Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to he... more Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to help others, it is forcing them to behave altruistically. And obviously, we are meant to think, that use of force is morally objectionable. But what exactly makes taxation objectionable? One answer that many libertarians supply is that forcing some people to benefit others is wrong because it involves forced labour. The underlying thought seems to be that there is something morally troubling about making some people work for others. In this article I scrutinize this thought. After describing two different kinds of taxation, I show how the libertarian argument about taxes depends on a distinction between posing a threat to other people and failing to help them. This brings us to the moral bedrock of the argument that taxation is forced labour, namely the idea that no one has a right to force you to do something unless you pose a threat to other people. The bulk of my article is devoted to s...
I THERE ARE SEVERAL STRIKING SIMILARITIES between the ethical views of Kant and Aquinas. Both att... more I THERE ARE SEVERAL STRIKING SIMILARITIES between the ethical views of Kant and Aquinas. Both attach great significance to the role of practical reason in ethical life; each believes that there is a fundamental principle of practical reason from which other principles or laws can be derived; both of them emphasize the importance of law in thinking about ethics; and each wants to claim that certain kinds of actions are good or evil in themselves. Yet in spite of these and other areas of similarity, there is one absolutely fundamental disagreement between them, a disagreement concerning the very foundations of ethics. Aquinas treats the concept of the good as the starting point for moral philosophy, holding that laws and principles are to be derived from it. In more contemporary language, Aquinas espouses the doctrine that the good has priority over the right. Kant, on the other hand, famously rejects that doctrine entirely, insisting instead that the fight must take precedence over the good. Kant offers several arguments in support of this claim. In this article, I wish to focus on the one he expounds in chapter 2 of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. (1) I shall refer to it as the nonteleology argument, taking as it does the form of a reductio purporting to demonstrate the unacceptable consequences attendant on assuming the priority of the good. Among the more important of these are that practical reason would have to play a purely instrumental, nonconstitutive role in ethics, and that no actions could be good or bad in themselves. I shall be considering how plausible Kant's argument is when brought to bear against the ethical theory presented by Aquinas. My aim is to show that the Kantian reductio fails to reveal anything incoherent in Aquinas's position. As a result, one can affirm the doctrine of the priority of good understood in the way that Aquinas does without being saddled with any of the unhappy consequences Kant adduces. My interest in this dispute is, however, not purely historical, for the doctrine of the priority of the right has been construed by some contemporary philosophers as a crucial component in any defensible alternative to consequentialism. (2) Philosophers who believe this tend to evidence deep sympathy with the Kantian approach to ethics. If their impression is wrong, as I shall suggest it is, then Aquinas's ethical theory will be revealed as an interesting alternative to the currently dominant, Kantian form of nonconsequentialism. The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. I begin by rehearsing the reductio Kant proposes in the Critique of Practical Reason as a refutation of the doctrine of the priority of the good. I shall present the argument in two versions: the first, in section 2, as it appears in Kant himself, the second, in section 3, in a more encompassing form in which the good is identified in broadly subjective terms. In sections 4-10, I expound the salient aspects of Aquinas's ethics, the major doctrines that, in my judgment, enable him to escape the corollaries Kant infers from affirming the priority of the good. I also indicate here the precise ways in which he is able to do so. In the final section, I close with some brief thoughts about the deeper philosophical roots of this dispute. II Kant's reductio runs as follows. Any concept of the good which is not derived from a prior practical law but is instead treated as the basis of the moral law has to be the concept of something whose attainment promises to bring us pleasure. For it is only in this way that the good could act upon us: the attraction of the anticipated enjoyment would lead us to do whatever would be necessary to secure it. This would mean, of course, that the concept of the immediately good could be applied only to what is accompanied by feelings of gratification, while the concept of that which is immediately evil would have to refer to what is joined by feelings of pain. …
La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L&... more La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L'accent est mis sur la combinaison qu'on y trouve entre perfectionnisme et liberalisme
In the opening chapter of the Monologion, Anselm offers an intriguing proof for the existence of ... more In the opening chapter of the Monologion, Anselm offers an intriguing proof for the existence of a Platonic form of goodness. This proof is extremely interesting, both in itself and for its place in the broader argument for God's existence that Anselm develops in the Monologion as a whole. Even so, it has yet to receive the scholarly attention that it deserves. My aim in this article is to begin correcting this state of affairs by examining Anslem's proof in some detail. In particular, I aim to clarify the proof's structure, motivate and explain its central premises, and begin the larger project of evaluating its overall success as an argument for Platonism about goodness.
