousness had to be omitted, but here at...
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
... How strange!&amp;#x27; Issa Kobayashi (17631827) Abstract: The article will attempt to... more ... How strange!&amp;#x27; Issa Kobayashi (17631827) Abstract: The article will attempt to show thatVelasquez&amp;#x27;s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical enactment of some of the current debates and controversies in the philosophy of cognition and self-representation. ...
This special interactive interdisciplinary issue of JCS on the singularity and the future relatio... more This special interactive interdisciplinary issue of JCS on the singularity and the future relationship of humanity and AI is the first of two issues centered on David Chalmers’ 2010 JCS article ‘The Singularity, a Philosophical Analysis’. These issues include more than 20 solicited commentaries to which Chalmers responds. To quote Chalmers: "One might think that the singularity would be of great interest to Academic philosophers, cognitive scientists, and artificial intelligence researchers. In practice, this has not been the case. Good was an eminent academic, but his article was largely unappreciated at the time. The subsequent discussion of the singularity has largely taken place in non-academic circles, including Internet forums, popular media and books, and workshops organized by the independent Singularity Institute. Perhaps the highly speculative flavour of the singularity idea has been responsible for academic resistance to it. I think this resistance is a shame, as the singularity idea is clearly an important one. The argument for a singularity is one that we should take seriously. And the questions surrounding the singularity are of enormous practical and philosophical concern". It is fair to say that Chalmers is the first to provide a detailed comprehensive philosophical analysis of the idea of the singularity that brings into focus not only questions about the nature of intelligence and the prospects for an intelligence explosion but also important philosophical questions about consciousness, identity and the relationship between facts and values
In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they neve... more In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they nevertheless take to heart and since we don't even know what could possibly count as a physical explanation of consciousness and since this review is influenced by my own peculiar position I will interact with this manuscript in my own peculiar way. Worse, mine is a minority position but that's what makes it fun. The article is stimulating, courageous, including its fascinating eschatological flavor and well argued. I sympathize with some of its conclusions but critical of others. Overall, this review attempts to defend a certain sane physicalism. On God and Infinity Alexandros Syrakos' "Hard Problems in the Philosophy of mind" is a passionate attempt to defend mind and personhood from those that seek to demystify these concepts. Alexandros' response is not only to argue against the prospects of physicalism but to argue for a radical view of personhood that appeals to a personal God. I agree that the current state of consciousness studies is so problematic that appealing to a 'God based explanation' is a legitimate option. I am also sympathetic to the author's view of 'persons' which combines ethics with metaphysics, in the way that religion used to, and am distrustful of a philosophy whose ethics and metaphysics are completely independent as is customary today. I am therefore interested in Levinas' metaphysics in which our 'inner-infinity' derives from realizing the other's infinity first. Levinas' 'infinity', as part of his theoretical matrix, is different than the mathematician's infinity but could be relevant to the author's pursuit. Infinity in Levinas also represents rupture and irreducible losses in representation. In calculus functions can have two kinds of discontinuity, removable and irremovable. F(x) = +1 for F(x) > 0 and F(x) =-1 for F(x) < 0 Is removable (you can set F(0) = 0). However a function like F(x) = log(x) has an irremovable discontinuity at F(0) referred to as pathological singularity. F(0) is both + andand cannot be set to zero. For a person to be as important as an inanimate universe she must harbor 'infinity'. Perhaps the realization that persons harbor infinity can be related to God based explanations. Here Alexandros may benefit from considering the connections between the claim that personhood is a 'simple substance' of sorts and claiming that this simple 'phenomenal space' is, in some way, also infinite. As a result, I am interested in theories of consciousness that view persons as 'island universes' of sorts (Pace David Lewis) and geometric structures that are finite from without but 'infinite on the inside' such as Anti de Sitter spaces (Juan Maldacena's 'Universe in a Bottle' or Escher's hyperbolic plates).
