South African agricultural export prospects to the BRICs. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication ... more South African agricultural export prospects to the BRICs. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). NAMC does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Af... more Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) and the Australian High Commission (AusAid). The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the view of any of these institutions.
Since the beginning of the new millennium we are increas structure of the world economy not only ... more Since the beginning of the new millennium we are increas structure of the world economy not only of some major emerging markets, namely Brazil, India and China, from a developing country perspective, but also of the rise of Russia (since the collapse of the Soviet Union). Their role in the global arena, from an economic and political perspective, has raised concern in the developed world about the manner in which their influence is shaping or shifting the balance of power. Concerns about the impact on the environment and govern been raised. However, in Africa, the role of some of these countries under the auspices of the so called South-South alliances can be viewed as an opportunity to enhance cooperation with other developing countries, playing a significa region. Poverty, poor infrastructure, lack of productive capacity and transfer of technology, the emerging threats associated with climate change as well as the food, energy, financial and economic cr have been identified as areas where Africa can enhance its capacity by cooperating with other developing countries. Furthermore, the increased bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations, as reflected in the current Doha neg Organisation (WTO), has been cited as another reason for cooperation. It is against this background that since 2000, African countries have entered into new partnerships and arrangements with the South, increasingly driven by economic rather than political. The new partnerships are often based on formal frameworks with dialogue forums and action plans. The agenda behind the renewed and increased global economic interest in Africa, a continent that was once dubbed 'hopeless' shou regarded as underdeveloped and poor, but of late Africa has been regarded as a continent brimming with potential and opportunities. The need of boom economies, like China and India, for raw materials, is generating valuable new opportunities. Can this be regarded as a new scramble for Africa in a post-colonial era? Concern should be raised if this increased interest goes unchecked, as this could be no different from the way in which Africa wa resources. This argument is certainly plausible if one looks at the majority of investments in Africa from the so called emerging markets. These are concentrated in the traditional resource Trade at a glance: the BRICS and Japan's engagement with tralac Working Paper | S12WP01/2012 This argument is certainly plausible if one looks at the majority of investments in Africa from the socalled emerging markets. These are concentrated in the traditional resource-rich primary sectors. The difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure development projects. For example, according to Holslag (2007), i were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for competition between the traditional investors Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa on the other. Africa's cooperation with especially the emerging markets su South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment conducive for tapping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and regional development goals. The Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the BRICS and Japan with Africa. Highlights of the analysis include: Economic and trade policy overview: and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, behind India, where growth reached 8.6%, and China, where GDP figures the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from-1.7% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010 (Richardson, 2011). Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipient Investment (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors during the same review period (UNCTAD, 2011). Trade at a glance: the BRICS and Japan's engagement with tralac Working Paper | S12WP01/2012 he difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure development projects. For example, according to Holslag (2007), in Mozambique, Indian contractors were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for ditional investors-the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Africa's cooperation with especially the emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment ping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and e Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) has prepared an analysis of the BRICS and Japan's engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the BRICS and Japan with Africa. Highlights of the analysis include: Economic and trade policy overview: The BRICS nations represent 42% of the world's population and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, behind India, where growth reached 8.6%, and China, where GDP figures rose by 10.3%. Russia had the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from 1.7% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010 (Richardson, 2011). Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipient (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also increased strongly, by 21%. They now account for 29% of global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors during the same review period (UNCTAD, 2011). apan's engagement with Africa 2 he difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure n Mozambique, Indian contractors were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment ping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and (tralac) has prepared an analysis of the BRICS and Japan's engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the The BRICS nations represent 42% of the world's population and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, rose by 10.3%. Russia had the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipients of Foreign Direct (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from increased strongly, by 21%. They now account for 29% of global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Africa Policy Research Institute, 2022
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is expected to lift 30 million people ... more The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is expected to lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty by 2035. African countries are looking to take advantage of improved market access under the AfCFTA to increase production and trade through agriculture, fisheries (blue economy), forestry and mining activities. While increased production in pursuit of trade opportunities under the AfCFTA will contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, this can also form a key part of the solution in shaping the transition of African economies to green growth, climate mitigation and adaptation. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges of addressing climate change under the AfCFTA. It draws from ongoing global and African discourse on climate change, and from the growing body of research on the AfCFTA and environmental sustainability. It provides recommendations on how African governments, African stakeholders and development partners in the European Union and the United States of America can achieve climate change objectives through the AfCFTA.
