Papers by rebekah humphreys
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics
While the causes of human-animal conflict are numerous, many are intertwined with food production... more While the causes of human-animal conflict are numerous, many are intertwined with food production systems and the wildlife trade. The emergence and spread of Covid-19 exemplify this. Indeed, the wildlife population in South Asian countries has seen an increase in the risk of both human and nonhuman death in recent months, and as the economy slows, the search for food and extra income will intensify, negatively impacting wildlife. This paper aims to address some of the ethical issues concerning our treatment of nonhuman creatures and the environment in relation to the global food system and wildlife trade following the Covid-19 crisis.
The issue of fish pain should be of fundamental importance to those who participate in recreation... more The issue of fish pain should be of fundamental importance to those who participate in recreational and sports fishing, for if fish can suffer and feel pain then moral questions arise about the treatment of fish by anglers (treatment which concerns, for example, the ways in which they are handled) and about the methods of fishing used by anglers (such as the 'catch and release' method commonly employed
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
This paper aims to assess R. G. Frey’s analysis of Leonard Nelson’s argument (that links interest... more This paper aims to assess R. G. Frey’s analysis of Leonard Nelson’s argument (that links interests to rights). Frey argues that claims that animals have rights or interests have not been established. Frey’s contentions that animals have not been shown to have rights nor interests will be discussed in turn, but the main focus will be on Frey’s claim that animals have not been shown to have interests. One way Frey analyses this latter claim is by considering H. J. McCloskey’s denial of the claim and Tom Regan’s criticism of this denial. While Frey’s position on animal interests does not depend on McCloskey’s views, he believes that a consideration of McCloskey’s views will reveal that Nelson’s argument (linking interests to rights) has not been established as sound. My discussion (of Frey’s scrutiny of Nelson’s argument) will centre on the dialogue between Regan and Frey in respect of McCloskey’s argument. I will endeavor to update the dialogue by providing a re-interpretation of ‘rig...
Animal Sentience, 2020
The considerable conservation research on environmental problems and climate change tends to focu... more The considerable conservation research on environmental problems and climate change tends to focus on species "biodiversity" rather than individuals. Individuals of the same species get categorized as "wild" or "captive", with the latter often omitted from conservationists' concerns. But wild and captive animals, although they may require different treatment, have comparable interests as individuals. Equity requires taking this into account in conservation efforts.
Ethics and the Environment, 2016
This paper analyzes the concept of ‘dignity’ in relation to other than human animals and examines... more This paper analyzes the concept of ‘dignity’ in relation to other than human animals and examines how this concept might be of use in informing us of actions that may harm such animals. In doing so, the characteristic features of actions that may be said to violate dignity are outlined before an analysis of the idea that one can degrade a being by treating it in a way that is excessively instrumental. Further examination offers an ontological explanation for why some actions that harm nonhuman animals can be thought of as a violation of dignity. Some of the relevant issues arising from an examination of dignity and its violation involve reflection on notions such flourishing, consent and autonomy. Such linking issues are considered in relation to the application of the concept of dignity to nonhuman beings.
Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, 2016
Suffering and Awareness 6.2. C h a p t e r o n e I n t r o d u c t i o n 1.1. Background, Importa... more Suffering and Awareness 6.2. C h a p t e r o n e I n t r o d u c t i o n 1.1. Background, Importance and Aim Millions o f animals are used every year in experiments and the intensive rearing industry. This figure increases to billions for certain animals, such as chickens. While some animals used in experiments may endure little suffering, for many of the animals used in the practices of factory farming and animal experimentation their lives are ones afflicted by perpetual suffering, frustration and discomfort. This thesis then begins from the premise that factory-farmed animals and many experimental animals endure significant suffering. There is much evidence to support this claim .1 However, this thesis will not focus on proving this to be true (I will only look at the evidence o f animal suffering where the context demands it, for example, in the case o f arguing against Michael Leahy in chapter six), or outlining in detail the ways in which animals are used in such practices. Since this is a philosophical thesis, not a scientific one, neither will it include an enquiry o f the neurophysiological details o f animals. Doing all this would be beyond the scope of this thesis. So I begin in the knowledge that such animals suffer, although I sometimes argue this point where the context necessitates it. Indeed, that such animals do suffer considerably in these practices gives me the personal impetus for writing this thesis, as well as a deep feeling o f repugnance over such suffering. Chapter One My method o f enquiry will be largely analytical following the Anglo-American tradition, with the aim o f conceptual clarity. The objects o f analysis in this thesis include (though are not limited to) principles (see, for example, an analysis o f the principle o f equal consideration in chapter two), arguments and claims made by various philosophers (see, for example, an analysis o f the arguments o f Peter Carruthers, R. G. Frey, and Michael Leahy, in chapters four, five and six respectively) and concepts (see, for example, an analysis o f the notion o f dignity and its application to animals in chapter nine). My overall aim is to examine the moral status o f animals and our treatment of animals in current practices. In doing so I further aim to analyse the justifications given for such widespread suffering in order to discover whether any of those justifications are valid ones. These aims will be delivered by tackling three central research questions, the answering o f which will be aided by further tackling three supplementary questions (see 1.2. below).* * A brief account o f what I mean by 'moral standing' and 'moral status' is needed here (since I use both these terms throughout the thesis). The word status means 'a person's position in society', or 'degree o f importance' (Collins English Dictionary (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 1996)). Similarly, talk o f 'moral status' is talk o f a thing's moral position in society and is likely to involve discussions about the degree o f moral importance that thing has. (I say 'thing' in order to include inanimate objects, since we can talk o f the moral status of, say, rocks, even if they lack moral standing, and even if they have no, or little importance in the moral sphere.) For example, when one talks about whether an animal ought to be included or not among that class o f entities which is normally taken into (moral) account, one is already talking o f the moral status o f animals. Discussions o f the moral status o f animals may, for example, involve questions concerning how animals should be treated or whether their interests and lives are morally important or the degree o f importance o f their interests in respect o f our moral decisions. In this sense, one can talk about the moral status o f animals and, at the same time, deny that they have interests or deny that they have interests which are morally important. One may argue that the moral status o f animals is subordinate or o f lesser importance than, say, that o f humans, but one would still be presenting an argument about the moral status o f animals. The term 'moral standing' could be seen to be less general than 'moral status'. A being has moral standing if that being ought to be taken into consideration for itself. In this sense, beings that have moral standing are beings 'to whom principles o f morality apply from, so to speak, the other end-from the standpoint not o f the agent but o f the "patient"' (G.
Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 2008
The idea that language is necessary for thought and emotion is a dominant one in philosophy. Anim... more The idea that language is necessary for thought and emotion is a dominant one in philosophy. Animals have taken the brunt of this idea, since it is widely held that language is exclusively human. Michael Leahy (1991) makes a case against the moral standing of factory-farmed animals based on such ideas. His approach is Wittgensteinian: understanding is a thought process that requires language, which animals do not possess. But he goes further than this and argues that certain factory farming methods do not cause certain sufferings to the animals used, since animals lack full awareness of their circumstances. In particular he argues that animals do not experience certain sufferings at the slaughterhouse since, lacking language, they are unaware of their fate (1991). Through an analysis of Leahy's claims this paper aims to explore and challenge both the idea that thought and emotion require language and that only humans possess language.
Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, 2014
The orthodox approach to the environment and its inhabitants is deemed to be anthropocentric in t... more The orthodox approach to the environment and its inhabitants is deemed to be anthropocentric in that it recognises the moral standing of human beings alone, and as such other beings are given at the most indirect moral consideration when their interests conflict with the interests of humans. However, many global environmental problems and worldwide practices directly affect not just human beings but many other creatures too. In the light of this, the anthropocentric approach has been accused by some philosophers of being too narrowly focused on human interests to creditably account for the true extent of our moral obligations. This article provides a conceptual outline of biocentrism as an alterative approach to ethics; one which widens the moral scope to include all living beings as candidates deserving of moral consideration. The article also discusses how this approach might be applied to contemporary ethical issues which are international in their dimension, including environmental issues, as well as issues concerning our use of animals in worldwide human practices
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 2010
This paper aims to provide an ethical assessment of the shooting of animals for sport. In particu... more This paper aims to provide an ethical assessment of the shooting of animals for sport. In particular, it discusses the use of partridges and pheasants for shooting. While opposition to hunting and shooting large wild mammals is strong, game birds have often taken a back seat in everyday animal welfare concerns. However, the practice of raising game birds for sport poses significant ethical issues. Most birds shot are raised in factory farming conditions, and there is a considerable amount of evidence to show that these birds endure extensive suffering on these farms. Considering the fact that birds do have interests, including interests in life and not suffering, what are the ethical implications of using them for blood sports? Indeed, in light of the suffering that game birds endure in factory farms, it may be that shooting such birds for sport is more morally problematic than other types of hunting and shooting which many people are often fiercely opposed to, for while it seems plausible to say that some animals may be harmed more by death than others (due to, say, their greater capacities), there may be harms that are worse than death (such as a life of intolerable suffering). The objective of this paper is to assess the ethics of shooting animals for sport, and in particular the practice of raising game birds for use in blood sports, by applying principles commonly used in ethics; specifically the principle of nonmaleficence and equal consideration of (like) interests.
Percipi, 2008
Although the practices of animal experimentation and intensive rearing involve a considerable amo... more Although the practices of animal experimentation and intensive rearing involve a considerable amount of animal suffering they continue to be supported. Why is the suffering of animals in these practices so often accepted? This paper will explore some of the reasons given in support of the use of animals for such practices. In particular I will focus on contractarianism as one of the many positions that argues that morally relevant differences between species justify animal experimentation and factory farming. These differences include rationality and moral agency. On this position non-humans are excluded from direct moral concern on the basis that they lack such qualities. I will argue that in order for contractarianism to be coherent it necessarily has to include non-humans in the contract. This has implications for the application of contractarianism to the ethics of factory farming and animal experimentation.
, who used to be, like the current reviewers, an ethical biocentrist, now defends Harean prescrip... more , who used to be, like the current reviewers, an ethical biocentrist, now defends Harean prescriptivism, twolevel utilitarianism, and sentientism, and in this book applies these stances to animal ethics, as well as to ethical principles in general. As his Introduction discloses, Varner feels impressed by large areas of Richard Hare's thinking, not least because much of it inspired that of Peter Singer. In this work Varner seeks to supplement the work of Hare and of Singer by discussing ethical principles appropriate to the treatment of animals, embodying his distinction between persons, nearpersons and sentient non-persons. Varner relates at the start of chapter 2 that he has been substantially convinced by Hare that universal prescriptivism entails utilitarianism (p. 26), and later introduces a formal argument in support of this conviction (pp. 38, 44-46). But Hare used to avoid claiming that normative conclusions were entailed by the logic of moral discourse, preferring to hold that universal prescriptivism 'generates' utilitarianism. (He did write of entailments between imperatives, but that is a different matter.) If he had endorsed the entailment view, then he would have
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Papers by rebekah humphreys