As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often... more As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often used interchangeably by the public, something that has negative implications for both the integration of the Muslim community into Western society, and the efficacy of counter-extremism efforts. This paper aims to provide working for these terms by understanding them independent from their misinformed socio-political contexts, and by determining how they relate to one another in what will be identified as a series of conceptual subsets (See Fig. 1). In doing so, this paper will attempt to provide a framework for the usage of these terms in the governmental, academic, and public contexts, while removing some of the noise surrounding the important, and often highly sensitive contexts within which these terms are referenced. In this paper, religious extremism will defined as an ideological prerequisite to fundamentalism, Islamism and jihadism. It is a rejectionist, and dogmatic orientation that neglects balance in all elements of an individual’s ideological outlook. However, a fundamentalist, when defined in terms of faith, seeks to legitimise his or her beliefs through a non-contextual analysis of the relevant religious texts. An Islamist seeks to implement his or her fundamentalist views (that are by necessity, extremist) with a view to altering the structures of governance in accordance with the aforementioned rejectionist traits. Finally, and in relatively simple terms, a jihadist is an individual that champions the violent, global imposition of the Islamists’ beliefs. Jihadism is a subset of Islamism, Islamism is a subset of fundamentalism, and fundamentalism is a subset of extremism.
Muslim-majority countries today (more than 50 globally) reflect an evolving approach to the relat... more Muslim-majority countries today (more than 50 globally) reflect an evolving approach to the relationship between religion and state. Since the 1970s, violent expressions of political Islam have impacted the world. These movements have collectively become known as “Islamists”, denoting an extremist, politicised interpretation of Islam grounded in revolutionary ideological zeal. The term “Islamism” is often used interchangeably with “political Islam”. However, since all religions are inherently political, maintaining a valid space for Muslim politics is key to enabling people to bring their deeply held values into this realm – just as believers in other major religions do. Religion remains important in many nations: there must be space for moderate Muslim politics to exist, not only for moral reasons, but also to oppose Islamist extremism. While Islamists claim to entirely represent political Islam, speaking on behalf of all Muslims, they must not be permitted to monopolise the discussion. This is why religious moderates, especially those engaged with politics, must not vacate this space and cede it to the Islamists. This often happens in geopolitical conflict, with militant Islamists influencing Muslims because there are no moderate Muslim voices offering peaceful and conciliatory approaches. Muslims who want to engage with legitimate political issues must have access to a third way that sits between the irreligious and fanatics. This report proposes moderate Muslim politics as this third way. It exists in practice but needs strengthening. We underpin it with Philip Gorski’s analytical framework. Islamism Is Not the Same as Political Islam While various Muslim leaders have articulated visions of Islam in recent times, from Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf to Jordan’s King Abdullah, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, there remains a need for frameworks that better integrate it into the modern world – and answer the popular slogans of Islamists. How can mainstream Islam reclaim major narratives to enable a tolerant, inclusive representation of Islam and politics in the modern world? This report introduces a rigorous framework that defines the spectrum of political Islam more accurately and distinguishes this term from its most extreme example, Islamism. Our analysis shows that: * Islam is not unique or exceptional among religions in having political aspects. * There are many versions of Muslim politics, ranging from confessional Muslim states to Islamic religious nationalism and the most extreme representation – Islamism. * With several Muslim-majority democracies included within this spectrum, it becomes easier to recognise the compatibility of Islam with democratic principles. To progress the global debate, this report makes two contributions: * We define political Islam more precisely, with Islamism identified as an extreme subset. This not only allows for more accurate discussions around both terms but also more precisely sets out the parameters for modern Muslim politics. * We introduce a framework that not only tracks the evolving dynamics between Islam and politics, but also functions as a new tool with which to predict the future direction that Muslim-majority countries could take. Islamism is totalitarian, holding that religion should determine everything, overseen by an essentially Leninist concept of leadership, with edicts handed down by a “central committee”. The current supreme leaders of Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of this. Moderate Muslim politics is the Muslim community offering society guidance, based on the values and ethics of Islam. It seeks influence, not conformity; persuasion, not prescription; to be a voice, respected on its merits, but not the only voice and not enforced by the power of the state. Our report shows that Islamism is the result of the total fusion of religion and politics in which the former dominates the latter. While Muslim theology has generally accepted that the Prophet Muhammad’s original example in Medina involved a total fusion, whether this can be replicated today is a central question for Muslims. Islamism – as represented today by Khomeinist Iran, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS – is inherently destructive in believing it can fully recreate the prophetic reality on Earth through violence. Furthermore, this narcissism has led directly to appalling instances of religious extremism resulting in horrific terrorism and violence, sometimes sponsored at state level. On the other hand, political Islam is more variable, corresponding to either a partial overlap or fusion of religion and politics – or somewhere in between, with the result being parity of religion and politics or dominance of religion over politics. It is a spectrum, with Islamism an extreme expression. The polar opposite to Islamism is radical republicanism, best represented in the Muslim world by Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey or Habib Bourguiba’s Tunisia. Case studies, on post-independence Egypt, Pakistan and Tunisia, highlight the dynamism of Muslim politics as practiced today. Using their constitutions as a guide, we apply the analytical framework to Muslim countries to identify that: The largest current groupings fit within liberal secularism (18 countries) & religious nationalism (14 countries). The liberal-secular countries comprise two types: former French colonies in West Africa and former Soviet states in Central Asia. Using the framework, we see that if religious forces in liberal-secular Muslim countries become stronger, these countries might move to a concept known as civil religion; however, if religion declines, those countries might move to radical republicanism. In our view, civil religion is the best outcome for countries transitioning to a post-Islamism state while Islamist clerocracy (or theocracy) is the worst. The six GCC countries currently fall into the category of religious monarchy, which means they are Muslim nations in which monarchy is the primary source of authority, with Islam as the official state religion. While continuing to espouse Islam as a core part of national identity, many of these countries are becoming more religiously plural, with diversity increasingly celebrated. Religious nationalism continues to be a force in Muslim democracies, such as Turkey and Pakistan Our approach is primarily designed to support the foundations of modern societies and oppose Islamist extremism. It is also designed to cultivate a model of moderate Muslim politics for a post-Islamism world: an exit ramp. A model of Muslim civil religion that mirrors the United States under Obama could be a strong force for a pluralist, civilisational Islam of the future and has the potential to become a future flagship of a post-Islamist world. Our approach calls for an acceptance of the reality and legitimacy of moderate Muslim politics, while continuing to resist Islamism. Muslim-majority countries that are liberalising but in which Islamism remains a threat need careful policymaking and support to ensure that social, political and external factors do not push them into the dangerous, adjacent category of Islamist clerocracy, which inevitably means extremist theocracy. Civil religion is the best scenario in terms of democracy as well as the balance between the religious and the secular. For post-Islamist nations, it represents a potential model on which to settle. To achieve a third way, the integrity and theological legitimacy of the modern world, including nation states and the international order, must be affirmed. There are four policies that can promote a healthy mixture of religion and politics. Summarised below, they are structured around the four major aspects of Islam currently contested between the extremists and moderates: Ummah (nation): Policymakers must allow Muslim communities to flourish while opposing divisive Islamist notions that pit Muslims against non-Muslims. A strong sense of nationhood is required so modern nation states must assert their values and emphasise they are shared by the major world religions and philosophies, including secular and humanist ones. Khilafa (governance): Policymakers must be clear that khilafa in Islam refers to good governance, with the rule of law and justice tinged with mercy. Attempts to insist on khilafa as a resurrection of medieval and obsolete caliphates or Islamist states must be uncompromisingly resisted. Sharia (law and ethics): Policymakers must be clear that the sharia in Islam refers to ethics. Medieval details of sharia must be modernised by drawing upon centuries of sophisticated jurisprudence and the intrinsic diversity of Muslim interpretations that have included dozens of schools of law. Attempts to insist on a single fundamentalist, literalist, interpretation of sharia must be resisted. Jihad (struggle): Policymakers must be clear that contemporary Islamic scholars have agreed that jihad in the modern world includes personal and social struggles for good against evil. Even in the military sphere, jihad is a last resort that can only be waged legitimately by conventional armed forces of nation states, another reason why the integrity of the latter is so essential in the battle against Islamist extremism. Modern jihad accepts the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on warfare.
Kutoka hali ya UDHIMMI hadi DEMOCRASIA
SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ... more Kutoka hali ya UDHIMMI hadi DEMOCRASIA SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ZA URAIA
Ripoti hii inaangazia hali ya kutoeleweka (makossa) ya mara kwa mara baina ya wale wenye na itikadi kali, wakiwemo waislamu na wale wenye kupinga waislamu, waosema kuwa haiwezekani kwa wasiokuwa waislamu kuishi kama raia waliosawa na waislamu katika dola ya “waislamu’ au dola ya ‘kiislamu.’ Hali hii ya kutoeleweka emeegemea baadhi ya haya yafuatayo kutokani na nadharia an mifumo ya kiislamu ya kal: (awali). (i) dhimma (kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa Waislamu waliomo chini ya mamlaka ya waislamu) baadala yake walipe (ii) jizya, kodi inayotozwa wasio waislamu, haswa wale ahl al-kitab (jamii za watume walioteremshiwa nyaraka au vitabu), mwanzo ikieleweka kuwahusu Mayahudi na manaswara (wakristo). (iii) Siasa za mgawanyo wa ardhi unaozingatia imani ya dini katika sehemu zinazotambulika kama (dar al Islam) maeneo/ardhi ya Uislamu/waislamu, dar alkufr (maeneo/ardhi ya makafiri na maeneo ya vita (dar al-hard) Tumeonyesha kwa ukamilifu kuwa dhana hizi zimekuzwa wakati Fulani katika historia (Mapisi) ya dini ya Islamu, kwa mfano (i) Mgawanyiko wa ardhi wa mwanzoni pia ulijumuisha sehemu iliyoitwa dar- al sulh (maeneo ya maelewano au (dar ahd) maeneo ya usalama ama uwe wa muda mfupi au muda wa kudumu (ii) Kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa waislamu walio chini ya mamlaka ya Kiislamu kwa fidia ya kulipa kodi ya jizya ambayo awali alifanyika kwa Mayahudi na Manaswara haraka haraka iliongwezwa pia kwa Mazorosta katika Uajemi na Wahindu katika India kwa sababu ahl alkitab iliwahusisha pia wao na dini nyingine kubwa ulimwenguni. Wanazuoni waislamu wa kileo na wanatheologia wameongezea fikra hii kutilia shime uhuru wa dini, (kuabudu) na usawa wa kidini. (iii) Matukio mapya kama vile Mardin na Galera ambapo miji yenye waislamu wengi ilitawaliwa na wasiokuwa wislamu ilisababisha mageuzi katika magawanyo ya sehemu za ardhi kwa mfumo unaozingatia Imani za dini ulisababisha kuchipuka kwa nadharia nyingine kama vile dar al-Murakkab, yaani sehemu ya inchi ambayo wanaishi wote waislamu na wasiokuwa waislamu. Waislamu wanafikra wa kileo na wanathiologia wameomgezea wazo kama hili kukubaliana na dhana ya kuwepo kwa ukamilifu uhuru na usawa wa kidini Ripoti hii inajumuisha pamoja uchanganuzi wa nyaraka, maswala ya kithiologia, maswala ya kifikihi, maswala ya kihistoria (mapisi) na ucchanganuzi wa kisiasa ya kileo kuelezea kulitundika) jambo katika muktadha wa kihistoria na kidini na kuunga mkono mchakato (process) wa upya ( renewal) na mageuzi (reform) katika kisiasa ambayo inaendelea katika jamii zenya na waislamu wengi kwa kipindi cha miaka 200 mia mbili iliyopita.
The issues in the Muslim world that led to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have been v... more The issues in the Muslim world that led to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have been vigorously contested in the two decades since. What is more, it is not only Western countries that have lost thousands of civilians, soldiers and security personnel due to extremism since 9/11. During this period, the Muslim world has lost many more civilians and members of the armed and security forces, killed by violence caused by Islamist extremism.
The past two decades have also seen intensified debates in the Muslim world on ideological issues, as the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath laid bare internal problems to do with extremism, Islamism, Islam-state dynamics and relations with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, at least a dozen major international Islamic charters and declarations have been issued in the past 20 years. These initiatives have covered the four ideological foundations of Islamist extremism, human and women’s rights, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, the rejection of theological justifications of violence by Islamist terrorist groups, the promotion of human coexistence, support for scientific endeavour and climate change.
This report summarises some of these debates, with an emphasis on good news and positive developments in the Muslim world since 9/11. It also identifies gaps in these debates and highlights some areas that need further attention and discussion.
Governments, policymakers and decision-makers should take note of the intense ongoing debates in the Muslim world. They should enable and support those voices and forces that are more open, inclusive and universalist with respect to the rest of the world. Such forces are more likely to be durable allies in efforts to build a shared, equitable future for humanity.
As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often... more As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often used interchangeably by the public, something that has negative implications for both the integration of the Muslim community into Western society, and the efficacy of counter-extremism efforts. This paper aims to provide working for these terms by understanding them independent from their misinformed socio-political contexts, and by determining how they relate to one another in what will be identified as a series of conceptual subsets (See Fig. 1). In doing so, this paper will attempt to provide a framework for the usage of these terms in the governmental, academic, and public contexts, while removing some of the noise surrounding the important, and often highly sensitive contexts within which these terms are referenced. In this paper, religious extremism will defined as an ideological prerequisite to fundamentalism, Islamism and jihadism. It is a rejectionist, and dogmatic orientation that neglects balance in all elements of an individual’s ideological outlook. However, a fundamentalist, when defined in terms of faith, seeks to legitimise his or her beliefs through a non-contextual analysis of the relevant religious texts. An Islamist seeks to implement his or her fundamentalist views (that are by necessity, extremist) with a view to altering the structures of governance in accordance with the aforementioned rejectionist traits. Finally, and in relatively simple terms, a jihadist is an individual that champions the violent, global imposition of the Islamists’ beliefs. Jihadism is a subset of Islamism, Islamism is a subset of fundamentalism, and fundamentalism is a subset of extremism.