The paper makes four major points: 1. While the AfCFTA makes minimal references to the environment, it can be adjusted to support environmental and climate change actions by building on the approach taken in the now stalled World Trade Organisation (WTO) Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations. This would involve ensuring that tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other restrictions to trade in environmental goods an services are eliminated. Benefits from such actions would include the development of green value chains for environmental goods and services in Africa, even as trade liberalization ensures that there is little or no need to develop green industries that cover all the many product lines-up to 304, that exist across the 10 sectors identified by the EGA.
2. As the AfCFTA forms part of a broader green economic transition plan for Africa, pursuant to the objectives of the Paris Agreement and national and continental targets on climate change, decarbonization in the energy sector and in trade-related sectors like transportation are central to the green transition under the agreement. For countries like Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe that rely on fossil fuels either as export receipts or for domestic power generation, the green transition to net zero emissions and decarbonization would require policymakers to devise a phased approach over decades. Successful green transition would further hinge on development partners providing technical and financial support that are beyond what is currently on offer.
3. While there might be utility in including some provisions in the AfCFTA framework that enhance the strategic link between trade and the environment, there are two reasons why doing this might not be optimal. First, past challenges in implementing trade agreements and the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism suggest that there may be limited value in incorporating an additional Environmental Protocol to the AfCFTA. Second, at the multilateral, continental and regional levels Africa has no shortage of agreements, commitments, and initiatives that deal extensively with environmental sustainability and climate. Introducing detailed provisions on climate into the AfCFTA would to some degree, amount to duplicating the Africa Climate Change Strategy, Africa’s Green Recovery Action Plan (2021–2027) and various regional strategies on climate change that African governments have committed to elsewhere. One solution would be to reinforce support for the implementation of these existing initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability, while at the same time supporting measures to consolidate, incorporate and synchronize current efforts under the AfCFTA such as the preparation of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the AfCFTA to support how environmental considerations can nevertheless be effectively incorporated into the implementation of the Agreement.
4. Development partners like the EU, Germany and the USA have a critical role to play in supporting Africa’s green transition under the AfCFTA. Within this context, the paper recommends the following:
i. Development partners should target enhanced support for regions that are vulnerable, lack resources for climate adaptation and possess limited capacity for trading under the AfCFTA. These include small island states, countries in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and Sahel regions. Some countries in these regions have large informal sectors and informal cross-border trade that are not captured under the AfCFTA and that require a nuanced approach to addressing climate issues.
ii. Development partners should use AfCFTA as an entry point for working with African policymakers to devise targeted and enhanced support for the development of export-capable green value chains, climate adapted agriculture, green manufacturing and services in energy and transportation and other sectors that are pivotal to Africa’s green transition and decarbonization, while also supporting initiatives and investments into the circular economy.
iii. In forming partnerships with Africa’s private sector, developing partners should support the adoption of complementary tools like the Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS). Adoption of VSS will help producers in the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors use global and regional value chains effectively to improve environmental sustainability and transition to green value chains. Such modification of production processes-that could include incentive mechanisms for development partners to help cover the costs of criteria compliance with the standards and adoption of best practices and tools-would essentially mitigate the negative impacts on the environment while improving competitiveness in trade under the AfCFTA.
iv. Development partners should align initiatives like the EU Green Deal and other African environmental sustainability initiatives like the Great Green Wall with the AfCFTA agreement in ways that are responsive to local needs and fosters greater local ownership. Actual commitments by development partners to support a green transition in Africa have fallen short of expectations and should be ramped up with speed. As the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, these countries and even China should deliver on their promises and make substantial climate funds available to African countries to mitigate and adapt to the inevitable negative impacts of climate change.