Philosophy <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Public Affairs, 2001
In a recent article, Jonathan Wolff argues that egalitarians are forced to choose between the val... more In a recent article, Jonathan Wolff argues that egalitarians are forced to choose between the values of fairness and respect.' According to Wolff, a properly egalitarian conception of fairness requires us to tailor the distributive shares of different individuals in ways that appropriately reflect the costs their choices impose on other people. In addition, egalitarian fairness mandates that we distribute resources so as to eliminate the effects of sheer bad luck on people's lives. Wolff notes that realizing this last demand would require some people to acknowledge embarrassing facts about themselves, concerning, for instance, their lack of talent. Making people do such things is obviously likely to undermine their selfrespect. And so, Wolff concludes, egalitarians should be willing to sacrifice fairness to secure equal respect for all. Of course, it is not news that a commitment to egalitarianism might require us to sacrifice other non-egalitarian values. It is often said, for instance, that equality and efficiency are incompatible and must be traded off against each other. But Wolffs thesis is both novel and radical, for he claims to find a genuine conflict of values within the heart of what he calls "the egalitarian ethos." Wolff's argument is, for this reason, well worth considering in its own right. In addition, it raises several deeper issues about the conception of fairness currently dominant among philosophical egalitarians. Their view has two main components, each of which, so I shall argue, ought to be I would like to thank Allison Freeman and Seana Shiffrin, as well as the editors of Phi
Abstract Contemporary egalitarians often appeal to a distinction between inequalities issuing fro... more Abstract Contemporary egalitarians often appeal to a distinction between inequalities issuing from choice as opposed to those stemming from brute luck. Inequalities of the second kind, they say, ought to be redressed, while those of the former may be allowed to stand. In this paper, I scrutinize the role played by the notion of brute luck in Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality. My intention is to show that Dworkin seeks to occupy what turns out to be an untenable middle position. He is sandwiched unhappily between G. A. Cohen's radical brute luck egalitarianism, on the one side, and a non-egalitarian conception of justice that rejects entirely the appeal to brute luck, on the other. It follows from the untenable nature of Dworkin's position that egalitarians face a much starker choice than he realizes. They should either wholeheartedly embrace the brute luck story or else find another way of grounding their position.
Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or... more Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or her own life to lead. This is to be distinguished from the doctrine of the separateness of persons: the claim that the fact of our separateness is especially deep and important, morally speaking. In this paper, I argue that we ought to reject this doctrine. I focus most of my attention on the suggestion that the separateness of persons best explains the importance we attach to moral rights. After criticizing Nozick's use of the doctrine, I formulate an alternative account of the significance of rights. I then show how proponents of the doctrine of separateness have no principled way of distinguishing between egoism and moral libertarianism. I suggest that rejecting the doctrine of our separateness for the reasons I propose ensures that we need have no fear of having to embrace consequentialism as a result.
Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to he... more Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to help others, it is forcing them to behave altruistically. And obviously, we are meant to think, that use of force is morally objectionable. But what exactly makes taxation objectionable? One answer that many libertarians supply is that forcing some people to benefit others is wrong because it involves forced labour. The underlying thought seems to be that there is something morally troubling about making some people work for others. In this article I scrutinize this thought. After describing two different kinds of taxation, I show how the libertarian argument about taxes depends on a distinction between posing a threat to other people and failing to help them. This brings us to the moral bedrock of the argument that taxation is forced labour, namely the idea that no one has a right to force you to do something unless you pose a threat to other people. The bulk of my article is devoted to s...
I THERE ARE SEVERAL STRIKING SIMILARITIES between the ethical views of Kant and Aquinas. Both att... more I THERE ARE SEVERAL STRIKING SIMILARITIES between the ethical views of Kant and Aquinas. Both attach great significance to the role of practical reason in ethical life; each believes that there is a fundamental principle of practical reason from which other principles or laws can be derived; both of them emphasize the importance of law in thinking about ethics; and each wants to claim that certain kinds of actions are good or evil in themselves. Yet in spite of these and other areas of similarity, there is one absolutely fundamental disagreement between them, a disagreement concerning the very foundations of ethics. Aquinas treats the concept of the good as the starting point for moral philosophy, holding that laws and principles are to be derived from it. In more contemporary language, Aquinas espouses the doctrine that the good has priority over the right. Kant, on the other hand, famously rejects that doctrine entirely, insisting instead that the fight must take precedence over the good. Kant offers several arguments in support of this claim. In this article, I wish to focus on the one he expounds in chapter 2 of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. (1) I shall refer to it as the nonteleology argument, taking as it does the form of a reductio purporting to demonstrate the unacceptable consequences attendant on assuming the priority of the good. Among the more important of these are that practical reason would have to play a purely instrumental, nonconstitutive role in ethics, and that no actions could be good or bad in themselves. I shall be considering how plausible Kant's argument is when brought to bear against the ethical theory presented by Aquinas. My aim is to show that the Kantian reductio fails to reveal anything incoherent in Aquinas's position. As a result, one can affirm the doctrine of the priority of good understood in the way that Aquinas does without being saddled with any of the