Papers by Tőzsér János
T. Demeter - T. Parent - A. Toon (eds.) Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations, New York - London, Routledge, 2022
This chapter has three aims. Firstly, it elaborates the so-called pragmatic approach to fictional... more This chapter has three aims. Firstly, it elaborates the so-called pragmatic approach to fictionalism. By evoking some classical pragmatic theories of fictive utterances, it gives an account of pragmatic properties responsible for the difference between serious and fictive utterances. The authors argue for the thesis that the pragmatic approach can be applied plausibly to all kinds of fictionalism, that is from instrumentalism to figuralism. Secondly, the authors investigate some consequences of the suggested account for fictionalist theories in general. They show that some more or less known difficulties of fictionalist theories become more serious if one accepts the pragmatic approach. The chapter discusses two of them, namely the problem of entirely fictional discourses and the apparent contradiction between hermeneutic fictionalism and first person authority. Thirdly, the authors investigate the consequences of the pragmatic approach for mental fictionalism in particular. At the end of the paper, they argue that once the pragmatic approach is applied to mental fictionalism, the well-known problem of cognitive suicide becomes especially nagging. They suggest it is highly questionable that mental fictionalism is worth to endorse in the light of these serious difficulties.
Metaphilosophy, 2021
This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion ... more This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self-defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the aporetic situation of the Bias Argument arises.
Human Affairs, 2020
Our paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive a... more Our paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive and permanent philosophical disagreement over philosophers' epistemic self-esteem. In the second part, we investigate the attitude of philosophers who have high epistemic self-esteem even in the face of philosophical disagreement and who believe they have well-grounded philosophical knowledge. In the third section, we focus on the attitude of philosophers who maintain a moderate level of epistemic self-esteem because they do not attribute substantive philosophical knowledge to themselves but still believe that they have epistemic right to defend substantive philosophical beliefs. In the fourth section, we analyse the attitude of philosophers who have a low level of epis-temic self-esteem in relation to substantive philosophical beliefs and make no attempt to defend those beliefs. We argue that when faced with philosophical disagreement philosophers either have to deny that the dissenting philosophers are their epistemic peers or have to admit that doing philosophy is less meaningful than it seemed before. In this second case, philosophical activity and performance should not contribute to the philosophers' overall epistemic self-esteem to any significant extent.
Teorema, 2020
ABSTRACT By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabil... more ABSTRACT By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument.
BUKSZ, 2018
Az utóbbi időben több országban és/vagy régióban merült fel az FNA bevezetésének gondolata és min... more Az utóbbi időben több országban és/vagy régióban merült fel az FNA bevezetésének gondolata és mindenütt élénk társadalmi vita övezi. Előbb-utóbb számos politikai közösség tagjainak dönteniük kell: olyan társadalomban kívánnak-e élni, melyben van FNA, vagy olyanban, amelyben nincs. E döntés során a politikai közösségeknek azt kell mérlegelniük: milyen értékek mentén képzelik el a jövőjüket. Mármost, e jövőkép meghatározásának széleskörű és lehetőség szerint racionális társadalmi párbeszéd útján kell megszületnie. Ezért különösen fontos, hogy a politikai közösség tagjai világosan lássák az FNA-t tartalmazó és az FNA nélküli társadalmi vízió hátterében húzódó értékeket, s azokat az alapvető társadalmi igazságossággal kapcsolatos megfontolásokat, melyek az FNA bevezetése mellett és ellen hozhatóak fel. Tanulmányunkban arra vállalkozunk, hogy felszínre hozzuk azokat a társadalmi igazságossággal kapcsolatos alapvető meggyőződéseket, melyek az FNA-t tartalmazó és az FNA nélküli társadalmi víziók hátterében állnak. Egy efféle (feltáró) elemzés nélkül az FNA-val kapcsolatos vita könnyen irracionálissá és meddővé válik, ahol is a vitatkozó felek elbeszélnek egymás mellett. Filozófiai kalauzunktól azt várjuk tehát: hozzásegíti a vitatkozó feleket ahhoz, hogy átlássák a vita dialektikáját és álláspontjukat világosabban tudják artikulálni. Úgy látjuk: az FNA-val kapcsolatos filozófiai vitát öt alapvető kérdés határozza meg. (1) A magánszféra vagy a politikai közösség érdeke élvez-e inkább elsőbbséget? (2) Az egyént vagy a politikai közösséget terheli-e elsősorban felelősség a szegénységért? (3) A jóléti juttatások esetében az államnak a szükség vagy az univerzalitás elvét kell-e követnie? (4) Az újraelosztás során az államnak a reciprocitás elvét kell-e alkalmaznia vagy az állam valójában nincs olyan episztemikus helyzetben, hogy azt jogosan alkalmazni tudja? (5) A helyes társadalompolitikának a munkapiacon való részvétel lehetőségét vagy a munkapiacról való kimaradás lehetőségét kell-e biztosítania? Tanulmányunkban ezeken a pontokon megyünk végig.