... With this book tralac hopes to contribute to debate and analytical work on the impact of FTAs... more ... With this book tralac hopes to contribute to debate and analytical work on the impact of FTAs ... 277 Chapter 9 The implications of a SACU-Mercosur free trade agreement for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland Ron Sandrey and Hans Grinsted Jensen 303 ...
Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes,... more Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. All views and opinions expressed remain solely those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of tralac This publication should be cited as: Fundira, T. 2013. An analysis of Africa's export performance and export similarity for select countries within the Tripartite Free Trade Area market. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by The Swedish Embassy Nairobi. The Swedish Embassy Nairobi does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
should make a contribution to this devel 9. Notwithstanding the data limitations we found that, a... more should make a contribution to this devel 9. Notwithstanding the data limitations we found that, aside from South Africa and Egypt, these IIT levels are low, and in some instances extremely low. This worrying trend is reinforced when we examine the IIT values for the 'majors' of Egypt, Kenya and South Africa with respect to intra Tripartite trade and trade with the BRICs (excluding Russia). We suggest reasons as to why this may be so, and present some explanations for this and use IIT to point out ho region development.
This book presents the output of a tralac project focusing on the trade agenda of South Africa an... more This book presents the output of a tralac project focusing on the trade agenda of South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) of which South Africa is a member. The proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is very much part of SACU and specifically South Africa’s trade agenda, since FTAs are negotiated collectively by SACU member states. The aim of the analysis in this book is twofold. First, the implications of different FTAs that are either being negotiated or being considered, are assessed in the context of the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Second, the book presents a sober assessment of trade modelling exercises, noting the value as well as the limitations of these exercises in the making of trade policy choices and negotiating trade agreements.
Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes,... more Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. All views and opinions expressed remain solely those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of tralac This publication should be cited as: Fundira, T. 2011. An assessment of agricultural sensitive products within the Cape to Cairo Tripartite Region. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. Sida does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
South Africa is interested in strengthening trade relations with developing country partners and ... more South Africa is interested in strengthening trade relations with developing country partners and is articulating a strong ‘Look East’ policy. Trade links with China and India seem to be high on the agenda. This is important in the context of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) too. South Africa is the largest and most developed country in this customs union, and its preferences are likely to influence SACU’s trade agenda. This book assesses the potential impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) between South Africa (SACU) and China, and an FTA with India. These are two very fast growing developing countries which are also important sources of foreign direct investment in Africa. The two FTAs are likely to deliver very different impacts, and to raise important policy questions for South Africa and SACU.
Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Af... more Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) and the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the view of any of these institutions.
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
This paper reviews the domestic political and legislative context surround biofuels initiatives t... more This paper reviews the domestic political and legislative context surround biofuels initiatives to highlight what opportunities exist for establishing a biofuels trade network between South Africa (as an anchor market) and its neighbours, specifically in Zambia and Mozambique. By analysing global developments in major biofuel importers, reasons for policy inertia in South Africa, and recent experiences with biofuels investments, we suggest that the likelihood for a regional biofuels market developing is slender without addressing land-related challenges in producer countries and revising South Africa's domestic legislation.
South African agricultural export prospects to the BRICs. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication ... more South African agricultural export prospects to the BRICs. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). NAMC does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Af... more Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) and the Australian High Commission (AusAid). The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the view of any of these institutions.