1. This study concludes, by reconciling Islamic scriptural interpretations with modern science, t... more 1. This study concludes, by reconciling Islamic scriptural interpretations with modern science, that Allah (God) created humans via evolution.
2. Theologically speaking, the moment when hominin (human-like) creatures became fully self-aware corresponds to the completion of the creation of Adam, the breathing of God’s Spirit into him and God teaching him all the Divine Names. The “Breathing of the Spirit of God into Adam” thus took billions of years from the Big Bang: it was a long process in human terms, but instantaneous for God. God created humanity so that the latter could become self-aware, know themselves and know God.
3. This study also clarifies that certain disputed matters of tafsir have been settled in the past by scientific consensus: examples of this are the age of the earth, the creation of the heavens before the earth, the role of the moon in solar eclipses, the roundness of the earth and the composition of embryos from the fluids of both parents.
4. In this respect, the science of human evolution answers many questions about the Qur’anic story of Adam and Eve with regard to human origin – these have been discussed in detail in this paper. Modern science also suggests that the early minority Muslim viewpoint, that the Garden of Eden was earthly and not heavenly, is in harmony with scientific knowledge.
Inspire conference papers on Women’s Rights and Islam (London, UK – 4-5 June, 2011).
Part I Qura... more Inspire conference papers on Women’s Rights and Islam (London, UK – 4-5 June, 2011).
Part I Quranic and theological foundations
1 Keynote Lecture KHALED ABOU EL-FADL
2 The Private vs. The Public and Gender Equality HALIMA KRAUSEN
3 Overcoming Challenges of Interpreting the Qur’an in Contemporary Societies MICHAEL MUMISA
4 Relationships: Between the Real and the Ideal AMINA WADUD
Part II Islamic law
5 Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Islam – between Traditionalism and Rationalism USAMA HASAN
6 Defending Female Muslims from Hadith-Abuse RUQAIYYAH WARIS MAQSOOD
Part III Islam and Feminism
7 Islam and Feminism: Opening a New Dialogue ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI
8 Personal Reflections on the Conference and the Issues it Addressed MONA SIDDIQUI
This two-page work summarises abortion laws (as at 2014) in 53 OIC (Islamic) countries, plus 3 We... more This two-page work summarises abortion laws (as at 2014) in 53 OIC (Islamic) countries, plus 3 Western countries for comparison: UK, USA & France.
The abortion laws are summarised according to: Country, Grounds to permit abortion, Date of current legislation, Maximum penalty (+ fine), Time limit.
The research was summarised from the following sources: United Nations, Women on Waves, Pew Research Centre & Cyberlaw (Harvard).
This is a summarised translation, with footnotes plus occasional translator's notes, of the chapt... more This is a summarised translation, with footnotes plus occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic rulings on abortion from: Dr. Ali Muhyi l-Din al-Qarahdaghi & Dr. Ali Yusuf al-Muhammadi, Fiqh al-Qadaya al-Tibbiyyah al-Mu’asirah (Jurisprudence of Contemporary Medical Issues), Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, 1426/2005, pp. 428-451
This is a summarised translation, with occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic r... more This is a summarised translation, with occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic rulings on abortion from: Dr. Ali Muhyi l-Din al-Qarahdaghi & Dr. Ali Yusuf al-Muhammadi, Fiqh al-Qadaya al-Tibbiyyah al-Mu’asirah (Jurisprudence of Contemporary Medical Issues), Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, 1426/2005, pp. 428-451
Just before Ramadan this year, the Muslim Mamas private Facebook group for Muslim mothers, that h... more Just before Ramadan this year, the Muslim Mamas private Facebook group for Muslim mothers, that has over 20,000 members and is like a Muslim version of Mumsnet, asked if I would answer some questions about Ramadan and "intimacy" (read: sex). I consented, and my answers were published on the group, I believe. I am reproducing the questions here, followed by my answers. These have been updated slightly from the ones I sent to Muslim Mamas. Before my answers, I set my stall out on my current approach to Hadith and Fiqh.
THE QUESTIONS 1. What affectionate acts between husband and wife are permissible during Ramadan, and which ones break the fast? (Kissing, fondling, open mouth kissing, dry humping, ...) 2. What does Islam say about the importance of female sexual pleasure? 3. What is your opinion of self-pleasure. Is it permissible in Islam? (If you do not agree that it is permissible, how is it that one person can then teach another about their own pleasure?) 4. What is your opinion about the permissibility of sex toys in Islam? 5. What is your opinion about oral sex in Islam? 6. If a woman is raped by her husband during Ramadan, does she have to make up the fast? 7. What advice do you have for couples in order to nurture love, affection and intimacy? 8. What examples did our Prophet pbuh leave us to follow with regards to spirituality and intimacy? 9. What rewards are there in Ramadan for being intimate-is it more rewarding to abstain? 10. Who can we turn to if our knowledgeable people are all men and mamas feel shy to ask about intimate questions? 11. A couple had intimate relations during fasting hours, just after fajr. What is the kaffarah [expiation]? 12. Can a couple resume intimate relations if neither is fasting? Or is it prohibited during the day?
This week, inspired by the Saudi announcement that they will abolish flogging as a form of crimin... more This week, inspired by the Saudi announcement that they will abolish flogging as a form of criminal punishment, Quilliam have published a new paper on the Hudood. The Hudood are the classical corporal and capital punishments in medieval Islam, including lashing/flogging, amputation of hands/arms/feet/legs, stoning to death, beheadings, crucifixion and other forms of execution. This paper considers:
(i) the theological-jurisprudential basis of corporal and capital punishment (Hudood) under Islamic Law/Ethics (Sharia), (ii) the Islamic case for the abolition of Hudood, and (iii) the significance of the issue to islamist groups from ISIS and Al Qaeda to the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brothers, Khomeinists and islamists of other persuasions, whether Sunni or Shia, Salafi or Sufi.
We stress that the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century, passed by the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan after backing from their senior Sharia scholars including the Grand Mufti, had already repealed the classical hudood punishments. We also propose a jurisprudential framework for the replacement of hudood laws based on the classical Islamic jurisprudential principle of ta’zir or discretionary punishments for crime.
اسلام در تاريخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی انديشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص
مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از... more اسلام در تاريخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی انديشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از دين و حتی خود باور و عقيده ی دينی ضرورتاً مستلزم بياناتی است که ممکن است برای بقيه اهانت آميز باشد يا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحريک مبتنی است بر معنويت ٬ عزت و کرامت و بخشش. اين سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز سخت نيازمند احياء در کشورها و جامعه هايی با اکثريت مسلمان است ٬ به ويژه با توجه به ميزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دينی زاييده می شود.
اسلام در تاریخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی اندیشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص
مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از... more اسلام در تاریخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی اندیشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از دین و حتی خود باور و عقیده ی دینی ضرورتاً مستلزم بیاناتی است که ممکن است برای بقیه اهانت آمیز باشد یا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحریک مبتنی است بر معنویت، عزت و کرامت و بخشش. این سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز سخت نیازمند احیاء در کشورها و جامعه هایی با اکثریت مسلمان است، به ویژه با توجه به میزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دینی زاییده می شود.
As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often... more As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often used interchangeably by the public, something that has negative implications for both the integration of the Muslim community into Western society, and the efficacy of counter-extremism efforts. This paper aims to provide working for these terms by understanding them independent from their misinformed socio-political contexts, and by determining how they relate to one another in what will be identified as a series of conceptual subsets (See Fig. 1). In doing so, this paper will attempt to provide a framework for the usage of these terms in the governmental, academic, and public contexts, while removing some of the noise surrounding the important, and often highly sensitive contexts within which these terms are referenced. In this paper, religious extremism will defined as an ideological prerequisite to fundamentalism, Islamism and jihadism. It is a rejectionist, and dogmatic orientation that neglects balance in all elements of an individual’s ideological outlook. However, a fundamentalist, when defined in terms of faith, seeks to legitimise his or her beliefs through a non-contextual analysis of the relevant religious texts. An Islamist seeks to implement his or her fundamentalist views (that are by necessity, extremist) with a view to altering the structures of governance in accordance with the aforementioned rejectionist traits. Finally, and in relatively simple terms, a jihadist is an individual that champions the violent, global imposition of the Islamists’ beliefs. Jihadism is a subset of Islamism, Islamism is a subset of fundamentalism, and fundamentalism is a subset of extremism.
Muslim-majority countries today (more than 50 globally) reflect an evolving approach to the relat... more Muslim-majority countries today (more than 50 globally) reflect an evolving approach to the relationship between religion and state. Since the 1970s, violent expressions of political Islam have impacted the world. These movements have collectively become known as “Islamists”, denoting an extremist, politicised interpretation of Islam grounded in revolutionary ideological zeal. The term “Islamism” is often used interchangeably with “political Islam”. However, since all religions are inherently political, maintaining a valid space for Muslim politics is key to enabling people to bring their deeply held values into this realm – just as believers in other major religions do. Religion remains important in many nations: there must be space for moderate Muslim politics to exist, not only for moral reasons, but also to oppose Islamist extremism. While Islamists claim to entirely represent political Islam, speaking on behalf of all Muslims, they must not be permitted to monopolise the discussion. This is why religious moderates, especially those engaged with politics, must not vacate this space and cede it to the Islamists. This often happens in geopolitical conflict, with militant Islamists influencing Muslims because there are no moderate Muslim voices offering peaceful and conciliatory approaches. Muslims who want to engage with legitimate political issues must have access to a third way that sits between the irreligious and fanatics. This report proposes moderate Muslim politics as this third way. It exists in practice but needs strengthening. We underpin it with Philip Gorski’s analytical framework. Islamism Is Not the Same as Political Islam While various Muslim leaders have articulated visions of Islam in recent times, from Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf to Jordan’s King Abdullah, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, there remains a need for frameworks that better integrate it into the modern world – and answer the popular slogans of Islamists. How can mainstream Islam reclaim major narratives to enable a tolerant, inclusive representation of Islam and politics in the modern world? This report introduces a rigorous framework that defines the spectrum of political Islam more accurately and distinguishes this term from its most extreme example, Islamism. Our analysis shows that: * Islam is not unique or exceptional among religions in having political aspects. * There are many versions of Muslim politics, ranging from confessional Muslim states to Islamic religious nationalism and the most extreme representation – Islamism. * With several Muslim-majority democracies included within this spectrum, it becomes easier to recognise the compatibility of Islam with democratic principles. To progress the global debate, this report makes two contributions: * We define political Islam more precisely, with Islamism identified as an extreme subset. This not only allows for more accurate discussions around both terms but also more precisely sets out the parameters for modern Muslim politics. * We introduce a framework that not only tracks the evolving dynamics between Islam and politics, but also functions as a new tool with which to predict the future direction that Muslim-majority countries could take. Islamism is totalitarian, holding that religion should determine everything, overseen by an essentially Leninist concept of leadership, with edicts handed down by a “central committee”. The current supreme leaders of Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of this. Moderate Muslim politics is the Muslim community offering society guidance, based on the values and ethics of Islam. It seeks influence, not conformity; persuasion, not prescription; to be a voice, respected on its merits, but not the only voice and not enforced by the power of the state. Our report shows that Islamism is the result of the total fusion of religion and politics in which the former dominates the latter. While Muslim theology has generally accepted that the Prophet Muhammad’s original example in Medina involved a total fusion, whether this can be replicated today is a central question for Muslims. Islamism – as represented today by Khomeinist Iran, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS – is inherently destructive in believing it can fully recreate the prophetic reality on Earth through violence. Furthermore, this narcissism has led directly to appalling instances of religious extremism resulting in horrific terrorism and violence, sometimes sponsored at state level. On the other hand, political Islam is more variable, corresponding to either a partial overlap or fusion of religion and politics – or somewhere in between, with the result being parity of religion and politics or dominance of religion over politics. It is a spectrum, with Islamism an extreme expression. The polar opposite to Islamism is radical republicanism, best represented in the Muslim world by Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey or Habib Bourguiba’s Tunisia. Case studies, on post-independence Egypt, Pakistan and Tunisia, highlight the dynamism of Muslim politics as practiced today. Using their constitutions as a guide, we apply the analytical framework to Muslim countries to identify that: The largest current groupings fit within liberal secularism (18 countries) & religious nationalism (14 countries). The liberal-secular countries comprise two types: former French colonies in West Africa and former Soviet states in Central Asia. Using the framework, we see that if religious forces in liberal-secular Muslim countries become stronger, these countries might move to a concept known as civil religion; however, if religion declines, those countries might move to radical republicanism. In our view, civil religion is the best outcome for countries transitioning to a post-Islamism state while Islamist clerocracy (or theocracy) is the worst. The six GCC countries currently fall into the category of religious monarchy, which means they are Muslim nations in which monarchy is the primary source of authority, with Islam as the official state religion. While continuing to espouse Islam as a core part of national identity, many of these countries are becoming more religiously plural, with diversity increasingly celebrated. Religious nationalism continues to be a force in Muslim democracies, such as Turkey and Pakistan Our approach is primarily designed to support the foundations of modern societies and oppose Islamist extremism. It is also designed to cultivate a model of moderate Muslim politics for a post-Islamism world: an exit ramp. A model of Muslim civil religion that mirrors the United States under Obama could be a strong force for a pluralist, civilisational Islam of the future and has the potential to become a future flagship of a post-Islamist world. Our approach calls for an acceptance of the reality and legitimacy of moderate Muslim politics, while continuing to resist Islamism. Muslim-majority countries that are liberalising but in which Islamism remains a threat need careful policymaking and support to ensure that social, political and external factors do not push them into the dangerous, adjacent category of Islamist clerocracy, which inevitably means extremist theocracy. Civil religion is the best scenario in terms of democracy as well as the balance between the religious and the secular. For post-Islamist nations, it represents a potential model on which to settle. To achieve a third way, the integrity and theological legitimacy of the modern world, including nation states and the international order, must be affirmed. There are four policies that can promote a healthy mixture of religion and politics. Summarised below, they are structured around the four major aspects of Islam currently contested between the extremists and moderates: Ummah (nation): Policymakers must allow Muslim communities to flourish while opposing divisive Islamist notions that pit Muslims against non-Muslims. A strong sense of nationhood is required so modern nation states must assert their values and emphasise they are shared by the major world religions and philosophies, including secular and humanist ones. Khilafa (governance): Policymakers must be clear that khilafa in Islam refers to good governance, with the rule of law and justice tinged with mercy. Attempts to insist on khilafa as a resurrection of medieval and obsolete caliphates or Islamist states must be uncompromisingly resisted. Sharia (law and ethics): Policymakers must be clear that the sharia in Islam refers to ethics. Medieval details of sharia must be modernised by drawing upon centuries of sophisticated jurisprudence and the intrinsic diversity of Muslim interpretations that have included dozens of schools of law. Attempts to insist on a single fundamentalist, literalist, interpretation of sharia must be resisted. Jihad (struggle): Policymakers must be clear that contemporary Islamic scholars have agreed that jihad in the modern world includes personal and social struggles for good against evil. Even in the military sphere, jihad is a last resort that can only be waged legitimately by conventional armed forces of nation states, another reason why the integrity of the latter is so essential in the battle against Islamist extremism. Modern jihad accepts the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on warfare.