Organon F, 2020
In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper "Mental Fictionalism as an Undermot... more In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper "Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory" (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács's criticism, which appeared in his "Mental fiction-alism and epiphenomenal qualia" (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory , so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács's criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argu-mentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács's main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács's, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fic-tionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint.
Recently, the idea of unconditional basic income (UBI) has emerged in several countries and/or re... more Recently, the idea of unconditional basic income (UBI) has emerged in several countries and/or regions, and the dispute is usually rather fierce. During this decision-making process, political communities have to form opinions about the most important values of the community. We believe that defining this vision of the political community must be based on comprehensive and rational social deliberation instead of fetishising or demonising an instrument. That is why it is especially important that members of the political community see the values behind the pro-UBI and anti-UBI social visions and those considerations of social justice which are for and against UBI clearly. In our paper, we undertake to bring to the surface those basic intuitions about social justice which are behind the pro-UBI and anti-UBI social visions. In other words, we will explore the often unspoken presuppositions held in the worldview of the supporters as well as the opponents. About UBI, rational discourse can be formed only when the parties realize and understand each other's reasons, and stop ignoring or underestimating the importance of these. Without these kinds of (exploratory) analyses, the debate about UBI can easily become irrational and fruitless, which is how the parties miss the point. We expect our philosophical guide to help the arguing parties to see through the dialect of the debate, and to articulate their standpoints better. We think that the philosophical debate about UBI is determined by five essential questions. (1) Do the interest of the private sphere or the interest of the political community have priority? (2) Is it the individual or the community who is primarily responsible for poverty? (3) In the case of welfare benefits, should the state follow the principle of need or the principle of universality? (4) During redistribution, should the state apply the principle of reciprocity or is the state not in the epistemic position to apply the principle justly? (5) Should the right social policy ensure the opportunity to participate in the labour market or ensure the opportunity to be left out of the labour market? In our paper, we will examine these questions one by one.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2009
The Monist, 2013
Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalis... more Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main sources of motivation. We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory.
My paper consists of five parts. In the first part I explain what I mean by the phenomenology of ... more My paper consists of five parts. In the first part I explain what I mean by the phenomenology of mind. In the second part I show that in contemporary analytic philosophy the prevailing metaphysical theories of the mind are typically not connected to the phenomenology of mind. Views on the nature of the mind are developed without considering the phenomenological facts. In the third part I outline a notion of metaphysics connected to the phenomenology of mind, then in the fourth and fifth parts I give some examples to illustrate how I envision the nature of this connection.
Hungarian Philosophical Review, 2012
the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the
salt shaker on y... more the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the
salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are
not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a
thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue
of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work
of art is?
In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are
like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the perceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of
art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is
extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there
allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from indiscernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every perceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument
from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) indiscernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is
not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like.
our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the
second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indiscernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we
hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter.
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics, 2016
The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any... more The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any kind of
physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo
the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and
physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same
kind of conscious experience in such a way that all the physical processes responsible for their experiences are
numerically the same. Based on the thought experiments and their interpretations we present our argument for
the inconsistency of the privacy of experience with physicalism in the third part of the paper. In the final part
we defend our argumentation against some objections.