Since the beginning of the new millennium we are increas structure of the world economy not only ... more Since the beginning of the new millennium we are increas structure of the world economy not only of some major emerging markets, namely Brazil, India and China, from a developing country perspective, but also of the rise of Russia (since the collapse of the Soviet Union). Their role in the global arena, from an economic and political perspective, has raised concern in the developed world about the manner in which their influence is shaping or shifting the balance of power. Concerns about the impact on the environment and govern been raised. However, in Africa, the role of some of these countries under the auspices of the so called South-South alliances can be viewed as an opportunity to enhance cooperation with other developing countries, playing a significa region. Poverty, poor infrastructure, lack of productive capacity and transfer of technology, the emerging threats associated with climate change as well as the food, energy, financial and economic cr have been identified as areas where Africa can enhance its capacity by cooperating with other developing countries. Furthermore, the increased bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral negotiations, as reflected in the current Doha neg Organisation (WTO), has been cited as another reason for cooperation. It is against this background that since 2000, African countries have entered into new partnerships and arrangements with the South, increasingly driven by economic rather than political. The new partnerships are often based on formal frameworks with dialogue forums and action plans. The agenda behind the renewed and increased global economic interest in Africa, a continent that was once dubbed 'hopeless' shou regarded as underdeveloped and poor, but of late Africa has been regarded as a continent brimming with potential and opportunities. The need of boom economies, like China and India, for raw materials, is generating valuable new opportunities. Can this be regarded as a new scramble for Africa in a post-colonial era? Concern should be raised if this increased interest goes unchecked, as this could be no different from the way in which Africa wa resources. This argument is certainly plausible if one looks at the majority of investments in Africa from the so called emerging markets. These are concentrated in the traditional resource Trade at a glance: the BRICS and Japan's engagement with tralac Working Paper | S12WP01/2012 This argument is certainly plausible if one looks at the majority of investments in Africa from the socalled emerging markets. These are concentrated in the traditional resource-rich primary sectors. The difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure development projects. For example, according to Holslag (2007), i were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for competition between the traditional investors Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa on the other. Africa's cooperation with especially the emerging markets su South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment conducive for tapping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and regional development goals. The Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the BRICS and Japan with Africa. Highlights of the analysis include: Economic and trade policy overview: and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, behind India, where growth reached 8.6%, and China, where GDP figures the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from-1.7% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010 (Richardson, 2011). Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipient Investment (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors during the same review period (UNCTAD, 2011). Trade at a glance: the BRICS and Japan's engagement with tralac Working Paper | S12WP01/2012 he difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure development projects. For example, according to Holslag (2007), in Mozambique, Indian contractors were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for ditional investors-the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Africa's cooperation with especially the emerging markets such as Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment ping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and e Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) has prepared an analysis of the BRICS and Japan's engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the BRICS and Japan with Africa. Highlights of the analysis include: Economic and trade policy overview: The BRICS nations represent 42% of the world's population and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, behind India, where growth reached 8.6%, and China, where GDP figures rose by 10.3%. Russia had the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from 1.7% in 2009 to 2.8% in 2010 (Richardson, 2011). Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipient (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from developing and transition economies also increased strongly, by 21%. They now account for 29% of global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors during the same review period (UNCTAD, 2011). apan's engagement with Africa 2 he difference, however, is that this renewed economic interest in Africa is enabling African countries to add terms and conditions into the mix such as concessions attached to infrastructure n Mozambique, Indian contractors were allowed to exploit the coal mines only after the Indian government had promised to invest in public infrastructure. Furthermore, this renewed interest in Africa has provided a front line for the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU) on the one hand, and other emerging players, such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) offers new options that can be turned into opportunities. It is important to note that the opportunities are not automatic and African countries need to create an environment ping into the benefits that accrue. In this regard, there is need for a proactive approach that allows for the development of cooperation strategies that are in line with national and (tralac) has prepared an analysis of the BRICS and Japan's engagement with Africa. The paper provides a summary of the key factors in the involvement of the The BRICS nations represent 42% of the world's population and 18% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Among the BRIC economies, Brazil ranked third, rose by 10.3%. Russia had the poorest result, with a 3.8% increase. For the new entrant, South Africa, real GDP recovered from Developing economies increased further in importance in 2010, both as recipients of Foreign Direct (FDI) and as outward investors. They absorbed more than half of global FDI inflows. Half of the top 20 host economies for FDI were developing or transition economies. FDI outflows from increased strongly, by 21%. They now account for 29% of global FDI outflows. Six developing and transition economies were among the top 20 investors
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and Africa Policy Research Institute, 2022
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is expected to lift 30 million people ... more The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement is expected to lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty by 2035. African countries are looking to take advantage of improved market access under the AfCFTA to increase production and trade through agriculture, fisheries (blue economy), forestry and mining activities. While increased production in pursuit of trade opportunities under the AfCFTA will contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, this can also form a key part of the solution in shaping the transition of African economies to green growth, climate mitigation and adaptation. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges of addressing climate change under the AfCFTA. It draws from ongoing global and African discourse on climate change, and from the growing body of research on the AfCFTA and environmental sustainability. It provides recommendations on how African governments, African stakeholders and development partners in the European Union and the United States of America can achieve climate change objectives through the AfCFTA.