Kutoka hali ya UDHIMMI hadi DEMOCRASIA
SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ... more Kutoka hali ya UDHIMMI hadi DEMOCRASIA SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ZA URAIA
Ripoti hii inaangazia hali ya kutoeleweka (makossa) ya mara kwa mara baina ya wale wenye na itikadi kali, wakiwemo waislamu na wale wenye kupinga waislamu, waosema kuwa haiwezekani kwa wasiokuwa waislamu kuishi kama raia waliosawa na waislamu katika dola ya “waislamu’ au dola ya ‘kiislamu.’ Hali hii ya kutoeleweka emeegemea baadhi ya haya yafuatayo kutokani na nadharia an mifumo ya kiislamu ya kal: (awali). (i) dhimma (kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa Waislamu waliomo chini ya mamlaka ya waislamu) baadala yake walipe (ii) jizya, kodi inayotozwa wasio waislamu, haswa wale ahl al-kitab (jamii za watume walioteremshiwa nyaraka au vitabu), mwanzo ikieleweka kuwahusu Mayahudi na manaswara (wakristo). (iii) Siasa za mgawanyo wa ardhi unaozingatia imani ya dini katika sehemu zinazotambulika kama (dar al Islam) maeneo/ardhi ya Uislamu/waislamu, dar alkufr (maeneo/ardhi ya makafiri na maeneo ya vita (dar al-hard) Tumeonyesha kwa ukamilifu kuwa dhana hizi zimekuzwa wakati Fulani katika historia (Mapisi) ya dini ya Islamu, kwa mfano (i) Mgawanyiko wa ardhi wa mwanzoni pia ulijumuisha sehemu iliyoitwa dar- al sulh (maeneo ya maelewano au (dar ahd) maeneo ya usalama ama uwe wa muda mfupi au muda wa kudumu (ii) Kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa waislamu walio chini ya mamlaka ya Kiislamu kwa fidia ya kulipa kodi ya jizya ambayo awali alifanyika kwa Mayahudi na Manaswara haraka haraka iliongwezwa pia kwa Mazorosta katika Uajemi na Wahindu katika India kwa sababu ahl alkitab iliwahusisha pia wao na dini nyingine kubwa ulimwenguni. Wanazuoni waislamu wa kileo na wanatheologia wameongezea fikra hii kutilia shime uhuru wa dini, (kuabudu) na usawa wa kidini. (iii) Matukio mapya kama vile Mardin na Galera ambapo miji yenye waislamu wengi ilitawaliwa na wasiokuwa wislamu ilisababisha mageuzi katika magawanyo ya sehemu za ardhi kwa mfumo unaozingatia Imani za dini ulisababisha kuchipuka kwa nadharia nyingine kama vile dar al-Murakkab, yaani sehemu ya inchi ambayo wanaishi wote waislamu na wasiokuwa waislamu. Waislamu wanafikra wa kileo na wanathiologia wameomgezea wazo kama hili kukubaliana na dhana ya kuwepo kwa ukamilifu uhuru na usawa wa kidini Ripoti hii inajumuisha pamoja uchanganuzi wa nyaraka, maswala ya kithiologia, maswala ya kifikihi, maswala ya kihistoria (mapisi) na ucchanganuzi wa kisiasa ya kileo kuelezea kulitundika) jambo katika muktadha wa kihistoria na kidini na kuunga mkono mchakato (process) wa upya ( renewal) na mageuzi (reform) katika kisiasa ambayo inaendelea katika jamii zenya na waislamu wengi kwa kipindi cha miaka 200 mia mbili iliyopita.
The issues in the Muslim world that led to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have been v... more The issues in the Muslim world that led to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have been vigorously contested in the two decades since. What is more, it is not only Western countries that have lost thousands of civilians, soldiers and security personnel due to extremism since 9/11. During this period, the Muslim world has lost many more civilians and members of the armed and security forces, killed by violence caused by Islamist extremism.
The past two decades have also seen intensified debates in the Muslim world on ideological issues, as the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath laid bare internal problems to do with extremism, Islamism, Islam-state dynamics and relations with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, at least a dozen major international Islamic charters and declarations have been issued in the past 20 years. These initiatives have covered the four ideological foundations of Islamist extremism, human and women’s rights, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, the rejection of theological justifications of violence by Islamist terrorist groups, the promotion of human coexistence, support for scientific endeavour and climate change.
This report summarises some of these debates, with an emphasis on good news and positive developments in the Muslim world since 9/11. It also identifies gaps in these debates and highlights some areas that need further attention and discussion.
Governments, policymakers and decision-makers should take note of the intense ongoing debates in the Muslim world. They should enable and support those voices and forces that are more open, inclusive and universalist with respect to the rest of the world. Such forces are more likely to be durable allies in efforts to build a shared, equitable future for humanity.
As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often... more As will be made clear below, the terms extremism, fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are often used interchangeably by the public, something that has negative implications for both the integration of the Muslim community into Western society, and the efficacy of counter-extremism efforts. This paper aims to provide working for these terms by understanding them independent from their misinformed socio-political contexts, and by determining how they relate to one another in what will be identified as a series of conceptual subsets (See Fig. 1). In doing so, this paper will attempt to provide a framework for the usage of these terms in the governmental, academic, and public contexts, while removing some of the noise surrounding the important, and often highly sensitive contexts within which these terms are referenced. In this paper, religious extremism will defined as an ideological prerequisite to fundamentalism, Islamism and jihadism. It is a rejectionist, and dogmatic orientation that neglects balance in all elements of an individual’s ideological outlook. However, a fundamentalist, when defined in terms of faith, seeks to legitimise his or her beliefs through a non-contextual analysis of the relevant religious texts. An Islamist seeks to implement his or her fundamentalist views (that are by necessity, extremist) with a view to altering the structures of governance in accordance with the aforementioned rejectionist traits. Finally, and in relatively simple terms, a jihadist is an individual that champions the violent, global imposition of the Islamists’ beliefs. Jihadism is a subset of Islamism, Islamism is a subset of fundamentalism, and fundamentalism is a subset of extremism.
1. This study concludes, by reconciling Islamic scriptural interpretations with modern science, t... more 1. This study concludes, by reconciling Islamic scriptural interpretations with modern science, that Allah (God) created humans via evolution.
2. Theologically speaking, the moment when hominin (human-like) creatures became fully self-aware corresponds to the completion of the creation of Adam, the breathing of God’s Spirit into him and God teaching him all the Divine Names. The “Breathing of the Spirit of God into Adam” thus took billions of years from the Big Bang: it was a long process in human terms, but instantaneous for God. God created humanity so that the latter could become self-aware, know themselves and know God.
3. This study also clarifies that certain disputed matters of tafsir have been settled in the past by scientific consensus: examples of this are the age of the earth, the creation of the heavens before the earth, the role of the moon in solar eclipses, the roundness of the earth and the composition of embryos from the fluids of both parents.
4. In this respect, the science of human evolution answers many questions about the Qur’anic story of Adam and Eve with regard to human origin – these have been discussed in detail in this paper. Modern science also suggests that the early minority Muslim viewpoint, that the Garden of Eden was earthly and not heavenly, is in harmony with scientific knowledge.
Inspire conference papers on Women’s Rights and Islam (London, UK – 4-5 June, 2011).
Part I Qura... more Inspire conference papers on Women’s Rights and Islam (London, UK – 4-5 June, 2011).
Part I Quranic and theological foundations
1 Keynote Lecture KHALED ABOU EL-FADL
2 The Private vs. The Public and Gender Equality HALIMA KRAUSEN
3 Overcoming Challenges of Interpreting the Qur’an in Contemporary Societies MICHAEL MUMISA
4 Relationships: Between the Real and the Ideal AMINA WADUD
Part II Islamic law
5 Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Islam – between Traditionalism and Rationalism USAMA HASAN
6 Defending Female Muslims from Hadith-Abuse RUQAIYYAH WARIS MAQSOOD
Part III Islam and Feminism
7 Islam and Feminism: Opening a New Dialogue ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI
8 Personal Reflections on the Conference and the Issues it Addressed MONA SIDDIQUI
This two-page work summarises abortion laws (as at 2014) in 53 OIC (Islamic) countries, plus 3 We... more This two-page work summarises abortion laws (as at 2014) in 53 OIC (Islamic) countries, plus 3 Western countries for comparison: UK, USA & France.
The abortion laws are summarised according to: Country, Grounds to permit abortion, Date of current legislation, Maximum penalty (+ fine), Time limit.
The research was summarised from the following sources: United Nations, Women on Waves, Pew Research Centre & Cyberlaw (Harvard).
This is a summarised translation, with footnotes plus occasional translator's notes, of the chapt... more This is a summarised translation, with footnotes plus occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic rulings on abortion from: Dr. Ali Muhyi l-Din al-Qarahdaghi & Dr. Ali Yusuf al-Muhammadi, Fiqh al-Qadaya al-Tibbiyyah al-Mu’asirah (Jurisprudence of Contemporary Medical Issues), Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, 1426/2005, pp. 428-451
This is a summarised translation, with occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic r... more This is a summarised translation, with occasional translator's notes, of the chapter on Islamic rulings on abortion from: Dr. Ali Muhyi l-Din al-Qarahdaghi & Dr. Ali Yusuf al-Muhammadi, Fiqh al-Qadaya al-Tibbiyyah al-Mu’asirah (Jurisprudence of Contemporary Medical Issues), Dar al-Basha’ir al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, 1426/2005, pp. 428-451
Just before Ramadan this year, the Muslim Mamas private Facebook group for Muslim mothers, that h... more Just before Ramadan this year, the Muslim Mamas private Facebook group for Muslim mothers, that has over 20,000 members and is like a Muslim version of Mumsnet, asked if I would answer some questions about Ramadan and "intimacy" (read: sex). I consented, and my answers were published on the group, I believe. I am reproducing the questions here, followed by my answers. These have been updated slightly from the ones I sent to Muslim Mamas. Before my answers, I set my stall out on my current approach to Hadith and Fiqh.
THE QUESTIONS 1. What affectionate acts between husband and wife are permissible during Ramadan, and which ones break the fast? (Kissing, fondling, open mouth kissing, dry humping, ...) 2. What does Islam say about the importance of female sexual pleasure? 3. What is your opinion of self-pleasure. Is it permissible in Islam? (If you do not agree that it is permissible, how is it that one person can then teach another about their own pleasure?) 4. What is your opinion about the permissibility of sex toys in Islam? 5. What is your opinion about oral sex in Islam? 6. If a woman is raped by her husband during Ramadan, does she have to make up the fast? 7. What advice do you have for couples in order to nurture love, affection and intimacy? 8. What examples did our Prophet pbuh leave us to follow with regards to spirituality and intimacy? 9. What rewards are there in Ramadan for being intimate-is it more rewarding to abstain? 10. Who can we turn to if our knowledgeable people are all men and mamas feel shy to ask about intimate questions? 11. A couple had intimate relations during fasting hours, just after fajr. What is the kaffarah [expiation]? 12. Can a couple resume intimate relations if neither is fasting? Or is it prohibited during the day?
This week, inspired by the Saudi announcement that they will abolish flogging as a form of crimin... more This week, inspired by the Saudi announcement that they will abolish flogging as a form of criminal punishment, Quilliam have published a new paper on the Hudood. The Hudood are the classical corporal and capital punishments in medieval Islam, including lashing/flogging, amputation of hands/arms/feet/legs, stoning to death, beheadings, crucifixion and other forms of execution. This paper considers:
(i) the theological-jurisprudential basis of corporal and capital punishment (Hudood) under Islamic Law/Ethics (Sharia), (ii) the Islamic case for the abolition of Hudood, and (iii) the significance of the issue to islamist groups from ISIS and Al Qaeda to the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brothers, Khomeinists and islamists of other persuasions, whether Sunni or Shia, Salafi or Sufi.
We stress that the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century, passed by the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan after backing from their senior Sharia scholars including the Grand Mufti, had already repealed the classical hudood punishments. We also propose a jurisprudential framework for the replacement of hudood laws based on the classical Islamic jurisprudential principle of ta’zir or discretionary punishments for crime.