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic "phenomenal character". Providing such topic neutral explanations is "hard" enough to make a philosophical difference and yet "easy" enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical "computation" that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in "strange metals" may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate "generating" them and explain why this representational content is "nowhere to be found". I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they neve... more In this business of consciousness studies people entertain very different theories that they nevertheless take to heart and since we don't even know what could possibly count as a physical explanation of consciousness and since this review is influenced by my own peculiar position I will interact with this manuscript in my own peculiar way. Worse, mine is a minority position but that's what makes it fun. The article is stimulating, courageous, including its fascinating eschatological flavor and well argued. I sympathize with some of its conclusions but critical of others. Overall, this review attempts to defend a certain sane physicalism. On God and Infinity Alexandros Syrakos' "Hard Problems in the Philosophy of mind" is a passionate attempt to defend mind and personhood from those that seek to demystify these concepts. Alexandros' response is not only to argue against the prospects of physicalism but to argue for a radical view of personhood that appeals to a personal God. I agree that the current state of consciousness studies is so problematic that appealing to a 'God based explanation' is a legitimate option. I am also sympathetic to the author's view of 'persons' which combines ethics with metaphysics, in the way that religion used to, and am distrustful of a philosophy whose ethics and metaphysics are completely independent as is customary today. I am therefore interested in Levinas' metaphysics in which our 'inner-infinity' derives from realizing the other's infinity first. Levinas' 'infinity', as part of his theoretical matrix, is different than the mathematician's infinity but could be relevant to the author's pursuit. Infinity in Levinas also represents rupture and irreducible losses in representation. In calculus functions can have two kinds of discontinuity, removable and irremovable. F(x) = +1 for F(x) > 0 and F(x) =-1 for F(x) < 0 Is removable (you can set F(0) = 0). However a function like F(x) = log(x) has an irremovable discontinuity at F(0) referred to as pathological singularity. F(0) is both + andand cannot be set to zero. For a person to be as important as an inanimate universe she must harbor 'infinity'. Perhaps the realization that persons harbor infinity can be related to God based explanations. Here Alexandros may benefit from considering the connections between the claim that personhood is a 'simple substance' of sorts and claiming that this simple 'phenomenal space' is, in some way, also infinite. As a result, I am interested in theories of consciousness that view persons as 'island universes' of sorts (Pace David Lewis) and geometric structures that are finite from without but 'infinite on the inside' such as Anti de Sitter spaces (Juan Maldacena's 'Universe in a Bottle' or Escher's hyperbolic plates).
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, th...
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle ... more This paper introduces a novel dual-aspect theory of consciousness that is based on the principle of holographic-duality in modern physics and explores the prospects of making philosophically significant empirical discoveries about the physical correlates of consciousness. The theory is motivated by an approach that identifies certain anti-physicalist problem intuitions associated with representational content and spatial location and attempts to provide these with a consciousness-independent explanation, while suspending questions about the hard problem of consciousness and the more problematic “phenomenal character”. Providing such topic neutral explanations is “hard” enough to make a philosophical difference and yet “easy” enough to be approached scientifically. I will argue that abstract algorithms are not enough to solve this problem and that a more radical “computation” that is inspired by physics and that can be realized in “strange metals” may be needed. While speculative, this approach has the potential to both establish necessary connections between structural aspects of conscious mental states and the physical substrate “generating” them and explain why this representational content is “nowhere to be found”. I will end with a reconsideration of the conceivability of zombies.
The article will attempt to show that Velasquez’s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical ena... more The article will attempt to show that Velasquez’s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical enactment of some of the current debates and controversies in the philosophy of cognition and self-representation. I will focus on two very different philosophical trajectories, to which the allegory of the painting can be linked. The first, analytic, trajectory relates Las Meninas to the notion of representation and self-representation in the work of philosophers David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Uriah Kriegel and Bruce Mangan, and neurologists Bernie Baars and Rodolfo Llinas. The second, continental, trajectory begins by relating to the painting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ‘embodied self-representation’. This trajectory, which can be further linked to John Ziman’s ‘second person view’ of reality, proceeds to relate Las Meninas to Lacan’s ‘object gaze’ and the ‘unbearable fragility of representation’, ending with Bataille’s (non)concept of ‘sovereignty’ as essential yet non-represen...
While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in prepar... more While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include these reviews in the special issue of the journal. Eight of the JCS authors (plus Uziel Awret) volunteered to review one or more of the fifteen papers in Artificial Consciousness; these individual reviews were then collected together with a minimal amount of editing to produce a seamless chapter-by-chapter review of the entire book. Because the number and length of contributions to the JCS issue was greater than expected, the collective review of Artificial Consciousness had to be omitted, but here at...
Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , whil... more Some materialists believe that physics is rich enough to bridge Levine's Explanatory Gap 1 , while others believe that it is not. Here I promote an intermediate position holding that physics is rich enough to explain why this gap seems more intractable than similar inter-theoretic explanatory gaps, without providing a full-blown "physical" explanation of consciousness. At a minimum, such an approach needs to explore the prospects of empirical discoveries that can diminish the power of anti-physicalist arguments like Chalmers's "conceivability argument" 2 and Jackson's "knowledge argument." While this is not an easy task, recent advances in the physics of spacetime and information convince us that these prospects are not poor. The empirical bent of this approach suggests framing it as a naturalist theory of mind seeking to situate or make room for consciousness within our great naturalist system, but the reliance of this approach on recent (re)conceptions of time and information pulls the carpet out from under essential concepts like concreteness and causation, thus demanding a radically reconfigured naturalism, or neo-naturalism. The question that will frame this discussion is, "What could possibly count as an empirical fact that can help naturalize consciousness?"
... How strange!&amp;#x27; Issa Kobayashi (17631827) Abstract: The article will attempt to... more ... How strange!&amp;#x27; Issa Kobayashi (17631827) Abstract: The article will attempt to show thatVelasquez&amp;#x27;s Las Meninas can be viewed as an allegorical enactment of some of the current debates and controversies in the philosophy of cognition and self-representation. ...
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