The paper makes four major points: 1. While the AfCFTA makes minimal references to the environment, it can be adjusted to support environmental and climate change actions by building on the approach taken in the now stalled World Trade Organisation (WTO) Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations. This would involve ensuring that tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other restrictions to trade in environmental goods an services are eliminated. Benefits from such actions would include the development of green value chains for environmental goods and services in Africa, even as trade liberalization ensures that there is little or no need to develop green industries that cover all the many product lines-up to 304, that exist across the 10 sectors identified by the EGA.
2. As the AfCFTA forms part of a broader green economic transition plan for Africa, pursuant to the objectives of the Paris Agreement and national and continental targets on climate change, decarbonization in the energy sector and in trade-related sectors like transportation are central to the green transition under the agreement. For countries like Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe that rely on fossil fuels either as export receipts or for domestic power generation, the green transition to net zero emissions and decarbonization would require policymakers to devise a phased approach over decades. Successful green transition would further hinge on development partners providing technical and financial support that are beyond what is currently on offer.
3. While there might be utility in including some provisions in the AfCFTA framework that enhance the strategic link between trade and the environment, there are two reasons why doing this might not be optimal. First, past challenges in implementing trade agreements and the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism suggest that there may be limited value in incorporating an additional Environmental Protocol to the AfCFTA. Second, at the multilateral, continental and regional levels Africa has no shortage of agreements, commitments, and initiatives that deal extensively with environmental sustainability and climate. Introducing detailed provisions on climate into the AfCFTA would to some degree, amount to duplicating the Africa Climate Change Strategy, Africa’s Green Recovery Action Plan (2021–2027) and various regional strategies on climate change that African governments have committed to elsewhere. One solution would be to reinforce support for the implementation of these existing initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability, while at the same time supporting measures to consolidate, incorporate and synchronize current efforts under the AfCFTA such as the preparation of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the AfCFTA to support how environmental considerations can nevertheless be effectively incorporated into the implementation of the Agreement.
4. Development partners like the EU, Germany and the USA have a critical role to play in supporting Africa’s green transition under the AfCFTA. Within this context, the paper recommends the following:
i. Development partners should target enhanced support for regions that are vulnerable, lack resources for climate adaptation and possess limited capacity for trading under the AfCFTA. These include small island states, countries in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and Sahel regions. Some countries in these regions have large informal sectors and informal cross-border trade that are not captured under the AfCFTA and that require a nuanced approach to addressing climate issues.
ii. Development partners should use AfCFTA as an entry point for working with African policymakers to devise targeted and enhanced support for the development of export-capable green value chains, climate adapted agriculture, green manufacturing and services in energy and transportation and other sectors that are pivotal to Africa’s green transition and decarbonization, while also supporting initiatives and investments into the circular economy.
iii. In forming partnerships with Africa’s private sector, developing partners should support the adoption of complementary tools like the Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS). Adoption of VSS will help producers in the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors use global and regional value chains effectively to improve environmental sustainability and transition to green value chains. Such modification of production processes-that could include incentive mechanisms for development partners to help cover the costs of criteria compliance with the standards and adoption of best practices and tools-would essentially mitigate the negative impacts on the environment while improving competitiveness in trade under the AfCFTA.
iv. Development partners should align initiatives like the EU Green Deal and other African environmental sustainability initiatives like the Great Green Wall with the AfCFTA agreement in ways that are responsive to local needs and fosters greater local ownership. Actual commitments by development partners to support a green transition in Africa have fallen short of expectations and should be ramped up with speed. As the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, these countries and even China should deliver on their promises and make substantial climate funds available to African countries to mitigate and adapt to the inevitable negative impacts of climate change.