اسلام در تاريخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی انديشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص
مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از... more اسلام در تاريخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی انديشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از دين و حتی خود باور و عقيده ی دينی ضرورتاً مستلزم بياناتی است که ممکن است برای بقيه اهانت آميز باشد يا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحريک مبتنی است بر معنويت ٬ عزت و کرامت و بخشش. اين سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز سخت نيازمند احياء در کشورها و جامعه هايی با اکثريت مسلمان است ٬ به ويژه با توجه به ميزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دينی زاييده می شود.
اسلام در تاریخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی اندیشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص
مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از... more اسلام در تاریخ سنتی قوی از رواداری و آزادی اندیشه و بحث دارد حتی در خصوص مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از دین و حتی خود باور و عقیده ی دینی ضرورتاً مستلزم بیاناتی است که ممکن است برای بقیه اهانت آمیز باشد یا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحریک مبتنی است بر معنویت، عزت و کرامت و بخشش. این سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز سخت نیازمند احیاء در کشورها و جامعه هایی با اکثریت مسلمان است، به ویژه با توجه به میزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دینی زاییده می شود.
Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers
Webinar: Protecting the Rights of Religious Mi... more Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers
Webinar: Protecting the Rights of Religious Minorities in the Age of COVID-19
with Minister Ijaz Alam Augustine,
Provincial Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Affairs in Punjab, Pakistan.
28th May, 2020 – notes by Usama Hasan
Minister: 1. We have been in power for 2 years. In Punjab [Pakistan’s most populous province, with over half of Pakistan’s population of approximately 220 million people], we have achieved gains for minorities that had not happened in the previous 70 years. [In 2019, Pakistan celebrated 72 years since Independence.]
Tariq Modood (2011) maps “Four Modes of Integration” (Assimilation, Individualist-Integration, Co... more Tariq Modood (2011) maps “Four Modes of Integration” (Assimilation, Individualist-Integration, Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism) according to “core, European democractic values” of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity that assume “a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values.” This paper presents some theological and jurisprudential arguments, aiming to help Muslim discourse about integration.
The paper concludes that hurriyah (liberty), musawah (equality) and ukhuwwah (fraternity) are maq... more The paper concludes that hurriyah (liberty), musawah (equality) and ukhuwwah (fraternity) are maqasid of Sharia and thus are Islamic values. This empowers Muslims to engage with the integration debates as suggested by Modood on the basis of a rigorous theological foundation.
Tariq Modood (2011) maps “Four Modes of Integration” (Assimilation, Individualist-Integration, Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism) according to “core, European democractic values” of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity that assume “a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values.”
This paper presents some theological and jurisprudential arguments, aiming to help Muslim discourse about integration: 1. During the Prophet’s mission, a treaty was concluded with the Jews and Christians of Medina that upheld a plural religious society, united against the attacks of the Meccan polytheists.
2. During early Islam, levying jizyah in return for military protection (dhimmah) and exemption from military service became a widespread practice. Jizyah is mentioned only once in the Qur’an (9:29). Even in early Islam, dhimmah was extended to non-Abrahamic religious communities, e.g. Zoroastrians and Hindus.
3. In traditional jurisprudence, jizyah and dhimmah became axiomatic, along with the associated concepts of Dar al-Islam (Land of Islam), Dar al-Kufr (Land of Disbelief) and Dar al-Harb (Land of War). There later developed the Maqasid theory of Islamic law that emphasizes universal values and objectives over specific texts and rulings.
4. There was a fundamental dichotomy in the basis of human rights jurisprudence: traditionalist schools favoured a communalist approach, based on a person’s Islam or dhimmah; more rationalist schools, e.g. Hanafis, favoured a universalist approach, based on a person’s basic humanity (adamiyyah). The Ottomans used adamiyyah, along with considerations of maqasid, to abandon their Millet system of multiple, parallel religious law for different faith communities in favour of a system of equal Ottoman citizenship. The Ottomans enacted radical reforms to bring about civic equality, irrespective of race or religion. They abolished jizyah and dhimmah in 1856.
5. Indian Muslims shared a homeland with Hindus, Buddhists, Parsis (Zoroastrians), Sikhs and Christians for centuries, and the Mughals ruled over large areas of India where the population was majority non-Muslim. Over the last century of British rule (19th-20th century), a strong nationalist movement for independence emerged. Scholars and thinkers grappled with nations, homelands and faiths, making notable contributions to the debates around loyalty to God, religion and homeland, including possible conflicts of loyalty, especially in the context of nationalist independence from colonial rule. These debates resonate with today’s integration debates.
6. Leading, contemporary jurists, thinkers and theologians of Islam agree that the mediaeval notions of jizyah and dhimmah are outdated, and that modern notions of citizenship (muwatanah) are appropriate expressions of Islamic law and ethics today. This conclusion is based on maqasid, universalist jurisprudence and adapting to practical situations.
7. Modern notions of citizenship, irrespective of religion, were also embraced by leading Muslim political leaders from the 20th century, including Ataturk and Jinnah. The constitutions of many Muslim-majority countries affirm equal rights for citizens, irrespective of religion, although implementation of equal rights is often deficient.
Contemporary Muslim Discourse on Religion, Identity & Loyalty. Presented at Religion, Identity & ... more Contemporary Muslim Discourse on Religion, Identity & Loyalty. Presented at Religion, Identity & Conflict Conference, St Mary’s University, Twickenham, 2-3 December 2016, UK. Includes detailed translation and commentary on Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah's discussion of integration, citizenship and secularism from an Islamic viewpoint.
Contemplating the Qur’an is a treatise on following the Qur’an and the Sunnah, benefiting from the codified Madhhabs holistically whilst not following any one Madhhab rigidly or blindly, by Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti (1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE) of Mauritania and Saudi Arabia, one of the greatest authorities on the Qur’an of the 20th century CE and the 14th Islamic century. The treatise is an abridged translation of the author’s tafsir of an ayah of the Qur’an (Surah Muhammad, 47:24) from his monumental tafsir, Adwa’ al-Bayan (Lights of Eloquence).
In this treatise, the author covers the following topics:
Muslims must contemplate the Qur’an, learn it, understand it and act by it
There is no basis for those who say that the above is only for the mujtahids
A muqallid is not an ‘alim: a follower of opinions does not have knowledge
Saying that we cannot follow the Qur’an and Sunnah but must follow the codified Madhhabs, is one of the greatest falsehoods
A critique of Sawi’s view that holding to the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah is one of the principles of kufr (blasphemy)
On Ijtihad, Taqlid and Madhhab; permissible and impermissible taqlid
He concludes with eleven “Important Notes About This Issue,” including: the Four Imams were united in forbidding their blind taqlid; Haram/Halal cannot be stated on the basis of taqlid; the difference between taqlid & ittiba’; our stance towards the Imams; every Imam has been criticized for going against the Sunnah in particular matters (with examples); muqallids must distinguish between their Imam’s actual views and those added to his Madhhab after him; it is impermissible for a Muslim to believe that the era of ijtihad is closed, and that only four Madhhabs must be followed; turning away from the Qur’an and Sunnah in favour of the Four Madhhabs is one of the greatest problems that has beset Muslims over recent centuries.
We have added five important Appendices.
Firstly, an earlier, concise fatwa from the Shaykh about following Madhhabs, given in 1385 H (1964/5 CE). The Shaykh moved on from this fatwa somewhat, but we include it for the sake of integrity.
Secondly, we mention the Shaykh’s broadening out from his basis of the Maliki Madhhab after becoming exposed in Mecca and Medina to diverse views and schools from around the Muslim world.
Thirdly, we correct a contemporary misquote from Imam Ibn al-Qayyim, whom the Shaykh quotes extensively in his full discussion. The misquote attempts to portray Ibn al-Qayyim as saying the opposite of his actual position, so we are happy to set the record straight.
Fourthly, we show how Imam Shatibi also presented a holistic approach to the Madhhabs.
Finally, we include Zamakhshari’s classic, educational and entertaining poem about Madhhabi sectarianism.
Translation of A BIOGRAPHY OF THE SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-AMĪN AL-SHANQĪTĪ (1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE... more Translation of A BIOGRAPHY OF THE SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-AMĪN AL-SHANQĪTĪ (1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE), AUTHOR OF THE MAGNIFICENT TAFSĪR, ADWÂ’ AL-BAYÂN FĪ ĪDÂH AL-QUR’ÂN BI L-QUR’ÂN (LIGHTS OF ELOQUENCE IN EXPLAINING THE QUR’AN BY THE QUR’AN) LEADING SCHOLAR OF MAURITANIA SENIOR JUDGE IN HIGH COURT FOR MURDER CASES, MAURITANIA HEAD EXEGETE OF THE QUR’AN AT: THE INSTITUTE OF KNOWLEDGE, RIYADH HIGHER INSTITUTE FOR THE JUDICIARY, RIYADH COLLEGE OF SHARIA, THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, MEDINA THE MOSQUE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM), MEDINA MAY ALLAH BESTOW HIS INFINITE MERCY UPON HIM Biography by SHAYKH ‘ATIYYAH MUHAMMAD SÂLIM Judge, Law Court of Medina, Saudi Arabia
The third edition, with additional direct memories of Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti by Shaykh Suhaib Hasan Founder of Al-Qur’an Society one of the eldest and most senior, living students of Shaykh Shanqiti
A translation of a magnificent poem about that magnificent journey, the Hajj or annual pilgrimage... more A translation of a magnificent poem about that magnificent journey, the Hajj or annual pilgrimage to Mecca, by Imam Abu ‘Abdillah Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Abi Bakr b. Ayyub al-Zar’i of Damascus, also known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (691-751 H / 1291-1350 CE).
The poem is an extract from Ibn al-Qayyim’s Qasidah Mimiyyah (Ode in the Letter Mim); the section of the latter regarding the Hajj is reproduced in Awdah al-Masalik ila Ahkam al-Manasik by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muhammad al-Salman (12th edition, Riyadh, 1403 H, pp. 265-272), where I came across it during the Blessed Hajj of the year 1422 (2002). I found the poem to be of immense inspiration, masterfully combining references to the outer physical actions of the Hajj with the Pilgrimage’s inner spiritual effects and etiquettes.
* This is the 1st edition. The latest (3rd) edition is available on Academia.edu here:
https:... more * This is the 1st edition. The latest (3rd) edition is available on Academia.edu here:
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-AMĪN AL-SHANQĪTĪ
(1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE),
AUTHOR OF THE MAGNIFICENT TAFSĪR,
ADWÂ’ AL-BAYÂN FĪ ĪDÂH AL-QUR’ÂN BI L-QUR’ÂN
(LIGHTS OF ELOQUENCE IN EXPLAINING THE QUR’AN BY THE QUR’AN)
LEADING SCHOLAR OF MAURITANIA
SENIOR JUDGE IN HIGH COURT FOR MURDER CASES, MAURITANIA
HEAD EXEGETE OF THE QUR’AN AT:
THE INSTITUTE OF KNOWLEDGE, RIYADH
HIGHER INSTITUTE FOR THE JUDICIARY, RIYADH
COLLEGE OF SHARIA, THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, MEDINA
THE MOSQUE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM), MEDINA
MAY ALLAH BESTOW HIS INFINITE MERCY UPON HIM
Biography by SHAYKH ‘ATIYYAH MUHAMMAD SÂLIM
Judge, Law Court of Medina, Saudi Arabia
An introduction to hadith sciences & terminology, including isnad (chain of transmission), matn (... more An introduction to hadith sciences & terminology, including isnad (chain of transmission), matn (text) and marfu', mawquf & maqtu' narrations.
This treatise is based on chapters from the authors PhD thesis, "The Concept of the Mahdi among Ahl al-Sunnah with a critical edition of the Mahdi hadiths from Nu'aym bin Hammad's Kitab al-Fitan" (University of Birmingham, UK, 1993)
Author: Sheikh Dr Suhaib Hasan Edited, with addition of an Introduction & Appendix by Usama Hasan
Translation of the European Council for Fatwa & Research (Qaradawi, Bin Bayyah, Al-Judai, etc.) f... more Translation of the European Council for Fatwa & Research (Qaradawi, Bin Bayyah, Al-Judai, etc.) fatwa on mortgages for home-purchasing with Salah al-Sawi’s detailed response. Includes analysis of classical fiqh and usul including Hanafi positions on riba in Dar al-Harb (“the Abode of War”), and Imam al-Haramayn Juwayni’s text al-Ghiyathiyyah.
The Character of the People of the Qur’an (Manners of the Bearers of the Qur’an and its People) d... more The Character of the People of the Qur’an (Manners of the Bearers of the Qur’an and its People) discusses the etiquettes and required character of those who preserve, recite and believe in the Qur’an, thus including all Muslims in general, whatever their spiritual station. The book is divided into ten chapters. Most of the material is of two types: (1) quotations from the Qur’an, Sunnah and words of the Companions and the Salaf, and (2) admonitions composed by the author, by which he addresses the reader directly, guiding him to the balanced path, relying on the quotations for support.
Al-Ajurri’s book is regarded as one of the principal sources in its subject-matter, being one of the very first sources to gather the required manners and character of Ahl al-Qur’an. Al-Quran Society is pleased to introduce this work and its author to an English readership for the first time, by the Grace of Allah.
Muhammad b. al-Husayn b. ‘Abdullah, Abu Bakr al-Ajurri, Scholar of Hadith and Law, pious Imam and trustworthy Follower of the Sunnah, was born around 264 or 280 H in Baghdad, where he was raised and educated before teaching Hadith there. He remained in Baghdad until the year 330 H, when he performed the pilgrimage to Makkah. He settled in the holy city and stayed there for thirty years, dedicated to worship and the teaching of Hadith until his death in 360 H.
Al-Ajurri had at least eighty illustrious teachers, including famous Imams and Hadith-preservers, and taught dozens of distinguished students from all over the Islamic lands, especially during his stay in Makkah. His teachers included al-Firyabi and Abu Bakr b. Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, son of the famous scholar of Hadith. His students included Abu Nu’aym of Isfahan, author of the Hilyah al-Awliya’ (“Ornament of the Saints”).
