In this paper, I consider the impact of Western foreign policy, diplomacy, and aid strategies on ... more In this paper, I consider the impact of Western foreign policy, diplomacy, and aid strategies on the politics of Georgia since the country's independence.in 1991. I argue that rather than promoting 'democracy', Western governments, international organisations, and NGOs have served to reinforce what Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010) have called 'competitive authoritarianism' in Georgia. I document the ways in which 'the West' has aided successive Georgian competitive authoritarian regimes before critiquing current conceptual and theoretical approaches to explaining the international dimensions of democratisation.
Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign i... more Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign interventions of Western states. Thus, it has constituted a central element of the hegemonic strategy of the US state and the Western transnational capitalist class. However, in this article, I suggest that democracy promotion itself faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. In this article, I challenge the currently hegemonic definition of democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
Abstract The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led ... more Abstract The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy promoters increasingly to turn their attention to political parties by the late 1990s. ‘Party aid’—project-based interventions in targeted party systems—soon became democracy promotion's ‘new frontier’. Yet party aid itself has not delivered. In this article I summarise the current main criticisms of party aid. I then highlight the striking similarities between these criticisms and those made of other forms of aid: democracy promotion, development and humanitarian aid. I argue that these similarities are the outcomes of the three main institutional trends in post-cold war foreign aid: bilateralisation, bureaucratisation and commodification. Based on these insights, I question how realistic current prescriptions for reforming party aid are. I conclude that the current legitimacy crisis that party aid, and democracy promotion more broadly, face makes it hard to predict a bright future for democracy promotion.
Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 200... more Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia's governance indicators have soared while its democracy scores have plummeted. The good governance–democracy merger constitutes an attempt by the transnational capitalist class to cultivate consent for its hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization. This article highlights the personal and institutional networks connecting Georgian elites with the organizations involved in globalizing governance and democracy. It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.
This article contributes to a praxis of critical hope by combining recent critical political econ... more This article contributes to a praxis of critical hope by combining recent critical political economic (CPE) analyses of postdigital education with the inspiring experimental practices emerging from the new field of critical digital pedagogy (CDP). I argue that CDP offers hope to educators looking for practical ways beyond capitalist exploitation and alienation, but lacks the analytical foundations needed to contribute to the liberation of our 'general intellect.' I highlight the emergence of the Free/Libre Open-Source Software (FLOSS) movement and 'hacker class' as exemplars of a more dialectically conscious praxis. Conversely, I encourage CPE scholars of the postdigital to contribute to developing both intellectual tools for understanding our position within capitalism and practical tools for hacking for our liberation. Throughout the article, I use a historical materialist lens to emphasise that we can identify the conditions of and elaborate the strategies for achieving our emancipation in the dialectic of the historically specific contradictions generated by specific class antagonisms. It is in this dialectic that we find a critical hope.
The struggle to liberate our common powers of creation - our ‘general intellect’ – transcends the... more The struggle to liberate our common powers of creation - our ‘general intellect’ – transcends the university. This struggle requires the development of ‘hybrid’ (combined online and offline) pedagogical technologies that empower us to democratise or re-common the ownership, means, and the objectives of knowledge production. In this paper, I describe the R.O.S.I. Website Project (Reviving Our Sociological Imaginations) – an experimental pedagogical project run at the University of Warwick in 2016 in which ten undergraduate students were invited to co-design a website that could help its users to cultivate their sociological imaginations – that essential ability to situate our personal problems within their social and historical contexts. This experience leads me to consider the politics of possibility within and beyond the neoliberal university today. Whilst everyday micro-practices of collective freedom can undermine neoliberalism within, our emancipatory objectives may demand macro...
Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign i... more Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign interventions of Western states. Thus, it has constituted a central element of the hegemonic strategy of the US state and the Western transnational capitalist class. However, in this article, I suggest that democracy promotion itself faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. In this article, I challenge the currently hegemonic definition of democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 200... more Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia’s governance indicators have soared while its democracy scores have plummeted. The good governance-democracy merger constitutes an attempt by the transnational capitalist class to cultivate consent for its hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization. This article highlights the personal and institutional networks connecting Georgian elites with the organizations involved in globalizing governance and democracy. It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.
The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy... more The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy promoters increasingly to turn their attention to political parties by the late 1990s. ‘Party aid’—project-based interventions in targeted party systems—soon became democracy promotion’s ‘new frontier’. Yet party aid itself has not delivered. In this article I summarise the current main criticisms of party aid. I then highlight the striking similarities between these criticisms and those made of other forms of aid: democracy promotion, development and humanitarian aid. I argue that these similarities are the outcomes of the three main institutional trends in post-cold war foreign aid: bilateralisation, bureaucratisation and commodification. Based on these insights, I question how realistic current prescriptions for reforming party aid are. I conclude that the current legitimacy crisis that party aid, and democracy promotion more broadly, face makes it hard to predict a bright future for democracy promotion.
In this paper, I consider the impact of Western foreign policy, diplomacy, and aid strategies on ... more In this paper, I consider the impact of Western foreign policy, diplomacy, and aid strategies on the politics of Georgia since the country's independence.in 1991. I argue that rather than promoting 'democracy', Western governments, international organisations, and NGOs have served to reinforce what Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010) have called 'competitive authoritarianism' in Georgia. I document the ways in which 'the West' has aided successive Georgian competitive authoritarian regimes before critiquing current conceptual and theoretical approaches to explaining the international dimensions of democratisation.
Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign i... more Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign interventions of Western states. Thus, it has constituted a central element of the hegemonic strategy of the US state and the Western transnational capitalist class. However, in this article, I suggest that democracy promotion itself faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. In this article, I challenge the currently hegemonic definition of democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
Abstract The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led ... more Abstract The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy promoters increasingly to turn their attention to political parties by the late 1990s. ‘Party aid’—project-based interventions in targeted party systems—soon became democracy promotion's ‘new frontier’. Yet party aid itself has not delivered. In this article I summarise the current main criticisms of party aid. I then highlight the striking similarities between these criticisms and those made of other forms of aid: democracy promotion, development and humanitarian aid. I argue that these similarities are the outcomes of the three main institutional trends in post-cold war foreign aid: bilateralisation, bureaucratisation and commodification. Based on these insights, I question how realistic current prescriptions for reforming party aid are. I conclude that the current legitimacy crisis that party aid, and democracy promotion more broadly, face makes it hard to predict a bright future for democracy promotion.
Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 200... more Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia's governance indicators have soared while its democracy scores have plummeted. The good governance–democracy merger constitutes an attempt by the transnational capitalist class to cultivate consent for its hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization. This article highlights the personal and institutional networks connecting Georgian elites with the organizations involved in globalizing governance and democracy. It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.
This article contributes to a praxis of critical hope by combining recent critical political econ... more This article contributes to a praxis of critical hope by combining recent critical political economic (CPE) analyses of postdigital education with the inspiring experimental practices emerging from the new field of critical digital pedagogy (CDP). I argue that CDP offers hope to educators looking for practical ways beyond capitalist exploitation and alienation, but lacks the analytical foundations needed to contribute to the liberation of our 'general intellect.' I highlight the emergence of the Free/Libre Open-Source Software (FLOSS) movement and 'hacker class' as exemplars of a more dialectically conscious praxis. Conversely, I encourage CPE scholars of the postdigital to contribute to developing both intellectual tools for understanding our position within capitalism and practical tools for hacking for our liberation. Throughout the article, I use a historical materialist lens to emphasise that we can identify the conditions of and elaborate the strategies for achieving our emancipation in the dialectic of the historically specific contradictions generated by specific class antagonisms. It is in this dialectic that we find a critical hope.
The struggle to liberate our common powers of creation - our ‘general intellect’ – transcends the... more The struggle to liberate our common powers of creation - our ‘general intellect’ – transcends the university. This struggle requires the development of ‘hybrid’ (combined online and offline) pedagogical technologies that empower us to democratise or re-common the ownership, means, and the objectives of knowledge production. In this paper, I describe the R.O.S.I. Website Project (Reviving Our Sociological Imaginations) – an experimental pedagogical project run at the University of Warwick in 2016 in which ten undergraduate students were invited to co-design a website that could help its users to cultivate their sociological imaginations – that essential ability to situate our personal problems within their social and historical contexts. This experience leads me to consider the politics of possibility within and beyond the neoliberal university today. Whilst everyday micro-practices of collective freedom can undermine neoliberalism within, our emancipatory objectives may demand macro...
Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign i... more Since the end of the cold war, democracy promotion has provided moral legitimacy to the foreign interventions of Western states. Thus, it has constituted a central element of the hegemonic strategy of the US state and the Western transnational capitalist class. However, in this article, I suggest that democracy promotion itself faces a profound crisis of legitimacy. In this article, I challenge the currently hegemonic definition of democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 200... more Western aid donors merge democracy and good governance in theory and practice. Yet, since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia’s governance indicators have soared while its democracy scores have plummeted. The good governance-democracy merger constitutes an attempt by the transnational capitalist class to cultivate consent for its hegemonic project of neo-liberal globalization. This article highlights the personal and institutional networks connecting Georgian elites with the organizations involved in globalizing governance and democracy. It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.
The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy... more The failure to engineer democracy in postcolonial societies via ‘civil society’ had led democracy promoters increasingly to turn their attention to political parties by the late 1990s. ‘Party aid’—project-based interventions in targeted party systems—soon became democracy promotion’s ‘new frontier’. Yet party aid itself has not delivered. In this article I summarise the current main criticisms of party aid. I then highlight the striking similarities between these criticisms and those made of other forms of aid: democracy promotion, development and humanitarian aid. I argue that these similarities are the outcomes of the three main institutional trends in post-cold war foreign aid: bilateralisation, bureaucratisation and commodification. Based on these insights, I question how realistic current prescriptions for reforming party aid are. I conclude that the current legitimacy crisis that party aid, and democracy promotion more broadly, face makes it hard to predict a bright future for democracy promotion.
Uploads
Papers by joel Lazarus
democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical
scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of
transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.
democracy as ‘polyarchy’ and critique the foundational justifications for democracy promotion and claims about its successes. I then describe the factors combining to generate democracy promotion’s current legitimacy crisis. I conclude that, linked as it is to American state power and neoliberal globalization, the future for Western democracy promotion remains deeply uncertain. I also argue that it befalls critical
scholars to challenge hegemonic definitions and practices of democracy and democracy promotion.
It shows how these organizations are dominated by the representatives of
transnational capital. Finally, it shows that Georgia, as an undemocratic but effective ‘governance state’, is not an exception.