Papers by Thomas Grundmann
In diesem Aufsatz räume ich mit einigen tiefsitzenden Vorurteilen gegen die methodologische Rolle... more In diesem Aufsatz räume ich mit einigen tiefsitzenden Vorurteilen gegen die methodologische Rolle von Intuitionen in der Philosophie auf. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass Intuitionen eine zentrale Rolle als epistemische Gründe in Gedankenexperimenten spielen. Aber auch völlig andere Methoden des Philosophierens (wie etwa die Transzendentalpragmatik) kommen ohne Rekurs auf Intuitionen als Gründe letztlich nicht aus. Außerdem kläre ich über die Natur von Intuitionen und deren epistemologischen Status genauer auf. Intuitionen sind fundamentale Gründe, aber sie sind fehlbar, anfechtbar und lassen sich methodisch kontrollieren. Im letzten Teil des Aufsatzes zeige ich, dass Intuitionen auf eine besondere Weise unangreifbar sind: Alle gegen sie gerichteten skeptischen Argumente rekurrieren selbst an irgendeiner Stelle verdeckt auf Intuitionen. Skeptische Generalangriffe auf Intuitionen als valide Gründe untergraben sich also selbst
Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examinati... more Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examination of transcendental arguments. This is the philosophical method of arguing that what is doubted or denied by the opponent must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. The line-up of contributors features leading figures in the field from both sides of the Atlantic; they discuss the nature of transcendental arguments, and consider their role and value. In particular, they consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems. The editor's introduction provides historical context and philosophical orientation for the discussions. This is the first major appraisal of transcendental arguments since the 1970s; they have continued to play a significant role in philosophy, and recent developments in epistemology and metaphysics have raised new questions and challenges for them. Transcendental Arguments will be essential ...
Grazer Philosophische studien, 2002
Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning t... more Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of the argument can be rebutted by the results of recent empirical dream research. As I will argue, there is an introspective criterion for currently being awake. Nevertheless there is one version of the dream-argument, which I will call quasi-dream-argument, that survives all criticism and brings out the structure of a compelling skeptical argument very clearly.
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
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Grazer Philosophische Studien
Abstract: It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, eg that under certain conditions... more Abstract: It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, eg that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out ...
Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft, 2013
Systematische Bedeutung und Rezeption seiner Philosophie in der Gegenwart, 2000
The Skeptical Tradition Around 1800, 1998
Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, 2000
Philosophical Knowledge, 2000
Page 1. Thomas Grundmann Analytische Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie w DE G Walter de Gruyter... more Page 1. Thomas Grundmann Analytische Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie w DE G Walter de Gruyter • Berlin • New York Page 2. Inhaltsverzeichnis Vorwort VII 1 Einführung . l 1.0 Was ist und wozu dient Erkenntnistheorie? 1 1.1 Was ist Erkenntnis? 1 ...
The Externalist Challenge, 2000
Philosophical Studies, 2013
Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard ... more Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one major objection to interpreting our judgments about Gettier cases as strict conditionals.
In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains of discourse, stable disagreement among p... more In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains of discourse, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in cases of peer disagreement suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest ubiquitous suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical understanding of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally called for. In the first part of this paper, I will focus on this question. After a critical survey of some recent alternative approaches (disagreement as a threat to reliability, as a decision problem, and as providing an undercutting defeater), I will argue that discovering peer disagreement provides one with a rebutting defeater, but only if some further non-trivial conditions are satisfiedamong them acknowledging one"s opponent as an epistemic peer. In the second part of the paper, I will explore the skeptical implications that this account seems to have for philosophy in particular. Here, I will defend two claims. First, skepticism about philosophy is rationally required only if the relevant peerness assumption can be justified. Second, there is no rational basis in philosophy that would support the relevant peerness assumption. If this peerness agnosticism is correct, then we are not forced into skepticism about philosophy and we may rationally retain our philosophical beliefs even in the face of controversy. As philosophers we are often confronted with colleagues who do not share our views. In the face of controversy we use arguments and present evidence in order to overcome these disputes. Sometimes we succeed in using these rational tools to persuade our opponent that the better reasons are on our side, or that her own argument was invalid or unsound, or that, on balance, her position has the higher theoretical costs or the lower explanatory power. At other times, it is just the other way round. But most of the time the situation in philosophy is very different.
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Papers by Thomas Grundmann