We know of around forty works compiled by al-Ajurri, including many that have been published several times in the original Arabic.
An Interfaith Dialogue about How Jews, Christians and Muslims Understand Their Sacred Scriptures.... more An Interfaith Dialogue about How Jews, Christians and Muslims Understand Their Sacred Scriptures.
What is the role of scripture in illuminating the lives of the faithful today? In this book, three experts in Judaism, Christianity and Islam respectively discuss and debate this question, by exploring the core messages of the Torah, Bible and Qu’ran. Taking a deeper look at the wide range of theological, political and social issues that divide (and sometimes unite) their religions, they reveal how inspiration and guidance can be drawn not only on life’s big questions such as sin and the afterlife, but also on societal issues including war, suffering, marriage and justice.
“Great stories, memorable jokes, profound theory - all are interwoven in this wonderful record of what happens when a Jew, a Christian and a Muslim talk together about their scriptures. You could call it Scriptural Reasoning; or you could call it a conversation among friends of God. Whatever you call it, this book will enlighten, enliven and engross your spirit.” - Rt Revd Dr Michael Ipgrave, Bishop of Lichfield
The ‘Big Question’ that the Task Force sought to address is:
Is a reconciliation between Islam an... more The ‘Big Question’ that the Task Force sought to address is: Is a reconciliation between Islam and Science desirable or possible? How do Muslim responses to Science’s Big Questions help bring about such a reconciliation?
The Task Force has sought to address issues like: Is there room for reconciliation between science and Islam? Is such a reconciliation desirable? It is necessary? What are the implications of such a reconciliation (or lack of it) on science, theology, and practical life in the Muslim World? In particular, specific questions addressed include: 1) The Science & Religion debate – What do Science and Islam say to each other since both are concerned with the search for truth attained through motivated belief? What Islamic perspectives and frameworks can underpin this conversation within the Islamic World? 2) Has Science Killed God? – What are the informed Muslim responses to atheist arguments based on Science (e.g. Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris etc.)? Can Muslim Scientists remain people of faith? Addressing, in particular: A. Allah as Creator: Fine tuning, design, the anthropic principle and the multiverse. B. Miracles: Does God tear up the natural, scientific order to enable miracles, or are there naturalistic explanations of miracles? 3) God, Creation & Biological Evolution – From Origins of Life to Human Evolution; how are these understood through faith in the Divine? 4) Soul, spirit, consciousness & free will – modern understandings of Ruh and Nafs 5) Policy and Ethical Implications – What are implications of this well-informed science-religion reconciliation on practical life - policy and societal ethics?
The Report includes the "Istanbul Declaration on Islam and Science" consisting of 14 conclusions.
War and Peace. In a narrative spanning 14 centuries, Usama Hasan finds a new understanding of Isl... more War and Peace. In a narrative spanning 14 centuries, Usama Hasan finds a new understanding of Islam and the West. "People of the Book" (Ahl al-Kitab) is the Koranic term for religious communities outside that of the Prophet, whose message is regarded as merely the final form of Islam-submission to God alone.
Karabell eloquently narrates the millennium-and-a-half-long stories of complex coexistence amongst Jew, Christian and Muslim: Muslim tolerance in periods of unquestioned dominance but some harsh treatment when People of the Book were seen as a threat: Medina, Damascus, Baghdad, Andalusia and the Ottoman empire provide ample examples. One of Karabell’s loudest messages is that it is often the conflicts only that are remembered, on all sides, whilst the glorious accomplishments of co-operation are forgotten and disappear like a mirage – this collective amnesia must be reversed if we are serious about peace between faiths in our world.
The phrase “Islam and the West” in the title is itself problematic, given the rich religious, philosophical, political and cultural interactions that the author masterfully describes, but the author is surely right in his conclusions: “If conflict is what we want to see, there is conflict. But if peace is what we are looking for, then peace is there to be found … Peace is woven into our collective past; it is there to be seen in our messy present; and it will be there in our shared future.” (pp. 285, 291)
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Papers by Usama Hasan
Since the 1970s, violent expressions of political Islam have impacted the world. These movements have collectively become known as “Islamists”, denoting an extremist, politicised interpretation of Islam grounded in revolutionary ideological zeal. The term “Islamism” is often used interchangeably with “political Islam”. However, since all religions are inherently political, maintaining a valid space for Muslim politics is key to enabling people to bring their deeply held values into this realm – just as believers in other major religions do. Religion remains important in many nations: there must be space for moderate Muslim politics to exist, not only for moral reasons, but also to oppose Islamist extremism.
While Islamists claim to entirely represent political Islam, speaking on behalf of all Muslims, they must not be permitted to monopolise the discussion. This is why religious moderates, especially those engaged with politics, must not vacate this space and cede it to the Islamists. This often happens in geopolitical conflict, with militant Islamists influencing Muslims because there are no moderate Muslim voices offering peaceful and conciliatory approaches. Muslims who want to engage with legitimate political issues must have access to a third way that sits between the irreligious and fanatics.
This report proposes moderate Muslim politics as this third way. It exists in practice but needs strengthening. We underpin it with Philip Gorski’s analytical framework.
Islamism Is Not the Same as Political Islam
While various Muslim leaders have articulated visions of Islam in recent times, from Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf to Jordan’s King Abdullah, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, there remains a need for frameworks that better integrate it into the modern world – and answer the popular slogans of Islamists.
How can mainstream Islam reclaim major narratives to enable a tolerant, inclusive representation of Islam and politics in the modern world? This report introduces a rigorous framework that defines the spectrum of political Islam more accurately and distinguishes this term from its most extreme example, Islamism. Our analysis shows that:
* Islam is not unique or exceptional among religions in having political aspects.
* There are many versions of Muslim politics, ranging from confessional Muslim states to Islamic religious nationalism and the most extreme representation – Islamism.
* With several Muslim-majority democracies included within this spectrum, it becomes easier to recognise the compatibility of Islam with democratic principles.
To progress the global debate, this report makes two contributions:
* We define political Islam more precisely, with Islamism identified as an extreme subset. This not only allows for more accurate discussions around both terms but also more precisely sets out the parameters for modern Muslim politics.
* We introduce a framework that not only tracks the evolving dynamics between Islam and politics, but also functions as a new tool with which to predict the future direction that Muslim-majority countries could take.
Islamism is totalitarian, holding that religion should determine everything, overseen by an essentially Leninist concept of leadership, with edicts handed down by a “central committee”. The current supreme leaders of Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of this. Moderate Muslim politics is the Muslim community offering society guidance, based on the values and ethics of Islam. It seeks influence, not conformity; persuasion, not prescription; to be a voice, respected on its merits, but not the only voice and not enforced by the power of the state.
Our report shows that Islamism is the result of the total fusion of religion and politics in which the former dominates the latter. While Muslim theology has generally accepted that the Prophet Muhammad’s original example in Medina involved a total fusion, whether this can be replicated today is a central question for Muslims. Islamism – as represented today by Khomeinist Iran, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS – is inherently destructive in believing it can fully recreate the prophetic reality on Earth through violence. Furthermore, this narcissism has led directly to appalling instances of religious extremism resulting in horrific terrorism and violence, sometimes sponsored at state level.
On the other hand, political Islam is more variable, corresponding to either a partial overlap or fusion of religion and politics – or somewhere in between, with the result being parity of religion and politics or dominance of religion over politics. It is a spectrum, with Islamism an extreme expression. The polar opposite to Islamism is radical republicanism, best represented in the Muslim world by Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey or Habib Bourguiba’s Tunisia.
Case studies, on post-independence Egypt, Pakistan and Tunisia, highlight the dynamism of Muslim politics as practiced today. Using their constitutions as a guide, we apply the analytical framework to Muslim countries to identify that:
The largest current groupings fit within liberal secularism (18 countries) & religious nationalism (14 countries).
The liberal-secular countries comprise two types: former French colonies in West Africa and former Soviet states in Central Asia.
Using the framework, we see that if religious forces in liberal-secular Muslim countries become stronger, these countries might move to a concept known as civil religion; however, if religion declines, those countries might move to radical republicanism.
In our view, civil religion is the best outcome for countries transitioning to a post-Islamism state while Islamist clerocracy (or theocracy) is the worst.
The six GCC countries currently fall into the category of religious monarchy, which means they are Muslim nations in which monarchy is the primary source of authority, with Islam as the official state religion.
While continuing to espouse Islam as a core part of national identity, many of these countries are becoming more religiously plural, with diversity increasingly celebrated.
Religious nationalism continues to be a force in Muslim democracies, such as Turkey and Pakistan
Our approach is primarily designed to support the foundations of modern societies and oppose Islamist extremism. It is also designed to cultivate a model of moderate Muslim politics for a post-Islamism world: an exit ramp. A model of Muslim civil religion that mirrors the United States under Obama could be a strong force for a pluralist, civilisational Islam of the future and has the potential to become a future flagship of a post-Islamist world.
Our approach calls for an acceptance of the reality and legitimacy of moderate Muslim politics, while continuing to resist Islamism.
Muslim-majority countries that are liberalising but in which Islamism remains a threat need careful policymaking and support to ensure that social, political and external factors do not push them into the dangerous, adjacent category of Islamist clerocracy, which inevitably means extremist theocracy.
Civil religion is the best scenario in terms of democracy as well as the balance between the religious and the secular. For post-Islamist nations, it represents a potential model on which to settle.
To achieve a third way, the integrity and theological legitimacy of the modern world, including nation states and the international order, must be affirmed. There are four policies that can promote a healthy mixture of religion and politics. Summarised below, they are structured around the four major aspects of Islam currently contested between the extremists and moderates:
Ummah (nation): Policymakers must allow Muslim communities to flourish while opposing divisive Islamist notions that pit Muslims against non-Muslims. A strong sense of nationhood is required so modern nation states must assert their values and emphasise they are shared by the major world religions and philosophies, including secular and humanist ones.
Khilafa (governance): Policymakers must be clear that khilafa in Islam refers to good governance, with the rule of law and justice tinged with mercy. Attempts to insist on khilafa as a resurrection of medieval and obsolete caliphates or Islamist states must be uncompromisingly resisted.
Sharia (law and ethics): Policymakers must be clear that the sharia in Islam refers to ethics. Medieval details of sharia must be modernised by drawing upon centuries of sophisticated jurisprudence and the intrinsic diversity of Muslim interpretations that have included dozens of schools of law. Attempts to insist on a single fundamentalist, literalist, interpretation of sharia must be resisted.
Jihad (struggle): Policymakers must be clear that contemporary Islamic scholars have agreed that jihad in the modern world includes personal and social struggles for good against evil. Even in the military sphere, jihad is a last resort that can only be waged legitimately by conventional armed forces of nation states, another reason why the integrity of the latter is so essential in the battle against Islamist extremism. Modern jihad accepts the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on warfare.
SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ZA
URAIA
Ripoti hii inaangazia hali ya kutoeleweka (makossa) ya mara kwa mara baina ya wale
wenye na itikadi kali, wakiwemo waislamu na wale wenye kupinga waislamu, waosema
kuwa haiwezekani kwa wasiokuwa waislamu kuishi kama raia waliosawa na waislamu
katika dola ya “waislamu’ au dola ya ‘kiislamu.’ Hali hii ya kutoeleweka emeegemea
baadhi ya haya yafuatayo kutokani na nadharia an mifumo ya kiislamu ya kal: (awali).
(i) dhimma (kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa Waislamu waliomo chini ya mamlaka ya
waislamu) baadala yake walipe
(ii) jizya, kodi inayotozwa wasio waislamu, haswa wale ahl al-kitab (jamii za
watume walioteremshiwa nyaraka au vitabu), mwanzo ikieleweka kuwahusu
Mayahudi na manaswara (wakristo).
(iii) Siasa za mgawanyo wa ardhi unaozingatia imani ya dini katika sehemu
zinazotambulika kama (dar al Islam) maeneo/ardhi ya Uislamu/waislamu, dar alkufr (maeneo/ardhi ya makafiri na maeneo ya vita (dar al-hard)
Tumeonyesha kwa ukamilifu kuwa dhana hizi zimekuzwa wakati Fulani katika historia
(Mapisi) ya dini ya Islamu, kwa mfano
(i) Mgawanyiko wa ardhi wa mwanzoni pia ulijumuisha sehemu iliyoitwa dar- al sulh
(maeneo ya maelewano au (dar ahd) maeneo ya usalama ama uwe wa muda mfupi au muda
wa kudumu
(ii) Kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa waislamu walio chini ya mamlaka ya Kiislamu kwa fidia
ya kulipa kodi ya jizya ambayo awali alifanyika kwa Mayahudi na Manaswara haraka haraka
iliongwezwa pia kwa Mazorosta katika Uajemi na Wahindu katika India kwa sababu ahl alkitab iliwahusisha pia wao na dini nyingine kubwa ulimwenguni. Wanazuoni waislamu wa
kileo na wanatheologia wameongezea fikra hii kutilia shime uhuru wa dini, (kuabudu) na
usawa wa kidini.
(iii) Matukio mapya kama vile Mardin na Galera ambapo miji yenye waislamu wengi
ilitawaliwa na wasiokuwa wislamu ilisababisha mageuzi katika magawanyo ya sehemu za
ardhi kwa mfumo unaozingatia Imani za dini ulisababisha kuchipuka kwa nadharia nyingine
kama vile dar al-Murakkab, yaani sehemu ya inchi ambayo wanaishi wote waislamu na
wasiokuwa waislamu. Waislamu wanafikra wa kileo na wanathiologia wameomgezea wazo
kama hili kukubaliana na dhana ya kuwepo kwa ukamilifu uhuru na usawa wa kidini
Ripoti hii inajumuisha pamoja uchanganuzi wa nyaraka, maswala ya kithiologia, maswala ya
kifikihi, maswala ya kihistoria (mapisi) na ucchanganuzi wa kisiasa ya kileo kuelezea
kulitundika) jambo katika muktadha wa kihistoria na kidini na kuunga mkono mchakato
(process) wa upya ( renewal) na mageuzi (reform) katika kisiasa ambayo inaendelea katika
jamii zenya na waislamu wengi kwa kipindi cha miaka 200 mia mbili iliyopita.