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2009
According to the phenomenological argument
for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should
prefer th... more According to the phenomenological argument
for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should
prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is
that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the
most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions
about perception (what Michael Martin
calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit
ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms
the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual
experience of objects. In this paper I try to
explain why is the phenomenal argument exceptionally
strong argument for disjunctivism and
at the same time against sense-datum and intentional
theories. Furthermore I try to show that
the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination
(which is allegedly the weak point of the theory)
is as plausible as its rivals’.
Books by Tőzsér János
Philosophy begins and ends in disagreement. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable... more Philosophy begins and ends in disagreement. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable ways, and this pervasive and permanent dissent is a sign of their inability to solve philosophical problems and present well-established substantive truths.
This raises the question: “What should we do with our philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure?” In this open access book, János Tozsér analyzes the possible answers to this question, develops them into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions, and argues that we cannot commit ourselves to any of them in peace, with a clear intellectual conscience, and without self-deception.
Tozsér calls this disheartening insight “the experience of breakdown,” claiming that no matter how we struggle, we are unable to create substantive philosophical knowledge that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis of philosophical theories. He makes the case that, at the same time, we cannot suspend all of our beliefs about the most fundamental facts of our world once and for all, and so forever give up on seeking substantive philosophical truths.
Collections edited by Tőzsér János
Uploads
Papers by Tőzsér János
salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are
not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a
thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue
of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work
of art is?
In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are
like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the perceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of
art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is
extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there
allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from indiscernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every perceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument
from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) indiscernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is
not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like.
our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the
second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indiscernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we
hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter.
physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo
the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and
physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same
kind of conscious experience in such a way that all the physical processes responsible for their experiences are
numerically the same. Based on the thought experiments and their interpretations we present our argument for
the inconsistency of the privacy of experience with physicalism in the third part of the paper. In the final part
we defend our argumentation against some objections.
for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should
prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is
that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the
most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions
about perception (what Michael Martin
calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit
ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms
the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual
experience of objects. In this paper I try to
explain why is the phenomenal argument exceptionally
strong argument for disjunctivism and
at the same time against sense-datum and intentional
theories. Furthermore I try to show that
the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination
(which is allegedly the weak point of the theory)
is as plausible as its rivals’.
Books by Tőzsér János
This raises the question: “What should we do with our philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure?” In this open access book, János Tozsér analyzes the possible answers to this question, develops them into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions, and argues that we cannot commit ourselves to any of them in peace, with a clear intellectual conscience, and without self-deception.
Tozsér calls this disheartening insight “the experience of breakdown,” claiming that no matter how we struggle, we are unable to create substantive philosophical knowledge that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis of philosophical theories. He makes the case that, at the same time, we cannot suspend all of our beliefs about the most fundamental facts of our world once and for all, and so forever give up on seeking substantive philosophical truths.
Collections edited by Tőzsér János
salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are
not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a
thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue
of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work
of art is?
In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are
like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the perceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of
art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is
extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there
allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from indiscernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every perceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument
from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) indiscernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is
not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like.
our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the
second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indiscernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we
hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter.
physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo
the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and
physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same
kind of conscious experience in such a way that all the physical processes responsible for their experiences are
numerically the same. Based on the thought experiments and their interpretations we present our argument for
the inconsistency of the privacy of experience with physicalism in the third part of the paper. In the final part
we defend our argumentation against some objections.
for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should
prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is
that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the
most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions
about perception (what Michael Martin
calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit
ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms
the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual
experience of objects. In this paper I try to
explain why is the phenomenal argument exceptionally
strong argument for disjunctivism and
at the same time against sense-datum and intentional
theories. Furthermore I try to show that
the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination
(which is allegedly the weak point of the theory)
is as plausible as its rivals’.
This raises the question: “What should we do with our philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure?” In this open access book, János Tozsér analyzes the possible answers to this question, develops them into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions, and argues that we cannot commit ourselves to any of them in peace, with a clear intellectual conscience, and without self-deception.
Tozsér calls this disheartening insight “the experience of breakdown,” claiming that no matter how we struggle, we are unable to create substantive philosophical knowledge that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis of philosophical theories. He makes the case that, at the same time, we cannot suspend all of our beliefs about the most fundamental facts of our world once and for all, and so forever give up on seeking substantive philosophical truths.