... With this book tralac hopes to contribute to debate and analytical work on the impact of FTAs... more ... With this book tralac hopes to contribute to debate and analytical work on the impact of FTAs ... 277 Chapter 9 The implications of a SACU-Mercosur free trade agreement for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland Ron Sandrey and Hans Grinsted Jensen 303 ...
Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes,... more Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. All views and opinions expressed remain solely those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of tralac This publication should be cited as: Fundira, T. 2013. An analysis of Africa's export performance and export similarity for select countries within the Tripartite Free Trade Area market. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by The Swedish Embassy Nairobi. The Swedish Embassy Nairobi does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
should make a contribution to this devel 9. Notwithstanding the data limitations we found that, a... more should make a contribution to this devel 9. Notwithstanding the data limitations we found that, aside from South Africa and Egypt, these IIT levels are low, and in some instances extremely low. This worrying trend is reinforced when we examine the IIT values for the 'majors' of Egypt, Kenya and South Africa with respect to intra Tripartite trade and trade with the BRICs (excluding Russia). We suggest reasons as to why this may be so, and present some explanations for this and use IIT to point out ho region development.
This book presents the output of a tralac project focusing on the trade agenda of South Africa an... more This book presents the output of a tralac project focusing on the trade agenda of South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) of which South Africa is a member. The proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is very much part of SACU and specifically South Africa’s trade agenda, since FTAs are negotiated collectively by SACU member states. The aim of the analysis in this book is twofold. First, the implications of different FTAs that are either being negotiated or being considered, are assessed in the context of the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Second, the book presents a sober assessment of trade modelling exercises, noting the value as well as the limitations of these exercises in the making of trade policy choices and negotiating trade agreements.
Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes,... more Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material for educational, non-profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. All views and opinions expressed remain solely those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of tralac This publication should be cited as: Fundira, T. 2011. An assessment of agricultural sensitive products within the Cape to Cairo Tripartite Region. Stellenbosch: tralac. This publication has been financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. Sida does not necessarily share the views expressed in this material. Responsibility for its contents rests entirely with the author.
South Africa is interested in strengthening trade relations with developing country partners and ... more South Africa is interested in strengthening trade relations with developing country partners and is articulating a strong ‘Look East’ policy. Trade links with China and India seem to be high on the agenda. This is important in the context of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) too. South Africa is the largest and most developed country in this customs union, and its preferences are likely to influence SACU’s trade agenda. This book assesses the potential impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) between South Africa (SACU) and China, and an FTA with India. These are two very fast growing developing countries which are also important sources of foreign direct investment in Africa. The two FTAs are likely to deliver very different impacts, and to raise important policy questions for South Africa and SACU.
Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Af... more Publication of this book was made possible by the support of the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac) and the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC). The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily the view of any of these institutions.
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
This paper reviews the domestic political and legislative context surround biofuels initiatives t... more This paper reviews the domestic political and legislative context surround biofuels initiatives to highlight what opportunities exist for establishing a biofuels trade network between South Africa (as an anchor market) and its neighbours, specifically in Zambia and Mozambique. By analysing global developments in major biofuel importers, reasons for policy inertia in South Africa, and recent experiences with biofuels investments, we suggest that the likelihood for a regional biofuels market developing is slender without addressing land-related challenges in producer countries and revising South Africa's domestic legislation.
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to greenhouse gas emissions, this can also form a key part of the solution in shaping the transition of African economies to green growth, climate mitigation and adaptation. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges of addressing climate change under the AfCFTA. It draws from ongoing global and African discourse on climate change, and from
the growing body of research on the AfCFTA and environmental sustainability. It provides recommendations on how African governments, African stakeholders and development partners in the European Union and the United States of America can achieve climate change objectives through the AfCFTA.
