Behavioral Analysis of Commercial Law: Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Antitrust
Social Science Research Network, Dec 14, 2017
This chapter critically surveys the behavioral analysis of commercial law. It begins by examining... more This chapter critically surveys the behavioral analysis of commercial law. It begins by examining the preliminary question of whether bounded rationality can persist in well-functioning, highly competitive markets. As the theoretical analysis and empirical evidence demonstrate, irrational behavior is present even in such settings. The chapter goes on to discuss the implications of behavioral analysis for key issues within corporate law, securities regulation, and antitrust law. These include the ramifications of managers’ overconfidence and passive boards; the bounded rationality of retail investors; and the effect of behavioral phenomena on market competition. The chapter concludes with discussion of the critiques leveled against the behavioral analysis of commercial law.
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Books by Eyal Zamir
This book develops a detailed framework for incorporating threshold constraints (and options) into CBA. It addresses the challenges facing the formulation of threshold functions, and illustrates the construction and use of threshold functions to analyze several prominent legal issues. Deontologically constrained CBA is more complex than standard CBA. Yet, we maintain that it is superior to its alternatives. It rectifies some of the normative flaws of conventional CBA without significantly compromising its methodological rigor. It also improves deontology by making the analysis of threshold constraints more precise and its policy implications potentially more determinate.
Papers by Eyal Zamir
This book develops a detailed framework for incorporating threshold constraints (and options) into CBA. It addresses the challenges facing the formulation of threshold functions, and illustrates the construction and use of threshold functions to analyze several prominent legal issues. Deontologically constrained CBA is more complex than standard CBA. Yet, we maintain that it is superior to its alternatives. It rectifies some of the normative flaws of conventional CBA without significantly compromising its methodological rigor. It also improves deontology by making the analysis of threshold constraints more precise and its policy implications potentially more determinate.