The past two decades have also seen intensified debates in the Muslim world on ideological issues, as the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath laid bare internal problems to do with extremism, Islamism, Islam-state dynamics and relations with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, at least a dozen major international Islamic charters and declarations have been issued in the past 20 years. These initiatives have covered the four ideological foundations of Islamist extremism, human and women’s rights, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, the rejection of theological justifications of violence by Islamist terrorist groups, the promotion of human coexistence, support for scientific endeavour and climate change.
This report summarises some of these debates, with an emphasis on good news and positive developments in the Muslim world since 9/11. It also identifies gaps in these debates and highlights some areas that need further attention and discussion.
Governments, policymakers and decision-makers should take note of the intense ongoing debates in the Muslim world. They should enable and support those voices and forces that are more open, inclusive and universalist with respect to the rest of the world. Such forces are more likely to be durable allies in efforts to build a shared, equitable future for humanity.
2. Theologically speaking, the moment when hominin (human-like) creatures became fully self-aware corresponds to the completion of the creation of Adam, the breathing of God’s Spirit into him and God teaching him all the Divine Names. The “Breathing of the Spirit of God into Adam” thus took billions of years from the Big Bang: it was a long process in human terms, but instantaneous for God. God created humanity so that the latter could become self-aware, know themselves and know God.
3. This study also clarifies that certain disputed matters of tafsir have been settled in the past by scientific consensus: examples of this are the age of the earth, the creation of the heavens before the earth, the role of the moon in solar eclipses, the roundness of the earth and the composition of embryos from the fluids of both parents.
4. In this respect, the science of human evolution answers many questions about the Qur’anic story of Adam and Eve with regard to human origin – these have been discussed in detail in this paper. Modern science also suggests that the early minority Muslim viewpoint, that the Garden of Eden was earthly and not heavenly, is in harmony with scientific knowledge.
Part I Quranic and theological foundations
1 Keynote Lecture
KHALED ABOU EL-FADL
2 The Private vs. The Public and Gender Equality
HALIMA KRAUSEN
3 Overcoming Challenges of Interpreting the Qur’an in Contemporary Societies
MICHAEL MUMISA
4 Relationships: Between the Real and the Ideal
AMINA WADUD
Part II Islamic law
5 Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Islam – between Traditionalism and Rationalism
USAMA HASAN
6 Defending Female Muslims from Hadith-Abuse
RUQAIYYAH WARIS MAQSOOD
Part III Islam and Feminism
7 Islam and Feminism: Opening a New Dialogue
ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI
8 Personal Reflections on the Conference and the Issues it Addressed
MONA SIDDIQUI
The abortion laws are summarised according to: Country, Grounds to permit abortion, Date of current legislation, Maximum penalty (+
fine), Time limit.
The research was summarised from the following sources: United Nations, Women on Waves, Pew Research Centre & Cyberlaw (Harvard).
THE QUESTIONS 1. What affectionate acts between husband and wife are permissible during Ramadan, and which ones break the fast? (Kissing, fondling, open mouth kissing, dry humping, ...) 2. What does Islam say about the importance of female sexual pleasure? 3. What is your opinion of self-pleasure. Is it permissible in Islam? (If you do not agree that it is permissible, how is it that one person can then teach another about their own pleasure?) 4. What is your opinion about the permissibility of sex toys in Islam? 5. What is your opinion about oral sex in Islam? 6. If a woman is raped by her husband during Ramadan, does she have to make up the fast? 7. What advice do you have for couples in order to nurture love, affection and intimacy? 8. What examples did our Prophet pbuh leave us to follow with regards to spirituality and intimacy? 9. What rewards are there in Ramadan for being intimate-is it more rewarding to abstain? 10. Who can we turn to if our knowledgeable people are all men and mamas feel shy to ask about intimate questions? 11. A couple had intimate relations during fasting hours, just after fajr. What is the kaffarah [expiation]? 12. Can a couple resume intimate relations if neither is fasting? Or is it prohibited during the day?
(i) the theological-jurisprudential basis of corporal and capital punishment (Hudood) under Islamic Law/Ethics (Sharia),
(ii) the Islamic case for the abolition of Hudood, and
(iii) the significance of the issue to islamist groups from ISIS and Al Qaeda to the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brothers, Khomeinists and islamists of other persuasions, whether Sunni or Shia, Salafi or Sufi.
We stress that the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century, passed by the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan after backing from their senior Sharia scholars including the Grand Mufti, had already repealed the classical hudood punishments. We also propose a jurisprudential framework for the replacement of hudood laws based on the classical Islamic jurisprudential principle of ta’zir or discretionary punishments for crime.
ነጻነት እንዲሁም የመቻቻል ባህል ነበረው። የእምነት ውይይቶችም ይሁን፤ ራሱ የሃይማኖት እምነት
በሌሎች ዘንድ እምነትን እንደማራከስ የሚወሰድ ወይም የሚያስቆጡ አባብሎች ወይም አገላለጾች
ማስከተሉ የግድ ነው። እስልምና ለእንደዚህ ዓይነቱ ቀስቃሽ ሁኔታዎች የሚሰጠው ምላሽ በመንፈሳዊነት፤
በጨዋነትና በይቅርባይነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ነው። በተለይ በአሁኑ ጊዜ አብዛኛው ሙስሊም በሆኑ አገሮችና
ህብረተሰቦች በጣም ተበራክቶ የሚታየው ጠባብ አመለካከትና የሌሎች ሃይማኖቶችን መብት አለማክብር
በተስፋፋበት ሁኔታ የዚህ ዓይነቱ ለተለያዩ ሃሳቦች ክፍት የመሆንና የደግነት ባህል እንደገና እንዲንሰራራ
ማድረግ አስፈላጊ ነው።
مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از دين و حتی خود باور و عقيده ی دينی ضرورتاً مستلزم بياناتی
است که ممکن است برای بقيه اهانت آميز باشد يا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحريک
مبتنی است بر معنويت ٬ عزت و کرامت و بخشش. اين سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز
سخت نيازمند احياء در کشورها و جامعه هايی با اکثريت مسلمان است ٬ به ويژه با توجه به
ميزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دينی زاييده می شود.
مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از دین و حتی خود باور و عقیده ی دینی ضرورتاً مستلزم بیاناتی
است که ممکن است برای بقیه اهانت آمیز باشد یا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحریک
مبتنی است بر معنویت، عزت و کرامت و بخشش. این سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز
سخت نیازمند احیاء در کشورها و جامعه هایی با اکثریت مسلمان است، به ویژه با توجه به
میزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دینی زاییده می شود.
للكلام في شأن المعتقد والإیمان بالدین ألا یستخدم تعابیر وأقوال قد تستفز الآخر فیرى فیها كفرًا. لكن رد
الإسلام على الاستفزاز یرتكز على الروحانیة والكرامة والغفران. فثمة حاجة ماسة الیوم إلى أن یعود تراث
الانفتاح والرحمة إلى البلدان والمجتمعات ذات الأكثریة المسلمة، لا سیما نظرًا إلى مقدار العنف الناتج عن
التعصب الدیني.
ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﺻﻌﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ .1 2 اﻷدﯾﺎن ازدراء ﻗﻮاﻧﯿﻦ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺔ اﻹﺳﺎءة .2 3 "اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﻓﻲ إﻛﺮاه "ﻻ اﻟﻘﺮآﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺪأ ﻓﻲ .3 4 ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺑﺎﻹﻛﺮاه اﻹﺳﻼم .4 4 اﻷدﯾﺎن ازدراء م ّ ﺗﺠﺮ ﻻ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻨﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر .5 5 وﯾﻌﺎﻗﺒﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺎت ﺗﺪﻧﯿﺲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﯾﺤﻜﻢ وﺣﺪه اﷲ .6 6 واﻟﻌﻘﯿﺪة اﻟﺪﯾﻦ أﻣﻮر ﻓﻲ واﻟﺠﺪال اﻟﻨﻘﺎش ﺣﺮﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﻣﻨﻬﺞ ﯾﺤﺚ .7 6 ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺴﺎﻣﺢ اﻻﺳﺘﻔﺰاز ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ .8 8 ﺧﺎﺗﻤﺔ 10 اﻟﺮدة ﺑﺘﻬﻤﺔ اﻹﻋﺪام ﺣﻜﻢ ﺣﻮل اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ اﻟﻘﺮون ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ :اﻷول اﻟﻤﻠﺤﻖ 11 اﻟﻤﻌﺘﻘﺪ وﺣﺮﯾﺔ اﻹﺳﻼم ﺣﻮل ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻖ : اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﺤﻖ 15 اﻟﻔﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺔ 17 1
Since the 1970s, violent expressions of political Islam have impacted the world. These movements have collectively become known as “Islamists”, denoting an extremist, politicised interpretation of Islam grounded in revolutionary ideological zeal. The term “Islamism” is often used interchangeably with “political Islam”. However, since all religions are inherently political, maintaining a valid space for Muslim politics is key to enabling people to bring their deeply held values into this realm – just as believers in other major religions do. Religion remains important in many nations: there must be space for moderate Muslim politics to exist, not only for moral reasons, but also to oppose Islamist extremism.
While Islamists claim to entirely represent political Islam, speaking on behalf of all Muslims, they must not be permitted to monopolise the discussion. This is why religious moderates, especially those engaged with politics, must not vacate this space and cede it to the Islamists. This often happens in geopolitical conflict, with militant Islamists influencing Muslims because there are no moderate Muslim voices offering peaceful and conciliatory approaches. Muslims who want to engage with legitimate political issues must have access to a third way that sits between the irreligious and fanatics.
This report proposes moderate Muslim politics as this third way. It exists in practice but needs strengthening. We underpin it with Philip Gorski’s analytical framework.
Islamism Is Not the Same as Political Islam
While various Muslim leaders have articulated visions of Islam in recent times, from Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf to Jordan’s King Abdullah, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, there remains a need for frameworks that better integrate it into the modern world – and answer the popular slogans of Islamists.
How can mainstream Islam reclaim major narratives to enable a tolerant, inclusive representation of Islam and politics in the modern world? This report introduces a rigorous framework that defines the spectrum of political Islam more accurately and distinguishes this term from its most extreme example, Islamism. Our analysis shows that:
* Islam is not unique or exceptional among religions in having political aspects.
* There are many versions of Muslim politics, ranging from confessional Muslim states to Islamic religious nationalism and the most extreme representation – Islamism.
* With several Muslim-majority democracies included within this spectrum, it becomes easier to recognise the compatibility of Islam with democratic principles.
To progress the global debate, this report makes two contributions:
* We define political Islam more precisely, with Islamism identified as an extreme subset. This not only allows for more accurate discussions around both terms but also more precisely sets out the parameters for modern Muslim politics.
* We introduce a framework that not only tracks the evolving dynamics between Islam and politics, but also functions as a new tool with which to predict the future direction that Muslim-majority countries could take.
Islamism is totalitarian, holding that religion should determine everything, overseen by an essentially Leninist concept of leadership, with edicts handed down by a “central committee”. The current supreme leaders of Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan are examples of this. Moderate Muslim politics is the Muslim community offering society guidance, based on the values and ethics of Islam. It seeks influence, not conformity; persuasion, not prescription; to be a voice, respected on its merits, but not the only voice and not enforced by the power of the state.
Our report shows that Islamism is the result of the total fusion of religion and politics in which the former dominates the latter. While Muslim theology has generally accepted that the Prophet Muhammad’s original example in Medina involved a total fusion, whether this can be replicated today is a central question for Muslims. Islamism – as represented today by Khomeinist Iran, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS – is inherently destructive in believing it can fully recreate the prophetic reality on Earth through violence. Furthermore, this narcissism has led directly to appalling instances of religious extremism resulting in horrific terrorism and violence, sometimes sponsored at state level.
On the other hand, political Islam is more variable, corresponding to either a partial overlap or fusion of religion and politics – or somewhere in between, with the result being parity of religion and politics or dominance of religion over politics. It is a spectrum, with Islamism an extreme expression. The polar opposite to Islamism is radical republicanism, best represented in the Muslim world by Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey or Habib Bourguiba’s Tunisia.
Case studies, on post-independence Egypt, Pakistan and Tunisia, highlight the dynamism of Muslim politics as practiced today. Using their constitutions as a guide, we apply the analytical framework to Muslim countries to identify that:
The largest current groupings fit within liberal secularism (18 countries) & religious nationalism (14 countries).
The liberal-secular countries comprise two types: former French colonies in West Africa and former Soviet states in Central Asia.
Using the framework, we see that if religious forces in liberal-secular Muslim countries become stronger, these countries might move to a concept known as civil religion; however, if religion declines, those countries might move to radical republicanism.
In our view, civil religion is the best outcome for countries transitioning to a post-Islamism state while Islamist clerocracy (or theocracy) is the worst.
The six GCC countries currently fall into the category of religious monarchy, which means they are Muslim nations in which monarchy is the primary source of authority, with Islam as the official state religion.
While continuing to espouse Islam as a core part of national identity, many of these countries are becoming more religiously plural, with diversity increasingly celebrated.
Religious nationalism continues to be a force in Muslim democracies, such as Turkey and Pakistan
Our approach is primarily designed to support the foundations of modern societies and oppose Islamist extremism. It is also designed to cultivate a model of moderate Muslim politics for a post-Islamism world: an exit ramp. A model of Muslim civil religion that mirrors the United States under Obama could be a strong force for a pluralist, civilisational Islam of the future and has the potential to become a future flagship of a post-Islamist world.
Our approach calls for an acceptance of the reality and legitimacy of moderate Muslim politics, while continuing to resist Islamism.