The paper makes four major points:
1. While the AfCFTA makes minimal references to the environment, it can be adjusted to support environmental and climate change actions by building on the approach taken in the now stalled World Trade Organisation (WTO) Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations. This would involve ensuring that tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other restrictions to trade in environmental goods an
services are eliminated. Benefits from such actions would include the development of green value chains for environmental goods and services in Africa, even as trade liberalization ensures that there is little or no need to develop green industries that cover all the many product lines-up to 304, that exist across the 10 sectors identified by the EGA.
2. As the AfCFTA forms part of a broader green economic transition plan for Africa, pursuant to the objectives of the Paris Agreement and national and continental targets on climate change, decarbonization in the energy sector and in trade-related sectors like transportation are central to the green transition under the agreement. For countries like Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe that rely on fossil fuels either as export receipts or for domestic power generation, the green transition to net zero emissions and decarbonization
would require policymakers to devise a phased approach over decades. Successful green transition would further hinge on development partners providing technical and financial support that are beyond what is currently on offer.
3. While there might be utility in including some provisions in the AfCFTA framework that enhance the strategic link between trade and the environment, there are two reasons why doing this might not be optimal. First, past challenges in implementing trade agreements and the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism suggest that there may be limited value in incorporating an additional Environmental Protocol to
the AfCFTA. Second, at the multilateral, continental and regional levels Africa has no shortage of agreements, commitments, and initiatives that deal extensively with environmental sustainability and climate. Introducing detailed provisions on climate into the AfCFTA would to some degree, amount to duplicating the Africa Climate Change Strategy, Africa’s Green Recovery Action Plan (2021–2027) and various regional strategies on climate change that African governments have committed
to elsewhere. One solution would be to reinforce support for the implementation of these existing initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability, while at the same time supporting measures to consolidate, incorporate and synchronize current efforts under the AfCFTA such as the preparation of a Strategic Environmental
Assessment (SEA) of the AfCFTA to support how environmental considerations can nevertheless be effectively incorporated into the implementation of the Agreement.
4. Development partners like the EU, Germany and the USA have a critical role to play in supporting Africa’s green transition under the AfCFTA.
Within this context, the paper recommends the following:
i. Development partners should target enhanced support for regions that are vulnerable, lack resources for climate adaptation and possess limited capacity for trading under the AfCFTA. These include small island states, countries in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and Sahel regions. Some countries in these regions have large informal sectors and informal cross-border trade that are not captured under the AfCFTA and that require a nuanced approach to addressing climate issues.
ii. Development partners should use AfCFTA as an entry point for working with African policymakers to devise targeted and enhanced support for the development of export-capable green value chains, climate adapted agriculture, green manufacturing and services in energy and transportation and other sectors that are pivotal to Africa’s green transition and decarbonization, while also supporting initiatives and investments into the circular economy.
iii. In forming partnerships with Africa’s private sector, developing partners should support the adoption of complementary tools like the Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS). Adoption of VSS will help producers in the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors use global and regional value chains effectively to improve environmental sustainability and transition to green value chains. Such modification of production processes-that could include incentive mechanisms for development partners to help cover the costs of criteria compliance with the standards and adoption of best practices and tools-would essentially mitigate the negative impacts on the environment while improving competitiveness in trade under the AfCFTA.
iv. Development partners should align initiatives like the EU Green Deal and other African environmental sustainability initiatives like the Great Green Wall with the AfCFTA agreement in ways that are responsive to local needs and fosters greater local ownership. Actual commitments by development partners to support a green transition in Africa have fallen short of expectations and should be ramped up with speed. As the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, these countries and even China should deliver on their promises and make substantial climate funds available to African countries to mitigate and adapt to the inevitable negative impacts
of climate change.
to greenhouse gas emissions, this can also form a key part of the solution in shaping the transition of African economies to green growth, climate mitigation and adaptation. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges of addressing climate change under the AfCFTA. It draws from ongoing global and African discourse on climate change, and from
the growing body of research on the AfCFTA and environmental sustainability. It provides recommendations on how African governments, African stakeholders and development partners in the European Union and the United States of America can achieve climate change objectives through the AfCFTA.