unhappy consequences Kant adduces. My interest in this dispute is, however, not purely historical, for the doctrine of the priority of the right has been construed by some contemporary philosophers as a crucial component in any defensible alternative to consequentialism. (2) Philosophers who believe this tend to evidence deep sympathy with the Kantian approach to ethics. If their impression is wrong, as I shall suggest it is, then Aquinas's ethical theory will be revealed as an interesting alternative to the currently dominant, Kantian form of nonconsequentialism. The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. I begin by rehearsing the reductio Kant proposes in the Critique of Practical Reason as a refutation of the doctrine of the priority of the good. I shall present the argument in two versions: the first, in section 2, as it appears in Kant himself, the second, in section 3, in a more encompassing form in which the good is identified in broadly subjective terms. In sections 4-10, I expound the salient aspects of Aquinas's ethics, the major doctrines that, in my judgment, enable him to escape the corollaries Kant infers from affirming the priority of the good. I also indicate here the precise ways in which he is able to do so. In the final section, I close with some brief thoughts about the deeper philosophical roots of this dispute. II Kant's reductio runs as follows. Any concept of the good which is not derived from a prior practical law but is instead treated as the basis of the moral law has to be the concept of something whose attainment promises to bring us pleasure. For it is only in this way that the good could act upon us: the attraction of the anticipated enjoyment would lead us to do whatever would be necessary to secure it. This would mean, of course, that the concept of the immediately good could be applied only to what is accompanied by feelings of gratification, while the concept of that which is immediately evil would have to refer to what is joined by feelings of pain. …
La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L&... more La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L'accent est mis sur la combinaison qu'on y trouve entre perfectionnisme et liberalisme
In the opening chapter of the Monologion, Anselm offers an intriguing proof for the existence of ... more In the opening chapter of the Monologion, Anselm offers an intriguing proof for the existence of a Platonic form of goodness. This proof is extremely interesting, both in itself and for its place in the broader argument for God's existence that Anselm develops in the Monologion as a whole. Even so, it has yet to receive the scholarly attention that it deserves. My aim in this article is to begin correcting this state of affairs by examining Anslem's proof in some detail. In particular, I aim to clarify the proof's structure, motivate and explain its central premises, and begin the larger project of evaluating its overall success as an argument for Platonism about goodness.
Philosophy <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Public Affairs, 2001
In a recent article, Jonathan Wolff argues that egalitarians are forced to choose between the val... more In a recent article, Jonathan Wolff argues that egalitarians are forced to choose between the values of fairness and respect.' According to Wolff, a properly egalitarian conception of fairness requires us to tailor the distributive shares of different individuals in ways that appropriately reflect the costs their choices impose on other people. In addition, egalitarian fairness mandates that we distribute resources so as to eliminate the effects of sheer bad luck on people's lives. Wolff notes that realizing this last demand would require some people to acknowledge embarrassing facts about themselves, concerning, for instance, their lack of talent. Making people do such things is obviously likely to undermine their selfrespect. And so, Wolff concludes, egalitarians should be willing to sacrifice fairness to secure equal respect for all. Of course, it is not news that a commitment to egalitarianism might require us to sacrifice other non-egalitarian values. It is often said, for instance, that equality and efficiency are incompatible and must be traded off against each other. But Wolffs thesis is both novel and radical, for he claims to find a genuine conflict of values within the heart of what he calls "the egalitarian ethos." Wolff's argument is, for this reason, well worth considering in its own right. In addition, it raises several deeper issues about the conception of fairness currently dominant among philosophical egalitarians. Their view has two main components, each of which, so I shall argue, ought to be I would like to thank Allison Freeman and Seana Shiffrin, as well as the editors of Phi
Abstract Contemporary egalitarians often appeal to a distinction between inequalities issuing fro... more Abstract Contemporary egalitarians often appeal to a distinction between inequalities issuing from choice as opposed to those stemming from brute luck. Inequalities of the second kind, they say, ought to be redressed, while those of the former may be allowed to stand. In this paper, I scrutinize the role played by the notion of brute luck in Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality. My intention is to show that Dworkin seeks to occupy what turns out to be an untenable middle position. He is sandwiched unhappily between G. A. Cohen's radical brute luck egalitarianism, on the one side, and a non-egalitarian conception of justice that rejects entirely the appeal to brute luck, on the other. It follows from the untenable nature of Dworkin's position that egalitarians face a much starker choice than he realizes. They should either wholeheartedly embrace the brute luck story or else find another way of grounding their position.
Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or... more Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or her own life to lead. This is to be distinguished from the doctrine of the separateness of persons: the claim that the fact of our separateness is especially deep and important, morally speaking. In this paper, I argue that we ought to reject this doctrine. I focus most of my attention on the suggestion that the separateness of persons best explains the importance we attach to moral rights. After criticizing Nozick's use of the doctrine, I formulate an alternative account of the significance of rights. I then show how proponents of the doctrine of separateness have no principled way of distinguishing between egoism and moral libertarianism. I suggest that rejecting the doctrine of our separateness for the reasons I propose ensures that we need have no fear of having to embrace consequentialism as a result.
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