Muslim-majority countries that are liberalising but in which Islamism remains a threat need careful policymaking and support to ensure that social, political and external factors do not push them into the dangerous, adjacent category of Islamist clerocracy, which inevitably means extremist theocracy.
Civil religion is the best scenario in terms of democracy as well as the balance between the religious and the secular. For post-Islamist nations, it represents a potential model on which to settle.
To achieve a third way, the integrity and theological legitimacy of the modern world, including nation states and the international order, must be affirmed. There are four policies that can promote a healthy mixture of religion and politics. Summarised below, they are structured around the four major aspects of Islam currently contested between the extremists and moderates:
Ummah (nation): Policymakers must allow Muslim communities to flourish while opposing divisive Islamist notions that pit Muslims against non-Muslims. A strong sense of nationhood is required so modern nation states must assert their values and emphasise they are shared by the major world religions and philosophies, including secular and humanist ones.
Khilafa (governance): Policymakers must be clear that khilafa in Islam refers to good governance, with the rule of law and justice tinged with mercy. Attempts to insist on khilafa as a resurrection of medieval and obsolete caliphates or Islamist states must be uncompromisingly resisted.
Sharia (law and ethics): Policymakers must be clear that the sharia in Islam refers to ethics. Medieval details of sharia must be modernised by drawing upon centuries of sophisticated jurisprudence and the intrinsic diversity of Muslim interpretations that have included dozens of schools of law. Attempts to insist on a single fundamentalist, literalist, interpretation of sharia must be resisted.
Jihad (struggle): Policymakers must be clear that contemporary Islamic scholars have agreed that jihad in the modern world includes personal and social struggles for good against evil. Even in the military sphere, jihad is a last resort that can only be waged legitimately by conventional armed forces of nation states, another reason why the integrity of the latter is so essential in the battle against Islamist extremism. Modern jihad accepts the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on warfare.
SHARIA YA KIISLAMU KUHUSU WASIOKUWA WAISLAMU NA HAKI SAWA ZA
URAIA
Ripoti hii inaangazia hali ya kutoeleweka (makossa) ya mara kwa mara baina ya wale
wenye na itikadi kali, wakiwemo waislamu na wale wenye kupinga waislamu, waosema
kuwa haiwezekani kwa wasiokuwa waislamu kuishi kama raia waliosawa na waislamu
katika dola ya “waislamu’ au dola ya ‘kiislamu.’ Hali hii ya kutoeleweka emeegemea
baadhi ya haya yafuatayo kutokani na nadharia an mifumo ya kiislamu ya kal: (awali).
(i) dhimma (kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa Waislamu waliomo chini ya mamlaka ya
waislamu) baadala yake walipe
(ii) jizya, kodi inayotozwa wasio waislamu, haswa wale ahl al-kitab (jamii za
watume walioteremshiwa nyaraka au vitabu), mwanzo ikieleweka kuwahusu
Mayahudi na manaswara (wakristo).
(iii) Siasa za mgawanyo wa ardhi unaozingatia imani ya dini katika sehemu
zinazotambulika kama (dar al Islam) maeneo/ardhi ya Uislamu/waislamu, dar alkufr (maeneo/ardhi ya makafiri na maeneo ya vita (dar al-hard)
Tumeonyesha kwa ukamilifu kuwa dhana hizi zimekuzwa wakati Fulani katika historia
(Mapisi) ya dini ya Islamu, kwa mfano
(i) Mgawanyiko wa ardhi wa mwanzoni pia ulijumuisha sehemu iliyoitwa dar- al sulh
(maeneo ya maelewano au (dar ahd) maeneo ya usalama ama uwe wa muda mfupi au muda
wa kudumu
(ii) Kulindwa kwa wasiokuwa waislamu walio chini ya mamlaka ya Kiislamu kwa fidia
ya kulipa kodi ya jizya ambayo awali alifanyika kwa Mayahudi na Manaswara haraka haraka
iliongwezwa pia kwa Mazorosta katika Uajemi na Wahindu katika India kwa sababu ahl alkitab iliwahusisha pia wao na dini nyingine kubwa ulimwenguni. Wanazuoni waislamu wa
kileo na wanatheologia wameongezea fikra hii kutilia shime uhuru wa dini, (kuabudu) na
usawa wa kidini.
(iii) Matukio mapya kama vile Mardin na Galera ambapo miji yenye waislamu wengi
ilitawaliwa na wasiokuwa wislamu ilisababisha mageuzi katika magawanyo ya sehemu za
ardhi kwa mfumo unaozingatia Imani za dini ulisababisha kuchipuka kwa nadharia nyingine
kama vile dar al-Murakkab, yaani sehemu ya inchi ambayo wanaishi wote waislamu na
wasiokuwa waislamu. Waislamu wanafikra wa kileo na wanathiologia wameomgezea wazo
kama hili kukubaliana na dhana ya kuwepo kwa ukamilifu uhuru na usawa wa kidini
Ripoti hii inajumuisha pamoja uchanganuzi wa nyaraka, maswala ya kithiologia, maswala ya
kifikihi, maswala ya kihistoria (mapisi) na ucchanganuzi wa kisiasa ya kileo kuelezea
kulitundika) jambo katika muktadha wa kihistoria na kidini na kuunga mkono mchakato
(process) wa upya ( renewal) na mageuzi (reform) katika kisiasa ambayo inaendelea katika
jamii zenya na waislamu wengi kwa kipindi cha miaka 200 mia mbili iliyopita.
The past two decades have also seen intensified debates in the Muslim world on ideological issues, as the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath laid bare internal problems to do with extremism, Islamism, Islam-state dynamics and relations with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, at least a dozen major international Islamic charters and declarations have been issued in the past 20 years. These initiatives have covered the four ideological foundations of Islamist extremism, human and women’s rights, the rights of non-Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, the rejection of theological justifications of violence by Islamist terrorist groups, the promotion of human coexistence, support for scientific endeavour and climate change.
This report summarises some of these debates, with an emphasis on good news and positive developments in the Muslim world since 9/11. It also identifies gaps in these debates and highlights some areas that need further attention and discussion.
Governments, policymakers and decision-makers should take note of the intense ongoing debates in the Muslim world. They should enable and support those voices and forces that are more open, inclusive and universalist with respect to the rest of the world. Such forces are more likely to be durable allies in efforts to build a shared, equitable future for humanity.
2. Theologically speaking, the moment when hominin (human-like) creatures became fully self-aware corresponds to the completion of the creation of Adam, the breathing of God’s Spirit into him and God teaching him all the Divine Names. The “Breathing of the Spirit of God into Adam” thus took billions of years from the Big Bang: it was a long process in human terms, but instantaneous for God. God created humanity so that the latter could become self-aware, know themselves and know God.
3. This study also clarifies that certain disputed matters of tafsir have been settled in the past by scientific consensus: examples of this are the age of the earth, the creation of the heavens before the earth, the role of the moon in solar eclipses, the roundness of the earth and the composition of embryos from the fluids of both parents.
4. In this respect, the science of human evolution answers many questions about the Qur’anic story of Adam and Eve with regard to human origin – these have been discussed in detail in this paper. Modern science also suggests that the early minority Muslim viewpoint, that the Garden of Eden was earthly and not heavenly, is in harmony with scientific knowledge.
Part I Quranic and theological foundations
1 Keynote Lecture
KHALED ABOU EL-FADL
2 The Private vs. The Public and Gender Equality
HALIMA KRAUSEN
3 Overcoming Challenges of Interpreting the Qur’an in Contemporary Societies
MICHAEL MUMISA
4 Relationships: Between the Real and the Ideal
AMINA WADUD
Part II Islamic law
5 Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Islam – between Traditionalism and Rationalism
USAMA HASAN
6 Defending Female Muslims from Hadith-Abuse
RUQAIYYAH WARIS MAQSOOD
Part III Islam and Feminism
7 Islam and Feminism: Opening a New Dialogue
ZIBA MIR-HOSSEINI
8 Personal Reflections on the Conference and the Issues it Addressed
MONA SIDDIQUI
The abortion laws are summarised according to: Country, Grounds to permit abortion, Date of current legislation, Maximum penalty (+
fine), Time limit.
The research was summarised from the following sources: United Nations, Women on Waves, Pew Research Centre & Cyberlaw (Harvard).
THE QUESTIONS 1. What affectionate acts between husband and wife are permissible during Ramadan, and which ones break the fast? (Kissing, fondling, open mouth kissing, dry humping, ...) 2. What does Islam say about the importance of female sexual pleasure? 3. What is your opinion of self-pleasure. Is it permissible in Islam? (If you do not agree that it is permissible, how is it that one person can then teach another about their own pleasure?) 4. What is your opinion about the permissibility of sex toys in Islam? 5. What is your opinion about oral sex in Islam? 6. If a woman is raped by her husband during Ramadan, does she have to make up the fast? 7. What advice do you have for couples in order to nurture love, affection and intimacy? 8. What examples did our Prophet pbuh leave us to follow with regards to spirituality and intimacy? 9. What rewards are there in Ramadan for being intimate-is it more rewarding to abstain? 10. Who can we turn to if our knowledgeable people are all men and mamas feel shy to ask about intimate questions? 11. A couple had intimate relations during fasting hours, just after fajr. What is the kaffarah [expiation]? 12. Can a couple resume intimate relations if neither is fasting? Or is it prohibited during the day?
(i) the theological-jurisprudential basis of corporal and capital punishment (Hudood) under Islamic Law/Ethics (Sharia),
(ii) the Islamic case for the abolition of Hudood, and
(iii) the significance of the issue to islamist groups from ISIS and Al Qaeda to the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brothers, Khomeinists and islamists of other persuasions, whether Sunni or Shia, Salafi or Sufi.
We stress that the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the mid-19th century, passed by the Ottoman Caliph and Sultan after backing from their senior Sharia scholars including the Grand Mufti, had already repealed the classical hudood punishments. We also propose a jurisprudential framework for the replacement of hudood laws based on the classical Islamic jurisprudential principle of ta’zir or discretionary punishments for crime.
ነጻነት እንዲሁም የመቻቻል ባህል ነበረው። የእምነት ውይይቶችም ይሁን፤ ራሱ የሃይማኖት እምነት
በሌሎች ዘንድ እምነትን እንደማራከስ የሚወሰድ ወይም የሚያስቆጡ አባብሎች ወይም አገላለጾች
ማስከተሉ የግድ ነው። እስልምና ለእንደዚህ ዓይነቱ ቀስቃሽ ሁኔታዎች የሚሰጠው ምላሽ በመንፈሳዊነት፤
በጨዋነትና በይቅርባይነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ነው። በተለይ በአሁኑ ጊዜ አብዛኛው ሙስሊም በሆኑ አገሮችና
ህብረተሰቦች በጣም ተበራክቶ የሚታየው ጠባብ አመለካከትና የሌሎች ሃይማኖቶችን መብት አለማክብር
በተስፋፋበት ሁኔታ የዚህ ዓይነቱ ለተለያዩ ሃሳቦች ክፍት የመሆንና የደግነት ባህል እንደገና እንዲንሰራራ
ማድረግ አስፈላጊ ነው።
مبانی و اصول دين. بحث از دين و حتی خود باور و عقيده ی دينی ضرورتاً مستلزم بياناتی
است که ممکن است برای بقيه اهانت آميز باشد يا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحريک
مبتنی است بر معنويت ٬ عزت و کرامت و بخشش. اين سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز
سخت نيازمند احياء در کشورها و جامعه هايی با اکثريت مسلمان است ٬ به ويژه با توجه به
ميزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دينی زاييده می شود.
مبانی و اصول دین. بحث از دین و حتی خود باور و عقیده ی دینی ضرورتاً مستلزم بیاناتی
است که ممکن است برای بقیه اهانت آمیز باشد یا کفر تلقی شود. پاسخ اسلام به تحریک
مبتنی است بر معنویت، عزت و کرامت و بخشش. این سنت گشودگی و سخاوت امروز
سخت نیازمند احیاء در کشورها و جامعه هایی با اکثریت مسلمان است، به ویژه با توجه به
میزان هول ناک خشونتی که از نابردباری و تعصب دینی زاییده می شود.
للكلام في شأن المعتقد والإیمان بالدین ألا یستخدم تعابیر وأقوال قد تستفز الآخر فیرى فیها كفرًا. لكن رد
الإسلام على الاستفزاز یرتكز على الروحانیة والكرامة والغفران. فثمة حاجة ماسة الیوم إلى أن یعود تراث
الانفتاح والرحمة إلى البلدان والمجتمعات ذات الأكثریة المسلمة، لا سیما نظرًا إلى مقدار العنف الناتج عن
التعصب الدیني.
ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﺻﻌﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ .1 2 اﻷدﯾﺎن ازدراء ﻗﻮاﻧﯿﻦ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺔ اﻹﺳﺎءة .2 3 "اﻟﺪﯾﻦ ﻓﻲ إﻛﺮاه "ﻻ اﻟﻘﺮآﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺪأ ﻓﻲ .3 4 ﺻﺤﯿﺢ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺑﺎﻹﻛﺮاه اﻹﺳﻼم .4 4 اﻷدﯾﺎن ازدراء م ّ ﺗﺠﺮ ﻻ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺪﯾﻨﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺎدر .5 5 وﯾﻌﺎﻗﺒﻪ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺎت ﺗﺪﻧﯿﺲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﯾﺤﻜﻢ وﺣﺪه اﷲ .6 6 واﻟﻌﻘﯿﺪة اﻟﺪﯾﻦ أﻣﻮر ﻓﻲ واﻟﺠﺪال اﻟﻨﻘﺎش ﺣﺮﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﺮآن ﻣﻨﻬﺞ ﯾﺤﺚ .7 6 ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺴﺎﻣﺢ اﻻﺳﺘﻔﺰاز ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ .8 8 ﺧﺎﺗﻤﺔ 10 اﻟﺮدة ﺑﺘﻬﻤﺔ اﻹﻋﺪام ﺣﻜﻢ ﺣﻮل اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ اﻟﻘﺮون ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ :اﻷول اﻟﻤﻠﺤﻖ 11 اﻟﻤﻌﺘﻘﺪ وﺣﺮﯾﺔ اﻹﺳﻼم ﺣﻮل ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻖ : اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﺤﻖ 15 اﻟﻔﻜﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺔ 17 1
Webinar: Protecting the Rights of Religious Minorities in the Age of COVID-19
with Minister Ijaz Alam Augustine,
Provincial Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Affairs in Punjab, Pakistan.