The paper makes four major points:
1. While the AfCFTA makes minimal references to the environment, it can be adjusted to support environmental and climate change actions by building on the approach taken in the now stalled World Trade Organisation (WTO) Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations. This would involve ensuring that tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other restrictions to trade in environmental goods an
services are eliminated. Benefits from such actions would include the development of green value chains for environmental goods and services in Africa, even as trade liberalization ensures that there is little or no need to develop green industries that cover all the many product lines-up to 304, that exist across the 10 sectors identified by the EGA.
2. As the AfCFTA forms part of a broader green economic transition plan for Africa, pursuant to the objectives of the Paris Agreement and national and continental targets on climate change, decarbonization in the energy sector and in trade-related sectors like transportation are central to the green transition under the agreement. For countries like Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe that rely on fossil fuels either as export receipts or for domestic power generation, the green transition to net zero emissions and decarbonization
would require policymakers to devise a phased approach over decades. Successful green transition would further hinge on development partners providing technical and financial support that are beyond what is currently on offer.
3. While there might be utility in including some provisions in the AfCFTA framework that enhance the strategic link between trade and the environment, there are two reasons why doing this might not be optimal. First, past challenges in implementing trade agreements and the absence of a strong enforcement mechanism suggest that there may be limited value in incorporating an additional Environmental Protocol to
the AfCFTA. Second, at the multilateral, continental and regional levels Africa has no shortage of agreements, commitments, and initiatives that deal extensively with environmental sustainability and climate. Introducing detailed provisions on climate into the AfCFTA would to some degree, amount to duplicating the Africa Climate Change Strategy, Africa’s Green Recovery Action Plan (2021–2027) and various regional strategies on climate change that African governments have committed
to elsewhere. One solution would be to reinforce support for the implementation of these existing initiatives on climate change and environmental sustainability, while at the same time supporting measures to consolidate, incorporate and synchronize current efforts under the AfCFTA such as the preparation of a Strategic Environmental
Assessment (SEA) of the AfCFTA to support how environmental considerations can nevertheless be effectively incorporated into the implementation of the Agreement.
4. Development partners like the EU, Germany and the USA have a critical role to play in supporting Africa’s green transition under the AfCFTA.
Within this context, the paper recommends the following:
i. Development partners should target enhanced support for regions that are vulnerable, lack resources for climate adaptation and possess limited capacity for trading under the AfCFTA. These include small island states, countries in the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and Sahel regions. Some countries in these regions have large informal sectors and informal cross-border trade that are not captured under the AfCFTA and that require a nuanced approach to addressing climate issues.
ii. Development partners should use AfCFTA as an entry point for working with African policymakers to devise targeted and enhanced support for the development of export-capable green value chains, climate adapted agriculture, green manufacturing and services in energy and transportation and other sectors that are pivotal to Africa’s green transition and decarbonization, while also supporting initiatives and investments into the circular economy.
iii. In forming partnerships with Africa’s private sector, developing partners should support the adoption of complementary tools like the Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS). Adoption of VSS will help producers in the manufacturing, mining and agriculture sectors use global and regional value chains effectively to improve environmental sustainability and transition to green value chains. Such modification of production processes-that could include incentive mechanisms for development partners to help cover the costs of criteria compliance with the standards and adoption of best practices and tools-would essentially mitigate the negative impacts on the environment while improving competitiveness in trade under the AfCFTA.
iv. Development partners should align initiatives like the EU Green Deal and other African environmental sustainability initiatives like the Great Green Wall with the AfCFTA agreement in ways that are responsive to local needs and fosters greater local ownership. Actual commitments by development partners to support a green transition in Africa have fallen short of expectations and should be ramped up with speed. As the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, these countries and even China should deliver on their promises and make substantial climate funds available to African countries to mitigate and adapt to the inevitable negative impacts
of climate change.