Papers by giorgio giorgio
Il documento può essere scaricato dal sito web www.dt.tesoro.it e utilizzato l i b e r a me n t e... more Il documento può essere scaricato dal sito web www.dt.tesoro.it e utilizzato l i b e r a me n t e c i t a n d o l a f o n t e e l ' a u t o r e . Comitato di redazione: Abstract Questo studio analizza le determinanti e le prospettive del venture capital in Italia, n e l l ' a mb i t o d e l l o s t u d i o d e l l e r e l a z i o n i esistenti tra struttura e funzionamento del sistema finanziario e crescita de l l ' e c o n o mi a e d e l l ' o c c u p a z i o n e . P articolare attenzione è dedicata al ruolo svolto dalla politica economica e regolamentare attraverso la disamina dei provvedimenti recenti che hanno contribuito a modificare il contesto entro il quale si muove in Italia questo segmento del mercato finanziario. JEL Classification: G24, O16 Indice delle Figure ISAE (2005) Priorità Nazionali: dimensioni aziendali, competitività, regolamentazione Rapporto ISAE, Quarta Parte. J e n g e We l l s ( 2 0 0 0 ) : " T h e d e t e r mi n a n t s o f v e n t u r e c a p i t a l f u n d i n g : e v i d e n c e a c r o s s c o u n t r i e s " , Journal of Corporate Finance. K a p l a n S . e P . S t r o mb e r g ( 2 0 0 0 ) : " Ho w d o v e n t u r e c a p i t a l i s t s c h o o s e a n d ma n a g e t h e i r i n v e s t me n t s ? " , W. p . Un i v e r s i t y o f Ch i c a g o . K a p l a n S . e P . S t r o mb e r g ( 2 0 0 1 ) : " V e n t u r e Ca p i t a l i s t s a sPrincipals: contracting, screening and mo n i t o r i n g " , A me r i c a n E c o n o mi c Re v i e w p a p e r s a n d p r o c e e d i n g s . K e u s c h n i g g C. ( 2 0 0 4 ) : " T a x a t i o n o f V e n t u r e Ca p i t a l i s t wi t h a P o r t f o l i o o f F i r ms " , Ox f o r d E c o n o mi c Papers, 56 (1). K o r t u m M. e J . L e r n e r ( 2 0 0 0 ) " Do e s V e n t u r e
Transition Studies Review, 2004
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an e... more Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of deposit insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However, it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of either inefficiency or market power in this financial segment. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance and other institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries. We find that deposit insurance increases the lending–deposit spread in banking. The main effect seems to arise not from the deposit side though, but from an increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as evidence of the presence of moral hazard problems related to this instrument. We also find that higher quality of institutions is associated with lower spreads, thus contributing to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an e... more Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of Deposit Insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of market power in this financial segment. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance and other institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries. We find that deposit insurance increases the lending borrowing spread in banking. The main effect seems to arise not from the deposit side though, but from an increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as evidence of the presence of moral hazard problems related to this instrument. We also find that higher quality of institutions is associated with lower spreads, thus contributing to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.
This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country "perpetual youth" model where agents can inve... more This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country "perpetual youth" model where agents can invest their wealth in both stock and bond markets. In our economy the foreign country is financially dominant, in the sense that it hosts the only active equity market where all agents (also residents of the home country) can trade stocks of listed foreign firms. We show that, contrary to what happens in a closed economy, the Central Bank in the economy endowed with an active stock market should grant a dedicated response to movements in stock prices driven only by local productivity shocks. Moreover, we show that the other Central Bank should also optimally respond to stock-price movements in the other economy, as they affect the budget constraint of domestic residents. Optimal monetary policy pursuing price stability requires dedicated response to stock-price dynamics driven by productivity shocks in addition to what implied by the simple existence of the terms of trade channel of policy transmission. Determinacy of rational expectations equilibria and approximation of the optimal policy by simple monetary rules are also investigated.
Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 2007
This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country model where agents can invest their wealth in... more This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country model where agents can invest their wealth in both stock and bond markets. In our economy the foreign country hosts the only active equity market where also residents of the home country can trade stocks of listed foreign firms. We show that, in order to achieve price stability, the Central Banks in both countries should grant a dedicated response to movements in stock prices driven by relative productivity shocks. Determinacy of rational expectations equilibria and approximation of the Wicksellian interest rate policy by simple monetary policy rules are also investigated.
Economic Notes, 2001
This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identi... more This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identify monetary policy shocks and their macroeconomic effects for the Italian economy in the 90s. The analysis is based on a detailed institutional description of the functioning of the domestic market for bank reserves. In this setting, we try to establish if monetary policy shocks are better identified using exchange rates or foreign exchange reserves as a conditioning variable for the small open economy framework. Our analysis confirms the view that the Bank of Italy has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans in the 90s. This is coherent with either proposed modeling choices. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how they impact the economy. * We thank two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper; Alberto Baffigi and Giorgio Valente provided precious help with the structural stability analysis. Giorgio Di Giorgio gratefully acknowledges financial support from CNR and the hospitality and excellent research environment provided by the
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identi... more This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identify monetary policy shocks and their macroeconomic effects for the Italian economy in the 90s. The analysis is based on a detailed institutional description of the functioning of the domestic market for bank reserves. In this setting, we try to establish if monetary policy shocks are better identified using exchange rates or foreign exchange reserves as a conditioning variable for the small open economy framework. Our analysis confirms the view that the Bank of Italy has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans in the 90s. This is coherent with either proposed modeling choices. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how they impact the economy. * We thank two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper; Alberto Baffigi and Giorgio Valente provided precious help with the structural stability analysis. Giorgio Di Giorgio gratefully acknowledges financial support from CNR and the hospitality and excellent research environment provided by the
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision ... more This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classi ed according to the regulatory regime in place. We nd that the in ation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more pro table when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary pol... more This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy exogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy... more In this paper we present a structural VAR analysis of monetary policy in Italy. A monetary policy operating regime based on the control of the overnight rate seems to t the data better than alternative quantitative monetary regimes. The model allows us to derive a n o v erall indicator of the monetary policy stance that is able to highlight the major episodes of monetary contraction in the sample. JEL Classi cation: E520.
Abstract The objective of the present work is to sketch a proposal for the re-organisation of reg... more Abstract The objective of the present work is to sketch a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory arrangements and supervisory agencies in Italy. This proposal follows the evolving role of financial markets and intermediaries in modern economies and is based ...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and s... more In this paper, we discuss pros and cons of different models for financial market regulation and supervision and we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments are consistent with both new theories and effective behaviour of financial intermediaries in industrialized countries. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the three objectives of supervision -microeconomic stability, investor protection and proper behaviour, efficiency and competition -should be assigned to three distinct European authorities, each one at the centre of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the central bank which would remain the institution responsible for price and macroeconomic stability. We suggest a plausible path to build our 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.
International Finance, 1999
This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision ... more This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are classi ed according to the regulatory regime in place. We nd that the in ation rate is considerably higher and more volatile in countries where the Central bank acts as a monopolist in banking supervision. Besides, although banks seem to be more pro table when Central banks supervise them, they incur into higher costs and rely more on deposits with respect to more sophisticated liabilities as a funding source.
In this paper we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencie... more In this paper we present a proposal for the re-organisation of regulatory and supervisory agencies for the Euro-area financial sector. Our proposed architecture for financial market regulation is based on the assignment of different objectives or "finalities" to different authorities, both at the domestic and the European level. According to this perspective, the objectives of financial regulation and supervision -microstability, investor protection and competition -should be assigned to distinct European authorities, each one at the center of a European system of financial regulators and supervisors, specialized in overseeing the entire financial market with respect to a single regulatory objective and regardless of the subjective nature of the intermediaries. Each system should be structured and organized similarly to the European System of Central Banks and work in connection with the ECB and national central banks. These institutions would remain responsible for price and macroeconomic stability, while Coordination Committees (at European and domestic levels) would be the formal site to discuss and solve any possible dispute among regulatory and supervisory agencies.
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Papers by giorgio giorgio