28th May, 2020 – notes by Usama Hasan
Minister:
1. We have been in power for 2 years. In Punjab [Pakistan’s most populous province, with over half of Pakistan’s population of approximately 220 million people], we have achieved gains for minorities that had not happened in the previous 70 years. [In 2019, Pakistan celebrated 72 years since Independence.]
This paper presents some theological and jurisprudential arguments, aiming to help Muslim discourse about integration.
The conference presentation may be viewed online here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFsKszlEbhA&t=4s
Also here (c. 15:00-30:00 minutes): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugF8WsMYgCs
Tariq Modood (2011) maps “Four Modes of Integration” (Assimilation, Individualist-Integration, Cosmopolitanism, Multiculturalism) according to “core, European democractic values” of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity that assume “a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values.”
This paper presents some theological and jurisprudential arguments, aiming to help Muslim discourse about integration:
1. During the Prophet’s mission, a treaty was concluded with the Jews and Christians of Medina that upheld a plural religious society, united against the attacks of the Meccan polytheists.
2. During early Islam, levying jizyah in return for military protection (dhimmah) and exemption from military service became a widespread practice. Jizyah is mentioned only once in the Qur’an (9:29). Even in early Islam, dhimmah was extended to non-Abrahamic religious communities, e.g. Zoroastrians and Hindus.
3. In traditional jurisprudence, jizyah and dhimmah became axiomatic, along with the associated concepts of Dar al-Islam (Land of Islam), Dar al-Kufr (Land of Disbelief) and Dar al-Harb (Land of War). There later developed the Maqasid theory of Islamic law that emphasizes universal values and objectives over specific texts and rulings.
4. There was a fundamental dichotomy in the basis of human rights jurisprudence: traditionalist schools favoured a communalist approach, based on a person’s Islam or dhimmah; more rationalist schools, e.g. Hanafis, favoured a universalist approach, based on a person’s basic humanity (adamiyyah). The Ottomans used adamiyyah, along with considerations of maqasid, to abandon their Millet system of multiple, parallel religious law for different faith communities in favour of a system of equal Ottoman citizenship. The Ottomans enacted radical reforms to bring about civic equality, irrespective of race or religion. They abolished jizyah and dhimmah in 1856.
5. Indian Muslims shared a homeland with Hindus, Buddhists, Parsis (Zoroastrians), Sikhs and Christians for centuries, and the Mughals ruled over large areas of India where the population was majority non-Muslim. Over the last century of British rule (19th-20th century), a strong nationalist movement for independence emerged. Scholars and thinkers grappled with nations, homelands and faiths, making notable contributions to the debates around loyalty to God, religion and homeland, including possible conflicts of loyalty, especially in the context of nationalist independence from colonial rule. These debates resonate with today’s integration debates.
6. Leading, contemporary jurists, thinkers and theologians of Islam agree that the mediaeval notions of jizyah and dhimmah are outdated, and that modern notions of citizenship (muwatanah) are appropriate expressions of Islamic law and ethics today. This conclusion is based on maqasid, universalist jurisprudence and adapting to practical situations.
7. Modern notions of citizenship, irrespective of religion, were also embraced by leading Muslim political leaders from the 20th century, including Ataturk and Jinnah. The constitutions of many Muslim-majority countries affirm equal rights for citizens, irrespective of religion, although implementation of equal rights is often deficient.
FOLLOWING THE QUR’AN AND SUNNAH:
BENEFITING FROM THE MADHHABS HOLISTICALLY
AND NOT FOLLOWING ONE MADHHAB RIGIDLY
Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti
An abridged translation of the author’s tafsir of
an ayah of the Qur’an (Surah Muhammad, 47:24)
from his Adwa’ al-Bayan (Lights of Eloquence)
with an
INTRODUCTION
by
Shaykh Suhaib Hasan
1st Rabi’ al-Awwal 1445 H / 16th September 2023
© Al-Qur’an Society, 1445 H / 2023 CE – All rights reserved.
Contemplating the Qur’an is a treatise on following the Qur’an and the Sunnah, benefiting from the codified Madhhabs holistically whilst not following any one Madhhab rigidly or blindly, by Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti (1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE) of Mauritania and Saudi Arabia, one of the greatest authorities on the Qur’an of the 20th century CE and the 14th Islamic century. The treatise is an abridged translation of the author’s tafsir of an ayah of the Qur’an (Surah Muhammad, 47:24) from his monumental tafsir, Adwa’ al-Bayan (Lights of Eloquence).
In this treatise, the author covers the following topics:
Muslims must contemplate the Qur’an, learn it, understand it and act by it
There is no basis for those who say that the above is only for the mujtahids
A muqallid is not an ‘alim: a follower of opinions does not have knowledge
Saying that we cannot follow the Qur’an and Sunnah but must follow the codified Madhhabs, is one of the greatest falsehoods
A critique of Sawi’s view that holding to the apparent meanings of the Book and the Sunnah is one of the principles of kufr (blasphemy)
On Ijtihad, Taqlid and Madhhab; permissible and impermissible taqlid
He concludes with eleven “Important Notes About This Issue,” including: the Four Imams were united in forbidding their blind taqlid; Haram/Halal cannot be stated on the basis of taqlid; the difference between taqlid & ittiba’; our stance towards the Imams; every Imam has been criticized for going against the Sunnah in particular matters (with examples); muqallids must distinguish between their Imam’s actual views and those added to his Madhhab after him; it is impermissible for a Muslim to believe that the era of ijtihad is closed, and that only four Madhhabs must be followed; turning away from the Qur’an and Sunnah in favour of the Four Madhhabs is one of the greatest problems that has beset Muslims over recent centuries.
We have added five important Appendices.
Firstly, an earlier, concise fatwa from the Shaykh about following Madhhabs, given in 1385 H (1964/5 CE). The Shaykh moved on from this fatwa somewhat, but we include it for the sake of integrity.
Secondly, we mention the Shaykh’s broadening out from his basis of the Maliki Madhhab after becoming exposed in Mecca and Medina to diverse views and schools from around the Muslim world.
Thirdly, we correct a contemporary misquote from Imam Ibn al-Qayyim, whom the Shaykh quotes extensively in his full discussion. The misquote attempts to portray Ibn al-Qayyim as saying the opposite of his actual position, so we are happy to set the record straight.
Fourthly, we show how Imam Shatibi also presented a holistic approach to the Madhhabs.
Finally, we include Zamakhshari’s classic, educational and entertaining poem about Madhhabi sectarianism.
The third edition, with additional direct memories
of Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti
by Shaykh Suhaib Hasan
Founder of Al-Qur’an Society
one of the eldest and most senior, living students of Shaykh Shanqiti
The poem is an extract from Ibn al-Qayyim’s Qasidah Mimiyyah (Ode in the Letter Mim); the section of the latter regarding the Hajj is reproduced in Awdah al-Masalik ila Ahkam al-Manasik by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Muhammad al-Salman (12th edition, Riyadh, 1403 H, pp. 265-272), where I came across it during the Blessed Hajj of the year 1422 (2002). I found the poem to be of immense inspiration, masterfully combining references to the outer physical actions of the Hajj with the Pilgrimage’s inner spiritual effects and etiquettes.
https://www.academia.edu/88612822/An_Ocean_from_the_Desert_biography_of_Shaykh_Muhammad_al_Amin_al_Shanqiti_3rd_edition_
Translation of
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-AMĪN AL-SHANQĪTĪ
(1325-1393 H / 1907-1973 CE),
AUTHOR OF THE MAGNIFICENT TAFSĪR,
ADWÂ’ AL-BAYÂN FĪ ĪDÂH AL-QUR’ÂN BI L-QUR’ÂN
(LIGHTS OF ELOQUENCE IN EXPLAINING THE QUR’AN BY THE QUR’AN)
LEADING SCHOLAR OF MAURITANIA
SENIOR JUDGE IN HIGH COURT FOR MURDER CASES, MAURITANIA
HEAD EXEGETE OF THE QUR’AN AT:
THE INSTITUTE OF KNOWLEDGE, RIYADH
HIGHER INSTITUTE FOR THE JUDICIARY, RIYADH
COLLEGE OF SHARIA, THE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, MEDINA
THE MOSQUE OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM), MEDINA
MAY ALLAH BESTOW HIS INFINITE MERCY UPON HIM
Biography by SHAYKH ‘ATIYYAH MUHAMMAD SÂLIM
Judge, Law Court of Medina, Saudi Arabia
This treatise is based on chapters from the authors PhD thesis, "The Concept of the Mahdi among Ahl al-Sunnah with a critical edition of the Mahdi hadiths from Nu'aym bin Hammad's Kitab al-Fitan" (University of Birmingham, UK, 1993)
Author: Sheikh Dr Suhaib Hasan
Edited, with addition of an Introduction & Appendix by Usama Hasan
Al-Ajurri’s book is regarded as one of the principal sources in its subject-matter, being one of the very first sources to gather the required manners and character of Ahl al-Qur’an. Al-Quran Society is pleased to introduce this work and its author to an English readership for the first time, by the Grace of Allah.
Muhammad b. al-Husayn b. ‘Abdullah, Abu Bakr al-Ajurri, Scholar of Hadith and Law, pious Imam and trustworthy Follower of the Sunnah, was born around 264 or 280 H in Baghdad, where he was raised and educated before teaching Hadith there. He remained in Baghdad until the year 330 H, when he performed the pilgrimage to Makkah. He settled in the holy city and stayed there for thirty years, dedicated to worship and the teaching of Hadith until his death in 360 H.
Al-Ajurri had at least eighty illustrious teachers, including famous Imams and Hadith-preservers, and taught dozens of distinguished students from all over the Islamic lands, especially during his stay in Makkah. His teachers included al-Firyabi and Abu Bakr b. Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, son of the famous scholar of Hadith. His students included Abu Nu’aym of Isfahan, author of the Hilyah al-Awliya’ (“Ornament of the Saints”).
We know of around forty works compiled by al-Ajurri, including many that have been published several times in the original Arabic.
What is the role of scripture in illuminating the lives of the faithful today?
In this book, three experts in Judaism, Christianity and Islam respectively
discuss and debate this question, by exploring the core messages of
the Torah, Bible and Qu’ran. Taking a deeper look at the wide range of
theological, political and social issues that divide (and sometimes unite)
their religions, they reveal how inspiration and guidance can be drawn
not only on life’s big questions such as sin and the afterlife, but also on
societal issues including war, suffering, marriage and justice.
“Great stories, memorable jokes, profound theory - all are interwoven
in this wonderful record of what happens when a Jew, a Christian and a
Muslim talk together about their scriptures. You could call it Scriptural
Reasoning; or you could call it a conversation among friends of God.
Whatever you call it, this book will enlighten, enliven and engross your
spirit.” - Rt Revd Dr Michael Ipgrave, Bishop of Lichfield
Is a reconciliation between Islam and Science desirable or possible? How do Muslim responses to Science’s Big Questions help bring about such a reconciliation?
The Task Force has sought to address issues like:
Is there room for reconciliation between science and Islam?
Is such a reconciliation desirable?
It is necessary? What are the implications of such a reconciliation (or lack of it) on science, theology, and practical life in the Muslim World? In particular, specific questions addressed include:
1) The Science & Religion debate – What do Science and Islam say
to each other since both are concerned with the search for truth attained
through motivated belief? What Islamic perspectives and frameworks can underpin this conversation within the Islamic World?
2) Has Science Killed God? – What are the informed Muslim responses to atheist arguments based on Science (e.g. Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris etc.)? Can Muslim Scientists remain people of faith? Addressing, in particular:
A. Allah as Creator: Fine tuning, design, the anthropic principle and the
multiverse.
B. Miracles: Does God tear up the natural, scientific order to enable
miracles, or are there naturalistic explanations of miracles?
3) God, Creation & Biological Evolution – From Origins of Life to Human
Evolution; how are these understood through faith in the Divine?
4) Soul, spirit, consciousness & free will – modern understandings of Ruh and Nafs
5) Policy and Ethical Implications – What are implications of this well-informed science-religion reconciliation on practical life - policy and societal ethics?
The Report includes the "Istanbul Declaration on Islam and Science" consisting of 14 conclusions.
"People of the Book" (Ahl al-Kitab) is the Koranic term for religious communities outside that of the Prophet, whose message is regarded as merely the final form of Islam-submission to God alone.
Karabell eloquently narrates the millennium-and-a-half-long stories of complex coexistence amongst Jew, Christian and Muslim: Muslim tolerance in periods of unquestioned dominance but some harsh treatment when People of the Book were seen as a threat: Medina, Damascus, Baghdad, Andalusia and the Ottoman empire provide ample examples. One of Karabell’s loudest messages is that it is often the conflicts only that are remembered, on all sides, whilst the glorious accomplishments of co-operation are forgotten and disappear like a mirage – this collective amnesia must be reversed if we are serious about peace between faiths in our world.
The phrase “Islam and the West” in the title is itself problematic, given the rich religious, philosophical, political and cultural interactions that the author masterfully describes, but the author is surely right in his conclusions: “If conflict is what we want to see, there is conflict. But if peace is what we are looking for, then peace is there to be found … Peace is woven into our collective past; it is there to be seen in our messy present; and it will be there in our shared future.” (pp. 285, 291)